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Abstract		The	general	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	further	undermine	the	convention	that	British	moral	philosophy	of	the	early	eighteenth	century	is	best	conceived	as	a	struggle	between	rationalist	and	sentimentalist	epistemologies.	I	argue	that	the	philosophers	considered	here	(Samuel	Clarke,	Francis	Hutcheson,	Gilbert	Burnet,	John	Balguy	and	John	Gay)	situated	their	moral	epistemologies	within	the	wider	framework	of	an	attempt	to	prove	the	‘reality’	of	virtue	in	terms	of	virtue	being	an	achievable,	practical	endeavour.	To	this	end,	they	were	as	much	concerned	with	the	attributes	that	motivated	or	caused	God	to	create	in	the	way	that	he	did	–	his	communicable	attributes	-	as	they	were	with	our	own	natural	moral	abilities.	I	maintain	that	this	concern	led	Clarke,	Burnet	and	Balguy	to	look	beyond	a	rationalist	epistemology	in	an	attempt	to	account	for	the	practical	possibility	of	moral	action.	I	claim	that	it	led	Hutcheson	to	develop	a	moral	theory	that	reflected	a	realist	theistic	metaphysics	that	went	some	way	beyond	an	appeal	to	providential	naturalism.	I	argue	that	it	led	Gay	to	try	to	synthesise	the	approaches	of	rival	moral	schemes	in	order	to	offer	a	unified	account	of	agency	and	obligation.	The	thesis	has	three	key	objectives:	1)	to	examine	the	relationship	of	rationalism	to	obligation	and	motivation	in	the	work	of	Clarke,	Burnet	and	Balguy,	and	2)	to	explore	the	relative	roles	of	sense	and	judgment	in	the	moral	epistemologies	of	Hutcheson,	Burnet,	Balguy	and	Gay	and	to	(re)	examine	the	nature	of	Hutcheson’s	moral	realism,	and	3)	to	investigate	the	theistic	metaphysical	claims	made	by	all	parties	with	respect	to	their	arguments	about	moral	realism.											
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Chapter	1		Introduction:		‘An	inquiry	into	the	understanding	pleasant	and	useful’.1		In	this	introductory	chapter	I	discuss	how	the	subject	matter	of	the	thesis	arose,	set	out	its	aims,	and	explain	how	the	fulfilment	of	those	aims	makes	a	contribution	to	scholarship.	I	will	then	provide	some	background	detail	of	the	approaches	to	epistemology	taken	by	seventeenth-century	thinkers,	whose	work	set	the	parameters	for	the	debate	that	followed	in	the	early	eighteenth	century.	I	will	close	with	a	brief	summary	of	the	content	of	each	chapter.			The	beginning	of	the	thesis		There	is	an	historiographical	method	that	champions	the	incongruous	fact	as	the	starting	point	for	historical	research.	Anomalous	details	are	prized	as	signs	of	deeper,	obscure	layers	of	cultural	meaning.	They	function	like	the	tips	of	hermeneutic	icebergs.	This	‘method	of	clues’	insists	that	a	certain	level	of	coherence	or	rationality	underwrites	human	behaviour.	The	disclosure	of	another,	less	visible	context,	is	required	in	order	to	resolve	apparently	irrational	or	counter-intuitive	thought	or	behaviour.	2		The	interpretation	of	historical	philosophical	texts	might,	I	suppose,	also	begin	by	investigating	the	apparently	anomalous	or	contradictory	parts.	Irrespective	of	any	ongoing	assessment	of	truth-value,	or	the	potential	of	certain	themes	to	contribute	to	current	preoccupations,	that	which	seems	to	be	discordant	can	prompt	the	re-framing	of	a	text.	This	involves	the	assumption	that	any	apparent	contradictions	should	be	viewed	as	having	been	non-apparent	to	the	author.	Not																																																									1	John	Locke,		“The	Contents,”	in	An	Essay	concerning	Human	Understanding	ed.	P.	H.	Nidditch	2	For	summaries	of	the	Italian	micro-historical	approach	see,	for	example,	Georg	G.	Iggers,	
Historiography	in	the	Twentieth	Century:	From	Scientific	Objectivity	to	the	Post	Modern	Challenge	(Middletown,	Wesleyan	University	Press,	1997).	Giovanni	Levi,	“On	Microhistory,”	in	New	
Perspectives	on	Historical	Writing,	ed.	Peter	Burke	(Cambridge,	Polity	Press,	2001).		They	borrow(ed)	heavily	from	Clifford	Geertz’s	cross-cultural	hermeneutics.	Clifford	Geertz,	The	
Interpretation	of	Culture:	Selected	Essays	(New	York:	Basic	Books,	1973).	
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because	the	author	was	unaware	of	any	defect	in	their	argument,	but	because,	at	the	time	of	writing,	the	charge	of	inconsistency	would	have	been	rejected	in	the	first	place.	Within	intellectual	history,	at	least	in	the	very	first	instance,	this	approach	puts	to	one	side	appeals	to	individual	or	group	psychology,	adopted	personas	or	political	performativity	as	explanatory	accounts	of	inconsistency.			I	offer	this	as	a	small	justification	for	the	fact	that	the	starting	points	for	this	research	were	a	couple	of	unrelated	features	of	the	argument	of	Samuel	Clarke,	and	the	debate	about	Francis	Hutcheson’s	moral	sense	theory	that	I	didn’t	understand.	First,	I	understood	Clarke	to	have	been	a	rationalist	and	a	leading	representative	of	Selby-Bigge’s	‘intellectual	school’.3	On	Clarke’s	account,	the	secondary	literature	said,	we	were	supposed	to	be	able	to	do	the	right	thing,	just	because	we	knew	it	was	the	right	thing	to	do	(without	referring	to	Scripture)	and	that,	therefore,	we	ought	really	to	do	it.	Why	then,	I	wondered,	in	the	second	of	his	Boyle	lectures,	did	Clarke	appear	to	be	quite	so	obsessed	with	the	need	for	us	to	understand	the	reality	of	the	rewards	and	punishments	that	awaited	us	in	the	afterlife?4	It	was	not	that	this	part	of	Clarke’s	work	had	gone	unnoticed.	Clarke’s	adverting	to	the	practical	force	of	a	belief	in	divine	justice	had	been	pointed	out	but	this	seemed	to	have	been	tidied	away	into	the	claim	that	it	was	simply	a	motivational	aid	for	the	degenerate,	or	the	cognitively	compromised.5	I	kept	returning	to	Clarke's	second	Boyle	lecture.	Clarke,	I	thought,	did	not	appear	to	have	suggested	that	a	belief	in	the	pains	and	pleasures	of	a	future	life	functioned	merely	as	a	support	for	those	of	us	who	were	especially	given	to	vice.	On	the	contrary,	it	seemed	to	me	as	if	Clarke	had	insisted	that	none	of	our	(post-lapsarian)	moral	lives	could	get	off	the	ground,	in	practical	terms,	without	our	holding	these	beliefs.	In	which	case,	Clarke’s	rationalism,	at	least	in	so	far	as	I	had	understood	it,	might	be	open	to	qualification.																																																										3	Lewis	A.	Selby-Bigge,	British	Moralists	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1897).		4	Samuel	Clarke,	A	Discourse	on	the	Unchangeable	Obligations	of	Natural	Religion,	and	the	Truth	
and	Certainty	of	the	Christian	Revelation,	8th	ed.	(London:	Knapton,	1732).	Henceforth	Natural	
Religion.	5	The	specifics	are	discussed	in	chapter	2,	but	I	refer	to	Jerome	B.	Schneewind,	The	Invention	of	
Autonomy	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1998),	310-327,	and	Terence	Irwin,	The	
Development	of	Ethics:	A	Historical	and	Critical	Study.	Volume	II:	From	Suarez	to	Rousseau	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2008),	372	-306.		See	D.O.	Thomas	“Reason	and	Revelation	in	Samuel	Clarke’s	epistemology	of	Morals,”	Enlightenment	and	Dissent	16	(1997):	114-135,	for	a	more	nuanced	discussion	of	this	aspect	of	Clarke’s	work.		
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	When	I	eventually	moved	on	to	Clarke’s	defenders,	Gilbert	Burnet	and	John	Balguy,	I	found	that	it	was	Burnet	who,	in	the	particular	context	of	an	exchange	of	letters	with	Hutcheson,	tried	to	explain	how	a	rational	appreciation	of	the	morality	of	an	action	ought	to	be	able	to	motivate	us	to	actually	perform	that	action	(although	he	also	allowed	that	plenty	of	other	natural	motivational	factors	most	often	did	move	us	to	virtue).6	Balguy,	on	the	other	hand,	appeared	to	be	even	closer	to	Clarke,	as	I	understood	him.	Balguy	had	insisted	that	we	were	under	two	sorts	of	obligation	–	one	moral	and	the	other	religious.	It	was	the	thought	of	our	religious	obligation	and	not	our	moral	obligation	alone,	Balguy	claimed,	that	actually	motivated	our	moral	behaviour.	For	Clarke	and	Balguy	then,	prudential	considerations	of	one	sort	or	another	appeared	to	be	key	to	explaining	the	actual	occurrence	of	moral	action.	To	be	sure,	they	argued	that	our	knowledge	of	what	was	virtuous	and	what	was	not,	ought	to	have	been	able	to	motivate	us.	Yet	Clarke	and	Balguy	seemed	to	me	to	have	claimed	that	in	practice,	at	least	as	things	had	stood	since	the	Fall,	this	knowledge	alone	was	insufficient.	At	the	very	least,	they	seemed	to	have	insisted	that	it	could	not	lead	us	to	the	sort	of	regular	virtue	that	would	be	acceptable	to	God.			My	other	niggling	query	concerned	the	apparent	proliferation	of	operational	definitions	of	a	moral	‘sense’	from	theorists	who	very	obviously	supported	rival	moral	schemes.	In	his	four	treatises,	Hutcheson	had	looked	to	our	experience	of	moral	thought	to	account	for	moral	epistemology.7	The	immediate,	affective,	involuntary	nature	of	our	moral	reactions	suggested	to	him	that	an	‘inward’	
																																																								6	I	have	used	the	Peach	edition	of	the	correspondence	between	Hutcheson	and	Burnet.	“The	Correspondence	between	Gilbert	Burnet	and	Francis	Hutcheson,”	in	Illustrations	on	the	Moral	
Sense,	ed.	Bernard	Peach	(Cambridge	Mass.:	The	Belknap	Press	of	Harvard	University	Press,	1971),	199-247.	Henceforth	Correspondence.	John	Balguy,	The	Second	Part	of	The	Foundation	of	
Moral	Goodness;	Illustrating	and	Enforcing	the	Principles	and	Reasonings	Contained	in	the	Former.	
Being	an	Answer	to	Certain	Remarks	Communicated	by	a	Gentleman	to	the	Author,	(1729),	14-15.	Henceforth	Second	Part.	7	These	four	treatises	were	his	first	two	inquiries	into	beauty	and	virtue,	first	published	together	in	1725,	and	revised	in	1726,	1729	and	1738,	as	An	Inquiry	into	the	Original	of	Our	Ideas	of	Beauty	
and	Virtue,	ed.	Wolfgang	Leidhold	(Indianapolis:	Liberty	Fund,	2004),	and	his	later	two	texts,	first	published	together	in	1728,	and	revised	in	1730,	and	1742,	as	An	Essay	on	the	Nature	and	
Conduct	of	the	Passions	and	Affections,	with	Illustrations	on	the	Moral	Sense,	ed.	Aaron	Garrett	(Indianapolis:	Liberty	Fund,	2002).	Henceforth,	variously,	four	treatises,	Inquiries,	Inquiry,	
Essay/Illustrations	or	Essay	and	Illustrations.		
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sense,	rather	than	reason,	supplies	our	original	ideas	of	virtue.	This	moral	sense	responds	selectively	to	the	appearance	of	benevolent	intention.	It	appeared	that	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	Hutcheson’s	early	publications	there	had	been	something	of	a	rush	to	admit	the	existence	of	this	moral	sense	and	to	explain	its	operation.	What	was	surprising	(to	me	at	least)	was	that	Clarke’s	defenders,	Gilbert	Burnet	and	Balguy,	had	agreed	that	we	have	a	moral	sense,	but	that	they	thought	that	this	moral	and	‘internal’	sense	was	reason	itself.	The	theological	utilitarian	John	Gay	argued	(again,	against	Hutcheson)	that	our	proper	motive	for	benevolence	was	the	thought	of	the	consequence	of	that	action	to	our	self.8	Yet	Gay	had	also	agreed	that	we	had	a	moral	sense	of	the	right	and	wrong	in	actions.	Its	operation,	Gay	claimed,	was	not	explained	by	a	special	sense,	or	by	reason,	but	by	the	association	of	ideas.	Not	only	had	Hutcheson	warned	his	readers	about	the	pernicious	effects	of	the	process	of	association	upon	moral	thought,	but	Locke,	who	Gay	took	himself	to	be	following,	had	stated	this	criticism	first	and	in	even	stronger	terms.	Locke’s	criticism	surrounded	the	tendency	of	ideas,	which	had	an	inherent	connectivity,	to	become	habitually	linked	or	associated	with	one	another,	to	form	judgment-like	entities	without	the	proper	supervision	of	reason.9	The	moral	sense	then,	could	refer	either	to	a	distinctive	internal	sense	on	the	model	of	our	external	senses,	or	to	reason,	or	to	the	unsupervised	formation	of	connections	or	associations	between	ideas.			Hutcheson’s	own	account	of	moral	sense,	moreover,	on	show	in	his	text	on	metaphysics	(initially	composed	at	the	same	time	as	his	four	treatises,	but	not	published	until	later),	claimed	that	the	moral	sense,	or	sense	of	‘the	fitting	and	the	good’	played	a	judicial	role.	He	claimed	that	it	passes	judgment	as	from	the	bench	on	all	the	things	men	do,	on	all	our	pleasures	of	body	or	mind,	on	our	opinions,	sentiments,	actions,	prayers,	intentions,	and	feelings,	determining	in	each	case	what	is	fine,	fitting	and	good,	and	what	is	the	measure	in	each.10																																																										8	John	Gay,	“Preliminary	Dissertation	Concerning	the	Fundamental	Principles	of	Virtue	or	Morality,”	in	William	King,	An	Essay	on	the	Origins	of	Evil,	trans.	Edmund	Law	(London:	Thurlbourn,	1731).	Henceforth	Dissertation.		9	Locke,	ECHU,	2:33:5,	395.	10	Francis	Hutcheson,	Logic,	Metaphysics,	and	the	Natural	Sociability	of	Mankind,	ed.	James	Moore	and	Michael	Silverthorne	(Indianapolis:	Liberty	Fund	press,	2006),	119.	Henceforth	Logic,	
Metaphysics,	and	the	inaugural	lecture	as	individual	texts,	and	LMNSM	for	the	publication.	
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Hutcheson	seemed	to	suggest	that	our	ideas	from	moral	sense	were	not	just	inherently	evaluative	because	of	their	affective	quality	(i.e.	that	we	somehow	‘liked’	benevolence),	although	this	claim	was	controversial	enough.	Hutcheson	claimed	here	that	the	moral	sense	issued	a	judgment	(‘as	from	the	bench’)	upon	the	moral	value	of	an	action,	and	upon	how	good	it	was	(‘the	measure	in	each’).				All	of	the	authors	discussed	here	were	signed	up	to	the	post-Lockean	agreement	as	to	the	illegitimacy	of	an	appeal	to	innate	guidance	in	moral	thought.	It	appeared	then,	that	in	the	earlier	part	of	the	eighteenth	century,	an	idea	from	sense	could	be	inherently	evaluative	and	pass	judgment	in	a	verdicative	way.	Reason	could	be	described	as	an	‘internal’	moral	sense,	and	ideas	could	be	associated	with	one	another	(without	the	inferential	oversight	of	judgment)	and,	potentially,	provide	us	with	an	accurate	view	of	the	moral	value	of	an	action.	During	this	attempt	to	account	for	the	experience	of	moral	thought,	the	terms	‘sense’,		‘judgment’	and	‘reason’	appeared	to	have	slipped	their	referential	moorings	in	moral	epistemology	(at	least	in	so	far	as	I	had	understood	those	terms	to	have	been	used	in	the	late	seventeenth	century	and	early	eighteenth	century).	What	is	more,	their	explanations	of	the	operation	of	this	sense	all	appealed	to	Locke	in	one	way	or	another.			At	this	point	I	had	two	questions	in	mind	–	first,	how	had	Clarke,	Burnet	and	Balguy	accounted	for	moral	motivation,	and	second,	how	could	a	sense	operate	like	a	sense	yet	be	a	judgment,	or	reason	be	a	sense,	or	a	sense	be	an	associative	process	which	delivered	information,	at	least	of	potential	value,	in	moral	thought?	The	introspective	method	that	theories	of	mind	such	as	Locke’s	were	built	upon	provided	a	connection	between	the	two.			The	foundation	of	Locke’s	way	of	ideas	was	the	premise	that	introspection	could	deliver	truth	about	the	operation	of	mind	(if	not	about	its	substance).	This	was	the	essence	of	his	‘historical,	plain	method’.11	Introspection	was	used	by	Hutcheson,	Burnet	and	Balguy,	and	to	a	certain	extent	Gay,	in	order	to	account	for	the	immediate,	intuitive,	affective	experience	of	our	moral	evaluations	and	to																																																									11	See	Locke	ECHU,	1:1:2,	44.	
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proffer	candidate	mental	processes.	This	approach	reflected	the	psychological	or	epistemological	approach	that	logics	of	ideas,	such	as	Locke’s,	brought	to	bear	upon	accounts	of	knowledge	acquisition.12	Within	epistemological	logics,	method	demanded	that	we	introspect	and	observe	the	experience	of	thought	(the	flow	of	ideas	through	the	mind	and	the	operations	that	we	performed	upon	them)	in	order	to	explain	how	we	arrived	at	truth	(or	probable	belief).			The	theistic	metaphysics	that	Clarke,	Burnet	and	Balguy	and	Hutcheson	offered	as	guarantee	for	their	moral	philosophies	also	relied,	to	some	extent,	upon	our	introspective	experience	into	our	moral	attributes.		They,	and	Gay,	all	took	the	latitudinarian	position	(against	orthodox	Calvinism)	that	those	remnants	of	our	moral	and	intellectual	abilities	that	had	survived	the	Fall	were	sufficient	for	us	to	lead	lives	that	were	acceptable	to	God.	They	all	assumed	that	God	had	made	virtue	possible	for	us	without	a	personal,	supernatural	infusion	of	grace.	For	Clarke,	Burnet,	Balguy,	and	Hutcheson	and	Gay	the	reality	of	virtue	was	secured	by	an	appeal	to	God’s	moral	attributes.	All	accepted	that	God	had	created	the	world	as	he	did	as	a	result	of	his	moral	perfection,	or	his	goodness.	Furthermore,	they	were	in	agreement	that	the	only	way	for	us,	eventually,	to	be	truly	happy	was	to	at	least	aim	for	virtue.	In	addition,	for	Clarke	and	his	defenders	and	Hutcheson,	despite	the	unbridgeable	gap	between	God’s	moral	perfection	and	our	own	state,	the	true	foundation	of	morality	was	to	be	found	in	that	faint	echo	within	each	of	us	of	whatever	it	was	that	was	morally	perfect	in	God.	We	needed	to	look	at	our	own	capacities	and	decide	which	of	them	resembled,	in	however	meagre	a	way,	the	attributes	of	God,	and	which	were	the	parts	of	our	nature	that	ought	to	be	governed	by	those	attributes.	These	attributes	were	God’s	communicable	virtues.	God’s	communicable	attributes	were	those	attributes	of	God	that	we	were	capable	of	understanding	because	we	had	been	created	with	an	analogous	form	of	them.	13			
																																																								12	For	the	identification	of	cognitive	psychology	with	descriptive	epistemology,	see	Alvin	I.	Goldman,	“The	Relation	between	Epistemology	and	Psychology,”	Synthese	64,	no.1	(1985):	29-68.		13	These	are	contrasted	with	God’s	incommunicable	attributes.	The	distinction	is	discussed	further	in	Chapter	3.		
 13 
Beyond	this	they	offered	quite	different	accounts	of	the	principles	behind	God’s	creative	activity.	Clarke,	Burnet	and	Balguy	maintained	that	God’s	moral	perfection	lay	in	the	‘rectitude’	of	his	will.	This	meant	that	God	always	acted	in	the	way	that	his	reason	dictated.	Furthermore,	God	could	not	alter	what	was	good	and	what	was	evil	in	the	act	of	creation.		As	Balguy	put	it,	God			was	under	a	necessity	of	suiting	it	[the	creation]	to	his	own	perfect	ideas	and	the	exact	model	of	his	own	mind.14			Hutcheson	maintained	that	God’s	benevolent	nature	was	his	moral	perfection	and	that,	as	such,	God’s	actions	derived	from	the	necessity	of	his	own	nature	(which	was	no	abridgment	of	his	freedom).15	Hutcheson	and	Clarke	also	agreed	that	God,	being	perfectly	happy	in	his	own	moral	perfection,	wanted	to	communicate	the	nature	of	this	moral	perfection	to	us,	in	order	to	make	us	happy.	This	act	of	communication	also	made	God	happy.	Yet	this	desire	for	happiness,	for	Clarke	and	Hutcheson,	was	not,	in	itself,	God’s	moral	motivation.			Gay,	I	will	suggest,	did	not	make	use	of	the	notion	that	God’s	moral	perfection	is	replicated	in	an	analogous	form	in	our	own	nature.		Gay	claimed	that	it	was	‘evident	from	the	nature	of	God’	that	God	was	infinitely	happy	and	furthermore	it	was	evident	(from	his	goodness	in	creating	the	world)	that	his	aim	was	to	make	everyone	else	happy.	We	ought	to	aim	at	the	happiness	of	all,	Gay	argued,	because	it	was	clearly	God’s	will	that	all	should	be	happy.	It	was	God’s	command	that	had	been	communicated	to	us	here,	and	not	an	analogous	form	of	his	nature	per	se.16			The	point	here,	for	the	moment,	was	that	Clarke,	Burnet,	Balguy	and	Hutcheson,	all	assumed	that	we	could	discover	the	nature	of	moral	goodness,	partly	through	introspection,	because	God’s	perfections	were	realised,	or	realisable,	in	some	small	imperfect	way	in	our	own	nature.17	To	be	clear,	none	of	these	authors																																																									14	John	Balguy,	Divine	Rectitude:	or,	a	Brief	Inquiry	Concerning	the	Moral	Perfections	of	the	Deity,	
Particularly	in	Respect	of	Creation	and	Providence,	(1733),	5.	Henceforth	Divine	Rectitude.		15		Hutcheson,	Metaphysics,	173	-174.		16	Gay,	Dissertation,	xix.		17	Balguy	objected	to	the	argument	from	analogy	with	our	own	nature	to	that	of	God	only	where	it	led	us	to	develop	the	wrong	ideas	of	God’s	virtue	from	our	own	imperfect	nature.	Divine	
Rectitude,	5.			
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argued	that	we	could	discover	all	moral	knowledge	by	introspection	alone	–	observation	of	the	world	around	us,	and/or	reflection	upon	the	causes	of	the	existence	and	nature	of	that	world	were	also	important.	They	suggested	that	we	ought	to	use	introspection	into	the	ways	in	which	we	think	about	morality	with	respect	to	our	own	nature	in	order	that	we	discover,	to	the	extent	that	we	are	able	to	discover	such	things,	what	exactly	it	is	that	God	thinks	constitutes	moral	goodness,	and	then	govern	our	behaviour	accordingly.			So,	for	example,	Hutcheson’s	great	suggestion	was	that,	in	the	first	instance,	rather	than	spend	our	time	attempting	to	deduce	the	laws	of	nature	we	should	pay	attention	to	our	experience	of	our	more	immediate	moral	reactions	and	to	what	we	instinctively	approve	in	our	motivational	impulses.	In	reply,	Burnet	and	Balguy	appealed	to	introspection	to	claim	that	it	was	our	experience	of	self-evident	thought	and	reasoned	demonstration	that	led	us	to	understand	that	our	conduct	ought	to	conform	to	the	deliverances	of	reason.	Gay	too	encouraged	reflection	upon	what	we	deemed	virtuous.	It	was	Gay,	however,	who	argued	that	there	were	limits	to	what	we	could	discover	about	the	fundamental	principles	behind	our	moral	thought	and	behaviour	by	appealing	to	our	conscious	awareness	of	our	own	motives	and	moral	responses.	Gay	suggested	that	we	needed	to	go	beyond	this	in	order	to	uncover	the	fundamental	principles	of	virtue,	or	morality.			In	the	next	section	I	will	argue	that	the	search	for	an	answer	to	both	of	my	initial	questions	conforms	to	the	aims	of	a	broader	movement	in	the	secondary	literature.	This	movement	insists	that	the	division	of	the	philosophy	of	the	early	modern	period	into	that	of	continental	rationalists	and	British	empiricists,	or	within	the	British	sphere	into	intellectualist	or	sentimental	moralists,	is	in	need	of	qualification.	I	will	provide	a	more	formal	introduction	to	the	themes	discussed	here,	state	the	aims	of	the	thesis,	and	explain	the	contribution	that	I	think	the	thesis	makes	to	scholarship.						
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	The	thesis	and	its	aims		Critiques	of	the	argument	that	there	were	‘fundamental	differences	of	method	and	purpose’	between	the	continental	rationalists	(usually	meaning	Descartes,	Spinoza,	Leibniz,	Arnauld	and	Malebranche)	and	British	empiricists	(traditionally	Locke,	Berkeley	and	Hume)	have	long	been	a	feature	of	the	secondary	literature.18	The	tension	between	rationalist	and	empiricist	elements	in	Locke’s	approach	(the	nature	of	his	ideas	of	reflection,	the	claims	about	the	demonstrability	of	moral	knowledge	and	his	account	of	the	foundation	of	morality)	has	been	a	recognised	feature	of	his	work	since	the	publication	of	the	
ECHU.19			Amendments	to	the	reading	of	later	seventeenth	and	eighteenth-century	British	moral	philosophy	as	the	binary	opposition	of	intellectualist	to	sentimentalist	epistemologies,	as	presented	by	Selby-Bigge,	have	been	also	gathering	pace.20		The	role	of	reason	in	Shaftesbury’s	approach	has	been	well	attended	to	by	Grean,	Gill,	and	Darwall.21	Gill,	Hutton	and	Darwall	have	all	emphasised	the	significance	of	the	role	that	sensory	elements	played	in	Cudworth’s	epistemology.	22	Yet	the	opposition	to	a	rationalist/empiricist	division	and	Selby-Bigge’s	binary	classification	has	taken	another	form.	This	is	to	downplay	the	significance	of																																																									18	John	Cottingham,	The	Rationalists	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1988),	2.	See	also	Louis	E.	Loeb,	From	Descartes	to	Hume:	Continental	Metaphysics	and	the	Development	of	Modern	
Philosophy	(New	York:	Cornell	University	Press,	1981),	25-35.		19	The	literature	is	vast	clearly,	but	for	example	see	David	Hartley,	Observations	on	Man	(Bath	and	London:	Samuel	Richardson,	1749)	on	Locke’s	ideas	of	reflection	as	compromising	his	empiricism.	See	John	Coleman,	John	Locke’s	Moral	Philosophy	(Edinburgh:	Edinburgh	University	Press,	1983),	on	the	coherence	of	Locke’s	moral	thought.	See	Francis	Oakley,	“Locke,	Natural	Law	and	God	–	Again,”	History	of	Political	Thought	18,	no.	4	(1997):	624-651,	on	the	tension	in	Locke’s	account	of	natural	law.	For	one	recent	intellectualist	interpretation	see	Andrew	Israelson,	“God,	Mixed	Modes	and	Natural	Law:	An	Intellectualist	Interpretation	of	God’s	Moral	Philosophy,”	
British	Journal	for	the	History	of	Philosophy	21,	no.	6	(2013):	1111-1132.	20	Cuneo	also	objects	to	the	rationalist/sentimentalist	division	in	the	work	of	MacIntyre	and	Rawls.	Terence	Cuneo,	“Reason	and	the	Passions,”	in	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	British	Philosophy	in	
the	Eighteenth	Century,	ed.	James	A.	Harris,	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013),	226.		21	Stanley	Grean,	Shaftesbury’s	Philosophy	of	Religion	and	Ethics:	A	Study	in	Enthusiasm	(Ohio;	Ohio	University	Press,	1967).		Michael	B.	Gill,	The	British	Moralists	on	Human	Nature	and	the	
Birth	of	Secular	Ethics	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006),	77-132.	Stephen	Darwall,	
The	British	Moralists	and	the	Internal	‘Ought’,	1640-1740,	Cambridge:		Cambridge	University	Press	(1995),	176-206.	22	Michael	B.	Gill,	“From	Cambridge	Platonism	to	Scottish	Sentimentalism,	”Journal	of	Scottish	
Philosophy	8	(2010):	13-31.	Darwall,	Internal	Ought,	109-148.	Sarah	Hutton,	“From	Cudworth	to	Hume:	Cambridge	Platonism	and	the	Scottish	Enlightenment,”	Canadian	Journal	of	Philosophy	21,	no.	6	(2012):	8-26.		
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epistemology	as	the	leading	principle	by	which	philosophies	might	be	classified.23		Knud	Haakonssen	has	offered	a	sustained	and	programmatic	critique	of	the	emphasis	placed	on	epistemology,	or	epistemology	narrowly	conceived,	in	histories	of	philosophies	of	the	early	modern	period.	Haakonssen	objects	to	the	Kantian/Reidian	vision	of	post-Cartesian	epistemology	as	paradigmatically	concerned	with	knowledge,	where	knowledge	is	stripped	back	to	its	propositional	character	and	regarded	solely	for	its	truth-value.24	Haakonssen	claims	that	this	misrepresents	the	wider	philosophical	concerns	of	a	number	of	late	seventeenth	and	eighteenth-century	theorists.	25	According	to	Haakonssen	the	main	effect	of	the	Lockean	ground	clearance	project	was	to	reveal	an	impressionable	subject,	together	with	its	various	environmental	conditioning	factors,	as	the	primary	object	of	philosophical	enquiry:26		The	central	part	of	the	Lockean	revolution	was	to	ask	“What	does	knowledge	do	to	the	knower?”	or	“What	are	the	conditions	under	which	a	knowing	subject	holds	knowledge?”	That	is	to	say,	the	primary	object	of	
attention	was	the	subject	as	such,	and	knowledge	was	only	one	of	the	
conditioning	factors	of	the	subject.27	[My	emphasis.]			One	corollary	of	Haakonssen’s	position	is	that	the	aims	of	the	philosophers	under	discussion	may	be	misunderstood	if	it	is	assumed	that	they	were	solely	concerned	to	provide	their	readership	with	compelling	reasons	to	always	be	virtuous.	Rather,	it	is	argued	that	the	relationship	between	thought	and	action	in	the	moral	sphere	was	considered	to	be	a	multi-factorial	affair.	Moral	theorists																																																									23	I	am	going	to	discuss	recent	approaches,	but	of	course	Whewell	offered	a	different	classification	to	Selby-Bigge.	William	Whewell,	Lectures	on	the	History	of	Moral	Philosophy	in	
England	(London:	Parker,	1852).		24	Knud	Haakonssen,	“Protestant	Natural	Law	Theory:	A	General	Interpretation,”	in	New	Essays	
on	the	History	of	Autonomy:	A	Collection	Honoring	J.	B.	Schneewind,	ed.,	Natalie	Brender,	and	Larry	Krasnoff,	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2004):	97.	25	See	Knud	Haakonssen,	ed.,	The	Cambridge	History	of	Eighteenth-Century	Philosophy	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006),	3-25.	For	commentators	who	share	Haakonssen’s	concerns	see,	for	example,	Timothy	J.	Hochstrasser,	Natural	Law	Theories	in	the	
Early	Enlightenment	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2000),	Aaron	Garrett,	“Seventeenth	Century	Moral	Philosophy:	Self-Help,	Self-Knowledge,	and	the	Devil’s	Mountain,”	in	
The	Oxford	Handbook	of	the	History	of	Ethics	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013),	229-279	and	James	A.	Harris,		“Religion	in	Hutcheson’s	Moral	Philosophy,”	Journal	of	the	History	of	
Philosophy	46,	no.	2	(2008):	205-222.					26	Haakonssen,	“Protestant	Natural	Law	Theory,”	97.		27	Ibid.,	97.	
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were	concerned	to	do	more	that	provide	an	account	of	the	actions	that	were	required	of	us,	and	an	explanation	of	why	we	ought	to	fulfil	those	requirements.	They	aimed,	more	broadly,	to	explain	how	we	could	achieve	virtue.	The	following	passages	from	Bacon,	More	and	Locke	provide	an	indication	of	this:		The	main	and	primitive	division	of	moral	knowledge	seemeth	to	be	into	the	Exemplar	or	Platform	of	Good,	and	the	Regimen	of	Culture	of	the	Mind;	the	one	describing	the	nature	of	good,	the	other	prescribing	rules	how	to	subdue,	apply,	and	accommodate	the	will	of	man	thereunto.	(Francis	Bacon).28		Ethics	are	divided	into	two	parts,	the	knowledge	of	happiness,	and	the	acquisition	of	it.	(Henry	More.)	29			There	be	two	parts	of	ethics,	the	one	is	the	rule	which	men	are	generally	in	the	right	in,	though	perhaps	they	have	not	deduced	them	as	they	should	from	their	true	principles.	The	other	is	the	true	motives	to	practice	them	and	the	ways	to	bring	men	to	observe	them,	and	these	are	generally	either	not	well	known	or	not	rightly	applied.	(John	Locke.)30 	Clarke,	Burnet	and	Balguy	were	left	out	of	Darwall’s	British	history	of	the	‘internal	ought’.	Darwall	relegated	them	to	the	sideline	on	the	grounds	that	their	position	was	a	reiteration	of	a	Platonic	position,	and,	as	such,	was	not	the	sort	of	internalism	that	he	[Darwall]	was	interested	in.	This	position	held	that	the	motivation	for	virtue	followed	as	a	‘necessary	consequence’	of	a	knowing	encounter	with	the	good,	but	was	not	part	of	that	knowing	encounter.31	Hutcheson	was	also	put	to	one	side,	in	a	sense,	in	Darwall’s	overall	scheme	(although	he	presents	a	very	detailed,	careful	and	revealing	account	of	Hutcheson’s	position	on	obligation).	This	was	because	Hutcheson,	like	Clarke	and	his	defenders,	did	not	find	moral	obligation	to	consist	in	a	rational	motive	to	act.	For	Clarke,	I	argue,	motivation	was	indeed	independent	of	obligation,	but	not	perhaps	in	the	way	in	which	Darwall	understands	it	to	have	been.	Clarke	here,	I	believe,	may	be	seen	to	have	taken	Locke’s	view	of	the	‘two	parts	of	ethics’.	For	Clarke,	the	‘true	motives’	to	act	according	to	one’s	moral	obligation,	did	not	arise																																																									28	Francis	Bacon,	The	Works	of	Francis	Bacon,	14	vols,	ed.	James	Spedding,	Robert	L.	Ellis	and	Douglas	D.	Heath	(London:	Longman	and	Co.,	1857-74),	iii,	419.		29	Henry	Moore,	Enchiridion	Ethicum,	The	English	Translation	of	1690,	trans.	Edward	Southwell	(New	York:	The	Facsimile	Text	Society,	1930),	3.	30	John	Locke,	“Ethica	B,”	in	Locke:	Political	Essays,	ed.	Mark	Goldie	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press),	319.		31	Darwall,	Internal	Ought,	10.		
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as	a	‘necessary	consequence’	of	the	recognition	of	an	obligation	(or	at	least	they	had	not	done	so	since	the	Fall).	Darwall	is	correct	in	seeing	that	Clarke,	Balguy	and	Hutcheson	(at	times)	did	not	privilege	the	sort	of	normativity	that	makes	motive	and	moral	obligation	coincide.	For	Darwall	this	makes	them	anomalous.		Darwall	did	not	consider	John	Gay	in	his	history.	Gay’s	particular	version	of	voluntarism	did	have	motivation	contained	within	obligation	(although	its	ultimate	source	is	clearly	extrinsic).	For	Gay,	obligation	is	a	state	in	which	the	obliged	person	finds	herself	when	she	finds	an	action	to	be	necessary	to	her	own	happiness,	so	that	it	is	not	directly	a	matter	of	command,	or	self-command	(but	is	ultimately	a	matter	of	divine	command).32	This	thesis	finishes	with	Gay	for	a	number	of	reasons,	but	as	Garrett	has	recently	pointed	out,	Gay	viewed	the	separation	of	moral	knowledge,	obligation	and	motivation	as	problematic,	and	his	aim	was	to	address	this.33		The	relation	of	judgment,	motivation,	obligation	and	action	in	the	work	of	all	the	philosophers	under	consideration	here	was	fundamentally	secured	by	providence	and	a	theistic	metaphysics.	The	guiding	concern	of	all	the	philosophers	considered	here	was,	I	suggest,	as	follows:	they	sought	to	explain	the	ways	in	which	God	had	created	us	so	as	to	allow	for	the	possibility	of	our	being	good.	Clarke,	Hutcheson,	Gilbert	Burnet,	John	Balguy	and	John	Gay	all	asked	how	was	it	possible	for	us	to	be	virtuous?	They	aimed,	to	this	end,	to	show	how	the	natural	principles	supplied	by	providence	operated	to	produce	our	moral	experience,	and	to	show	how	an	understanding	of	those	principles	might	be	used	to	best	practical	effect.	As	I	said,	they	shared	the	assumption	that	our	natural	condition	is	not	one	of	Calvinist	post-lapsarian	degeneracy.		Nevertheless,	they	all	understood	that	our	moral	vulnerabilities,	both	cognitive	and	motivational,	needed	to	be	addressed	within	a	moral	scheme.	In	addition,	they	all,	bar	Gay,	pointed	to	an	understanding	of	revealed	religion	as	a	resource																																																									32	Irwin,	Development,	Vol.	II,	826.	Irwin	mentions	Gay	very	infrequently,	but	he	does	draw	succinct	attention	to	the	difference	between	Gay’s	voluntarism	and	the	voluntarism	of	those	who	made	the	immediate	perception	of	an	obligation	a	matter	of	the	perception	of	the	need	to	fulfill	the	command	from	an	authority.				33	Aaron	Garrett,	“A	Lockean	Revolution	in	Morals,”	paper	presented	to	the	John	Locke	Conference,	Department	of	Philosophy,	University	of	Pittsburgh,	April	11th	2015.		
 19 
that	was	intended	to	help	supply	this	want	of	natural	moral	ability.34	To	be	sure,	the	question	of	what	constitutes	our	moral	obligation	was	one	that	they	all	addressed,	but	this	was	done	in	the	service	of	a	wider	explanation	of	how	virtue	is	made	possible	for	us.				There	are	then	three	lines	of	enquiry	taken	up	by	this	thesis.	They	are	broadly	governed	by	the	concern	to	further	undermine	the	convention	that	British	moral	philosophy	of	this	period	is	best	conceived	as	a	struggle	between	rationalist	and	sentimentalist	epistemologies.		I	do	not	deny	that	there	were	differences	between	the	epistemologies	proposed	by	Hutcheson,	Burnet	and	Balguy	and	Gay,	and	I	spend	time	looking	at	those	differences.	However,	I	suggest	that	each	of	the	philosophers	considered	here	situated	their	epistemology	within	a	wider	concern	to	account	for	the	possibility	of	virtue	being	a	real	practical	endeavour,	the	reality	of	which	was	secured	by	an	appeal	to	theistic	metaphysics.	This	concern	led	Clarke,	Burnet	and	Balguy	to	look	beyond	a	rationalist	epistemology	in	an	attempt	to	account	for	the	practical	possibility	of	virtue.	I	suggest	that	it	led	Hutcheson	to	develop	a	moral	epistemology	that	reflected	a	realist	theistic	metaphysics,	or	at	least	one	that	went	some	way	beyond	an	appeal	to	providentially	implanted	moral	abilities.	It	led	Burnet	and	Balguy	to	consider	the	experiential	qualities	of	reason,	and	to	appeal	to	the	sensory	and	affective	elements	of	reason	itself.	It	led	Gay	to	attempt	to	synthesise	the	approaches	of	Clarke	and	Hutcheson,	with	his	own	voluntarist	position.	Gay’s	scheme	relied	upon	their	agreement	that	God	aimed	at	the	happiness	of	all,	and	that	this	ought	to	be	our	aim	too.		His	multifactorial	model	of	moral	thought	and	action	used	elements	of	Clarke	and	Hutcheson’s	epistemology	to	explain	different	aspects	of	our	introspectively	available	moral	experience.		Gay’s	aim,	however,	was	to	demonstrate	that	the	various	features	of	our	moral	experience	were	all	best	accounted	for	by	a	more	fundamental,	explanatory	principle.	This	was	‘reason	pointing	out	private	happiness’.35			
																																																								34	Although	the	will	of	God	is	the	ultimate	source	of	our	obligation	and	motivation	for	action,	Gay	does	not	refer	directly	to	Scripture	in	his	short	Dissertation.		35	Gay,	Dissertation,	xiv.	
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The	thesis	is	narrowly	focused	on	a	debate	about	the	original,	foundational	and	fundamental	principles	of	virtue	that	occurred	between	1725	(the	publication	date	of	Hutcheson’s	Inquiries)	and	1732	(the	publication	of	Gay’s	Dissertation).	The	focus	is	justified,	I	believe,	because	a	closer	reading	of	this	small	exchange	of	views	brings	to	light	the	ways	in	which	the	various	protagonists	sought	to	account	for	the	experience	of	moral	thought.		The	truth-aptness	of	any	moral	judgments,	or	evaluations,	was	assumed	by	all	to	be	underwritten	by	divine	guarantee.	The	disagreements	were	about	the	internal	mechanics	of	facultative	logic,	which	put	to	one	side	considerations	about	the	proper	form	of	inferential	relations	in	favour	of	an	explanation	of	the	ways	in	which	our	moral	thought	and	behaviour	reflected	the	impoverished,	but	analogous,	operation	of	the	divine	‘virtues	concerned	with	the	understanding’.36	In	addition,	I	argue	that	the	governance	of	those	principles	or	attributes	of	human	nature	which	were	not	found	in	the	divine	case,	were	of	equal	importance	in	the	accounts	of	the	ways	in	which	God	had	made	it	possible	for	us	to	be	virtuous.	These	arguments	need	to	be	given	equal	weight	in	interpretations	of	the	work	of	Clarke	and	his	followers.	Both	these	aspects	of	the	debate	are	neglected	in	current	accounts	of	the	moral	philosophy	of	the	period.			The	thesis	therefore	aims	to	(1)	examine	the	relationship	of	rationalism	to	obligation	and	motivation	in	the	work	of	Clarke,	Burnet	and	Balguy,	and	(2)	to	explore	the	relative	roles	of	sense	and	judgment	in	Hutcheson,	Burnet,	Balguy	and	Gay.	My	secondary	aim	(2b)	is	to	examine	the	somewhat	vexed	question	of	Hutcheson’s	realism.	I	take	this	matter	up	because	I	believe	that	by	looking	carefully	at	the	relative	place	of	sense	and	judgment	in	Hutcheson,	something	new	might	be	offered	to	the	debate.		To	this	end,	I	also	trace	the	influence	of	Locke’s	logic	of	ideas	upon	the	accounts	of	moral	cognition	offered	by	Hutcheson,	Burnet,	Balguy	and	Gay.	I	will	also	(3)	investigate	the	theistic	metaphysical	claims	made	by	all	parties	with	respect	to	the	arguments	about	moral	realism,	and	Hutcheson’s	realism	in	particular.					
																																																								36	Hutcheson,	Metaphysics,	168.		
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These	three	themes	are	covered	to	a	greater	or	lesser	degree	in	each	of	the	chapters.	The	first	chapter	on	Clarke	(Chapter	2)	speaks	largely	to	the	first	aim	(Clarke’s	thoughts	on	theistic	metaphysics	are	covered	in	chapter	3).	The	two	chapters	on	Hutcheson	(Chapters	3	and	4)	speak	to	the	second	and	third	aims.	The	chapters	on	Burnet	and	Balguy	(Chapter	5)	and	Gay	(Chapter	6)	encompass	all	three.			
The	first	aim		As	to	the	first	of	line	of	enquiry,	Michael	Gill	has	argued	that	rationalism	or,	‘the	claim	that	morality	originates	in	reason	alone’,	actually	contains	three	separate	claims.	These	are:	the	metaphysical	claim	that	morality	consists	in	reason	(the	values	present	in	the	universe),	the	epistemological	claim	that	moral	knowledge	is	acquired	solely	through	reason,	and	the	practical	claim	that	reason	alone	can	move	us	to	moral	action.	Gill	believes	that	Clarke	and	Balguy	(along	with	Cudworth)	made	all	three	claims	and	rarely	distinguished	between	them.37	I	believe,	however,	that	if	the	practical	claim	is	to	be	attributed	to	Clarke	and	Balguy	then	this	claim	ought	to	be	unpacked	a	little	further.			I	will	argue	that	Clarke	and	Balguy	very	deliberately	did	not	make	the	claim	that	the	rational	perception	of	the	fitness	of	an	action	alone	is	sufficient	to	move	us	to	moral	action,	although	they	did	make	the	claim	that	it	ought	to	be.	(Clarke’s	views	on	the	motivational	impotence	of	all	perceptions	and	the	immediate	natural	causes	of	all	actions	are	not	the	main	focus	of	the	argument	here.)	I	argue	that	for	Clarke	and	Balguy,	rectitude	of	will	is	God’s	moral	perfection	alone	-	divine	goodness	leads	God	to	always	conform	all	of	his	actions	to	the	knowledge	of	what	is	right,	or	fit.		God	however,	created	us	rational	and	sensible,	and,	at	least	since	the	Fall,	we	have	been	required	to	discover	(or	to	be	taught)	other	motivating	truths	that	appeal	to	the	sensible	parts	of	our	nature,	in	order	to	perform	moral	actions.	These	are	truths	about	the	certainty	of	our	continued																																																									37	Michael	B.	Gill,	British	Moralists,	273.		See	also	Michael	Gill,	“Moral	Rationalism	vs.	Moral	Sentimentalism:	Is	Morality	More	Like	Math	or	Beauty?”	Philosophy	Compass	2/1	(2007):	26.	See	also	Frederick	C.	Beiser,	The	Sovereignty	of	Reason:	The	Defense	of	Rationality	in	the	Early	English	
Enlightenment	(New	Jersey:	Princeton	University	Press,	1996),	267,	who	outlines	similar	tripartite	ambitions.		
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existence	in	a	future	state,	where,	as	recipients	of	divine	justice,	we	can	expect	reward	or	punishment.			This	argument	offers	a	partial	corrective	to	certain	views	of	the	relationship	between	rationalism	and	motivation	in	Clarke	that	are	currently	on	offer	in	the	secondary	literature,	which	appear	to	deny	or	to	downplay	the	role	of	reward	and	punishment	in	moral	motivation.	In	addition,	there	has	been	very	little	discussion	of	Balguy	in	the	secondary	literature,	especially	with	respect	to	this	issue.			
The	second	aim	As	to	the	second	aim,	I	will	argue	that	there	is	a	shared	reliance,	in	all	authors,	on	the	scaffold	of	Locke’s	approach	to	theory	of	mind.	I	will	argue	that	the	psychologism	inimical	to	logics	of	ideas	such	as	Locke’s,	and	a	focus	on	the	introspected	experience	of	moral	evaluation,	entailed	that	the	nature	of	the	separation	between	sense	and	judgment	in	the	descriptive	moral	epistemologies	of	rationalism	and	sentimentalism	was	complex	and	is	worthy	of	further	exploration.	The	various	accounts	of	sense,	judgment	and	reason	across	the	work	of	the	authors	considered	here	is	examined	in	the	context	of	epistemological	logics.	This	issue	has	not	been	fully	discussed	in	the	secondary	literature.38			At	this	stage	it	is	appropriate	to	ask	why	the	focus	here	is	on	Locke,	and	to	this	end	I	offer	the	following	rationale.	Samuel	Clarke’s	appeal	to	the	self-evident	intuition	of	the	moral	value	of	actions	did	not	sit	within	an	explicitly	Lockean	theory	of	mind.	The	work	of	the	rest	of	the	philosophers	selected	here	all	took	inspiration	from	Locke’s	general	descriptive	account	of	cognition.	Each	of	them	took	something	from	him	directly	in	the	detail	of	their	accounts	of	the	cognitive	aspects	of	moral	thought.	That	is,	they	borrowed	small	parts	of	the	mental	machinery	by	which	Locke’s	general	account	of	human	understanding	proceeded.	These	were:	ideas	of	internal	sense	(Hutcheson),	the	perceptual	
																																																								38	Gill,	in	“Math	or	Beauty?”	discusses	the	phenomenology	of	sentimentalism	and	rationalism,	but	not	in	relation	to	the	logic	of	ideas.		
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nature	of	reason	and	internal	sense	(Gilbert	Burnet	and	Balguy),	and	associationism	and	the	idea	of	mixed	modes	or	compound	ideas	(Gay).			Nevertheless,	as	Norton	and	Moore	have	been	at	pains	to	point	out	(with	respect	to	Hutcheson),	there	were	several	other	‘ways	of	ideas’	than	Locke’s	way.39	Malebranche	and	the	Port-Royal	logicians	in	particular,	were	influential	in	terms	of	theory	of	mind	in	the	early	eighteenth	century	in	Britain	(not	speak	of	influential	earlier	non-ideaists).	Each	of	the	figures	considered	here	was	influenced	by	a	wide	variety	of	thinkers,	both	ancient	and	modern,	in	any	number	of	ways.	Indeed,	Locke	may	have	been	a	figure	that	they	disagreed	with	fundamentally	in	many	respects.	There	were	certainly	other,	more	direct	influences,	upon	particular	aspects	of	the	theory	of	mind	that	Hutcheson	used.	Nonetheless,	Locke’s	descriptive	account	of	mind	provided	the	general	framework	to	which	Hutcheson	and	the	other	groups	referred.	They	borrowed	terminology,	adapted	concepts,	argued	over,	agreed	and	disagreed	with	many	aspects	of	Locke’s	approach,	which	of	course	itself	reflected	a	multiplicity	of	influences.	Locke’s	way	of	ideas,	his	general	account	of	the	operation	of	our	minds,	was	the	paradigm	in	which	they	worked	-	but	this	did	not	entail	that	Locke’s	moral	philosophy,	his	metaphysics,	or	indeed	any	other	aspect	of	his	approach	were	taken	up.	As	such	Hutcheson,	Burnet,	Balguy,	Law	and	Gay	can	be	seen	very	frequently,	to	borrow	a	phrase	from	Stephen	Buckle,	to	have	used	‘Lockean	concepts	to	serve	quite	un-Lockean	ends’.	40			I	also	argue	that,	in	particular,	problems	in	Locke’s	terminology	and	the	treatment	of	his	‘ideas	of	reflection’,	or	internal	sense,	allowed	for	the	production	of	the	conflicting	accounts	of	the	existence	and	operation	of	a	moral	sense,	with	which	this	thesis	is	concerned.	Locke’s	ideas	of	reflection	were	termed	ideas	from	an	internal	sense.41	Locke	did	not	clearly	distinguish	these	ideas	from	consciousness,	or,	our	awareness	of	the	content	of	our	minds.	Neither	did	he																																																									39	David	Fate	Norton,	“Hutcheson’s	Moral	Realism,”	Journal	of	the	History	of	Philosophy	23	(1985):	397-418.	Moore,	Introduction,	LMNSM,	xi-xii.	40	Stephen	Buckle,	Natural	Law	and	the	Theory	of	Property:	Grotius	to	Hume	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2002),	96.	41	Locke,	ECHU,	2:1:4,105.		
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distinguish	between	our	intuitive	knowledge	(our	awareness)	of	the	existence	and	content	of	our	own	ideas,	and	the	perception	of	the	certain	agreement	or	disagreement	of	ideas	(also	intuitive	knowledge),	or	our	intuitive	insight	into	(speculative)	self-evident	principles.	Moreover	sometimes,	the	having	of	ideas	of	reflection	(i.e.	ideas	of	our	mental	operations)	was	confused	by	some	of	his	readers	with	our	power	of	reflection	(or	reason).42		I	will	argue	that	this	confusion	caused	some	of	the	apparently	bewildering	use	of	terminology	to	account	for	the	nature	and	operation	of	a	moral	sense.	I	am	not	concerned	here	with	whether	or	not	Locke’s	theory	was	coherent	or	confused.	I	just	aim	to	show	that	the	reading	of	it	allowed	for	a	range	of	understandings	as	to	the	nature	of	an	‘internal	sense’	in	the	early	eighteenth	century.	There	has	not	been	a	detailed	discussion	of	Locke’s	influence	in	this	respect	across	the	work	of	the	range	of	authors	discussed	here.			I	will	also	offer	a	fairly	substantial	treatment	of	Hutcheson’s	claim	that	his	moral	sense	does	not	operate	by	means	of	native	ideas	or	propositions.	This	discussion	will	centre	around	Locke's	(and	Hutcheson’s)	commitment	to	what	has	been	termed	the	‘awareness	principle’,	and	Locke’s	discussion	in	the	ECHU	of	implicit	and	explicit,	or	declarative	principles.43	There	has	been	no	discussion	in	the	secondary	literature	of	the	way	in	which	Hutcheson	may	or	may	not	have	controverted	this	principle.44			Examination	of	the	impact	of	Locke	on	Hutcheson	is	not	unprecedented,	of	course.	The	dispute	between	Norton	and	Winkler	is	perhaps	the	most	well	
																																																								42	Udo	Thiel,	“Hume’s	Notions	of	Consciousness	and	Reflection	in	Context,”	British	Journal	for	the	
History	of	Philosophy	2	(1994):	75-115,	and	The	Early	Modern	Subject:	Self-Consciousness	and	
Personal	Identity	from	Descartes	to	Hume	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011),	118-119.	43	De	Rosa	names	this	aspect	of	Locke’s	approach	the	‘awareness	principle’	and	offers	a	revealing	discussion	of	its	role	Locke’s	rejection	of	nativism.	Rafaella	De	Rosa,	“Locke's	Essay,	Book	I:	the	Question-Begging	Status	of	the	Anti-Nativist	Arguments,”	in	John	Locke:	Critical	Assessments	of	
Leading	Philosophers,	Series	II.	Volume	II,	Knowledge:	Its	Nature	and	Origins,	ed.	Peter	Anstey	(London:	Routledge,	2006),	82-110.	44	Daniel	Carey	provides	a	good	account	of	Hutcheson’s	approach	to	nativism	and	the	issue	of	diversity	in	Daniel	Carey,	Locke,	Shaftesbury	and	Hutcheson:	Contesting	Diversity	in	the	
Enlightenment	and	Beyond	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006),	150-119.	He	touches	on	the	relevance	of	principles	in	relation	to	Locke	and	Thomas	Burnet	and	Hutcheson,	167,	and	he	also	discusses	the	relationship	of	sense	and	judgment	in	Hutcheson,	165-166.	These	issues	are	discussed	at	some	length	in	Chapter	4.			
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known.	But	this	debate	was	focused	very	tightly	on	the	comparison	of	Hutcheson’s	ideas	of	moral	sense	in	relation	to	Locke’s	ideas	of	primary	and	secondary	qualities.45	I	believe	that	the	analysis	I	provide	of	Hutcheson’s	treatment	of	his	moral	sense,	using	features	of	epistemological	logics	of	ideas	in	general,	together	with	other	aspects	of	Locke’s	approach,	delivers	some	fresh	insight	into	an	old	debate	about	the	nature	of	Hutcheson’s	realism.	In	addition	I	discuss	the	ontology	of	Hutcheson’s	ideas	from	moral	sense,	as	they	are	discussed	in	his	texts	on	Metaphysics	and	Logic.	I	believe	that	the	nature	of	Hutcheson’s	realism	is	far	better	understood	once	his	texts	on	Metaphysics	and	
Logic	are	read	alongside	his	other	works	composed	in	Dublin	in	the	1720s.	As	far	as	I	am	aware	there	has	been	no	substantial	treatment	of	the	arguments	presented	in	both	these	texts	in	relation	to	this	issue,	although	reference	has	been	made	to	them.			
The	third	aim	Lastly,	I	suggest	that	the	theistic	metaphysics	that	secured	virtue	for	Hutcheson	and	his	rationalist	interlocutors	may	not	have	been	as	different	from	each	other,	as	Hutcheson’s	contemporaries	or	later	commentators	have	assumed.	I	will	examine	Hutcheson’s	appeal	to	the	communicability	of	God’s	attributes	and	the	substance	of	Hutcheson’s	response	to	Clarke	on	this	issue,	and	the	response	of	Burnet,	Balguy	and	Gay	to	Hutcheson	here.	Again,	I	do	not	believe	this	part	of	Hutcheson’s	moral	theory,	or	the	responses	to	it	have	been	considered	in	sufficient	detail.			I	make	no	apology,	if	anyone	expects	it,	for	the	absence	of	a	discussion	about	Hume	in	this	thesis.	The	choice	to	focus	on	Hutcheson’s	work	of	the	1720s,	and	the	earlier	response	to	it,	was	made	in	order	that	I	might	avoid	any	overlap	with	Hume’s	entrance	into	the	debate.		I	wanted	to	investigate	the	ways	in	which	the	paradigm	that	had	been	set	by	earlier	approaches	to	the	philosophy	of	mind	influenced	the	debate	between	the	philosopher’s	selected.	The	degree	to	which																																																									45	David	Fate	Norton,	“Hutcheson’s	Moral	Realism,”	Journal	of	the	History	of	Philosophy	23	(1985):	397-418.	Kenneth	P.	Winkler,	“Hutcheson’s	Alleged	Moral	Realism,”	Journal	of	the	History	of	
Philosophy,	23	(1985):	179-94	and	“Hutcheson	and	Hume	on	the	Color	of	Virtue,”	Hume	Studies	1	(1996):	3-22.	
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Hume	subsequently	did,	or	did	not,	occasion	a	paradigm	shift	is	not	my	concern	here.	I	should,	however,	offer	an	apology	for	leaving	out	Shaftesbury,	who	was	very	obviously	a	figure	of	interest	and/or	influence	to	the	authors	considered	here.	Shaftesbury	is	one	of	the	deists	who	were	the	target	of	Clarke	and	Balguy’s	attack	upon	the	ability	of	natural	reason	to	deliver	sufficient	moral	knowledge.	His	influence	on	Hutcheson’s	method	and	theory	remains	a	topic	of	great	interest.	My	only	justifications	are	first,	insufficient	space,	and	second,	that	Shaftesbury’s	primary	concern	was	not	to	embed	his	moral	theory	in	an	especially	detailed	theory	of	mind,	and	it	was	the	detail	of	moral	judgment	that	I	wanted	to	examine	here,	across	the	work	of	all	the	selected	authors.				In	the	next	section	some	of	the	relevant	background	material	on	the	seventeenth	century	is	provided.	I	will	look	first	at	the	reasons	for	the	focus	upon	moral	experience	at	the	beginning	of	the	eighteenth	century.	I	will	then	provide	a	reasonably	detailed	account	of	Locke’s	general	theory	of	mind	and	its	relation	to	other	logics	of	ideas.			Background	material		Early	in	the	eighteenth	century,	the	Dutch	physician	Bernard	Mandeville	vivified	a	denial	of	the	reality	of	virtue	in	his	Grumbling	Hive,	later	Fable	of	the	Bees.	Mandeville’s	disquieting	promotion	of	both	psychological	and	ethical	egoism	was	intended	as	a	particular	provocation	to	supporters	of	Shaftesbury’s	view	of	universal	benevolence	as	a	constitutive	force	in	both	divine	and	human	nature.	46	One	of	the	problems	for	those	early	eighteenth-century	moralists	who	wished	to	defend	the	reality	of	virtue	against	the	conventionalism	of	Mandeville	or	indeed	Hobbes,	or	Locke	and	Pufendorf,	was	the	depleted	store	of	explanatory	resources	with	which	to	meet	a	sceptical	challenge.			In	Britain,	this	scarcity	of	conceptual	assets	was	a	distinctly	post-Lockean	phenomenon.	It	was	brought	about	by	a	shaken	confidence	in	the	ability	of	our	reasoning	abilities	to	demonstrate,	or	even	follow	a	demonstration,	of	the																																																									46	See	John	Colman,		“Bernard	Mandeville	and	the	Reality	of	Virtue,”	Philosophy	47	(1972):	125-139.				
 27 
content	of	divine	legislation	or	eternal	conceptions	of	the	good.	Locke	had	not	only	failed	to	make	good	on	the	promise	of	the	ECHU	of	a	rational	deduction	of	moral	law,		he	had	also	voiced	the	firm	opinion	in	the	Reasonableness	of	
Christianity	that	the	inadequacy	of	our	unassisted	reason	entailed	the	necessity	of	Revelation,	and	the	regular	teaching	and	reading	of	Scripture.	The	text	was	published	anonymously	in	1695,	but	if	there	was	doubt	as	to	authorship	this	was	clarified	in	a	codicil	to	Locke’s	will.47		Moreover,	the	difficulty	with	following	long	and	difficult	deductions	of	our	moral	duties	that	Locke	had	pointed	to	was	of	critical	importance.	This	was	because	of	the	non-negotiable	requirement,	for	Anglican	and	dissenting	moralists	alike,	that	belief	or	knowledge	arise	out	of	one's	own	reasoning	process.	It	would	not	suffice,	for	a	Protestant	God,	that	we	simply	adopt	principles	rather	than	taking	active	responsibility	for	supplying	the	contents	of	individual	conscience.	Everybody	had	a	moral	duty	to	understand	his	or	her	moral	duties.	48		Furthermore,	the	argument	of	book	three	of	the	ECHU	had	suggested	that	natural	language	ought	to	be	viewed	with	some	apprehension.	Words	were	seen	as	a	source	of	unavoidable	error	in	the	social	arena	because	the	terms	that	represented	complex	ideas	were	thought	to	be	characterised	by	an	inherent	semantic	instability.	The	rules	for	the	formal	manipulation	of	terms	laid	down	by	logicians	were	at	least	commonly	understood,	if	not	always	agreed	upon,	within	the	community	of	those	educated	into	its	principles.	There	was	no	such	guarantee	offered	by	Locke,	who	understood	our	use	of	terms,	which	were	supposed	to	signify	our	complex	moral	ideas,	to	have	been	occasioned	by	a	voluntary,	arguably	arbitrary,	blend	of	our	own	ideas.	This	threatened	successful	communication	between	speaker	and	listener	and	writer	and	reader.		So	for	example,	the	successful	translation	of	moral	terms	across	languages	looked	doubtful.	Indeed	Locke’s	concern,	and	he	was	far	from	alone	in	this,	was	that	any																																																									47	John	Locke,	The	Reasonableness	of	Christianity,	as	Delivered	in	the	Scriptures,	in	John	Locke	
Writings	on	Religion,	ed.	Victor	Nuovo	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2002),	85-211.	Henceforth	Reasonableness.		48	For	example,	see	Brian	Young,	Religion	and	Enlightenment	in	Eighteenth-Century	England:	
Theological	Debate	from	Locke	to	Burke	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1998),	25,	on	Locke	and	the	need	for	‘an	inward	persuasion	of	the	mind’	to	save	in	matters	of	religion.		
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form	of	public	discourse	about	moral,	theological	or	political	matters	could	serve	only	to	create	mutual	misunderstanding	and	might	even	foster	civil	unrest,	unless	it	could	be	stringently	managed	via	the	establishment	of	an	agreed	understanding	of	the	relevant	mix	of	ideas	behind	the	words	in	use.49				Perhaps	more	significantly,	throughout	the	seventeenth	century	universally	available	‘certitude	of	mind’	had	been	supplied	either	by	innate	ideas,	or	by	self-evident	logical	truths,	or	by	common	notions	(those	ideas	that	received	universal	assent).50	In	the	immediate	post-Lockean	period,	a	‘naive’	appeal	to	implanted	ideas	and	principles	of	both	speculative	and	practical	kinds	was	also	ruled	out.	Locke	had,	with	some	success,	also	deemed	the	‘dispositional’	approach	to	nativism	argumentatively	vacuous.	Here	he	had	pointed	to	the	absence	of	any	meaningful	delineation	between	the	power,	or	ability	of	reason	to	grasp	an	externally	held	moral	truth,	and	the	divine	implantation	of	that	truth	in	an	implicit	form,	which	then	required	the	very	same	cognitive	power	to	realise	it.51	Locke	had	also	insisted	that	there	were	no	self-evident	moral	principles.	We	might	always,	and	reasonably,	ask	why	any	candidate	moral	rule	should	be	accepted	as	a	rule.52			In	the	early	part	of	the	eighteenth	century,	doubts	about	the	sufficiency	and	universality	of	our	powers	of	rational	deduction,	in	the	context	of	a	widespread	adoption	of	Locke’s	basic	complaints	about	innatism,	drove	some	early	eighteenth-century	moral	philosophers	in	England	and	Scotland	to	examine	our	experience	of	moral	judgment.	After	Locke,	the	discussion	of	what	might	legitimately	be	considered	innate	to	us	required	careful	management,	but	the	
																																																								49	On	this	aspect	of	Locke	and	language	see	Hannah	Dawson,	Locke,	Language	and	Early-Modern	
Philosophy	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2007),	129-154	and	John	Marshall,	John	
Locke:	Resistance,	Religion	and	Responsibility,	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1994),	353-355.	50	Peter	Harrison,	‘Religion’	and	the	Religions	in	the	English	Enlightenment	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1990),	29.		51	John	W.	Yolton,	Locke	and	the	Way	of	Ideas	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1968).	52	Locke,	ECHU	1:3:1	and	4,	66	and	68.		
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discussion	about	our	natural	resources	was	very	much	subject	to	reformulation,	rather	than	having	been	brought	to	a	close.53			It	was	Shaftesbury	who	turned	from	language	to	appeal	to	our	moral	experience,	in	terms	of	the	reality	of	the	pleasures	it	afforded	us,	in	an	effort	to	defeat	scepticism.	All	the	authors	considered	in	the	following	chapters	agreed	that	our	
experience	of	moral	evaluation	was	universal,	however	misguided	these	evaluations	may	have	been.	Whatever	the	original	source,	or	sources	of	the	term,	all	agreed,	however	grudgingly,	that	the	experience	of	moral	judgment	was	loosely	(if	not	properly)	described	by	the	term	‘moral	sense’	–	in	terms	of	non-voluntariness,	immediacy,	certainty	and	an	affective	quality	that	feels	like	approbation	or	condemnation.	Whatever	faculty	of	mind	actually	supplied	this	experience,	it	was	agreed	that	basic	moral	judgment	does	not	require	the	ability	to	undertake	or	follow	complex	deductions	from	the	nature	of	man,	or	the	extensive	analysis	of	moral	terms.	The	argument	between	Hutcheson,	Burnet	and	Balguy	and	Gay	was	one	about	what	lay	beneath	our	experience	of	an	often	immediate	and	non-voluntary	moral	judgment.	What	were	the	natural	principles,	that	produced	our	experience	of	this	response?				The	argument	of	the	following	chapters	is	based	upon	an	understanding	of	Locke’s	way	of	ideas,	and	similar	logics	of	ideas,	such	as	that	of	the	Port	Royal	theorists,	Arnuald	and	Nicole.	In	order	to	support	this	argument,	I	will	briefly	discuss	features	of	such	logics	and	then	outline	Locke’s	own	theory.	The	point	of	this	section	is	to	provide	an	account	of	how	the	focus	on	the	first	act	of	perception	or	reception	of	simple	ideas	became	the	focus	of	attention	within	logics	of	ideas	and	how	the	boundary	between	this	and	the	second	act	of	judgment	was	not	fixed.	This	is	supposed	to	go	some	way	in	providing	the	context	for	the	various	explanations	of	a	moral	sense	of	concern	in	this	thesis.																																																											53	See	James	A.	Harris,	“Innateness	in	British	Philosophy	(c.	1750-1820),”	Eighteenth	Century	
Thought	4	(2008):	203–227,	on	speculative	principles.	See	also	George	Watson,	introduction	to	
Remarks	on	John	Locke	by	Thomas	Burnet	with	Locke’s	Replies,	ed.	G.	Watson	(Doncaster:	Brynmill	Press,	1989),	18.	See	Hans	Aarsleff,	Locke	to	Saussure:	Essays	on	the	Study	of	Language	and	
Intellectual	History	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	1982),	159,	on	the	assumption	of	uniformity	of	natural	and	‘original’	principles.			
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The	study	of	logic,	from	the	twelfth	century	up	until	the	latter	half	of	the	seventeenth	century,	was	conceived	of	as	a	science	of	language.54	The	concern	of	the	medieval	logician	was	to	identify	rules	of	inference	that	could	legitimise,	or	discredit,	a	proposition	or	a	series	of	propositions,	expressed	either	in	a	natural	language,	or	as	Ockham	had	proposed,	in	a	mental	proposition.	Later,	humanist	complainants	vilified	formal	logic	for	(among	other	things)	being	alien	to	natural	thought	processes,	structurally	incompatible	with	natural	grammatical	expression	and	incapable	of	delivering	novel	information.	Despite	a	rejection	of	the	formal,	inferential	nature	of	the	medieval	approach,	humanist	logicians	retained	the	linguistic	conception	of	logic.	Humanist	logic	was	the	art	of	argument,	rather	than	the	scholastic	science	of	dispute,	but	it	was	still	very	much	a	language	game.55			The	method	of	Descartes	and	Locke,	Hobbes,	Gassendi	and,	to	some	extent,	the	Port–Royal	team	of	Arnauld	and	Nicole	departed	from	both	medieval	and	humanist	approaches.56	Descartes	and	Locke	moved	away	from	the	formal	(rule-governed)	manipulation	of	terms	that	both	legitimised	and	constrained	medieval	formalism.	In	their	place,	and	in	stark	contrast	to	humanist	approaches,	they	introduced	naturalised	accounts	of	cognition	where	psychology,	theories	of	mental	faculties	and	epistemology	were	called	upon	to	explain	and	to	justify	where	and	how	we	might	find	truth.		Logic	became	focused	on	the	legitimacy	of																																																									54	I	am	indebted	to	the	following	for	the	content	of	this	part	of	introduction.	Gabriel	Nuchelmans,	“Logic	in	the	Seventeenth	Century:	Preliminary	Remarks	and	the	Constituents	of	the	Proposition,”	in	The	Cambridge	History	of	Seventeenth	Century	Philosophy,	ed.	Daniel	Garber	and	Michael	Ayers	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1998),	103-117,	and		“Proposition	and	Judgment,”	ibid.,	118-131.	Gabriel	Nuchelmans,	Judgment	and	Proposition:	from	Descartes	to	Kant	(Amsterdam:	North	Holland,	1983).	Claude	Panaccio,	“Ockham	and	Locke	on	Mental	Language,”	in	The	Medieval	Heritage	in	Metaphysics	and	Modal	Theory	1400-1700,	ed.	R.	Freidman	and	L.	O	Neilson	(Netherlands:	Klewer,	2003):	37-52.		James	G.	Buickerood,	“The	Natural	History	of	the	Understanding:	Locke	and	the	Rise	of	Facultative	Logic	in	the	Eighteenth	Century,”	in	The	
Philosophy	of	Locke:	New	Perspectives,	ed.	Peter	Anstey	(London:	Routledge,	2003),	229-268.	Paul	Schuurman,	Ideas,	Mental	Faculties	and	Method:	The	Logic	of	Ideas	of	Descartes	and	Locke	and	Its	
Reception	in	the	Dutch	Republic,	1630-1750	(Netherlands,	Brill,	2004).	55	Frederick	S.	Michael,	“Why	Logic	Became	Epistemology:	Gassendi,	Port	Royal	and	the	Reformation	in	Logic,”	in	Logic	and	the	Workings	of	the	Mind:	The	Logic	of	Ideas	and	Faculty	
Psychology	in	Early	Modern	Philosophy,	ed.	Patricia	A.	Easton	(Atascadero,	CA:	Ridgeview	Publishing,	1997),	3.		56	Nuchelmans,	Logic,	seems	not	to	view	Locke’s	work	as	logic,	‘Others,	like	Descartes	and	Locke,	left	it	to	their	followers	to	apply	the	new	insights	to	the	field	of	logic’,	105.	But	see	the	convincing	argument	of	Buickerood	Facultative	Logic,	and	Schuurman,	Logic	of	Ideas,	that	Locke’s	ECHU	and	
The	Conduct	of	the	Understanding	(planned	as	a	chapter	of	the	ECHU)	were	viewed	and	taught	as	‘logics’	well	into	the	eighteenth	century.	
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our	ideas,	rather	than	on	the	legitimate	use	of	terms.	There	was,	moreover,	a	manifestly	remedial	or	therapeutic	air	about	many	of	these	new	logics	of	ideas,	as	they	sought	to	dictate	the	proper	conduct	of	our	understanding	and	to	proffer	advice	upon	the	improvement	of	our	mental	faculties.57	It	was	to	our	management	of	the	flow	of	information	through	our	understanding	that	Descartes	and	Locke	turned.58		Despite	widespread	disparagement	of	the	Aristotelian	logical	tradition,	these	seventeenth-century	schemes	frequently	kept	to	its	organisational	conventions.	Knowledge	was	held	to	share	a	structure	with	language,	so	that	at	each	level	a	linguistic	entity	(a	word,	a	sentence,	or	a	piece	of	discourse)	was	paired	with	a	psychological	event	or	the	exercise	of	a	specific	mental	operation	(perception	or	conception,	judgment	and	discourse).59	The	presentation	of	subject	matter	typically	blended	traditional	formal	structure	with	the	sort	of	psychologism	that	was,	and	still	is,	held	to	have	subverted	the	practice	of	logical	enquiry	for	much	of	the	early	modern	period.60	In	fact,	logics	structured	with	reference	to	mental	acts	were	found	frequently	in	humanist	logics.61		It	is	the	case,	however,	that	there	were	no	accompanying	theories	of	concept	formation	within	any	humanist	logic.62	It	was	the	theorised	progression	of	the	‘concrete’	perception	through	a	hierarchy	of	mental	acts	or	operations	to	its	termination	in	a	meaningful	utterance	that	characterised	‘logics	of	ideas’.	The	emphasis	had	shifted	from	a	primary	concern	with	the	linguistic	entity	within	the	pair,	to	focus	attention	on	
																																																								57	Gary	Hatfield,	“The	Workings	of	the	Intellect:	Mind	and	Psychology,”	in	Logic	and	the	Workings	
of	the	Mind:	The	Logic	of	Ideas	and	Faculty	Psychology	in	Early	Modern	Philosophy,	ed.	Patricia	A.	Easton	(Atascadero,	CA:	Ridgeview	Publishing,	1997),	30		58	Hatfield,	ibid.,	30.	Descartes	and	Locke	in	particular,	had	much	to	say	about	the	duty	and	practice	of	the	‘cognitive	virtues’	within	the	conduct	of	the	understanding.	59	Jaap	Maat,		“Language	and	Semiotics,”	in	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Philosophy	in	Early	Modern	
Europe’,	ed.	Desmond	Clark	and	Catharine	Wilson	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011),	272-294.	60	To	take	just	one	example,	for	Bochenski	(quoted	in	Michael,	“Why	Logic,”	2)	logic	from	the	mid	1500’s	to	the	mid	1900’s	is	‘poor	in	content,	devoid	of	all	deep	problems,	permeated	with	a	whole	lot	of	non-logical	philosophical	ideas,	psychologist	in	the	worst	sense.’		61		Michael,	“Why	Logic,”	9.		62	Ibid,.		
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its	purely	psychological	counterpart	-	the	cognitive	operations	of	perception,	judgment	and	reason.	63		The	application	of	the	new	philosophy	to	logical	theory	was	presented	in	several	widely	used	textbooks	and	manuals.	Arguably	the	most	successful	and	durable	pedagogic	tool	of	this	kind	was	‘Logic	or	the	Art	of	Thinking’.	Published	anonymously	in	1662,	its	title	proved	controversial.64	Logic,	critics	claimed,	was	conventionally	and	properly	the	art	of	reasoning	well	and	did	not	reflect	the	brute	act	of	thinking	per	se.	All	subsequent	editions	carried	a	reply	to	that	objection	(the	‘second	discourse’)	in	which	its	authors	Arnauld	and	Nicole	insisted	that			the	purpose	of	logic	is	to	give	rules	for	all	the	actions	of	the	mind,	and	for	simple	ideas	as	well	as	for	judgments	and	inferences	there	is	practically	no	other	word	which	covers	all	these	different	acts.	Certainly	“thinking”	includes	all	of	them,	for	simple	ideas	are	thoughts,	judgments	are	thoughts,	and	inferences	are	thoughts.65			The	scope	of	concern	of	logic	had	been	broadened	to	include	the	simple	apprehension,	or	perception	of	ideas.	The	focus	upon	the	analysis	of	the	origin	and	perception	of	our	first	ideas	was	fundamental	to	the	philosophy	of	the	Port-	Royal	theorists’	predecessor,	Descartes,	and	also	to	Locke.			Both	Descartes	and	Locke,	however,	went	much	further	than	Arnauld	and	Nicole,	and	eschewed	reliance	upon	the	publicly	available	deductive	proof	delivered	by	the	syllogism.	Truth	was	to	be	accessed	via	the	proper	governance	of	our	mental	faculties	as	they	manipulated	foundational	‘simple’	ideas.	Proof,	moreover,	for	Descartes	and	Locke	was	ascertained	by	means	of	an	inward	‘feeling’	of	certainty	that	arose	within	an	individual	whenever	she	introspected	and	examined	the	content	of	her	own	ideas	(or	the	perceived	connexions	between	them.)	For	both																																																									63	See	also,	Jill	Vance	Buroker,	'The	Priority	of	Thought	to	Language	in	Cartesian	Philosophy,”	in	
Logic	and	the	Workings	of	the	Mind:	The	Logic	of	Ideas	and	Faculty	Psychology	in	Early	Modern	
Philosophy	ed.	Patricia	A.	Easton	(Atascadero,	CA:	Ridgeview	Publishing,	1996),	99-102.	64	The	editor	of	the	1996	English	edition	claims	it	as	‘The	most	influential	logic	from	Aristotle	until	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century’,	see	Jill	Vance	Buroker,	introduction	to	Logic	or	the	Art	of	
Thinking	by	Antoine	Arnauld	and	Pierre	Nicole,	trans.	and	ed.	Jill	Vance	Buroker	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1996),	xxiii.		65	Antoine	Arnauld	and	Pierre	Nicole,	Logic	or	the	Art	of	Thinking,	trans.	and	ed.	Jill	Vance	Buroker	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1996),	14.			
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Descartes	and	Locke,	certainty	about	the	truth	of	one’s	own	thoughts	was	available	on	a	purely	intrapersonal	basis.			Self-evident	knowledge,	and	the	experience	of	certainty	with	which	it	coexists,	was	said	to	be	a	matter	of	either	the	intuition	of	a	proposition,	or	the	perception	of	the	natural	connection,	or	disconnection	between	ideas,	which	is	a	proposition.	For	Descartes,	the	process	of	acquiring	knowledge	began	with	an	episode	of	rational	insight.	Clear	and	distinct	perceptions	were	made	'manifest	by	the	natural	light'.66	For	Locke,	knowledge	resulted	from	the	certain	perception	of	agreement	or	disagreement	between	just	two	ideas	(intuitive	knowledge),	or	between	pairs	of	ideas	that	were	linked,	chain	like,	by	successive	intuitive	episodes	(demonstrative	knowledge).	Locke	also	insisted	on	sensitive	knowledge	(of	the	'existence	of	anything	without	us').			The	operation	of	logic	under	the	reign	of	ideas	then,	became	a	descriptive,	naturalised	account	of	the	workings	of	the	mind,	where	truth	(where	it	could	be	found)	was	a	matter	of	successful	cognition.	In	the	late	nineteenth	and	twentieth	centuries	critics	protested	that	this	logic	of	ideas	was	predicated	upon	a	naturalistic	fallacy.		Their	complaint	was	that	a	naturalistic	description	of	the	workings	of	the	mind	did	not,	and	could	not,	guarantee	the	validity	of	the	truths	produced	by	such	a	mind.	Our	cognitive	faculties	in	the	early	modern	period	though,	were	God	given	and,	as	such,	they	were	underwritten	by	divine	guarantee	as	being	capable,	correctly	used,	of	discovering	truth.	An	individual’s	moments	of	intuitive	certainty	gave	her	potential	access	to	that	part	of	external	reality	that	God	wishes	us	to	comprehend.	However,	although	certainty	was	a	matter	of	individual	phenomenological	experience,	we	could	be	mistaken	and	correct	ourselves	by	reasoning	further.67				So,	the	focus	on	the	origin	and	perception	of	simple	ideas	was	fundamental	to	the	way	of	ideas.	Just	as	fundamental	was	the	insistence	upon	our	awareness	of	the	progression	of	these	‘concrete’	perceptions,	through	a	hierarchy	of	mental	acts	to																																																									66		Rene	Descartes,	Meditations	on	First	Philosophy:	With	Selections	from	the	Objections	and	
Replies,	trans.		John	Cottingham.	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2017),28.		67	Hatfield,	“Workings,”	21-46.	
 34 
a	termination	in	knowledge	or	belief.	For	Descartes,	the	Port-Royal	Group,	Locke	and	Berkeley,	the	cognitive	operations	of	perception,	judgment	and	reason	were	performed	by	a	unified,	conscious	mind.68	This	entailed	that	for	these	authors,	that	the	workings	of	the	mind	could	be	viewed	clearly	through	the	process	of	introspection.	At	each	stage,	the	progression	of	information	from	the	sense	reception	to	rational	discourse	was	available	to	consciousness.69	Individual	ideas	must	enter	(or	occur	to)	the	mind	via	an	act	of	apprehension	or	perception,	unmodified	by	an	act	of	judgment	or	inference.	Yet	the	fulfilment	of	these	twin	obligations,	to	full	conscious	awareness	of	mental	operations	and	the	passage	of	information	through	a	rigid	hierarchy	of	mental	acts,	was	a	challenge	in	the	field	of	perception.			For	example,	in	visual	perception	the	task	was	to	explain	the	gap	between	the	impoverishment	of	the	visual	stimulus	represented	on	the	retina	relative	to	the	complex	nature	of	our	visual	phenomenal	experience,	where	a	sensory	idea	may	not	be	legitimately	modified	until	it	has	been	compared	or	associated	with	another	idea,	inside	of	conscious	awareness.	The	problem	was	how	to	account	for	the	phenomenal	experience	of	the	three-dimensional	field.	An	explanation	was	needed	for	our	experience	of	the	size,	shape,	distance	and	motion	of	objects,	given	what	appears	on	the	retina,	and	that	introspection	would	lead	us	to	believe	that	we	do	not	reason	ourselves	into	our	visual	phenomenal	experience.			The	solution	that	Descartes	and	Locke	came	up	with	was	to	propose	that	our	phenomenal	visual	experience	is	the	result	of	our	making	a	succession	of	unconscious,	or	rather	unnoticed,	inferences.	They	hypothesised	that	we	make	a	series	of	judgments,	which,	because	we	make	them	so	frequently,	become	habitual	and	therefore	go	unnoticed.	Berkeley	rejected	inference	as	the	cognitive																																																									68	I	am	indebted	to	Gary	Hatfield	for	this	summary	of	the	account	of	the	process	in	the	work	of	Descartes	and	Berkeley.		Locke’s	struggle	with	unnoticed	inferences	in	three-dimensional	visual	field	was	first	noticed	by	Condillac	and	is	discussed	by	Stephen	K.	Land,	The	Philosophy	of	
Language	in	Britain:	Major	Theories	from	Hobbes	to	Thomas	Reid	(New	York:	AMS	Press,	1986),	73.		69	See	Gary	Hatfield,	“The	Sensory	Core	and	the	Medieval	Foundations	of	Early	Modern	Perceptual	Theory,”	in	Hatfield	Perception	and	Cognition:	Essays	in	the	Philosophy	of	Psychology	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press	2009),	384.	See	also	Hatfield,		“Perception	as	Unconscious	Inference,”	in	Perception	and	the	Physical	World:	Psychological	and	Philosophical	Issues	in	Perception,	ed.	Dieter	Heyer	and	Rainer	Mausfeld	(New	York:	Wiley,	2002),	115-144.	
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process	by	which	we	judge	necessary	connections	between	the	content	of	ideas	and	instead	proposed	that	phenomenal	experience	arises	from	the	repeated	co-occurrence	of	cues,	which	are	not	themselves	content-sensitive.	These	association	or	suggestions,	however,	still	took	place	outside	of	conscious	awareness.70			The	relationship	between	perception	and	judgment	in	Locke	is	of	interest	in	other	respects	too.	Locke	grounded	all	speculative	reasoning	on	the	perception	of	self-evident	propositions.	These	are	those	propositions,	mental	or	verbal,	which	provoke	our	immediate	assent	provided	that	we	understand	the	terms	or	ideas	that	they	contain.	Locke	argued	that	whilst	truth	was	properly	a	matter	for	propositions	and	not	ideas,	we	could	form	as	many	self-evident	propositions	as	we	have	distinct	ideas.	For	example,	'that	white	is	white	and	not	black',	is	a	proposition	that	we	form	when	we	attend	to	our	perceiving	of	the	colour	white.71	In	this	way	then	Locke	seemed	to	flout	the	convention	that	a	non-verbal	idea	from	sense	could	not	also	be	a	judgment	or	proposition.	Locke	claimed	that		when	we	make	any	propositions	within	our	own	thoughts,	about	white	or	black,	sweet	or	bitter,	a	triangle	or	a	circle,	we	can	and	often	do	frame	in	our	minds	the	ideas	themselves	without	reflecting	on	the	names.72		Locke’s	account	of	the	perceptual	nature	of	reason	also	gave	rise	to	certain	problems	of	terminology,	not	the	least	of	which	was	the	fact	that	the	ideas	that	resulted	from	the	first	act	of	perception	or	conception	were	simple	and	sensory	in	nature	-	despite	some	of	them	deriving	from	an	external	sense	and	others	from	the	operation	of	the	mind	upon	the	ideas	received	from	external	sense.	In	1728,	Zachary	Mayne	objected	that	Locke	had	not	distinguished	between	the	acts	of	sense	perception	and	acts	of	understanding.	Mayne	wanted	our	ideas	from	sense	to	be	understood	as	images	or	copies	of	those	things	that	our	senses	perceive.	Our	understanding,	or	our	intellect,	he	insisted,	gave	rise	to	notions.	Hutcheson’s	discussion	of	the	ontology	of	his	ideas	from	moral	sense	also	spoke																																																									70	Hatfield,	“Sensory	Core,”	384.	See	also	Rebecca	Copenhaver,	“Perception	and	the	Language	of	Nature,”	in	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	British	Philosophy	in	the	Eighteenth	Century,	ed.	James	A.	Harris,	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013),	107-127,	for	Berkeley	on	this	process.		71	Locke,	ECHU,	4:7:3	and	4,	591.	72	Locke,	ECHU,	4:5:4,	575.		
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directly	to	this	issue,	as	we	shall	see,	but	it	was	contained	in	his	texts	on	Logic	and	Metaphysics.73	Balguy	too	had	something	to	say	to	Locke	about	this	issue.	I	have	already	outlined	the	ways	in	which	Locke’s	simple	ideas	of	reflection	(which	gave	us	ideas	of	various	modes	of	mental	experience	such	as	thinking,	doubting,	willing)	were	under-specified,	especially	with	respect	to	their	differentiation	from	our	more	general	conscious	awareness	or	sense	of	mind.	This	will	be	a	topic	of	interest	in	the	chapters	on	Hutcheson	and	Burnet	and	Balguy.			The	question	of	conscious	awareness	was	also	central	to	claims	made	about	the	operation	of	practical	principles.	A	particular	part	of	Locke’s	attack	on	dispositional	nativism	relied	upon	his	rejection	of	the	operation	of	implicit	principles	in	the	mind,	because	it	contravened	his	principle	that	we	be	aware,	or	have	been	aware,	of	everything	that	takes	place	in	the	mind.	This	principle	is	intended	to	cover	both	the	content	and	operation,	or	actions	of	the	mind.	With	respect	to	propositions,	Locke	said,	‘No	proposition	can	be	said	to	be	in	the	mind,	which	it	never	yet	knew,	which	it	was	never	conscious	of.’74	Locke,	therefore,	rejected	the	argument	of	Descartes	and	Leibniz	that	these	general	implicit	principles	(e.g.	‘something	cannot	both	be	and	not	be’)	could	be	used	to	understand	a	particular	proposition	(e.g.	‘white	is	not	black’),	on	the	grounds	that	we	did	not	use	these	principles	to	judge	consciously	by.75			I	leave	the	account	of	the	implications	of	this	material	for	the	individual	chapters.		To	close	the	introduction	I	present	a	brief	summary	of	the	content	of	the	remaining	chapters.		
	
Chapter	2:	This	chapter	examines	the	nature	of	Clarke’s	rationalism	and	interrogates	his	views	on	the	relationship	of	that	rationalism	to	obligation	and	motivation.	I	offer	a	partial	corrective	to	certain	readings	of	Clarke	on	this	issue.		
																																																									73	Timothy	Stanton,	“Locke	and	His	Influence,”	in	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	British	Philosophy	in	the	
Eighteenth	Century,	ed.	James	A.	Harris,	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013),	21-40.		74	Locke,	ECHU,	1:2:5,	50.		75	Locke,	ECHU,	1:2:22,	60.	See	also	De	Rosa,	Locke	Question	Begging,	86.	
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Chapter	3:	This	is	first	of	two	chapters	on	Hutcheson,	whose	overriding	aim	is	to	consider	the	nature	of	his	realism.	In	the	first	I	examine	the	position	of	Clarke	and	Hutcheson	with	respect	to	God’s	communicable	attributes	and	our	cognitive	access	to	essences.		I	look	at	the	intended	practical	effect	of	Hutcheson’s	adoption	of	introspection	as	a	methodology	and	examine	the	intended	function	of	obligation	for	Hutcheson.		I	then	consider	the	nature	of	Hutcheson’s	commitment	to	moral	realism.	I	discuss	why	Hutcheson’s	commitment	to	an	implanted,	natural	benevolence,	which	rested	upon	a	divine	decision	to	communicate	that	virtue,	was	unlikely	to	have	been	intended	by	Hutcheson	as	a	species	of	voluntarism.	I	argue	that	Hutcheson’s	texts	on	Metaphysics,	and	Logic	reveal	that	Hutcheson	did	not	view	God’s	decision	to	communicate	benevolence	to	us	as	reflective	of	any	sort	of	contingency.		
	
Chapter	4:	This	chapter	presents	a	detailed	consideration	of	Hutcheson’s	moral	epistemology.	I	explore	three	ways	in	which	Hutcheson	may	have	understood	his	ideas	from	moral	sense	as	capable	of	delivering	a	judgment	as	to	the	moral	value	of	an	action.	First,	I	argue	that	the	direction	of	Hutcheson’s	thought	may	have	reflected	the	weakened	boundary	between	sense	or	perception	and	judgment.	Second,	I	suggest	Hutcheson	both	re-examined	the	role	of	reason	in	the	stages	prior,	and	subsequent	to,	the	emergence	of	an	idea	of	moral	sense,	and	I	discuss	the	ways	that	Hutcheson	shifted	the	epistemic	burden	back	onto	reason.	Third,	I	consider	the	ontology	of	Hutcheson’s	ideas	of	moral	sense.	An	overall	assessment	of	Hutcheson’s	moral	realism	is	presented	at	the	end	of	the	chapter.		
	
Chapter	5:	This	chapter	examines	the	response	of	Clarke’s	defenders	Burnet	and	Balguy	to	the	appearance	of	Hutcheson’s	moral	sense	theory.	I	explore	the	experiential	priority	that	Burnet	and	Balguy	assigned	to	reason	over	sense,	and	discuss	the	influence	of	Locke’s	perceptual	account	of	reason	here.	I	then	consider	whether	Burnet	and	Balguy	can	be	said	to	have	upheld	Clarke’s	position	with	respect	to	the	motivation	of	moral	actions.	Finally,	I	discuss	their	understanding	of	the	nature	of	God’s	moral	perfection	and	their	quarrel	with	Hutcheson	over	his	commitment	to	God’s	benevolent	nature	as	the	foundation	of	moral	goodness.		
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Chapter	6:	This	chapter	looks	at	the	ways	in	which	Gay	responded	to	the	work	of	Clarke	and	his	defenders	and	Hutcheson,	with	respect	to	the	three	themes	that	the	thesis	is	concerned	with:	the	relationship	of	rationalism	to	obligation	and	motivation,	the	relative	roles	of	sense	and	judgment	in	moral	knowledge	(and	the	demand	that	motive,	ideas,	principles,	propositions	and	judgments	be	available	to	conscious	awareness),	and	the	theistic	metaphysics	used	to	support	arguments	about	realism	(with	particular	emphasis	on	God’s	communicative	attributes).	
	
Chapter	7:	Conclusion.			 	
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Chapter	2		 Samuel	Clarke	and	the	‘mighty	motives’		The	chapter	aims	to	examine	the	nature	of	Clarke’s	rationalism	and	to	inspect	his	views	on	the	relationship	of	that	rationalism	to	obligation	and	motivation.	To	this	end,	I	will	introduce	Clarke’s	approach	and	compare	his	account	of	reason	with	that	offered	by	the	Cambridge	Platonists.	This	is	followed	by	a	detailed	account	of	the	argument	of	the	second	of	Clarke’s	Boyle	Lecture	series.	I	then	introduce	and	counter	some	of	the	claims	made	by	recent	commentators	with	respect	to	Clarke’s	account	of	motivation.	I	also	draw	attention	to	similarities	between	the	arguments	made	by	Clarke	and	Locke	in	the	Reasonableness	of	
Christianity.	The	chapter	finishes	with	an	exploration	of	Clarke’s	views	on	conscience	in	relation	to	obligation.			Introduction	By	1704,	Clarke,	Voltaire’s	‘veritable	thinking	machine’,	was	sufficiently	well	established	in	English	intellectual	life	to	be	made	Boyle	lecturer.	Boyle	had	instituted	the	lectures	in	1692	to	call	attention	to	the	harmony	between	the	new	natural	philosophy	and	Scripture,	in	order	to	defend	the	Christian	religion.	Hobbes’	moral	conventionalism	and,	more	especially,	various	deist	claims	for	the	sufficiency	of	natural	reason	in	the	attainment	of	moral	and	religious	knowledge	were	the	targets	of	several	of	the	early	lectures.76			Clarke’s	first	series	of	lectures	was	published	as	A	Demonstration	of	the	Being	
and	Attributes	of	God.	More	Particularly	in	Answer	to	Mr	Hobbs,	Spinoza	and	Their	
Followers.77	Clarke’s	aim	was	to	reveal	the	power	of	natural	reason	to	discover	both	the	necessary	existence	of	God	and,	perhaps	more	importantly	for	Clarke,	to	demonstrate	the	necessity	of	his	possessing	various	attributes.	Clarke	deemed	the	demonstration	of	certain	divine	attributes	to	be	central	to	the	understanding	of	a	God	who	continued	to	display	an	interest	in,	and	exercised	power	over																																																									76	On	the	Boyle	Lectures,	see	James	P.	Ferguson,	An	Eighteenth	Century	Heretic	Dr.	Samuel	Clarke	(Kineton:	The	Roundwood	Press,	1976),	23-34.	77	Samuel	Clarke,	A	Demonstration	of	the	Being	and	Attributes	of	God	and	Other	Writings	ed.	Ezio	Vailati	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1998).	Henceforth	Being	and	Attributes.		
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human	affairs	and	the	operation	of	matter.	Clarke	made	both	a	priori	and	a	posteriori	arguments	for	the	existence	of	God.	The	distinction	between	the	two	referred	to	the	direction	of	argument	running	between	cause	and	effect	rather	than	its	relation	to	experience.	He	made	a	priori	arguments	for	the	necessary	existence	of	a	self-existent	God	possessed	of	the	attributes	of	independence,	immensity,	immutability,	omnipresence	and	infinitude,	and	a	series	of	a	posteriori	arguments	for	the	necessity	of	God’s	omniscience,	the	liberty	of	his	agency	and	his	moral	attributes.78			Clarke	himself,	it	seems,	was	not	especially	fond	of	the	argument	a	priori,	or	‘metaphysical	reasoning’,	which	made	his	reputation,	but	he	believed	it	to	be	indispensable	for	the	proof	of	three	of	God’s	attributes	-	his	immensity,	eternity	and	unity.	Clarke’s	preferred	weapon	of	choice	in	the	popular	war	against	deism	was,	according	to	William	Whiston,	the	more	easily	comprehended	argument	from	design.	Clarke	believed	that	the	ease	of	comprehension	of	this	argument	offered	a	better	safeguard	against	scepticism	for	the	majority.79		Nevertheless	his	‘numberless	mathematics’	was	initially	very	well	received	and	his	method	was	promoted	at	Cambridge	for	about	twenty	years	according	to	his	critic	Edmund	Law,		‘till	at	length	certain	flaws	being	discovered	in	the	Doctor's	celebrated	argument	a	priori.’80	One	of	the	flaw	finders	was	Law	himself,	who	was	part	of	a	wider	anti-Newtonian	group	within	Cambridge	that	included	Daniel	Waterland	and	Phillips	Gretton.			Clarke’s	reputation	as	an	ethical	rationalist	stems,	in	part,	from	his	defence	of	the	ability	of	natural	reason	to	discern,	or	at	least	to	recognise,	the	truths	of	rational	arguments	for	the	existence	of	God	and	his	attributes.	It	was	the	content	of	his																																																									78	See	James	P.	Ferguson,	The	Philosophy	of	Dr.	Samuel	Clarke	and	its	Critics	(London:	Vantage	Press,	1974),	for	an	overview	of	Clarke’s	approach,	including	the	various	criticisms	by	Clarke’s	commentators	as	to	the	‘a	priority’	of	his	arguments	in	Chapter	2.	See	also	Vailati,	introduction	to	
Being	and	Attributes,	xiv-xviii,	and	Timothy	Yenter	and	Ezio	Vailati,	"Samuel	Clarke,"	The	Stanford	
Encyclopaedia	of	Philosophy	(Spring	2014	Edition),	Edward	N.	Zalta	(ed.),	URL	=	http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/clarke/.		79	See	Vailati,	introduction,	xiv	-xix.	See	also	Samuel	Clarke,	“The	Answer	to	a	Seventh	Letter	Concerning	the	Argument	A	Priori”	in	Being	and	Attributes,	118-123.	80	Cited	by	John	Stephens	in	“Edmund	Law	and	his	Circle	at	Cambridge,”	in	The	Philosophical	
Canon	in	the	17th	and	18th	Centuries,	ed.	G.	A.	J.	Rogers	and	Sylvana	Tomaselli,	(Suffolk:	University	of	Rochester	Press,	1996),	165.	
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second	series	of	Boyle	lectures	however,	delivered	the	following	year,	which	did	most	to	promote	an	understanding	of	Clarke	as	a	rationalist	in	moral	epistemology	and	in	practical	morality.	Clarke	was,	and	still	is,	deemed	to	have	held	the	intellectualist	position	that	a	natural	understanding	of	the	good	is	sufficient	to	move	us	to	virtue.81	The	second	lecture	series,	A	Discourse	on	the	
Unchangeable	Obligations	of	Natural	Religion,	and	the	Truth	and	Certainty	of	the	
Christian	Revelation,	however,	delivered	Clarke’s	defence,	in	fifteen	propositions,	of	the	necessity	of	Christian	revelation	for	a	successful	moral	life	and	the	conformity	of	the	content	of	Christian	revelation	to	natural	reason.			After	the	publication	of	Hutcheson’s	four	treatises	proclaiming	the	existence	of	a	moral	sense,	Clarke	became	the	standard	bearer	for	a	brand	of	ethical	rationalism.	I	suggest	that	Clarke’s	concern	to	emphasise	the	ineffectiveness	of	unassisted	reason	in	governing	human	conduct	became	detached	from	his	wider	position	partly	as	a	result	of	the	intense	focus	in	the	later	debate	between	Hutcheson	and	other	opponents	on	the	workings	of	natural	moral	knowledge.		Clarke’s	defender,	Gilbert	Burnet,	fought	Hutcheson	on	Hutcheson’s	terms	as	they	both	sought	to	account	for	the	operation	of	natural	reason	alone	in	the	production	of	moral	behaviour.	I	will	argue	that	another	of	Clarke’s	followers	John	Balguy	in	fact	took	Clarke’s	approach	in	accounting	for	the	motivation	of	moral	action,	but	that	there	has	been	far	less	consideration	of	his	work	in	the	secondary	literature.			Clarke	was,	and	often	still	is,	taken	to	have	put	forward	the	claim	that	natural	reason	alone	is	sufficient	to	motivate	moral	action.	That	is,	Clarke	is	deemed	to	have	claimed	that	reason	is	sufficient	not	only	to	discover	all	the	moral	truth	necessary	for	our	purposes,	but	further	that	this	knowledge	creates	an	obligation,	the	rational	perception	of	which	can	then	move	us	to	moral	behaviour.		
		I	will	suggest	that	Clarke’s	rationalism	extended	no	further	than	the	assertion	that	God,	through	moral	(i.e.	freely	imposed)	necessity,	directs	himself	in	his																																																									81	See	for	example,	Darwall,	Internal	Ought,	10.		
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creative	endeavours	by	his	understanding	of	eternal	law,	that	we	have	some	shared	access,	through	natural	reason,	to	this	law,	and	that	this	knowledge	is	our	formal	obligation	(of	which	more	later).	82	Clarke,	it	is	true,	also	argued	that	a	few	ancient	moralists	might	have	been	able	to	reason	themselves	to	the	knowledge	of	an	omnipotent	God	who	will	distribute	justice	to	us	in	a	future	state,	and	that	this	knowledge	may	have	been	able	to	move	them	to	moral	action	(on	occasion).	What	Clarke	did	not	claim	however,	was	that	this	motivation	derived	from	formal,	or	moral	obligation.			I	will	argue	that	Clarke’s	broader	moral	psychology	spoke	entirely	against	the	interpretation	of	his	thought	as	the	position	that	rational	understanding	of	right	and	wrong,	or	the	fitness	or	unfitness	of	actions	alone,	was	(post-Fall)	sufficient	to	carry	anyone	to	virtue.	It	will	be	argued	that	Clarke’s	rationalism,	at	least	so	far	as	it	was	argued	for	in	the	Boyle	Lectures,	sat	in	the	context	of	his	primary	practical	concern,	which	did	not	lie	with	the	details	of	moral	cognition,	but	was	rather	to	demonstrate	the	practical	necessity	of	revealed	truths	to	the	living	of	a	moral	life.	Virtue	was	only	made	practically	possible,	according	to	Clarke,	when	we	were	supplied	with	the	confidence	that	just	reward	and	punishment	in	eternity	would	be	the	definite	consequence	of	actions	in	this	world,	and	when	we	used	the	thoughts	of	these	consequences	to	ourselves	to	motivate	our	actions.		These	indeed	were	Clarke’s	‘mighty	motives’.			To	begin	with	I	would	like	to	make	a	few	remarks	about	Clarke’s	general	account	of	reason,	its	relationship	to	divine	understanding,	and	our	motivation	for	virtue.	Beiser	views	Clarke	as	part	of	a	later	seventeenth/early	eighteenth-century	tradition	of	English	ethical	rationalism	birthed	in	Cambridge	by	the	Cambridge	Platonists	and	giving	rise	to	the	work	of	Clarke,	Wollaston,	Balguy	and	Gilbert	Burnet,	amongst	others.83	As	Harrison	points	out	though,	there	are	substantial	differences	between	the	accounts	of	reason	offered	by	English	Platonists,	by	‘deists’	and	by	‘Enlightenment	rationalists	in	general’.	Harrison’s	concern	is	the	Platonists	and	deists	and	he	(wisely)	does	not	elaborate	on	the	position	of																																																									82	See	Clarke,	“Sermon	XVI	On	the	Justice	of	God,”	in	Being	and	Attributes,	144.	83	Beiser,	Sovereignty,	266	and	see	also	chapter	7,	266-232.		
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‘enlightenment	rationalists	in	general’.84	Here,	in	order	to	explode	further	the	characterisation	of	the	philosophy	of	‘British	moralists’	as	a	set	of	bilateral	negotiations	held	between	rationalists	and	sentimentalists,	I	will	outline	briefly	some	of	the	differences	between	the	versions	of	rationalism	presented	by	the	Cambridge	Platonists	and	by	Clarke.			It	is	undoubtedly	the	case	that	there	were	substantial	similarities	in	outlook	between	Clarke	and	the	Cambridge	Platonists.	Both	abhorred	all	forms	of	voluntarism	that	grounded	the	difference	between	good	and	evil	purely	in	divine	command.	The	moral	order,	or	eternal	law,	existed	prior	to	divine	creative	activity	and	prior	to	any	law	made	by	God.	The	difference	between	good	and	evil	existed,	as	Clarke	put	it,		‘antecedent	to	will	and	to	all	arbitrary	or	positive	appointment	whatsoever’.	This	difference	could	not	be	altered,	even	by	the	absolute	power	of	God’s	will,	which	could	not	act	inconsistently	with	the	reason	of	things.85	The	content	of	any	moral	obligations	was	held	to	be	found	in	our	comprehension	of	the	essential	difference	between	good	and	evil.	It	was	found	‘eternally,	necessarily,	and	unchangeably	in	the	nature	and	reason	of	things’.86			Clarke	also	took	the	Latitudinarian	position	that	God’s	natural	and	moral	attributes	are	identical	in	kind	with	those	found	in	human	beings,	although	they	are	infinite	in	the	divine	case	and	radically	curtailed	in	ours.87	However,	while	Clarke	was	committed	to	the	idea	that	there	is	common	access	for	God	and	ourselves	to	the	rational	order	of	things,	his	understanding	of	human	reason	was	very	different	to	the	one	advertised	by	the	Cambridge	Platonists.	The	rationalism	of	both	the	Cambridge	Platonists	and	Clarke	was	modulated,	to	a	significant	degree,	by	the	need	to	demonstrate	how	the	possibility	of	consistent	moral	behaviour,	sufficient	to	please	God,	could	come	about	-	but	their	approach	to	practical	morality	was	very	different.		
																																																								84	Harrison,	Religions,	31.	85	Clarke,	Being	and	Attributes,	83.		86	Ibid.,	83.	See	also	Beiser,	Sovereignty,	269.	87	Vailati,	introduction,	xv.	See	also	Beiser,	Sovereignty,	282.		
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The	Cambridge	Platonists	worked	from	a	model	of	shared	access	to	the	divine	mind	based	on	the	'deiformity'	of	our	created	nature,	which	could	ascend	in	order	to	partake	of,	or	participate	with,	the	divine	nature	through	the	joint	exercise	of	thought	and	love.	They	worked	from	an	understanding	of	moral	knowledge	as	issuing	from	an	active	participation	with	the	divine	mind.88		Natural	knowledge	of	God	is	knowledge	of	his	goodness,	not	of	the	metaphysical	necessity	of	his	other	attributes.89	They	held	not	only	that	the	successful	communication	of	this	knowledge	results	in	a	life	of	consistent	virtue,	but	further	that	living	virtuously	brings	about	this	knowledge.	Religion,	as	Harrison’s	thesis	claims,	was	a	moral	matter	for	the	Cambridge	Platonists	and	not	a	question	of	assent	to	propositions	or	the	performance	of	ceremonial	rites.	John	Smith,	to	take	but	one	example,	wrote	that	this	indeed	is	such	a	deification	.	.	.	in	the	highest	powers	of	the	soul	by	a	living	and	quickening	spirit	of	true	religion	there	uniting	God	and	soul	together	on	the	unity	of	affections,	will	and	end.90		According	to	the	Cambridge	Platonists	our	moral	abilities,	both	epistemic	and	motivational,	derived	from	the	affective	quality	of	reason	in	both	the	human	and	divine	case.	When	functioning	veridically,	that	is	practically,	reason	is	love	or		‘intellectual	love’.	Their	epistemology	was	grounded	in,	and	realised	by,	innate	sensory	and	affective	elements	in	the	human	case.	Their	view	of	human	reason	itself	was	profoundly	practical,	based	on	the	founding	notion	of	a	self-determining	agency	comprising	intellect,	will	and	desire,	which	came	supplied	with	a	variety	of	innate	provisions.91	Reason	in	the	human	case	was	either	planted	with	innately	given	sensory	‘praecognitia’	or	‘instincts’	(Cudworth),	or	was	crowned	by	a	boniform	faculty	(More),	or	was	seen	as	the	organ	of	‘divine	sense’,	pregnant	with	spiritual	truths	(Whichcote),	all	of	which	led	our	understanding	to	both	appreciate	and	love	the	good	and	motivate	its	performance.	For	the	Cambridge	Platonists,	the	intimate	proximity	of	love	and																																																									88	See	Jennifer	A.	Herdt,	“Affective	Perfectionism:	Community	with	God	without	Common	Measure”	in	New	Essays	on	the	History	of	Autonomy:	A	Collection	Honoring	J.B.	Schneewind,	ed.	Natalie	Brender	and	Larry	Krasnoff	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2004),	30-60.			89	This	is	Harrison’s	point,	Religions,	46.	90	C.	A.	Patrides,	The	Cambridge	Platonists	(London:	Edward	Arnold,	1969),	176.	91	Tod	E.	Jones,	introduction	to	The	Cambridge	Platonists:	A	Brief	Introduction,	ed.	Tod	E.	Jones	(Maryland:	University	Press	of	America,	2005),	21.		
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the	source	of	reason	within	the	divine	being,	and	echoed	in	our	own	nature,	facilitated	dual	routes	into	our	participation	with	that	being	–	we	could	learn	through	love,	hence	their	identification	of	virtue	with	reason.	Loving	obedience	to	scripture,	far	from	being	a	servile	adherence	to	the	law	of	a	superior,	actually	facilitated	participation	within	divine	understanding.		They	saw	obedience	to	scripture	as	the	beginning	of	an	epistemic	route	to	moral	and	spiritual	understanding	and	as	the	route	to	present	and	future	happiness.		Clarke’s	God	created	the	world	according	to	the	‘abstract	nature	of	things’.	His	benevolence,	or	goodness	along	with	his	justice	and	equity,	led	his	creative	will	to	act	(freely)	in	a	manner	consistent	with	his	understanding	of	the	‘reason	of	things’.92	In	general,	Clarke,	as	we	will	see,	expressed	a	far	more	pessimistic	view	of	human	nature	and	of	our	real	world	cognitive	abilities	than	did	the	Cambridge	Platonists.	Clarke	did	not	advertise	human	participation	in	the	divine	mind.	For	Clarke,	while	we	may	appreciate	and	be	grateful	for	divine	love,	there	is	no	emotional	resonance	between	our	minds	and	God's	that	can	deepen	our	rational	understanding	of	our	obligations.	We	do	not	reach	an	epistemic	awareness	of	the	moral	good	of	beneficence,	for	example,	through	any	affective	component	of	reason	itself.	Clarke	had	us	proceeding	from	the	self-evident	comprehension	of	eternal	relations	that	exist	between	things,	to	an	evaluation	of	the	moral	worth	of	actions.	Clarke	did	allow	a	role	for	affect	in	the	comprehension	of	duty.	Like	the	Cambridge	Platonists,	Grotius	and	Hutcheson,	Clarke	insisted	on	the	existence	of	natural	affections	towards	others	which	did	not	derive	from	the	utility	of	sociability.	Clarke	maintained	that	reflection	upon	our	natural	‘uncorrupted’	loving	affections	towards	each	other	(parental	affection	towards	our	young,	for	example)	was	key	to	understanding	ourselves	as	‘part	and	member	of	that	one	universal	body	or	community,	which	is	made	up	of	all	Mankind’	and	thus	that	we	were	‘born	to	promote	the	public	good’	and	obligated	to	do	so.	‘Tis	evident	every	man	is	bound	by	the	Law	of	his	nature’	(my	emphasis).	93	Our	affections,	once	
reflected	upon,	reveal	to	us	that	we	are	obligated	to	help	all	other	members	of	our	community	and	that	benevolence	is	an	eternal	‘fitness’,	or	moral	principle.																																																									92	Clarke,	Being	and	Attributes,	86-89.	93	Clarke,	Natural	Religion,	208.		
 46 
	Clarke	also	excluded	implanted	or	innately	given	ideas,	propositions	or	principles,	as	a	source	of	understanding.	His	model	of	human	moral	reasoning	excluded	entirely	any	instinctual	sensory	apprehensions	to	drive	universal	assent	to	moral	principles,	which	would	naturally	push	us	towards	moral	action.	His	view	of	reason	was	entirely	theoretical	or	speculative.	Its	deliverances	are	founded	upon	rational	intuition	into	the	eternal	relations	that	specify	the	moral	worth	of	actions.	This	understanding	provides	us	with	a	formal	obligation,	but	does	not	contain	any	motivational	component	beyond	the	understanding	that	an	action	is	‘fit’	or	correct	to	be,	or	to	have	been,	performed.			Both	the	Cambridge	Platonists	and	Clarke	appealed	to	Scripture.	But	the	Cambridge	Platonists	viewed	practical	obedience	to	the	dictates	of	Scripture		both	as	a	route	to	epistemic	development	and	as	an	immediate	and	on-going	hedonic	reward	(i.e.	in	the	increased	joy	and	love	experienced	when	performing	a	moral	action).	Clarke,	on	the	other	hand,	assigned	a	direct	motivational	role	for	the	rational	belief	in	the	specific	revealed	truth	of	a	future	state	of	divine	justice.	Revealed	truth,	according	to	Clarke,	fulfils	our	‘natural	hopes	and	expectations’	and	provides	us	with	the	requisite	emotional	ballast	–	that	is,	the	thoughts	of	our	
future	happiness	–	needed	to	keep	us	virtuous	in	a	world	where	virtue	frequently	goes	unrewarded	and	the	vicious	appear	to	escape	censure	and	even	to	thrive.94			For	the	Cambridge	Platonists	Scripture	was	an	‘after-revelation’	in	that	it	post-dated	natural	reason,	and	its	contents	were	comprehended	and	assessed	by	natural	reason.	But	reason,	for	the	Cambridge	Platonists,	was	capable	of	receiving	spiritual	truths	as	well	as	discovering	natural	ones.95	Clarke	shared	the	view	that	virtue,	not	ceremonial	action	or	belief	in	specific	Christian	doctrine,	was	the	criterion	by	which	we	would	eventually	be	judged,	and	he	too	upheld	the	fundamental	rationality	of	the	content	of	scripture.96	But	as	we	shall	see,	Clarke	did	not	see	the	reach	of	natural	reason	extending	to	the	grasp	of	all	the	spiritual	truths	necessary	for	leading	a	consistently	moral	life.	He	understood	belief	in																																																									94	See	Clarke,	Natural	Religion,	317,	for	example.			95	See	Harrison,	Religions,	33,	on	the	break	that	this	represented.	96	See	Beiser,	Sovereignty,	on	the	Latitudinarian	position	on	good	works,	284-289.		
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particular	revealed	doctrines	(a	future	state	and	the	immortality	of	the	soul)	to	be	vital	in	motivating	us	to	be	virtuous.	The	vital	practical	import	of	these	two	truths	to	us,	and	the	historical	fact	of	our	failure	to	grasp	their	truth	using	our	natural	cognitive	abilities,	led	to	their	Revelation	as	recorded	in	Scripture.	Clarke	did	not	see	the	charms	of	virtue	alone	as	sufficient	to	get	us	through	the	demands	of	this	life,	behaving	well.			I	will	now	turn	to	the	detail	of	Clarke’s	argument	as	he	presented	it	in	his	second	Boyle	lecture	series.			The	argument	of	the	second	Boyle	lectures	In	terms	of	our	practical	ability	to	behave	virtuously,	this	chapter	argues	that	Clarke	insisted	that	knowledge	of	revealed	truths,	which	contained	truths	about	the	hedonic	consequences	of	divine	justice	in	a	future	state,	could	not	now	be	reached	by	natural	reason	alone,	in	a	way	that	could	consistently	lead	us	to	virtue.97		I	argue	further	that	Clarke	did	not	claim	that	the	rational	perception	of	the	fitness	of	an	action	and	the	formal	obligation	that	such	a	perception	gave	rise	to	were	sufficient,	post-Fall,	to	move	us	to	action.	This	chapter	questions,	therefore,	those	readings	of	Clarke,	such	as	Schneewind’s,	that	have	him	assert	that	a	naturally	acquired	knowledge	of	our	moral	obligation	alone	is	capable	of	motivating	us	to	moral	behaviours.98	Clarke’s	thoughts	on	both	the	conditions	under	which	we	are	able	to	understand	our	obligations,	and	the	relationship	of	this	obligation	to	behaviour	will	be	explored.	Clarke	is	presented	here	as	someone	who	shared	Bacon,	More	and	Locke’s	understanding	of	the	‘two	parts’	of	ethics,	and	who	saw	a	vital	and	necessary	role	for	the	regular	and	careful	promulgation	of	revealed	truths	in	the	development	of	our	practical	moral	abilities,	notwithstanding	our	natural	cognitive	encounters	‘with	the	good’.99																																																										97	Clarke	allowed	that	there	may	have	been	a	very	few	exceptional	heathens	who	had	reasoned	their	way	to	these	truths,	but	Clarke	claimed	that	without	Revelation	the	force	of	these	reasoned	truths	in	their	own	minds	was	insufficient	to	allow	them	to	live	consistently	virtuous	lives.	This	is	discussed	later	on	in	this	chapter.			98	Schneewind,	Invention,	318.	99	See	Darwall	Internal	Ought,	10	and	13,	where	he	delineates	two	kinds	of	internalism.	One	of	these,	which	he	says	is	not	his	concern	in	his	book,	is	that	of	Clarke,	Balguy	and	Price.	This	is	said	to	be	‘as	old	as	the	ancients’	and	refers	to	a	motive	for	doing	good	presenting	itself	in	consequence	to	perceiving	or	knowing	the	good.	
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	The	chapter	will	focus	largely	upon	Clarke’s	moral	thought	as	it	was	presented	in	the	second	Boyle	lecture	series.	Clarke’s	claims	for	the	existence	of	God	and	his	natural	and	moral	attributes	presented	in	the	first	lecture	series	were	the	platform	from	which	he	launched	his	defence	of	Christian	revelation.	They	are	summarised	at	the	beginning	of	Natural	Religion.			Clarke’s	second	lecture	series	contained	a	preface	in	which	he	responded	to	criticism	of	his	Being	and	Attributes	(and	declared	his	independence	from	Locke),	and	fifteen	propositions	that	Clarke	believed	would	demonstrate	the	unchangeable	obligations	of	natural	religion	and	the	truth	and	certainty	of	the	Christian	revelation.100	Clarke	admitted	that	the	same	standard	of	demonstration	and	mathematical	certainty	that	he	thought	the	proofs	of	the	being	and	attributes	of	God	delivered	were	not	achievable	for	his	present	purposes.	Here,	matters	of	fact	must	be	introduced	in	the	form	of	‘mixt	proofs	from	circumstances	and	testimony’.	Matters	of	fact	were	not	by	their	nature	capable	of	a	priori	demonstration	Clarke	thought,	but	‘wise	and	honest	men	are	always	satisfied’	with	the	type	of	mixed	proofs	that	he	would	offer.101			Clarke’s	commentators	have	shown	a	preference	for	engaging	with	the	substance	of	his	attempt	to	demonstrate	our	natural	understanding	of	our	obligations.	That	such	an	obligation	is	created	when	our	natural	reason	recognises	or	involuntarily	approves	of	an	action	as	fit	to	be	done	was	indeed	the	substance	of	Clarke’s	first	proposition.	The	remaining	fourteen	propositions	however,	were	dedicated	to	the	task	of	demonstrating	the	inadequacy	of	natural	reason	to	discover	many	of	the	truths	of	natural	religion	and,	therefore,	to	understand	our	obligation.	Even	where	an	action	has	been	recognised	as	fit,	and	thus	obligatory,	the	impotence	of	that	understanding	to	govern	subsequent	behaviour	was	laid	bare	by	Clarke.																																																											100	‘I	neither	cited	any	one	passage,	nor	(that	I	know	of)	borrowed	any	argument	from	him’,	Clarke,	Preface,	Natural	Religion,	136.		101	Clarke,	Natural	Religion,	158.	Clarke’s	moral	theory	is	also	discussed	in	Being	and	Attributes,	84,	89-90,	and	in	his	Sermon	XVI,	in	Being	and	Attributes,	144-45.		
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In	the	first	proposition	Clarke	maintained	that	an	act	of	assent	as	to	the	right	or	wrongness	of	particular	actions	is	compelled	in	divine	and	human	understanding	by	the	‘very	nature	and	reason	of	things’.	God	always	chooses	to	conform	his	undetermined	will	to	this	understanding,	as	his	nature	is	both	just	and	benevolent.	(Clarke	argued	that	God’s	natural	attributes	could	not	be	separated	from	his	moral	attributes	–	to	deny	his	moral	attributes,	as	he	understood	Hobbes	to	have	done,	was	to	deny	his	natural	attributes.102)	Clarke’s	metaphysical	commitment	to	a	moral	order	existing	in	the	nature	of	things	was	cashed	out	in	the	claim	that,	from	the	difference	of	things	which	exist,	eternal	law	specifies	the	relations	which	hold	between	those	things	(which	include	persons).	The	necessary	‘fitness’	or	‘unfitness’	of	actions	is	determined	by	their	conformity	or	non-conformity	to	the	eternal	relations	that	hold	between	things.			To	convey	the	rudimentary	analytic	nature	of	the	judgment	of	the	relations	that	hold	between	things,	Clarke	used	examples	such	as	the	following:	That	God	is	infinitely	superior	to	man	is	as	clear	as	that	infinity	is	larger	than	a	point,	or	eternity	longer	than	a	moment.	103			Clarke	frequently	drew	an	analogy	with	geometry.	We	recognise	the	essential	differences	between	geometric	figures	in	the	same	way	as	we	recognise	that	‘that	God	is	infinitely	superior	to	man’	and	that	there	are	differences	between	people	(‘the	qualifications	of	persons’).		Clarke	argued	that	the	specification	of	eternal	relations	derives	from	the	same	rational	ordering	principle	at	work	throughout	existence.	Just	as	there	is	consonance	and	dissonance	between	different	geometrical	figures,	which	flows	from	their	essences,	and	gives	us	the	content	of	basic	axioms	that	we	must	observe	as	successful	geometers,	so	we	must	observe	the	rules	of	a	kind	of	moral	geometry	that	governs	relations	between	the	different	essences	of	God,	and	ourselves,	and	of	other	people	if	we	are	to	act	as	successful	rational	creatures.	104		
																																																								102	Clarke,	Natural	Religion,	164.		103	Clarke	Natural	Religion,	177.		104	See	Gill,	“Math	or	Beauty,”	on	the	analogy	with	mathematics	and	beauty	in	moral	thinking.		
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These	eternal	truths	are	not	innate,	they	exist	in	the	‘reason	of	things’,	but	our	assent	to	them	is	involuntary,	even	in	cases	where	more	protracted	reasoning	process	is	needed	to	reveal	or	to	reach	them.105	Like	mathematical	first	principles	they	are	seen	as	necessary,	in	the	sense	of	our	not	being	able	to	contradict	them	as	truths.106	From	our	understanding	of	an	action	as	fit	or	unfit	to	be	performed	(whether	or	not	it	respects	the	eternal	relations	between	things)	an	understanding	of	our	obligation	to	determine	our	wills	to	this	understanding	arises.	We	ought	always	to	behave	as	we	see	fit,	Clarke	believed.	God	always	performs	his	obligation,	which	is	to	say	that	he	always	conforms	his	actions	to	his	understanding,	but	we,	for	a	variety	of	reasons,	do	not.107	It	is	important	to	emphasise,	as	Clarke	did,	that	the	obligation	created	for	us,	by	our	understanding	of	relations	between	beings	or	persons,	derives	in	the	first	instance	from	the	very	‘nature	of	things’.	Moral	values	just	are	fundamentally	present	in	the	relations	between	things,	prior	to	any	divine	command	for	us	to	act	in	conformity	to	this	understanding.108			Moral	principles	are	‘eternal	fitnesses’	because	they	describe	the	correct	relationships	between	things.	Clarke	identified	equity,	piety,	justice,	sobriety,	or	prudent	self-love,	and	benevolence	as	the	moral	principles.	Clarke’s	first	proposition,	then,	explained	our	natural	understanding	of	our	natural	obligation	to	act	according	to	eternal	fitnesses	and	unfitnesses,	specified	by	eternal	law.	It	described	our	original,	natural	ability	to	discover	the	truth	about	the	existence	of	God	and	his	attributes,	and	to	reason	our	obligations	to	him	and	one	another.			Throughout	the	text,	it	is	important	to	pay	attention	to	the	difference	in	cognitive	process	that	Clarke	specified,	which	allows	us	either	to	discover	a	truth	for	ourselves,	or	more	simply	to	recognise	the	truth	of	a	proposition	that	is	explained	to	us.109	An	important	part	of	the	later	text	saw	Clarke	baldly	state	the																																																									105	Clarke,	Natural	Religion,	192.	106	Slawomir	Raube,	“Morality	and	Reason.	Samuel	Clarke’s	Rationalist	Ethics,”	Studies	in	Logic,	
Rhetoric	and	Grammar	15,	no.	28.	(2009):	138.	107	See	Clarke’s	first	proposition	Natural	Religion	176	–	241.		108		On	Clarke’s	metaphysics,	see	Beiser,	Sovereignty,	272-275.			109	See	also	Thomas	“Reason	and	Revelation,”	125-128,	on	the	difference	between	discovery	and	teaching	in	Clarke	and	the	place	of	revelation	in	Clarke’s	broader	epistemology.		
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difficulty	of	the	reasoning	involved	in	discovering	unassisted	certain	knowledge	of	the	whole	truth	that	contains	our	obligation:	And	how	can	man	be	sure	he	should	have	made	so	good	improvement	of	his	reason,	as	to	have	understood	it	perfectly	in	all	parts,	without	such	help?	.	.	.		But	suppose	he	could,	and	by	strength	of	reason	he	could	demonstrate	to	himself	these	things	with	all	clearness	and	distinctness;	yet	could	all	men	do	so?	Assuredly	all	men	are	not	equally	capable	of	being	philosophers	though	all	men	are	equally	obliged	to	be	religious.110		Given	that,	however	unequal	our	cognitive	abilities	are,	we	are	all	equally	obliged	to	‘be	religious’,	which	means	understanding	the	whole	truth	of	God’s	existence	and	the	proper	governance	of	human	behaviour,	Clarke	wanted	to	explain	how	the	less	gifted	amongst	us	may	understand	our	obligations.	This	would	be	achieved	through	the	‘particular’	teaching	of	scripture	that	meets	a	residual	ability	in	the	‘generality	of	men’	to	understand	the	truth	of	what	is	being	said	to	them.111	It	is	the	teaching	of	particular	doctrines,	understood	as	issuing	from	an	authoritative	source	that	will		enforce	and	inculcate	upon	men’s	minds	with	so	strong	an	impression,	as	to	influence	and	govern	the	general	practice	of	the	world.112		Indeed,	the	remainder	of	the	work	was	devoted	to	establishing	that	our	natural	knowledge	of	our	obligation	is	insufficiently	motivating	to	us	in	our	present	condition,	and	further,	that	most	of	us	are	not	capable	of	discovering	our	obligations	in	the	first	place.			Clarke	argued	that	it	was	only	the	truth	of	Christianity,	acknowledged	as	a	practical	force,	which	made	it	possible	for	us	now	to	be	virtuous.	He	maintained	that	everything	contained	in	revelation	is	consistent	with	what	we	understand	to	be	reasonable.	The	motives	that	its	doctrines	supply	are	reasonable	and	the	way	in	which	it	‘urges’	these	motives	is	reasonable.	Clarke	believed	that	this	is	what	justifies	Christianity	to	us.	But,	he	thought,	we	have	not	been	able,	at	least	since	the	Fall,	to	reason	our	way	to	discover	all	of	the	truth	that	we	need	to	govern	ourselves	in	accordance	with	what	reason	dictates	(supported	by	the	evidence	of	the	fact	of	miracles,	signs,	
																																																								110	Clarke,	Natural	Religion,	314.	111	See	Ferguson,	Heretic,	30,	on	our	ability	preserved	ability	to	recognise	truth.		 	112	Clarke,	Natural	Religion,	154.	
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etc.).	It	is	worth	summarising	Clarke’s	remaining	propositions,	with	fairly	extensive	quotations,	in	order	to	see	the	direction	and	force	of	his	argument.	113		Clarke	went	on:		ii)	Though	this	‘eternal	moral	obligation’	is	universally	binding	on	rational	creatures	and	was	derived	by	God	from	the	metaphysical	structure	of	existence	(‘the	abstract	reason	of	things),		‘that	which	most	strongly	confirms	and	in	
practice	most	effectually	and	indispensably	enforces	them	upon	us’	is	that	God	has	made	these	moral	obligations	his	commands.	As	such	‘in	obedience	to	his	supreme	
authority’	we	should	observe	that	which	our	reason	tells	us	is	the	right	thing	to	do	(my	italics).			iii)	That	compliance	or	disobedience	to	his	will	are	necessarily	rewarded	or	punished	by	God.			iv)	That	God,	in	order	to	establish	the	‘difference	between	the	fruits	or	effects	of	virtue	and	vice’,	had	arranged	matters	so	that	virtue	makes	the	virtuous	happy	and	vice	upsets	the	vicious,	but	through	the	original	effects	of	the	Fall	we	are	now	ruined	creatures	and	justice	in	this	world	is	perverted.	Through		some	great	and	general	corruption	and	depravation,	(whencesoever	that	may	have	arisen;	the	particular	original	whereof	could	hardly	have	been	known	now	without	revelation,)	since,	I	say,	the	condition	of	men	in	this	present	state	is	such,	that	the	natural	order	of	things	in	the	world	is	in	event	manifestly	perverted,	and	virtue	and	goodness	are	visibly	prevented	in	great	measure	from	obtaining	their	proper	and	due	effects	in	establishing	men’s	happiness	proportionate	to	their	behaviour	and	practice.		This	is	so	clearly	contrary	to	God’s	design	and	the	natural	order	of	things	that	there	must	be	(and	there	is)	a	future	state	where	justice	is	reasserted.			v)	Though	natural	reason	was,	in	theory,	capable	of	discovering	the	moral	obligations	of	natural	religion	and	the	certainty	of	a	future	state	of	rewards	and	punishment,	we	had	destroyed	our	natural	abilities	to	discover	these	truths,	and																																																									113	These	are	summarised	by	Clarke,	Natural	Religion,	150-157,	and	see	these	pages	for	the	following	quotations.		
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now	require	instruction	to	comprehend	and	perform	even	the	most	basic	of	moral	duties.	Such	is	the	carelessness,	inconsiderateness,	and	want	of	attention	of	the	greater	part	of	mankind;	so	many	the	prejudices	and	false	notions	taken	up	by	evil	education;	so	strong	and	violent	the	unreasonable	lusts,	appetites	and	desires	of	sense;	and	so	great	the	blindness,	introduced	by	superstitious	opinions,	vicious	customs,	and	debauched	practices	throughout	the	world;	that	very	few	are	able,	in	reality	and	effect,	to	discover	these	things	clearly	and	plainly	for	themselves:	but	men	have	great	need	of	particular	teaching,	and	much	instruction;	to	convince	them	of	the	truth,	and	certainty,	and	importance	of	these	things;	to	give	them	a	due	sense,	and	clear	and	just	apprehensions	concerning	them;	and	to	bring	them	effectually	to	the	practice	of	the	plainest	and	most	necessary	duties.		vi)	That	although	throughout	history	there	had	been	a	very	few	‘wise,	brave	and	good’	heathens	who	had	attempted	both	to	discover	moral	truth	and	live	by	it,	and	went	to	some	lengths	to	try	to	check	the	‘extreme	superstition	and	wickedness	of	the	nations	wherein	they	lived’,	none	of	them	had	been	able	to	reform	the	world	with	‘any	considerably	great	and	universal	success’.	The	heathen	moralists	(and	Clarke	had	great	admiration	for	a	few	of	them)	were	altogether	ignorant	of	some	doctrines,	and	doubtful	and	uncertain	about	others	‘necessary	to	bring	about	that	great	end’.	What	they	did	know,	they	could	not	prove	and	explain	clearly.	Where	they	could	prove	and	explain	things	clearly,	they	did	not	have	did	not	have	sufficient	authority	to		enforce	and	inculcate	upon	men’s	minds	with	so	strong	an	impression	as	to	influence	and	govern	the	general	practice	of	the	world.			vii)	Divine	revelation	was	needed	to	redeem	mankind.		
	viii)	No	other	religion	but	Christianity	is	tolerable	to	reason.	If	Christianity	is	not	true	then	there	is	no	revelation	of	the	will	of	God	to	mankind	
	ix)	The	Christian	religion	‘considered	in	its	primitive	simplicity’	and	in	Scripture	supplies	all	the	‘marks	and	proofs	‘	of	being	a	divine	revelation	that	anyone	could	want.		
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x)	The	practical	duties	required	by	Christianity	contain	all	the	‘wise	and	true	precepts’	of	all	other	philosophies	(and	does	not	contain	any	of	the	absurd	and	superstitious	ones.)	As	such	Christianity	is	thoroughly	conducive	to	our	happiness	and	wellbeing.		
	xi)	The	motives	by	which	Christianity		‘enforces	the	practice	of	these	duties’	are	consistent	with	God’s	wisdom	and	man’s	natural	expectations.		
	xii)	The	ways	in	which	Christianity	‘enjoins’	our	duties	and	‘urges’	these	motives	is	reasonable.					xiii)	Many	truths	of	Christianity	are	not	discoverable	without	revelation	(by	reason	alone)	but	are	found	to	be	‘agreeable’	to	reason	and	moreover,	‘every	one	of	them	has	a	natural	tendency	and	a	direct	and	powerful	influence	to	reform	men’s	lives	and	correct	their	manners.’	These	truths	are	a	more	‘consistent	and	rational	scheme’	than	is	found	in	heathen	philosophy	or	promoted	by	‘modern	unbelievers’.		
	xiv)	Revelation	is	recognised	by	reason	as	truth,	but	signs,	miracles,	fulfilled	prophecies	and	the	testimony	of	Christ’s	followers	is	the	most	‘credible,	certain	and	convincing’	evidence	of	fact	that	exists.			
	xv)	Those	not	convinced	by	Clarke’s	argument	would	not	be	convinced	by	any	other	argument	or	evidence.			What	are	we	to	make	of	Clarke’s	apparent	undermining	of	the	claims	for	natural	reason	to	derive	our	obligation,	and	for	that	obligation	to	move	us	to	action?	The	rationalism	for	which	Clarke	is	now,	and	was	in	the	years	following	the	publication	of	the	lectures,	most	famous,	refers	to	our	natural	ability	to	discover	these	truths	for	ourselves,	hold	them	in	mind	as	we	make	a	moral	judgment,	and	in	his	grounding	of	their	justificatory	power	in	the	‘reason	of	things’.		Michael	Gill	makes	the	particularly	helpful	point	that	rationalism	or,	‘the	claim	that	morality	originates	in	reason	alone’	actually	contains	three	claims	that	can	be	clearly	
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delineated.	These	are:	the	metaphysical	claim	that	morality	consists	in	reason	(the	values	present	in	the	universe),	the	epistemological	claim	that	moral	knowledge	is	acquired	solely	through	reason,	and	the	practical	claim	that	reason	alone	can	move	us	to	moral	action.	Gill	believes	that	Cudworth	‘along	with	most	of	the	other	ethical	rationalists	of	the	seventeenth	and	eighteenth	centuries’	made	all	three	claims	and	rarely	distinguished	between	them.114	We	have	seen	that	the	epistemological	claim	can	be	justifiably	claimed	in	relation	to	Cudworth	only	with	some	accommodation	being	made	for	innate	sensory	affective	‘praecognitia’	operating	within	reason.	I	don’t	think	Balguy	can	be	said	to	make	all	three	of	these	claims	straightforwardly	either,	but	this	will	be	discussed	in	a	later	chapter.	Clarke,	as	we	have	seen,	certainly	held	to	the	metaphysical	claim	that	moral	value	consists	of	and	exists	in	the	‘abstract	reason	of	things’.	Clarke	also	made	the	epistemological	claim,	although	here	his	psychology	of	knowledge	acquisition	and	belief	formation	included	such	considerations	as	the	difference	between	an	ability	to	discover	a	truth	for	ourselves,	and	to	recognise	that	truth	once	it	has	been	taught	to	us	by	someone	we	recognise	as	having	sufficient	authority.	However,	the	practical	claim	may	only	be	said	to	have	been	made	by	Clarke	with	two	qualifications.	First,	as	we	shall	see,	Clarke	does	not	claim	that	a	rational	perception	of	the	fitness	of	an	action	alone	is	sufficient	to	motivate	the	performance	of	that	action.	If	reason	is	understood	as	the	rational	perception	of	the	fitness	of	actions	and	the	naturally	reasoned	truths	of	eternal	life	and	divine	reward	and	punishment,	then	Clarke	does	say	that	it	is	possible	that	for	a	few	gifted	ancients	natural	reason	may	have	been	able	to	motivate	action	–	in	an	indirect	way,	or	a	way	in	which	Clarke	did	not	make	clear		-	in	these	few	cases,	and	on	occasion.	Clarke’s	argument	against	the	Deists	though,	is	that	we	are	not	able,	in	the	main,	to	reason	ourselves	to	these	truths,	or	use	them	to	motivate	ourselves	consistently	where	we	have	reasoned	ourselves	naturally	to	them.	Second,	even	a	natural	appreciation	that	God’s	authority	entailed	that	his	justice	would	be	applied	in	a	future	state,	does	not	obligate	us.	It	might	motivate	us,	if	we	were	in	fact	able	to	discover	it	for	ourselves,	but	it	would	not	obligate	us	
morally.																																																										114	Gill,	British	Moralists,	273.	See	also	Beiser	Sovereignty,	267,	who	outlines	similar	tripartite	ambitions	for	English	rationalists.		
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	I	will	now	move	on	to	look	at	the	accounts	of	Clarke’s	thoughts	on	motivation	that	are	found	in	the	recent	secondary	literature.			The	treatment	of	Clarke	in	the	recent	secondary	literature	I	do	not	believe	that	Clarke	did	make	the	practical	claim	in	an	undifferentiated	form,	although	his	some	of	his	contemporaries	may	have	understood	him	to	have	done	so,	and	it	is	the	practical	claim	that	Clarke	has	received	much	attention	for	in	present	day	philosophical	circles.	Clarke	is	supposed	to	have	claimed	that	speculative	reason	is	sufficient	to	motivate	us	to	perform	an	action	we	believe	to	be	morally	‘right’,	via	our	perception	that	something	being	morally	right	is	obligatory	for	us.	Korsgaard	has	Clarke,	Balguy	and	Price	believing	that	‘the	perception	of	an	action	as	right,	or	what	they	took	to	be	the	same	thing	obligatory,	is	a	motive	to	do	it.’115	Irwin	says	that		Clarke,	however,	takes	bare	awareness	to	motivate	us.		He	believes	that	the	simple	grasp	of	a	moral	principle	motivates	a	well-ordered	will	to	choose	the	right	action.	A	sound	understanding	necessarily	grasps	the	true	moral	
principles	and	a	sound	will	necessarily	acts	on	them.116	[My	emphasis.]		Schneewind	argues	that	we	‘are	able	to	be	moved	by	the	fitness	of	things’	and	that	 Clarke	is	trying	to	think	his	way	to	the	view	that	it	is	our	rational	agency	that	makes	moral	principles	binding	on	us	and	enables	us	to	be	moved	by	them.117		Schneewind	also	claims	that	Clarke	held	that	the	obligation	to	act	in	conformity	with	our	understanding	of	what	is	right	and	wrong,	or	fit	or	unfit,		‘need	not,	at	least	in	principle,	be	backed	by	sanctions.’118		The	practical	claim	is	interpreted	by	these	authors	to	entail	that	our	rational	comprehension	of	our	obligation	is	sufficient	alone	to	motivate	us,	at	least	in	a	small	number	of	cases,	in	however	few	people.	It	is	important	to	emphasise	that																																																									115	Christine	Korsgaard,	“Kant's	Analysis	of	Obligation:	The	Arguments	of	Foundation	1,”	Monist	72,	no.3	(1979)	311-340.	116	Irwin,	Development,	Vol.		II,	387.		117	Schneewind,	Invention,	318-319.		118	Ibid.,	318.	
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this	is	not	the	claim	that	what	we	have	discovered	to	be	true	by	using	our	reason	is	capable	of	motivating	us.	Clarke	was	clear	that	a	very	few	respectable	heathen	moralists	were	able	to	discover	the	truths	about	the	existence	of	a	future	state,	in	which	the	compliance	or	non-compliance	with	an	all-powerful	divine	will	(acting	on	an	understanding	of	what	is	right)	would	be	met	with	the	force	of	his	justice.	This	though,	amounts	to	a	reasoned	understanding	of	the	hedonic	consequences	of	our	action	in	a	future	state.	This	knowledge	might	help	motivate	us,	and	Clarke	said	that	it	did,	but	it	is	not	part	of	our	knowledge	of	our	obligation,	which	is	caused	by	the	reason	of	things,	and	Clarke	did	not	claim	that	it	was.	Clarke	clearly	made	the	argument	that	self-interested	concern	with	the	pains	and	pleasures	of	eternal	life	motivates	us	to	behave	virtuously	(and	in	fact	he	terms	rewards	and	punishments	‘secondary	obligations’.)	Ferguson	notes	the	implications	of	the	change	between	the	argument	of	the	first	proposition	and	the	remainder,	i.e.	that	at	first	Clarke	said	that	our	awareness	of	our	obligation	motivates	us	and	that	he	then	switched	to	the	position	that	thoughts	of	our	happiness	motivate	us.119	I	don’t	believe	there	was	a	change	-	that	is,	Clarke	never	claimed	that,	in	practice,	post-Fall,	the	comprehension	of	rational	obligation	alone	is	a	sufficient	motive	for	action	(although	it	ought	to	be).	If	the	obligation	sat	within	a	framework	of	belief	acquired	naturally,	which	included	knowledge	of	God	and	a	future	eternal	state	in	which	justice	would	be	apportioned,	then	this	would	motivate	us.	The	thought	of	God’s	justice	in	a	future	state	is	a	motive	for	action	–	natural	religion	understood	by	reason	in	its	entirety	can	obligate	and	motivate	us	to	be	virtuous.	The	natural	understanding	that	an	act	is	obligatory	because	it	is	‘fit’	in	and	of	itself,	however,	will	not,	by	itself,	now	move	us	to	perform	it	in	the	absence	of	an	additional	motivational	impetus.			Clarke’s	moral	principles	included	equity	piety,	justice,	sobriety	or	prudent	self-love	and	benevolence.	We	might,	as	Schneewind	argues,	see	the	eternal	fitness	of	obeying	and	worshipping	God.120		We	may	see	that	it	is	rational	and	fit	for	God	to	govern	us	and	distribute	justice,	and	that	the	expected	rewards	and	punishments	are	reasonable,	but	I	suggest	that	Clarke	does	not	argue	that	it	is	the	perception																																																									119	See	Ferguson,	Samuel	Clarke,	89.		120	Schneewind,	Invention,	317.	
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of	these	particular	fitnesses,	derived	from	moral	principles	which	moves	us	–	rather	that	it	is	the	thought	of	the	experience	of	punishment	or	reward,	which	is	necessary	for	the	actual	performance	of	the	action.	Clarke	in	fact	stated	the	following:		The	dread	of	superior	power	and	authority	and	the	sanctions	of	reward	and	punishment;	however	absolutely	necessary	to	the	government	of	frail	and	fallible	creatures,	and	truly	the	most	effectual	means	of	keeping	them	in	their	duty;	is	yet	really	in	itself	only	a	secondary	and	additional	
obligation	or	inforcement	of	the	first.	121[My	emphasis.]		If	it	is	an	‘absolute’	(presumably	logical)	necessity	for	God	to	use	our	dread	of	power	and	associated	sanctions	to	govern	us,	then	yes,	this	secondary	obligation	may	be	said	to	derive	from	God’s	comprehension	of	eternal	law,	but	it	is	not	only,	or	simply,	our	perception	of	the	fitness	of	secondary	obligations	that	moves	us	surely?	It	is	the	obligatory	force	of	the	thought	of	the	actual	dread	or	the	anticipated	pains	and	pleasures	of	a	future	state.			Schneewind	insists	that	for	Clarke,	‘sanctions	have	no	role	in	obligating’.122	I	agree	that	this	is	true	of	what	Clarke	terms	‘formal’	obligation,	but	Schneewind,	as	we	saw,	also	says	that	Clarke	argued	that	formal	obligation	‘need	not,	at	least	in	principle,	be	backed	by	sanctions.’123	Schneewind	does	not	quote	Clarke	here	but	provides	a	single	reference	after	this	statement	(‘Works,	I,	p.614’).	124		In	this	edition,	on	page	614	we	find	Clarke	insisting	that	the	wills	and	actions	of	‘all	rational	creatures’	ought	to	be	constantly	determined	by	the	‘eternal	rule	of	right	and	equity’	and	that			 the	justice	and	conscience	of	a	man’s	own	mind,	concerning	the	reasons	and	fitness	of	the	thing	that	his	actions	should	be	conformed	to	such	or	such	a	rule	or	law;	is	the	truest	and	formallest	obligation;	even	more	properly	so	than	any	opinion	whatsoever	of	the	authority	of	the	giver	of	a	law	or	any	regard	he	may	have	to	its	sanctions	by	reward	and	punishment.																																																												121	Clarke,	Natural	Religion,	191.		122	Schneewind,	Invention,	315.		123	Ibid.,	318.	124		The	Works	of	Samuel	Clarke:	Sermons	on	Several	Subjects.	(London:	Knapton,	1738;	repr.,	New	York:	Garland,	1978)	614.	The	corresponding	page	number	in	the	edition	I	have	used	is	191.		
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Clarke	here,	I	believe,	just	argued	that	formal	obligation	is	more	proper	than	secondary	obligation,	but	not	that	it	is	possible,	even	in	principle	(post-Fall),	to	act	without	knowledge	of	secondary	obligation,	or	enforcement	‘of	the	first’.	This	passage	is	followed	by	Clarke’s	views	on	the	self-condemnation	of	conscience	and	then	immediately	the	quotation	above	concerning	sanctions	and	secondary	obligation.			At	the	end	of	the	page	Clarke	goes	on	to	say	that	God,	who	has	no	superior,	always	obliges	himself	to	govern	the	world	according	to	his	understanding	of	the	reason	of	things	(and	is	not	made	happier	or	less	happy	by	doing	so).		Clarke	goes	on:		
And	the	more	excellent	and	perfect,	(or	the	freer	form	corruption	and	
depravation)	any	creatures	are	the	more	cheerfully	and	steadily	are	their	wills	always	determined	by	their	supreme	obligation,	in	conformity	to	the	nature,	and	in	imitation	of	the	perfect	will	of	God.	[My	emphasis]		Clarke,	as	we	have	seen,	made	his	views	on	our	current	(intellectual	and	moral)	corruption	and	depravity	completely	clear.	He	talks	here	of	‘creatures’	rather	than	human	beings	per	se	(and	at	the	beginning	of	this	section	says		‘all	rational	creatures’	are	obliged	by	the	eternal	rule	of	right	and	equity	and	that	this	covers	‘Men’.)	Given	the	prevalence	of	the	view	of	the	more	perfect	understanding	and	natures	of	angels,	and	the	less	perfect	understanding	and	natures	of	men	and	then	of	animals,	I	suggest	that	the	more	perfect	creatures	referred	to	here	are	angelic.		Clarke’s	follower	Balguy	referred	to	angelic	natures	and	their	moral	abilities	in	a	similar	fashion	in	relation	to	our	need	for	religion.	Balguy	argued	that	those		
purer	beings,	which	are	of	an	order	superior	to	human	nature,	need	not	
perhaps	any	other	rule	than	the	internal	one	of	reason	or	virtue;	but	our	frail	and	faulty	species	wants	both	another	law,	and	a	legislator,	to	curb	their	follies	and	vices,	and	keep	them	in	some	measure	within	the	bounds	of	their	duty.	125	[My	emphasis.]			I	think	that	Clarke’s	statement	refers	to	a	sliding	scale	of	ability	in	all	‘creatures’	to	govern	their	wills	by	formal	obligation	alone.	In	the	very	next	sentence	Clarke																																																									125	Balguy,	Second	Part,	43.			
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reverts	to	stating	that	‘men’	ought	to	govern	their	will	by	the	reason	of	things	as	‘indispensably”	as	their	assent	is	governed	by	it.		My	reading	of	this	page	is	that	we	are	under	a	formal	obligation	to	act	according	to	our	own	judgment	of	what	is	right	–	but	Clarke	does	not	say	that	we	are	under	an	obligation	to	act	from	this	formal	obligation	alone,	or	that	we	can	do	–	we	are	just	under	an	obligation	not	to	act	against	it.			So,	with	respect	to	the	practical	claim,	I	agree	that	Clarke	held	that	purely	rational	motivation	is	possible	where	that	rational	motivation	includes	the	rational	comprehension	of	eternal	rewards	and	punishments	(secondary	obligation).	Clarke	said	that	we	are	formally	obliged	to	govern	ourselves	according	to	the	reason	of	things,	but	I	do	not	believe	that	he	argued	that,	even	in	principle,	that	human	beings	(post-Fall)	could	do	this	without	an	appreciation	of	both	our	formal	and	secondary	obligations.		Clarke	then,	did	not	hold,	as	Irwin	claims,	that	‘bare’	speculative	reason	could	motivate	us,	unless	that	reason	contained	an	understanding	of	an	hedonically	tinted	promise	or	threat.		Clarke	repeatedly	told	us	that	it	couldn’t.		He	did,	however,	repeatedly	tell	us	that	we	are	obligated	by	reason	and	that	we	could	understand	our	formal	obligation	by	reason.	This	is	just	one	example:		So	far	therefore	as	men	are	conscious	of	what	is	right	and	wrong,	so	far	they	are	under	an	obligation	to	act	accordingly	–	it	ought	to	govern	men’s	actions	as	it	cannot	but	necessarily	determine	their	assent.126			Irwin	claims	that	Clarke	believed	that		A	sound	understanding	necessarily	grasps	the	true	moral	principles	and	a	sound	will	necessarily	acts	on	them.127		This	is	perhaps	fair	comment	as	long	as	Clarke	is	understood	to	have	maintained	that	first,	neither	our	understandings,	nor	our	wills	have	been	sound	since	the	Fall,	and	second	that	‘bare	awareness’	must	also	grasp	the	truths	about	our	continued	existence	in	a	future	state	and	dread	the	punishment	or	look	forward	to	the	reward	that	will	be	ours	in	that	future	state.																																																									126	Clarke,	Natural	Religion,	191.		127	Irwin,	Development,	Vol.		II,	387.		
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	The	entire	point	of	the	second	lecture	series	was	to	deliver	bad	news	to	the	four	different	kinds	of	present	day	deists	condemned	by	Clarke	as	‘vain	pretenders	to	reason.’128		Clarke	counted	as	deists	those	who	understood	God	to	have	created	the	world,	but	then	to	have	opted	out	of	any	involvement	with	it;	those	who	maintained	that	God	continued	to	maintain	his	creation,	but	did	not	recognise	the	basis	for	the	moral	judgments	made	by	his	creatures;	those	who	believed	that	God	is	possessed	of	natural	and	moral	attributes,	but	who	did	not	believe	in	future	state	for	immortal	souls,	and	finally	those	who	held	that	natural	reason	is	capable	of	discovering	the	religious	truth	including	moral	truths,	and	who	denied	a	necessary	role	for	revelation	in	this	process.129	The	bad	news	that	Clarke	was	keen	to	impart	was	that	only	Christianity,	as	revealed	in	Scripture,	is	able	to	provide	the	appropriate	psychological	conditions	for	us	to	be	good.	For	Clarke,	the	practical	force	contained	within	Revelation	is	the	means	by	which	God	has	made	it	possible	for	us	to	be	good.	Revelation	was	needed	because	of	the	historic	fact	of	our	wilful	failure	in	the	‘past	trial’	to	put	our	natural	reasoning	abilities	to	their	proper	purpose	in	order	discover	all	of	the	moral	truth	we	needed	in	order	to	behave.			At	this	point	we	can	notice	the	similarity	between	Clarke’s	argument	and	Locke’s	claim	in	the	final	chapter	of	the	Reasonableness	that	natural	or	unassisted	reason	is	incapable	of	discovering	and	keeping	us	to	our	duty	sufficiently	(hence	the	need	for	Christ).	Locke	argued	that	God	had	provided	all	of	us	with	a	natural	reason	(the	‘candle	of	the	Lord’)	through	which	(by	the	‘light	of	reason’)	he	revealed	to	us	his	existence	(‘through	the	works	of	nature’),	his	power	and	his	goodness,	and	that	as	his	creatures	we	were	under	a	law	that	specified	both	our	duties	and	various	ways	to	reconciliation	should	we	fail	in	those	duties.130	So	Locke	asked,	given	that	this	knowledge	was	at	least	in	theory	accessible,	‘What	need	was	there	of	a	Saviour?	What	advantage	have	we	by	Jesus	Christ’?																																																										128	Ibid.,150.		129	See	Ferguson,	Heretic,	28,	for	this	summary.		130	Locke,	Reasonableness,	190-191.	There	is	also	an	interesting	discussion	on	Locke’s	position	here	in	relation	to	Spinoza	in	Andrea	Sangiacomo	“Locke	and	Spinoza	on	the	Epistemic	and	Motivational	Weaknesses	of	Reason:	The	Reasonableness	of	Christianity	and	the	Theological-
Political	Treatise,”	Intellectual	History	Review	26,	no.	4	(2016):	477-495.	
 62 
	Locke	then	proceeded	to	work	his	way	through	the	historical	reasons	for	Christ’s	appearance.	Either	blinded	by	‘sense	and	lust’,	or	by	‘a	careless	inadvertency’,	we	had	failed	to	use	our	natural	reason	to	look	at	the	works	of	nature	that	clearly	‘evidence’	a	benevolent	deity.	Fear	and	suspicion	of	a	superior	being	had	led	us	into	the	clutches	of	false	polytheistic	priests,	who	led	us	further	into	darkness,	ignorance,	vice	and	superstition,	through	‘wrong	notions	and	invented	rites’.		Our	natural	reason	was	at	this	point	of	no	use,	since	reason	had	been	driven	from	religion	and	was	‘judged	to	have	nothing	to	do	in	the	case’.		Fear	and	superstition	reigned	within	our	minds	and	reason,	which	would	have	informed	us	of	the	existence	of	‘the	one	invisible	true	God’,	except	that	through	our	own	misuse	reason	now	lacked	sufficient	authority	within	our	own	minds	to	‘prevail	upon	the	virtuous’.	Lacking	a	true	idea	of	God,	we	also	lacked	proper	knowledge	of	our	duty.131	The	Mosaic	Revelation	was	contained	within	that	community	and	did	not	spread.	Locke	asserted	that		natural	religion	in	its	full	extent,	was	no	where,	that	I	know	of,	taken	care	of	by	the	force	of	natural	reason.		.	.	.	‘tis	too	hard	a	task	for	unassisted	reason,	to	establish	morality	in	all	its	parts	upon	its	true	foundations;	with	a	clear	and	convincing	light.132		Deducing	our	certain	duties	required	‘such	trains	of	reasonings’	that	it	made	the	task	too	difficult	for	most.		Revelation	by	Christ	was	the	‘surer	and	shorter	way’	for	God	to	disclose	our	duties	with	sufficient	authority	to	that	the	‘mass	of	mankind’,	who	lacking	will,	ability,	education	or	time,	could	then	be	brought	to	obedience.	The	task	of	discovering	all	the	parts	of	the	moral	law	that	pertained	to	us	is	so	difficult,	Locke	argued,	that	even	the	learned	Christian	philosophers	had	failed	to	realise	the	debt	they	owed	to	revelation,	which	provided	the	seeds	of	a	rational	account	of	Christianity.	Here,	Locke	made	the	distinction	between	the	discovery	of	truth	and	rational	reception	to	truth	once	it	is	promulgated:	Native	and	original	truth,	is	not	so	easily	wrought	out	of	the	mine	as	we	who	have	it	delivered,	ready	dug	and	fashioned	into	our	hands,	are	apt	to	imagine.133																																																										131	Clarke,	Natural	Religion,	192-94.	132	Ibid.,	195.		133	Ibid,.		
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As	for	the	ancient	philosophers	-	the	‘wise	heathens’	-	Locke’s	conclusion	was	that		 ‘tis	plain	in	fact,	that	human	reason	unassisted,	failed	men	in	its	great	and	proper	business	of	morality.	It	is	never	from	unquestionable	principles,	by	clear	deductions,	made	out	an	entire	body	of	the	law	of	nature.	And	he	that	will	collect	all	the	moral	rules	of	the	philosophers,	and	compare	them	with	those	contained	in	the	New	Testament	will	find	them	to	come	short	of	the	morality	delivered	by	our	saviour,	and	taught	by	his	apostles.134		Even,	Locke	maintained,	if	we	were	to	allow	that	these	philosophers	had	made	out	all	the	rules	by	which	we	were	to	live	life	(and	he	stressed	they	had	not),	then	this	rulebook	would	still	fail	as	a	guide	to	practical	morality,	as	it	would	not	have	been	backed	by	sufficient	authority	to	place	us	under	an	obligation.	We	could	accept	or	reject	it	at	will	because	our	obligations	to	conform	to	its	dictates	had	not	been	made	out.	The	law	of	nature	is	not	a	complete	system	of	morality	without	a	demonstration	of	its	obligatory	nature,	which	is,	Locke	insisted,	the	power	of	the	law	maker	to	make	or	destroy	our	happiness	in	a	future	life	in	which	the	‘great	rewards	and	punishments,	for	those	who	would,	or	would	not	obey	him’	would	become	manifest.135	Locke	argued	that	the	rewards	for	virtue	in	our	earthly	existence	were	insufficiently	tied	to	its	performance	and	without	
certain	knowledge	of	a	future	realm	where	this	state	of	affairs	would	be	remedied,	the	motivation	for	moral	behaviour	was	too	weak.136		Clarke	too	was	pellucid	on	the	degeneration	of	our	natural	ability	in	the	‘generality	of	men’	to	correctly	identify	that	which	is	fit	or	unfit	to	be	done.	The	reasons	for	this	(which	compound	the	results	of	our	original	Fall)	are	given	as	our	carelessness	and	lack	of	attention,	false	notions	supplied	by	an	evil	education,	and	the	effect	of	sensual	desires	and	appetites,	where	debauched	practice	destroys	our	ability	to	think	properly	or	to	want	to	think	properly	about	moral	duty.	We	all	now	require	particular	instruction	to	give	us	accurate	moral	ideas	and	to	convince	us	of	their	truth,	certainty	and	importance.	There	is	a	reciprocal	effect	of	ignorant	thought	and	vicious	practice	upon	one	another,	such	that																																																										134	Ibid.,	196.	135	Ibid.,	199	136	Ibid.,	203-204.		
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vicious	customs	and	actions,	reciprocally	increase	the	blindness	of	their	hearts,	darken	the	judgments	of	their	understandings,	stupefy	and	sear	their	consciences	so	as	to	become	past	feeling,	and	by	degrees	extinguish	wholly	that	light	of	nature	in	their	own	minds,	which	was	given	to	them	originally	to	enable	them	to	discern	between	good	and	evil.137		Clarke	disagreed	with	Locke	that	the	obligation	for	moral	behaviour	derived	from	its	status	as	a	command	from	an	all-powerful	lawmaker.	For	Clarke,	formal	obligation	derived	from	the	conformity	of	an	action	to	a	value	specified	in	eternal	law	by	the	relation	of	object,	things	or	persons	to	one	another.	For	Locke,	in	this	text,	obligation	had	motive	force	because	the	belief	in	a	command	made	by	an	omnipotent	lawmaker	(even	where	it	is	a	command	made,	by	a	benevolent	lawmaker	with	reference	to	an	eternal	and	immutable	law	that	states	what	is	good	or	evil),	was	accompanied	by,	or	bound	up	with,	the	motivating	belief	of	likelihood	of	associated	rewards	and	punishments	attached	to	compliance	or	non-compliance.		For	Clarke,	obligation	derived	from	values	present	necessarily,	eternally	and	immutably,	and	not	by	the	command	per	se	of	a	lawgiver	referring	to	these	values.	Motivation,	for	Clarke,	was	extrinsic	to	the	obligation,	but	it	was	indispensable	for	the	fulfilment	of	obligation.	This	is	what	an	understanding	of	the	New	Testament	provided.	Clarke	also	thought,	like	Locke,	that	unassisted	reason	failed	to	deliver	a	complete	moral	law	because	of	the	weakness	of	our	minds	and	will,	and	the	lack	of	authority	that	rational	deliverance	on	its	own	carried	within	our	fallen	natures.	This	meant	that	virtue	alone	was	insufficiently	attractive	to	us	to	motivate	performance,	but	the	remedy	of	revelation	here	spoke	to	motivation	and	not	obligation	itself.					It	is	also	important	to	emphasise	that	Clarke	thought	that	the	‘wise	and	good	laws’	made	for	us	and	commanded	by	God,	if	followed,	would	lead	to	our	happiness.	They	‘tend	to	the	good	of	mankind’.138		Clarke	was	absolutely	clear	though,	that	the	obligatory	force	of	our	moral	ideas	derived	from	what	is	fit	or	unfit	to	be	done,	and	not	from	the	good	that	virtue	may	accrue	us.	I	believe	that	Clarke	argued	that	we	need	to	have	a	full	and	complete	understanding	of	that	part	of	God’s	ordained	law	for	us,	which	he	freely	chose	to	conform	to	eternal																																																									137	Clarke,	Natural	Religion,	277.	138	Clarke,	Being	and	Attributes,	90.	
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law,	and	which	includes	the	law	of	nature,	in	order	for	it	to	be	possible	for	us	to	effectively	fulfil	our	moral	duties.	This	full	and	complete	understanding	was	revealed	in	Scripture	to	us,	because	we	had	failed	to	derive	it	from	our	natural	comprehension	of	the	law	of	nature.			Clarke	did	not	go	so	far	as	to	claim	that	nobody	ever	had	been	able	to	understand	and	fulfil	any	moral	obligation	without	knowing	and	accepting	the	whole	of	the	Christian	revelation,	but	he	said	that	‘those	few	of’	the	heathen	philosophers	who	may	have	done	so	were	exactly	those	who	had	reasoned	their	way	to	a	confident	belief	in	a	future	state.	That	is,	they	fulfilled	their	obligations,	motivated	by	the	thought	of	future	hedonic	consequences.	Clarke	did	not	directly	state	that	this	was	their	motivation	but	he	stated	that	belief	in	a	future	state	had	been	discovered	by	‘those	few’	through	natural	reason	alone	and	that	(some	of)	the	ancient	moralists	had	‘indeed	a	consistent	scheme	of	deism	as	far	as	it	went’.	They	were	‘very	brave	and	wise	men,	if	any	of	them	could	keep	steady	and	firm	to	
it’	139	(my	emphasis).	Clarke	clearly	doubted	here	the	ability	of	these	men	to	be	consistently	virtuous,	and	claimed	that	part	of	their	wisdom	was	to	see	the	necessity	for	revelation.	This	was	a	necessity	also	foreseen	by	God,	and	met	partly	by	the	revelation	of	the	commandments	to	Moses,	but	mainly	by	the	coming	of	Christ.			Nowhere	in	the	text	of	the	second	lecture	series	did	Clarke	claim	that	fulfilment	of	an	obligation	from	natural	religion	could	occur	without	the	natural	understanding	that	that	obligation	is	also	the	commandment	of	an	all-powerful	God	who	will	expose	us	to	his	justice	at	some	point.	He	made	the	opposite	claim,	thus:	 All	the	great	things	that	modern	deists	affect	to	say	of	right	reason	as	to	its	sufficiency	in	discovering	obligations	and	motives	of	morality;	is	only	a	pretence.140		Virtuous	action,	where	it	resulted	from	natural	religion,	was	made	possible	by	our	knowledge	of	the	other	tenets	of	natural	religion.	It	did	not	come	about	from																																																									139	Clarke,	Natural	Religion,	172.	140	Ibid.,	314.	
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the	reasoned	belief	or	knowledge	that	an	action	is	right.		It	might	have	come	about	as	the	results	of	our	natural	reasoning	of	other	religious	truths,	but	this	is	not	the	claim	that	the	‘bare	awareness’	of	the	fitness	of	an	action,	which	is	understood	as	an	obligation,	can	motivate	us.	It	also	entails	that	even	if	the	practical	claim	is	interpreted	as	including	religious	truths,	then	these	truths	include	the	certainty	of	future	reward	and	punishment	to	be	meted	out	to	us.	A	bare	awareness	of	certain	eternal	damnation	would	motivate	us.	It	does	not	obligate	us,	but	then	the	performance	of	a	moral	action	or	the	forbearance	of	a	degenerate	one	does	not	arise	from	the	obligation,	but	from	the	fear	or	hope	engendered	by	the	thought	of	acting	against	or	in	accordance	with	that	obligation.	Clarke,	throughout	the	text,	sets	‘obligations	and	motives’	apart.	Indeed	in	proposition	(xi)	Clarke	described	the	ways	in	which	the	motives	supplied	by	Christianity	are	consistent	with	reason,	and	in	proposition	(xii)	Clarke	says	that	the	way	in	which	Christianity	‘urges’	our	motive	to	perform	our	duties	is	reasonable	and	refers	to	the	setting	before	men	of	their	duties	but	also	the	great	dangers	involved	in	neglecting	them.141		Looking	hard	for	any	evidence	of	the	claim	that	Clarke	believed	that	obligation	is	ever	sufficient	to	motivate	us,	we	might	look	at	the	following	quotations	cited	in	the	secondary	literature	in	support	of	the	practical	claim:	1)	The	fitness	of	men’s	governing	all	their	actions	by	the	rule	of	right	or	equity:	and	also	that	this	assent	is	a	formal	obligation	upon	every	man,	actually	and	constantly	to	conform	himself	to	that	rule.142		This	again	is	simply	the	understanding	that	assent	results	in	obligation.	There	are	frequent	examples	of	this	claim	in	Clarke’s	text,	some	of	which	we	have	already	seen.		The	following	passage	is	also	offered	in	support	of	the	idea	that	understanding	fitness	alone	as	an	obligation	is	practically	sufficient	to	move	us	to	that	action:		2)	And	by	this	understanding	or	knowledge	of	the	natural	and	necessary	relations,	fitnesses	and	proportions	of	things,	the	wills	likewise	of	all	intelligent	beings	are	constantly	directed,	and	must	needs	be	determined																																																									141	Ibid.,	344.		142	Ibid.,	199.		
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to	act	accordingly;	excepting	those	only,	who	will	things	to	be	what	they	are	not	and	cannot	be;	that	is	those,	whose	wills	are	corrupted	by	particular	interest	or	affection,	or	swayed	by	some	unreasonable	and	prevailing	passion.143			Clarke	claimed	that	assent	‘constantly	directs’,	by	which	we	might	understand	that	it	counsels,	or	points	towards	or	issues	an	order	to	the	will.	Clarke	argued	elsewhere,	that	moral	necessity	does	not	imply	physical	or	absolute	necessity.	Our	understanding	as	to	what	is	fit	could	issue	a	command	but	our	liberty	is	such	that	we	might	reject	this	and	select	another	(less	reasonable)	reason	for	acting.144	Clarke	did,	as	Schneewind	says,	argue	in	a	later	sermon	that	when	we	act	we	always	act	with	‘some	view’	in	mind,	but	this	view	could	also	be	that	given	to	us	by	‘the	brutal	guidance	of	mere	appetite	and	passion’.			Schneewind	argues	that	Clarke’s	view	of	rational	agency	entails	that	we	are	‘unable	to	escape	being	moved	by	reasons	at	least	to	some	extent’	145	(my	emphasis).	The	trouble	is	that	the	‘at	least	to	some	extent’	makes	the	claim	trivial,	in	the	moral	case.	Obviously,	I	might	well	have	a	view	of	my	obligation	to	repay	a	debt	and	a	view	of	my	finances	being	better	served	by	not	repaying	it.	My	will	may	be	‘directed’	by	both	views.	Schneewind	admits	soon	after	in	the	moral	case	that	in	doing	so	he	runs	afoul	of	a	problem	that	he	barely	touches	on.	We	can,	regrettably	know	what	we	ought	to	do	and	yet	not	do	it.146			This	is	presumably	why	Schneewind	starts	the	sentence	with	‘Clarke	is	trying	to	think	his	way	to	the	view	that	it	is	our	rational	agency	that	makes	moral	principles	binding	on	us	and	enables	us	to	be	moved	by	them.’	There	is,	though,	very	little	evidence	that	that	is	what	Clarke	did	think.	Clarke,	on	the	contrary	argued	for	the	‘necessity	of	rewards	and	punishment’	in	the	‘practice	of	virtue’.147	Given	the	immediate	rewards	that	vice	seems	to	offer	and	where	
																																																								143	Clarke,	Natural	Religion,	186.	144		See	James	A.	Harris,	Of	Liberty	and	Necessity:	The	Free	Will	Debate	in	Eighteenth	Century	
British	Philosophy	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2005),	46-53,	for	Clarke’s	view	of	liberty,	145	Schneewind,	Invention,	318.		146	Schneewind,	Invention,	318-9.		147	Clarke,	Natural	Religion,	223.		
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virtue	is	often	threatened	with	great	calamities,	losses	and	sometimes	even	death	itself,	Clarke	maintained	the	following:	This	alters	the	question	and	destroys	the	practice	of	that	which	appears	to	be	so	reasonable	in	the	whole	speculation.148			Indeed,	Clarke	claimed	it	was	‘the	error	of	the	Stoics’,	to	assume	that	the	rightness	of	virtue	made	it	'entirely	self-sufficient'.	For	though	virtue	is	unquestionably	worthy	to	be	chosen	for	its	own	sake,	even	without	expectation	of	reward;	yet	it	does	not	follow	that	it	is	therefore	entirely	self	sufficient,	and	able	to	support	men	under	all	kinds	of	sufferings,	even	death	itself,	for	its	sake;	without	any	prospect	of	future	recompense.	Here	therefore	began	the	error	of	the	Stoics;	who	taught	that	the	bare	practice	of	virtue,	was	itself	the	chief	good,	and	able	of	itself	to	make	a	man	happy,	under	all	the	calamities	in	the	world.149		Clarke	did	not	‘run	afoul	of	a	problem	he	barely	touches	upon’	as	Schneewind	suggests.	On	the	contrary	knowing	what	do	to	and	yet	not	doing	it	is	at	the	forefront	of	Clarke’s	attempt	to	privilege	an	understanding	of	revealed	truths	as	the	only	source	of	knowledge	that	can	lead	us	to	a	virtuous	life.	Schneewind	finds	Clarke’s	account	of	the	weakness	of	the	will,	based,	as	it	is	on	our	corrupted	nature,	‘hardly	philosophically	satisfying’.150	But	this	is	akin	to	the	complaint	that	sees	Hutcheson’s	moral	theory	is	not	‘recognisably	realist’	to	present-day	readers.151	Plainly	neither	Clarke,	nor	Hutcheson,	was	attempting	to	satisfy	or	interest	philosophers	who	exclude	the	workings	of	divine	providence.	Both	thinkers	sought	to	offer	solutions	to	the	problems	of	a	Christian	moral	life	lived	in	the	round	and	not	to	satisfy	the	Whiggish	demands	of	later	histories	of	autonomy	or	moral	cognitivism.			Schneewind	doesn’t	use	quotation	(2)	(Irwin	does)	but	perhaps	he	ought	to	have,	because	the	second	phrase	in	the	sentence	that	‘the	wills	likewise	of	all	intelligent	beings	are	constantly	directed,	and	must	needs	be	determined	to	act	
accordingly’	(my	emphasis)	is	more	problematic.	The	phrase	is	not	problematic	if	
																																																								148	Ibid.,	223.		149	Ibid.		150	Schneewind,	Invention,	319.		151	Peter	J.	E.	Kail	“Hutcheson's	Moral	Sense:	Skepticism,	Realism,	and	Secondary	Qualities,”	
History	of	Philosophy	Quarterly	18,	no.	1	(2001):	77.		
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‘must	needs	be’	is	read	as	‘should’	or	‘ought	to’	be	determined	to	act	accordingly,	but	could	‘must	needs	be’,	be	read	as	‘are’	determined	to	act	accordingly?			The	passage	is	taken	from	a	section	of	Clarke’s	argument	that	God	always	determines	his	will	according	to	his	perfect	understanding.	Clarke	continued	that	it	is	also	‘very	unreasonable	and	blame-worthy	in	practice’	that	rational	creatures	gifted	with	faculties	of	reason	and	will,	which	allow	us	to	identify	good	and	evil	(reason)	and	choose	good	and	reject	evil	(will)	act	viciously.	But	he	then	said,	‘if	we	suppose	no	future	state	of	rewards	it	will	follow	that	God	has	endued	men	with	such	faculties’,	and	has	put	them	under	a	necessity	of	approving	and	choosing	virtue	in	the	judgment	of	their	own	minds;	and	yet	has	not	given	them	the	wherewith	to	support	themselves	in	the	suitable	and	constant	practice	of	it.152		So,	if	we	read	that	either	our	wills,	or	we	as	the	intelligent	beings	‘must	needs	be	determined	to	act	accordingly’	as	meaning	that	we	do	act	accordingly,	or	our	wills	are	determined	to	act	accordingly,	by	our	knowledge	of	fitness	and	unfitness,	then	this	makes	nonsense	of	Clarke’s	understanding	that	we	need	the	thought	of	certain	future	rewards	or	punishments	to	bring	ourselves	to	be	virtuous.	A	resolution	might	be	suggested	by	looking	at	Leibniz’s	response	to	Clarke’s	position	on	the	liberty	of	the	will,	but	it	should	be	noted	that	Clarke’s	various	statements	on	liberty	do	not	seem	to	have	been	reconciled	in	a	manner	that	anyone	other	than	Clarke	has	found	satisfactory.153		Clarke’s	position	(or	one	of	them)	was	that	it	is	impossible	for	the	last	judgment	of	the	understanding	to	move	an	agent	to	act	since	judgment	is	a	passive	occurrence	and	cannot	move	us	to	act.	At	one	point,	in	a	later	letter,	Clarke	claimed	that		there	is	no	connection	between	approbation	and	action,	between	what	is	passive	and	what	is	active.	The	spring	of	action	is	not	the	understanding,	for	a	being	incapable	of	action	might	nevertheless	be	capable	of	perception.154																																																										152	Clarke,	Natural	Religion,	225.		153	See	Harris,	Liberty,	52-53.		154	Clarke,	“Clarke’s	Answer	to	Bulkeley’s	First	Letter”	in	Being	and	Attributes,	26.		
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Clarke	maintained	that,	in	fact,	the	‘spring	of	action	is	the	self-motive	power	which	is	(in	all	animals)	spontaneity,	and	(in	rational	ones)	we	call	liberty.’	An	agent	then	is	always	moved	to	act	on	something	other	than	the	last	judgement	of	the	understanding.	Harris	though,	understands	Clarke’s	notion	of	freedom	to	entail	a	further	liberty.	That	is,	the	liberty	to	choose	to	perform	a	different	action	than	the	one	that	our	last	judgment	has	approved	(where	this	liberty	is	still	a	freedom	to	choose	and	not	a	freedom	to	act).	Leibniz,	in	an	exchange	with	Clarke,	may	be	seen	as	having	understood	Clarke	this	way,	and	saw	the	problematic	implications	of	this	for	the	motive	force	of	reasons.	Clarke’s	manoeuvring	around	the	various	senses	of	necessity,	Leibniz	argued,	dissociated	‘the	mind	from	the	motives’	in	such	a	way	as	we	are	left	needing	a	second-order	motive	to	choose	to	choose	the	last	judgment	of	the	understanding.155		So	then	Clark’s	account	of	freedom	does	not	simply	claim	that	we	are	not	moved	to	action	by	an	act	of	the	understanding,	but	further	that	the	understanding	does	not	determine	which	action	it	is	that	we	end	up	choosing.			It	is	possible	that	Clarke’s	account	of	liberty	left	the	space	between	the	last	judgment	of	the	understanding	that	an	action	was	fit	or	unfit	and	the	election	of	that	action,	in	order	that	the	motives	supplied	by	Christianity	might	have	a	role	in	moral	conduct	(not	covered	by	the	judgment	that	an	action	is	fitting	or	unfitting).	The	power	to	choose	differently,	after	the	last	judgment	of	the	understanding	has	been	issued,	is	captured	by	the	passage	where	Clarke	talks	about	the	unfairness	of	the	situation	where	without	knowledge	of	just	rewards	and	punishment	being	handed	out	in	a	future	state,	we	would	be		under	a	necessity	of	approving	and	choosing	virtue	in	the	judgment	of	their	own	minds;	and	yet	has	not	given	them	the	wherewith	to	support	themselves	in	the	suitable	and	constant	practice	of	it.156		Clarke	insisted	that,	in	practice,	we	need	further	motives	to	help	us	to	choose	to	choose	what	our	understanding	has	put	us	under	a	‘necessity	of	approving	and	choosing’.																																																											155	Quoted	in	Harris,	Of	Liberty,	53.		156	Clarke,	Natural	Religion,	225.		
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This	also	helps	to	understand	why	a	rationally	derived	obligation	to	act	is	not	ever	seen	by	Clarke	as	having	the	power	to	motivate	us.	The	correct	reading	of	
must	needs	be	determined	to	act	accordingly	in	quotation	2	is	that	our	wills	should	or	ought	to	be	directed	by	our	understanding	to	act	accordingly	by	the	force	of	moral	necessity	which	does	not	imply	a	loss	of	freedom	to	ignore	the	dictates	of	reason.			That	Clarke	understood	obligation	and	motive	as	independent	entities,	to	be	derived	independently	is	also	alluded	to	here:		All	the	great	things	that	modern	deists	affect	to	say	of	right	reason	as	to	its	sufficiency	in	discovering	obligations	and	motives	of	morality;	is	only	a	pretence.157		Clarke,	however,	also	said	that		every	man,	because	of	the	natural	liberty	of	his	will,	can	and	ought	to	govern	all	his	actions	by	some	certain	rule	and	give	a	reason	for	everything	he	does.158	(My	emphasis.)			Which	certainly	suggests	a	more	compatibilist	reading	of	Clarke’s	view	of	freedom,	but	it	is	not	my	aim	here	to	offer	a	full	treatment	of	Clarkes’	views	on	freedom.		My	point	is	that	Clarke’s	wider	argument	was	that	in	our	present	fallen	state	we	need	revelation	to	help	us	truly	believe	that	there	will	be	future	consequences	to	our	actions.	Clarke	admired	those	very	few	ancient	heathens	who	managed	to	reason	the	existence	of	a	future	state,	but	he	was	sceptical	of	their	ability	to	be	consistently	virtuous,	especially,	as	we	saw	in	his	rebuttal	of	stoic	claims	of	the	self-sufficiency	of	virtue,	in	the	face	of	misfortune	and	tragedy.	Just	because	we	could,	and	should	govern	our	actions	according	to	a	rule,	does	not	imply	that	we	must	only	use	knowledge	of	the	judgment	of	fitness	or	unfitness	to	practically	govern	our	actions.			I	now	turn	to	look	at	Clarke’s	account	of	conscience	in	relation	to	obligation.			Clarke,	conscience	and	obligation																																																										157	Ibid.,	314.	158	Ibid.,	273.		
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At	this	point	we	can	press	Clarke	still	harder	on	the	question	of	the	foreseeable	hedonic	consequences	of	breaking	or	complying	with	a	rule.	As	we	have	seen,	Clarke	insisted	that	the		judgment	and	conscience	of	a	man's	own	mind	concerning	the	reasonableness	and	fitness	of	a	thing,	that	his	actions	should	be	conformed	to	such,	or	such	a	rule	or	law,	is	the	truest	and	formallest	obligation.159		We	have	already	seen	that	obligation	for	Clarke	consisted	in	the	reason	of	things.	The	knowledge	of	rewards	and	punishments	in	the	next	life	were	characterised	by	Clarke	as	‘secondary	obligations’	or	the	‘most	effectual	means	of	inforcement’.	Clarke,	however,	sometimes	said	that	our	assent	to	the	fitness	of	an	action	just	is	the	obligation	and	at	other	times	he	indicated	that	obligation	derives	from	the	involuntary	assent	to	a	further	principle;	this	is	the	principle	of	the				fitness	of	men’s	governing	all	their	actions	by	the	rule	of	right	or	equity:	and	also	that	this	assent	is	a	formal	obligation	upon	every	man,	actually	and	constantly	to	conform	himself	to	that	rule.160		Here,	obligation	derives	from	our	involuntary	judgment	that	it	is	right	to	do	what	we	believe	is	right,	and	not	solely	from	the	judgment	that	something	is	right.		So,	for	example,	when	Korsgaard	says	that		for	Clarke,	Balguy	and	Price	‘They	believed	that	the	perception	of	an	action	as	right,	or	what	they	took	to	be	the	
same	thing	obligatory,	is	a	motive	to	do	it’(my	emphasis),		this	is	not	quite	accurate.	Conscience	would	seem	here	to	be	a	formal	obligation,	but	Clarke	did	not	elaborate	on	what	he	meant	by	formal	obligation	(or	‘formallest’).	Raube	takes	him	to	mean	that	obligation	is	a	‘logical	consequence’	of	the	perception	of	the	fitness	of	an	action,	and	that	the	obligation	to	govern	one’s	actions	according	to	the	perception	of	what	one	takes	to	be	right	is	the	‘primary’,	or	presumably	foundational,	obligation	from	which	obligations	to	specific	actions	derives.161				If	this	is	what	Clarke	has	in	mind,	it	entails	that	it	is	not	the	basic	perception	of	an	act	as	fit	to	be	performed	that	motivates	us,	but	rather	the	hedonic	consequences	of	performing	or	not	peforming	an	action	we	know	to	be	right.																																																									159	Clarke,	Natural	Religion,	190-191.	160	Ibid.,	199.		161	Raube,	“Morality	and	Reason,”	138-9.	
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For	whoever	acts	contrary	to	this	sense	and	conscience	of	his	own	mind	is	necessarily	self	condemned;	and	the	greatest	and	strongest	of	obligations,	is	that	which	a	man	cannot	break	through	without	condemning	himself.162		Indeed,	Clarke	made	plain	the	hedonic	consequences	of	this	self-judgment.	There	is	no	man,	who	at	any	time	does	good	and	brave	and	generous	things,	but	the	reason	of	his	own	mind	applauds	him	for	so	doing;	and	no	man	at	any	time	does	things	base	and	vile,	dishonourable	and	wicked,	but	at	the	same	time	he	condemns	himself	in	what	he	does,	the	one	is	necessarily	accompanied	with	good	hope,	and	expectation	of	reward;	the	other	with	continual	torment	and	fear	of	punishment.163			Clarke	then	can	be	said	to	have	argued	that	we	are	able	to	act	according	to	our	moral	judgment	and	according	to	our	obligation	only	where	there	is	some	additional	hedonic	motivation,	from	conscience	or	from	other	foreseeable	hedonic	consequences.	When	we	act	on	this	additional	motivation,	our	obligation	is	from	the	reason	of	things	(the	metaphysical	claim)	and	the	reason	of	our	own	minds	(the	epistemological	claim).	It	could	even	fulfil	the	practical	claim	(that	reason	alone	can	motivate)	if	by	this	we	understand	this	reasoning	to	include	reasoning	of	hedonic	consequence	of	our	action.	But	then	we	have	not	acted	solely	from	the	fitness	of	the	action	but	from	the	additional	reason	of	the	consequence	to	ourselves.				It	is	important	to	note	that	Clarke’s	theory	of	why	parts	of	revelation	work	so	well	upon	us	as	motivating	tools	is	that	we	come	equipped	with	‘natural	hopes	and	expectations’.	Despite	his	refusal	of	innatism,	Clarke	believed	that	we	are	created	needing	to	be	reassured	that	these	natural	hopes	and	expectations	are	valid	and	will	be	met.	Having	failed	our	trial	at	managing	our	own	behaviour	guided	by	natural	reason	alone,	revelation	was	provided.		A	good	piece	of	textual	support	for	this	interpretation	is	derived	from	Clarke’s	observation	of	the	frequent	dissociation	between	our	understanding	of	what	is	required	of	us	(where	we	also	have	an	appreciation	of	the	attractiveness	of	virtue)	and	our	performance	of	the	action.	
																																																								162	Clarke,	Natural	Religion,	191.		163	Clarke,	Natural	Religion,	272.		
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Men	may	be	pleased	with	the	beauty	and	excellency	of	virtue,	and	have	some	faint	inclinations	and	even	resolutions	to	practice	it;	and	yet	at	the	return	of	their	temptations,	constantly	fall	back	into	their	accustomed	vices;	if	the	great	motives	of	their	duty	be	not	very	frequently	and	very	strongly	inculcated	upon	them,	so	as	to	make	a	very	deep	and	lasting	impression	upon	their	minds;	and	they	have	not	some	greater	and	higher	assistance	afforded	them,	than	the	bare	conviction	of	their	own	speculative	
reason.164	(my	emphasis)		The	aim	of	this	chapter	was	to	bring	out	the	implications	of	the	wider	context	of	Clarke’s	second	Boyle	lectures	for	the	understanding	of	his	ethical	rationalism.	I	will	return	to	the	subject	of	rationalism	and	motivation	in	chapter	5	when	I	look	at	the	position	of	Clarkes’	defenders,	Gilbert	Burnet	and	Balguy.			In	the	next	chapter	I	move	on	to	compare	the	theistic	metaphysics	of	Clarke	and	Hutcheson	and	examine	their	respective	positions	on	essences.	This	will	be	the	first	of	two	chapters	on	Hutcheson,	whose	overriding	aim	is	to	consider	the	nature	of	his	realism.			 	
																																																								164	Clarke,	Natural	Religion,	282.	
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Chapter	3		Hutcheson’s	method	and	God’s	communicable	attributes		 	It	is	an	easy	thing	for	men	to	assert	anything	in	words;	but	our	own	hearts	must	decide	the	matter.	 Hutcheson	Inquiry165		The	aim	of	this	chapter	and	the	next	is	to	offer	an	account	of	the	nature	of	Hutcheson’s	realism.	The	present	chapter	focuses	upon	the	way	in	which	Hutcheson	sought	to	secure	the	reality	of	virtue	–	his	theistic	metaphysics,	and	the	way	in	which	he	intended	to	prove	that	reality	to	his	readers	–	his	method.	I	will	argue	that	Hutcheson’s	theistic	metaphysics	may	not	be	as	far	apart	from	a	figure	like	Clarke	as	might	have	been	imagined.	The	chapter	proceeds	as	follows:		First,	I	briefly	outline	some	of	the	approaches	to	the	interpretation	of	Hutcheson’s	work	in	the	secondary	literature.	I	will	then	introduce	the	comparison	of	Hutcheson	with	Clarke	on	the	matter	of	method	and	God’s	communicable	attributes.	I	move	on	to	discuss	Hutcheson’s	adoption	of	introspection	as	a	method.	Hutcheson’s	teleology	and	his	views	on	the	purpose	of	moral	obligation	are	then	discussed.	I	finish	with	a	comparison	of	the	meta-ethics	of	Clarke	and	Hutcheson.	A	detailed	inspection	of	Hutcheson’s	moral	(and	aesthetic)	epistemology	is	reserved	for	the	following	chapter.			Approaches	to	Hutcheson	Hutcheson’s	first	major	works	in	moral	science,	his	four	treatises,	were	composed	in	the	1720s	in	Dublin.	His	Latin	treatise	on	moral	philosophy,	possibly	based	on	his	earlier	Dublin	lectures	and	given	as	his	Glasgow	private	lectures,	the	Philosophiae	Moralis	Institutio	Compendiaria	was	published	in	1742,	revised	in	1745	and	then	translated	into	English	and	published	as	A	Short	
Introduction	to	Moral	Philosophy	in	1747.166	His	System	of	Moral	Philosophy,	circulated	amongst	friends	from	1737,	and	probably	given	as	his	public	Glasgow	
																																																								165	Hutcheson,	Inquiry,	98.	166	See	Luigi	Turco,	introduction	to	Francis	Hutcheson,	Philosophiae	Moralis	Institutio	
Compendiaria,	with	A	Short	Introduction	to	Moral	Philosophy,	ed.	Luigi	Turco,	(Indianapolis:	Liberty	Fund	Press,	2007),	ix-xi.	
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lectures,	was	published	posthumously	in	1755.167	His	Dublin	course	notes	on	metaphysics	were	first	published	without	his	permission.	Hutcheson	published	his	own	version	in	1742	as	A	Synopsis	of	Metaphysics	Comprehending	Ontology	
and	Pneumatology	(revised	in	1744).	Student	notes	from	his	Dublin	courses	on	logic	were	circulated,	and	eventually	published	after	his	death	in	1756,	as	A	
Compend	of	Logic.168			One	prominent	debate	in	the	secondary	literature	concerns	the	relationship	between	Hutcheson’s	four	treatises	and	his	later	published	works,	the	System	and	the	Short	Introduction.	In	the	four	treatises	Hutcheson	had	opposed	any	legislative	basis	for	moral	judgment	and	behaviour.	Hutcheson	denied	both	that	moral	judgments	are	made	with	reference	to	a	known	law	(revealed,	natural	or	civil)	and	that	the	motivation	for	moral	action	arose	from	the	foreseeable	consequences	of	deviation	or	compliance	with	a	law.	Hutcheson	insisted	upon	the	natural	occurrence	of	a	distinctively	moral	motivation	(a	kind	affection	towards	others),	and	a	natural	sense	of	the	difference	between	virtue	and	vice,	which	responds	to	the	presence	of	benevolent	intention	in	an	actor’s	motivational	set		(a	moral	sense).	In	the	Inquiry	and	the	Essay	Hutcheson	described	both	the	moral	sense	and	our	primary	impetus	towards	securing	good	for	others	as	instinctive.169	Prudential	concerns,	according	to	Hutcheson,	even	those	surrounding	divine	justice	in	a	future	state,	do	not	drive	or	govern	what	we	count	as	moral	behaviour.	Neither	is	the	motivation	to	perform	an	action	simply	to	satisfy	God,	what	anyone	counts	as	moral	in	a	motivation.			The	debate	in	the	secondary	literature	over	the	cohesion	of	Hutcheson’s	work	centres	upon	the	degree	of	conformity	in	the	later	published	works	to	traditional	aspects	of	the	curriculum	−	those	that	dealt	with	natural	and	civil	law	(especially	the	System),	and	the	Reformed	scholastic	doctrine	that	taught	that	moral	motivation	properly	consisted	of	a	specific	intention	to	please,	or	appease,	God	
																																																								167	Francis	Hutcheson,	A	System	of	Moral	Philosophy.	Collected	Works,	Vols.	v-vi,	(Hildesheim:	George	Olms	Verlagsbuchhandlung,	1755,	1969).		168	Moore,	introduction,	LMNSM,	xxii-xxiii.		169	Hutcheson,	Inquiry,	112,	133.	Essay,	23-24.		
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(especially	the	Short	Introduction).170	James	Moore	originally	argued	for	a	‘two	system’	reading	of	Hutcheson	whereby	the	later	published	works	are	to	be	understood	as	teaching	materials	that	were	not	primarily	intended	to	advance,	or	promulgate	his	own	philosophy.171	Moore	has	more	recently	argued,	in	the	introduction	of	his	editions	to	the	Logic	and	Metaphysics,	that	these	were	clearly	pedagogic	and	probably	composed	initially	in	Dublin.	Moore	claims	that	both	of	these	works	and	the	Short	Introduction	and	parts	of	the	System	can	be	seen	as	part	of	a		‘textbook	tradition’	whereby	the	author	offered	commentary	on	a	variety	of	opinions	on	the	topics	under	consideration,	the	choice	of	topic	and	structure	having	been	set	by	authors	of	previous	texts.172	Moore	now	takes	care	to	emphasis	the	points	in	the	Logic	and	the	Metaphysics	where	Hutcheson	introduces	his	own	theories	into	these	discussions.	This	is	seen	most	especially	in	the	Metaphysics,	a	work	in	which	Moore	sees	Hutcheson	presenting	‘his	own	distinctive	theory	of	concomitant	ideas’	in	order	to	offer	a	Lockean	style	rebuttal	of	Berkeley’s	denial	of	external	reality.173	Moore	also	links	this	work	to	Hutcheson’s	Logic	and	appears	to	find	support	for	moral	concomitants	there	too.	These	are,	says	Moore,	‘the	principle	point	of	connection	between	his	logic	and	his	writings	on	aesthetics	and	morals’.174		Knud	Haakonssen	and	James	Harris	both	oppose	Moore’s	initial	‘two	system’	interpretation.	Haakonssen	offers	a	particularly	trenchant	rebuttal	of	Moore’s	position.	He	reads	Hutcheson	as	a	moral	realist	and	a	cognitivist,	where	virtue	is	a	naturally	existing	quality	in	motivation,	which	is	judged,	correctly	or	incorrectly,	as	such	by	a	natural	moral	sense,	our	natural	abilities	both	cognitive	and	motivational	being	the	result	of	divine	benevolence.	In	addition	the	moral	sense	is	able	to	lead	us	to	an	understanding	the	role	of	divine	benevolence	at	work	in	the	natural	world,	which	includes	our	own	natural	moral	abilities.	Haakonssen	suggests	that	natural	religion	is	the	bridge	between	moral	sense	and																																																									170	See	Haakonssen,	Natural	Law,	65	-67,	and	Harris,	“Religion,”	205-222.			171	James	Moore,	“The	Two	System	of	Francis	Hutcheson:	On	the	Origins	of	the	Scottish	Enlightenment,”	in	Studies	in	the	Philosophy	of	the	Scottish	Enlightenment,	ed.	M.	A.	Stewart	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1990),	37-60.	See	also	James	Moore,	“Hutcheson’s	Theodicy:	The	Argument	and	Context	of	A	System	of	Moral	Philosophy,”	in	The	Scottish	Enlightenment:	Essays	
in	Reinterpretation,	ed.	Paul	Wood	(Rochester:	University	of	Rochester	Press,	2000),	239-266.	172	Moore,	introduction,	LMNSN,	x.		173	Ibid.,	xiv.	174	See	Moore,	footnotes	3	and	4	of	Logic,	12-13.		
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natural	law	for	Hutcheson.175	Harris	finds,	against	Moore,	for	continuity	across	texts	in	Hutcheson’s	treatment	of	religious	belief,	seeing	them	as	offering	a	
supportive	motivational	aid	for	providentially	instituted	natural	moral	abilities.176	Crowe	both	follows	Harris,	and	goes	further,	to	argue	that	Hutcheson	was	in	fact	an	early	champion	of	a	psychological	approach	to	religion,	which	is	founded	upon	man’s	moral	and	aesthetic	abilities,	and	that	this	approach	is	evident	across	the	entire	span	of	Hutcheson’s	work.177		Hutcheson’s	thought,	of	course,	developed	over	the	span	of	his	writing	career,	differences	in	intended	audiences	notwithstanding.	Other	commentators	have	taken	a	purely	chronological	view	of	the	shifts	in	thinking	evident	in	the	texts	and	revisions.	Scott,	Hutcheson’s	first	biographer,	and	Bishop,	both	present	‘four-stage’	models	of	Hutcheson’s	work,	structured	chronologically	over	the	Inquiry,	then	Essay	and	Illustrations,	System	and	the	Short	Introduction.178	Both	examine	the	changes	in	each	of	the	texts	in	the	way	that	Hutcheson	conceptualised	the	moral	sense	and	its	relation	to	motivation.		By	far	the	most	popular	approach	to	Hutcheson	though,	is	to	confine	the	analysis	to	the	four	treatises,	and	sometimes	to	the	changes	between	the	first	two	treatises	and	the	second	two.		This	tack,	where	it	is	justified,	is	sometimes	taken	on	the	grounds	that	Hutcheson’s	four	treatises	were	the	ones	that	his	contemporaries	responded	to,	or	which	his	reputation	came	to	rest	upon,	or	that	they	represent	a	‘purer’	statement	of	his	moral	philosophy.	To	a	great	extent	though,	Hutcheson	presents	his	readers	with	a	moving	target,	as	his	views	develop	across	the	texts	and	the	earlier	works	are	revised,	at	least	to	some																																																									175	See	Knud	Haakonssen,”Natural	Law	and	Moral	Realism:	The	Scottish	Synthesis,”	in	Studies	in	
the	Philosophy	of	the	Scottish	Enlightenment,	ed.	M.	A.	Stewart	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1990),	61-85.	Haakonssen,	Natural	law,	63-98.	Knud	Haakonssen,	“Moral	Philosophy	and	Natural	Law:	From	the	Cambridge	Platonists	to	the	Scottish	Enlightenment,”	Political	Science	40	(1988):	97-110.		176	Harris,	“Religion,”	205-222.	177	Benjamin	D.	Crowe,	“Hutcheson	on	Natural	Religion,”	British	Journal	for	the	History	of	
Philosophy	19,	vol.	4	(2011):	711-740.	178	They	disagree	about	the	order	of	composition	between	the	Short	Introduction	and	the	System.	William	R.	Scott,	Francis	Hutcheson;	His	Life	Teaching	and	Position	in	the	History	of	Moral	
Philosophy	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1900;	repr.,	Forgotten	Books,	2012).	John	D.	Bishop,	“Moral	Motivation	and	the	Development	of	Francis	Hutcheson's	Philosophy,”	Journal	of	
the	History	of	Ideas	57,	No.	2	(1996):	277-295,	and	The	Moral	Philosophy	of	Francis	Hutcheson,	(PhD	Diss.,	University	of	Edinburgh,	1979).	
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extent,	to	reflect	his	subsequent	thought.	The	important	point	about	the	interpretation	of	Hutcheson	is	well	captured	by	Gill,	in	his	British	Moralists,	where	he	describes	his	own	analysis	of	Hutcheson	as	a	‘snapshot’.179	Any	explanation	will	likely	hold	good	only	for	a	period	of	Hutcheson’s	thought	and,	moving	between	texts,	because	of	later	revisions	and	certain	dating	difficulties,	is	something	of	a	high-wire	act.			In	this	chapter	and	the	next,	I	will	concentrate	on	the	period	up	to	and	including	Hutcheson’s	inaugural	lecture	at	Glasgow	in	1730	(On	the	Natural	Sociability	of	
Mankind),	mainly	because	the	subsequent	chapters	in	the	thesis	look	at	responses	to	the	four	treatises.	I	will,	however,	include	Hutcheson’s	Logic	and	
Metaphysics	and	the	text	of	the	inaugural	lecture.180	These	texts	were	either	not	circulated,	or	not	widely	circulated	in	Hutcheson’s	lifetime,	but	I	believe,	as	Moore	has	indicated,	that	they	offer	valuable	information	for	an	assessment	of	Hutcheson’s	thought	in	the	period	up	to	1730.	Reference	will	also	be	made	to	Hutcheson’s	correspondence	with	Gilbert	Burnet,	an	introductory	letter	to	the	‘Inquiry’	published	in	the	‘London	Journal’	as	‘Reflections	in	our	Common	Systems	
of	Morality’	in	1725,	and	’Hibernicus’s	Letters’	published	in	the	‘Dublin	Journal’	of	1725.181	Hutcheson’s	Metaphysics	and	the	Logic	have	yet	to	receive	a	comprehensive	treatment	in	the	secondary	literature	and	this	is	not	the	aim	here.182	Nevertheless,	in	this	chapter	and	the	next,	parts	of	both	these	texts	will	be	analysed.	With	regard	to	Hutcheson’s	realism,	I	argue	in	this	chapter	that	first,	Hutcheson’s	theistic	metaphysics	indicate	that	moral	good	was	a	mind	independent	property	in	so	far	as	moral	goodness	was	a	property	of	the	divine	nature,	and	was	understood	by	God	to	be	an	eternal	and	immutable	good.	Second,	Hutcheson	clearly	argued	that	this	part	of	the	divine	nature	had	been	communicated	to	us,	and	that	we	could	recognise	it	as	a	good	via	our	natural																																																									179	Gill,	British	Moralists,	155.	This	is	also	Darwall’s	approach	to	Hutcheson	in	Internal	Ought.		180	I’ll	note	revisions	made	to	the	four	treatises	in	1738	and	1742	and	to	the	Metaphysics	in	1744	181	“Correspondence”	in	Illustrations,	195-247.		Francis	Hutcheson,	Francis	Hutcheson:	Two	Texts	
on	Human	Nature,	ed.	Thomas	Mautner	(Cambridge;	Cambridge	University	Press,	1993).	Henceforth	Two	Texts.	Francis	Hutcheson,	Opera	Minora,	Works,	Vol	vii	(Hildesheim:	George	Olms	Verlagsbuchhandlung,	1971).			182	Although	see	Emily	Michael,	“Francis	Hutcheson’s	Logicae	Compendium	and	the	Glasgow	School	of	Logic,”	in	Logic	and	the	Workings	of	the	Mind:	The	Logic	of	Ideas	and	Faculty	Psychology	
in	Early	Modern	Philosophy,	ed.	Patricia	A.	Easton	(Atascadero,	CA:	Ridgeview	Publishing,	1977),	83-96.		
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affections	and	sense	of	morality.		In	the	next	section,	I	will	introduce	a	comparison	of	the	approach	of	Clarke	and	Hutcheson	on	the	matter	of	God’s	communicable	attributes	and	method.		Clarke	and	Hutcheson		Hutcheson	was	opposed	to	Clarke’s	‘a	priori’	method	because	he	thought	that	rational	demonstration	was	inadequate	as	a	tool	to	defeat	scepticism	in	the	general	population.	This,	however,	was	not	just	because	of	the	difficulty	of	following	the	argument,	but	also	because	Hutcheson	did	not	believe	that	God’s	moral	goodness	could	be	proven	to	us	(i.e.	to	all	human	beings)	to	follow	from	his	other	attributes.	More	fundamentally	Hutcheson	did	not	believe	that	rational	insight	into	eternal	law	was	the	starting	point	for	moral	cognition.	He	argued	that	our	original	idea	of	virtue	derived	necessarily	from	a	sense.			There	was	no	disagreement	between	Clarke	and	his	defenders	and	Hutcheson	over	Hutcheson’s	assertion	that	virtue,	defined	as	benevolence,	is	real	in	the	following	two	ways.	First,	Hutcheson	maintained	that	benevolence	exists	as	a	quality	in	our	present	motivational	set	and	was	not	completely	obliterated	by	the	events	surrounding	the	Fall.	Second,	he	insisted	that	the	experience,	or	feeling	of	benevolence,	does	not	supervene	upon	a	more	fundamental	wish	to	serve	our	own	best	interests.	Clarke	and	his	champions	were	in	agreement	with	the	reality	of	virtue	understood	in	both	these	ways.183		While	the	epistemological	channel	for	our	ideas	of	virtue	was	an	issue	that	Clarke’s	supporters	clashed	with	Hutcheson	over,	they	rarely	engaged	in	any	depth	with	one	another	over	metaphysics.	Indeed,	Hutcheson	kept	most	of	his	metaphysics	well	away	from	his	four	treatises.184	Beiser	argues	that	Clarke	himself	and	his	supporters	were	rhetorically	unwilling	to	be	clear	about	the	debt	
																																																								183	This	is	what	Gill	terms	his	‘anti-egoist’	reality.	See	Gill,	British	Moralists,	296,	for	example.		184	See	Moore,	introduction	LMNSM,	xvii,	footnote	28.	Moore	suggests	that	Hutcheson,	after	Shaftesbury,	found	metaphysical	reasoning	to	be	an	unnecessary	distraction	in	the	imparting	of	his	wisdom	to	gentlemen,	rather	than	scholars,	the	former	being	the	intended	readership	of	his	
four	treatises.		
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that	their	vision	of	nature	owed	to	scholastic	essentialism.185	It	is	Beiser’s	thesis	that	Hutcheson	(and	Hume)	both	ignored	the	metaphysical	meaning	of	nature	that	underpinned,	but	was	not	always	declared	by,	figures	such	as	Clarke,	Burnet	and	Balguy.186	Hutcheson	furthermore	is	supposed	by	Beiser	to	have	taken	‘moral	values	out	of	the	universe	and	placed	them	within	the	realm	of	human	consciousness	alone’.187	I	will	argue	that	this	is	not	an	accurate	statement	of	Hutcheson’s	position,	and	neither	is	the	charge	of	contingency	levelled	at	Hutcheson,	in	different	forms,	by	his	contemporaries	and	by	a	line	of	later	commentators	running	from	Frankena,	to	Winkler,	to	Michael	Gill.188			The	teleology	of	Hutcheson’s	account	of	nature	is	undeniable	and	is	present	in	his	four	treatises,	but	it	receives	its	fullest	and	clearest	statement	in	his	inaugural	
lecture	of	1730	and	his	Metaphysics.	Haakonssen	and	Cuneo	present	Hutcheson’s	realism	as	lying	in	the	providentially	instituted	fact	of	our	benevolent	affections	as	a	distinctively	moral	motivation.	This	is	a	necessity	that	issues	from	God’s	benevolence	at	work	in	his	creative	activity.189	I	believe	though,	that	Hutcheson	went	further	than	this.	I	will	argue	that	it	is	not	just	that	Hutcheson	believed	that	God	had	opted	to	abide	by	the	specifications	of	eternal	law,	when	he	chose	to	create	as	he	did,	because	of	his	goodness.	Both	Hutcheson	and	Clarke	agree	that	God	acted	as	he	did	to	secure	our	(eventual)	happiness.	I	argue	that	Hutcheson’s	commitment	to	realism	was	stronger	even	than	this.	It	was	located	in	the	eternal	and	immutable	moral	good	of	benevolence,	which	could	not	be	overturned	by	God	in	his	creative	activity,	as	its	essence	lies	in	this	divine	attribute.	(Although,	as	discussed	a	little	later,	God	might	potentially	have	retained	the	power	to	ignore	it.)	I	will	argue	in	the	next	chapter,	moreover,	that	our	ideas	from	moral	sense	derive	from	this	eternal	and	immutable	realm,	at	least	as	it	existed	in	the	divine	mind.	(Whether	these	ideas	from	moral	sense	are	comparable	with	any																																																									185	Beiser,	Sovereignty,	274.		186	Ibid.,	272.		187	Ibid.,	309.	188	William	Frankena,	“Hutcheson’s	Moral	Sense	Theory,”	Journal	of	the	History	of	Ideas	16	(1955):	356	-375.		Kenneth	P.	Winkler	“Hutcheson’s	Alleged	Realism”	Journal	of	the	History	of	
Philosophy,	23	(1985):	170-194.		Kenneth	P.	Winkler,	“Hume	and	Hutcheson	and	the	Color	of	Virtue,”	Hume	Studies	22	(1996),	3-22	and	Gill,	British	Moralists,	“Notes	to	Chapter	13,”	footnote	2,	295-301.			189	Haakonssen,	“Natural	Law	and	Moral	Realism,”	63-65,	Haakonssen,	Natural	law,	63-85,	Terence	Cuneo,	“Reason	and	the	Passions,”	233-234.		
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present	day	understanding	of	moral	realism,	or	cognitivism,	is	not	my	concern,	but	the	nature	of	the	evaluation	offered	by	Hutcheson’s	moral	sense,	and	the	nature	of	the	ideas	it	produces,	will	be	the	subject	of	the	following	chapter.)				One	early	critical	response	to	Clarke’s	Boyle	lectures	came	from	the	young	Francis	Hutcheson.	In	1717	Hutcheson	wrote	to	Clarke	to	protest	at	the	nature	of	Clarke's	a	priori	proof	of	the	existence	and	attributes	of	God	offered	in	his	Boyle	lectures.	Neither	Hutcheson’s	original	letter,	nor	a	substantive	account	of	its	contents	survives,	but	Hutcheson	later	told	his	friend	William	Leechman	that	he	had	expressed	reservations	about	the	feasibility	of	a	certain	demonstration	of	such	matters,	the	failure	of	which	would	engender	yet	more	scepticism	in	the	reading	public.190			Hutcheson’s	concerns	about	rational	demonstration	of	the	existence	of	God	(and	some	of	his	attributes)	derived	from	the	conviction	that	the	nature	of	the	creative	force	upon	which	any	moral	system	ultimately	rested,	could	not	be	demonstrated	in	the	way	that	he	believed	Clarke	to	have	attempted	to	do	so.	The	
Inquiry,	Hutcheson’s	first	publication,	from	the	first	edition	of	1725	to	the	fourth	edition	of	1738,	closed	with	the	guarantee	that	our	natural	moral	abilities	are	the	result	of	providential	institution	by	a	benevolent	Deity	who	is	keen	to	secure	our	happiness.	These	abilities	could	have	been	different	abilities,	‘there	is	nothing	surpassing	the	natural	power	of	the	Deity’,	Hutcheson	admitted,	but	the	goodness	of	divine	nature	dictated	that	our	happiness	is	his	aim	and	that	any	implanted	abilities	would	have	to	service	this	aim.191		The	‘great	agreement	of	mankind’	over	divine	benevolence	itself,	however,	Hutcheson	noted,	did	not	derive	from	the	idea	of	a	necessary	and	original,	self-existing	being.	It	was	conceived	of	as	an	‘abundant	probability’	that	was	‘deduced’	from	observed	effects	in	the	natural	world	back	to	cause.	It	has	often	been	taken	for	granted	in	these	papers.	“That	the	deity	is	morally	good;”	tho’	the	reasoning	is	not	at	all	built	upon	this	supposition.	If	we	enquire	into	the	reason	of	the	great	agreement	of	mankind	in	this	opinion,	we	shall	perhaps	find	no	demonstrative	argument	a	priori,	from																																																									190	Scott,	Hutcheson,	15-16	and	Beiser,	Sovereignty,	308.		191	Hutcheson,	Inquiry,	197.	
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the	idea	of	an	independent	being,	to	prove	his	goodness.	But	there	is	an	abundant	probability	deduced	from	the	whole	frame	of	nature,	which	seems	as	far	as	we	know,	plainly	contrived	for	the	good	of	the	whole;	and	the	casual	evils	seem	the	necessary	concomitants	of	some	mechanism	designed	for	vastly	prepollent	good.192	Hutcheson	did	not	actually	claim	here	that	God’s	goodness	could	not	be	demonstrated	from	his	independence,	but	rather	that	the	general	agreement	with	the	idea	of	his	goodness	derives	from	our	observation	of	the	world.	He	was	making	an	empirical	claim	about	the	general	source	of	our	agreement.				That	Clarke	did	not	actually	claim	that	God’s	moral	attributes	were	necessary	in	a	metaphysical	sense	seems	to	have	escaped	Hutcheson.	The	substance	of	Clarke’s	argument	was	that	God’s	goodness	was	a	moral	necessity	(by	which	he	meant	it	was	not	compelled	by	the	force	of	divine	understanding),	but	Clarke	did	not	argue	that	God’s	goodness	was	necessary	in	the	same	way	that,	for	example,	his	independence	or	infinity	were.193	God’s	independence,	in	Clarke’s	account,	referred	to	his	being	uncaused.194			With	respect	to	God’s	goodness,	Clarke	argued	that	like	his	liberty	and	his	other	moral	perfections,	this	was	a	communicable	attribute.	The	scholastic	distinction	between	God’s	communicable	and	incommunicable	attributes	referred	to	the	difference	between	those	attributes	that	we	shared	some	part	of,	and	so	could	understand	by	enlarging	them	in	order	to	have	some	view	of	their	perfection	in	God	(his	goodness,	liberty	and	power,	for	example),	and	those	that	lay	outside	of	our	experience	and	must	be	demonstrated	in	a	different	way,	if	at	all	(his	self-existence,	independence,	omniscience	and	omnipresence,	for	example.)	Clarke	made	the	contrast	between	the	incommunicability	of	God’s	self-existence	and	absolute	independence	and	the	communicability	of	his	other	attributes	explicit:	No	powers	are	impossible	to	be	communicated	but	only	those	which	imply	self-existence	and	absolute	independence.195																																																										192	Ibid.,	197-198.	193	See	Vailati,	introduction,	for	the	difference	between	Clarke’s	senses	of	necessary,	xiv-xv.		194	Jonathan	Bennett,	Glossary	“Independence,”	www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/clarke1704.pdfglossary.			195	Clarke,	Being	and	Attributes,	61.	
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	Clarke	argued	first,	that	God	was	infinitely	good	because	he	was	‘necessarily	happy	in	the	eternal	enjoyment	of	his	own	infinite	perfections’,	and	so	could	not	have	any	other	motive	for	creating	creatures	other	than	to	communicate	his	own	perfections	to	them	and,	secondly,	that	God	was	‘necessary	all-sufficient’	(he	didn’t	want	for	anything,	nor	depend	on	anything	else	for	anything)	and	so	was	‘infinitely	removed’	from	any	‘cause	or	temptations	of	doing	evil’,	and	that	his	power	was	not	limited	by	another	superior	will.196		God’s	goodness	did	not	derive	from	his	being	uncaused,	or	independent	in	the	way	that	Clarke	outlined	the	argument	for	independence.	For	Clarke,	God’s	causal	independence	was	an	incommunicable	attribute.	His	goodness	and	power	(his	self-sufficiency)	had	been	communicated.	This	was	Clarke’s	position:			In	particular,	the	supreme	cause	must	in	the	first	place	be	infinitely	good,	that	is,	he	must	have	an	unalterable	disposition	to	do	and	to	communicate	good	and	happiness	because,	being	himself	necessarily	happy	in	the	eternal	enjoyment	of	his	own	infinite	perfections,	he	cannot	possibly	have	any	other	motives	to	make	creatures	at	all	but	only	that	he	may	communicate	to	them	his	own	perfection	.	.	.	That	he	must	be	infinitely	good	appears	likewise	further	from	hence,	that	being	necessarily	all-sufficient,	he	must	consequently	be	infinitely	removed	from	all	malice	and	envy	and	from	all	other	possible	causes	or	temptations	of	doing	evil,	which,	it	is	evident,	can	only	be	the	effects	of	want	and	weakness,	of	imperfection	or	deprivations.197				In	his	text	on	Metaphysics,	composed	in	Dublin	in	the	1720s,	Hutcheson	discussed	God’s	attributes	and	referred	the	distinction	between	those	that	are	communicable	and	those	that	are	incommunicable.	God’s	independence	is	incommunicable	to	us	in	the	sense,	Hutcheson	argued,	that	we	cannot	infer	that	he	is	self-caused.	God’s	independence	rather,	entailed	only	that	he	is	subject	to	no	other	will.198	This	was	not	Clarke’s	understanding	of	independence,	but	it	was,	as	we	have	just	seen,	one	of	his	arguments	for	God’s	goodness.	God’s	moral	attributes	and	his	unfettered	power	are,	under	Hutcheson’s	scheme,	both	communicable	attributes.	In	fact	a	little	later	in	the	Metaphysics,	Hutcheson	
																																																								196	Ibid.,	84.		197	Ibid.,	84.		198	Hutcheson,	Metaphysics,	163.	
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produced	exactly	the	same	arguments	‘which	show	that	God	is	good’	that	Clarke	had	used.	We	infer	that	God	is	‘wholly	good	and	benevolent’	because		
it	is	praiseworthy	in	itself	and	the	supreme	excellence	and	perfection	of	an	intelligent	nature,	the	very	sense	of	which	brings	joy	to	such	a	nature,	but	also	because	no	temptation	to	a	contrary	course	could	occur	to	a	superior	nature	which	needs	nothing	for	its	own	sake.199	[My	emphasis]		On	the	question	of	the	nature	of	the	necessity	that	characterises	God’s	goodness	then,	Clarke	and	Hutcheson	did	not	in	fact	disagree.	I	will	argue	that	both	Clarke	and	Hutcheson	argued	that	God’s	creative	activity	was	caused	by	the	goodness	of	his	nature	in	a	way	that	could	not	be	considered	an	abridgment	of	his	freedom.	For	Clarke	and	Hutcheson,	the	necessary	fact	that	God	could	not	be	other	than	happy	about	his	own	moral	perfection	derived,	in	the	first	instance,	from	the	fact	that	God’s	goodness	was	good	‘in	itself’.	Moreover	Clarke,	like	Hutcheson	was	an	anti-essentialist	when	it	came	to	the	matter	of	God’s	being.200	I	do	not	believe	that	Hutcheson	intended	that	God,	given	his	other	attributes,	in	practice	retained	the	ability	to	impose	values	on	his	creation	that	were	at	odds	with	his	understanding.	I	believe	that	the	charge	of	voluntarism	or	contingency	thrown	at	Hutcheson	by	Gilbert	Burnet	and	Balguy,	or	later	commentators	was,	and	is,	ill-judged.	The	problem	has	been	that	we	really	need	Hutcheson’s	Metaphysics	(and	his	Logic)	to	see	why.		I	will	return	to	this	subject	in	the	last	part	of	the	chapter.			Burnet,	and	Balguy	especially,	did	understand	and	object	to	Hutcheson	founding	God’s	goodness	in	his	benevolent	nature,	as	opposed	to	the	rectitude	of	his	will,	which	was	also	Clarke’s	broader	position.	This	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	5.	They	all	(Clarke,	Hutcheson,	Burnet	and	Balguy),	however,	believed	that	God’s	goodness	was	communicated	to	us	in	such	a	way	as	we	could	discover	an	analogous,	imperfect	residue	of	the	particular	nature	of	God’s	goodness	in	ourselves.	According	to	Hutcheson,	we	did	this	by	introspection,	and	not	by	rational	demonstration	from	an	uncaused	being	(however	mistaken	Hutcheson	may	have	been	about	Clarke’s	actual	argument	here).																																																										199	Ibid.,	174.		200	Clarke,	Being	and	Attributes,	29-31.		
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In	the	next	section,	I	will	examine	the	nature	of	Hutcheson’s	introspective	method.	His	use	of	introspection	relied	upon	the	assumption	that	we	be	aware	of	a	difference	in	the	quality	of	motive	behind	actions	and	that	we	be	able	to	trust	in	the	reality	of	a	motivation	to	do	good	for	others,	rather	than	resolve	this	back	into	an	original	impetus	of	self-love	or	self-interest.			Hutcheson’s	method	The	accuracy	of	his	reading	of	Clarke	notwithstanding,	Hutcheson	was	convinced	that	our	etiolated	powers	of	reason	meant	that	our	consensus	over	the	goodness	of	God	did	not	derive	from	the	‘demonstrative	argument	a	priori’.	Since	the	consensus	did	exist	from	whence	did	it	derive?		Hutcheson	joined	Shaftesbury	in	the	attempt	to	reinstate	legitimate	enquiry	into	what	could	be	considered	‘natural’	to	us.	Hutcheson’s	longer	argument	–	the	purpose	of	his	first	two	
Inquiries	–	was	to	assert	that	by	looking	at	‘the	whole	frame	of	nature’	we	could	observe	the	existence	of	a	sense	of	beauty	and	a	moral	sense.	These	had	been	provided	by	providence	as	the	foundation	of	our	understanding	of	the	existence	of	a	wise	and	benevolent	God	(although	we	did	not	need	to	realise	the	existence	of	that	God	in	order	for	them	to	operate	in	the	first	place).	Ultimately,	Hutcheson	argued	in	his	first	treatise	on	beauty,	if	we	governed	our	minds	well	enough,	our	sense	of	beauty	would	inform	us	of	the	presence	of	an	intelligent	designer	whose	purpose	was	our	happiness.	It	did	so	by	guiding	us	towards	the	observation	of	regularity	in	nature	and	mathematics	–	the	uniformity	amidst	all	the	variety.201			In	the	second	treatise,	he	argued	that	our	ability	to	detect	the	presence	of	a	quality	in	motivation	that	was	recognised	as	a	distinctively	moral	good	(either	in	God	or	in	each	other)	was	provided	by	our	moral	sense.	What	this	entailed	was	that	our	being	able	to	have	the	very	idea	of	moral	good	as	something	that	was	found	in	our	own	motives	or	God’s	motives,	depended	in	the	first	instance	on	our	having	a	special	sense	of	virtue.	Hutcheson	argued	that	we	just	could	not	have	an	idea	of	goodness	(or	evil)	as	a	moral	quality	without	this.	Any	attempt	to	argue	(a	priori	or	a	posteriori)	to	the	goodness	of	God	depended,	in	the	first	instance	on																																																									201	See	Crowe,	Natural	Religion,	for	a	thorough	and	convincing	examination	of	the	importance	of	Hutcheson’s	sense	of	beauty	in	his	religious	thought.	See	Haakonssen,	Natural	Law,	for	the	argument,	also	made	later	by	Crowe,	that	religious	belief	is	the	completion	of	our	morality,	72.	
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our	original	idea	from	this	sense	-	that	is,	it	depended	upon	our	knowing	that	there	is	such	a	thing	as	moral	good,	or	least	a	good	that	is	distinctively	different	from	natural	good.	This	is	the	substance	of	Hutcheson’s	empiricism	and	it	will	be	examined	further	throughout	this	chapter	and	the	next.			Just	as	fundamental	to	Hutcheson’s	approach,	though,	was	his	claim	that	our	benevolence	or	kind	affections,	as	perceived	by	our	moral	sense,	are	real	in	themselves.	Hutcheson	meant	that	kind	affections	do	not	derive	from	a	more	foundational	self-love	and	neither	do	they	instance	the	workings	of	delusional	pride	upon	a	corrupted,	fallen	nature.	In	his	four	treatises,	Hutcheson	launched	his	inquiries	proper	into	both	our	natural	moral	cognitive	powers	and	our	natural	sociable	inclinations.	To	discover	these	truths	about	ourselves,	Hutcheson	insisted	that	we	did	not	require	any	particular	knowledge	(natural	or	revealed),	or	an	intellectual	ability	beyond	the	capacity	to	introspect	and	reflect	upon	what	we	observe	about	ourselves.	To	discover	truth	on	these	subjects,	nothing	more	is	necessary	than	a	little	attention	to	what	passes	in	our	own	hearts,	and	consequently	every	man	may	come	to	certainty	in	these	points,	without	much	art	or	knowledge	of	other	matters.202			Would	men	reflect	upon	what	they	feel	in	themselves,	all	proofs	in	such	matters	would	be	needless.203		An	appeal	to	the	introspected	experience	of	moral	motivation	and	judgement	was	Hutcheson’s	chief	method	in	his	four	treatises.	This	approach	required	observation	of	our	own	experience	of	social	interaction,	in	terms	of	our	own	aims	and	motivations	and	our	responses	to	the	actions	of	others,	and	our	reactions	to	hearing	or	reading	about	the	thoughts	and	actions	of	characters	in	history	and	abroad.	It	was,	however,	premised	upon	the	understanding	that	our	benevolence	is	real	and	understood	by	us	via	our	experience	because	it	is	a	communicable	attribute	of	God	(although	we	do	not	need	to	understand	this	to	recognise	the	different	qualities	of	motives).	James	Moore	thinks	that	Hutcheson’s	adoption	of	the	distinction	between	God’s	communicable	and	non-																																																								202	Hutcheson,	Essay,	4.		203	Ibid.,	5.		
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communicable	attributes	indicated	a	policy	of	appeasement	towards	those	readers	who	expected	to	see	aspects	of	Reformed	scholasticism	on	the	curriculum.	Haakonssen	too,	thinks	that	although	Hutcheson’s	use	of	it	is	blunted	by	an	absence	of	other	supporting	theories	on	the	nature	of	the	Trinity,	it	still	represented	a	considerable	concession.		Haakonssen’s	missing	Trinitarian	theories,	I	suspect,	were	those	found	in	reformed	accounts	of	the	operation	of	the	Trinity,	such	as	Turretin’s,	whereby	the	communication	of	God’s	goodness	is	achieved	by	participating,	or	sharing	directly,	in	divine	love	itself,	through	the	grace	giving	activity	of	the	Holy	Spirit.	Our	benevolence,	for	Hutcheson	however,	is	only	analogous	to	God’s.204	Nevertheless,	I	suggest	that	the	distinction	between	God’s	communicable	and	incommunicable	attributes	was	central	to	Hutcheson’s	arguments	about	the	ways	in	which	we	may	have	moral	knowledge.		Our	moral	attributes	are	supposed	to	be	analogous	in	kind,	but	not	scope,	to	those	of	the	Deity.	By	looking	at	the	‘whole	frame	of	nature’,	Hutcheson	argued,	we	might	observe	our	own	sociability	and	concern	for	the	good	of	others.	The	goodness	of	our	own	nature,	our	‘universal	benevolence	and	a	social	temper’,	will,	if	put	into	practice,	give	us	great	pleasure	on	reflection	and	ultimately	lead	to	our	own	happiness	-	as	God	had	intended	and	Shaftesbury	had	advertised.	Hutcheson	insisted	however,	that	even	if	we	enjoy	this	pleasure	and	realise	that	our	own	interests	are	best	served	by	acting	for	the	good	of	others,	acting	from	primary	‘kind	affections’	is	not	reducible	to	acting	from	self-interest.205	If	we	pay	attention	to	‘what	passes	in	our	own	breasts’	we	will	understand	the	reality	of	the	difference	between	the	two.	Once	this	has	been	understood,	we	might																																																									204	See	William	J.	Danaher,	“Jonathan	Edwards,	Francis	Hutcheson,	and	the	Problems	and	Prospects	of	Civil	Society,”	in	A	World	for	All?	Global	Civil	Society	in	Political	Theory	and	
Trinitarian	Theology,	ed.	William	F.	Storrar,	Peter	J.	Casarella	and	Paul	L.	Metzger	(Michigan:	William	B.	Eerdmans	Publishing	Company,	2011),	181,	on	the	difference	between	Hutcheson’s	use	of	the	distinction	between	communicable	and	incommunicable	virtues,	and	the	more	traditional	understanding	of	this	division	that	occurred	in	the	context	of	metaphysical	Trinitarian	arguments	in	Turretin,	for	example.		205	See	Bishop,	Moral	Motivation,	on	how,	in	Hutcheson,	the	appreciation	of	the	relative	roles	of	pleasure	from	acting	virtuously	and	acting	from	other	directed	affections	sharpen	Hutcheson’s	concern	with	moral	motivation	from	the	Inquiry	to	the	Essay/Illustrations.	See	also	Henning	Jensen,	Motivation	and	the	Moral	Sense	in	Francis	Hutcheson’s	Ethical	Theory,	(The	Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff,	1971).		
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enlarge	and	perfect	this	notion	of	moral	goodness	to	comprehend	the	goodness	of	God.			The	Cambridge	Platonists	had	framed	the	claim	that	there	were	principles	of	human	nature,	which	constituted	our	moral	abilities,	but	that	were	not	entirely	exhausted	by	the	appeal	to	our	ultimate	self-interest	lying	in	virtue.		That	is,	that	the	exercise	of	those	abilities	might	lead	to	our	benefit	in	important	ways,	but	that	they	did	not	originate	in	our	concern	for	our	own	well-being.	This	claim	found	itself	beleaguered	on	several	fronts	at	the	turn	of	the	eighteenth	century.	Hobbes	had	of	course	stepped	forward	to	propose	that	the	natural	condition	of	man	was	that	of	a	being,	desirous	only	of	its	own	survival,	self-gratification	or	pain	relief,	and	driven	into	society	solely	in	pursuit	of	these	ends.	Pufendorf	had	claimed	that	sociability	and	social	affections	had	a	real	existence	within	us,	but	analysis	revealed	that	they	were	driven	ultimately	by	a	more	fundamental	principle	of	self-love.	Locke’s	tabula	rasa	had	left	us	officially	without	innate	ideas	of	either	moral	good	or	evil	to	guide	action	in	either	direction,	but	he	also	thought	that	our	natural	motivational	apparatus,	left	unguided,	naturally	disposed	us	to	vice	rather	than	original	neutrality.		For	Locke,	moral	knowledge,	for	the	individual	actor,	was	knowledge	of	the	content	of	a	law	and	the	correspondence	of	an	action	to	that	law.	Moral	motivation	was	a	matter	of	self-concerned	compliance	and	was	effected	through	the	foreseeable	consequences	of	compliance	or	non-compliance	with	that	law.		Clarke	did	allow	that	we	possessed	un-derived,	original,	natural	affections	towards	others,	reflection	upon	which	allowed	us,	in	theory,	to	derive	the	other-directed	duties	of	natural	law.	In	practice	though,	as	we	saw,	Clarke	argued	that	we	were	so	corrupted	that	we	needed	continuous	instruction	in	a	future	state	of	rewards	and	punishment	to	motivate	us	effectively	to	do	what	we	thought	was	right.	Moreover,	orthodox	Reformed	theologians	continued	to	insist	upon	a	post-lapsarian	corruption	so	thoroughly	wrought	upon	our	natural	state	that	even	the	willing	performance	of	actions	commanded	by	God	were	displeasing	to	him	unless	they	were	performed	with	the	assistance	of	grace.206																																																										206	See	Mautner,	introduction,	Two	Texts,	11.	
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In	the	early	eighteenth	century,	those	British	moralists	who	wished	to	insist	that	our	moral	thoughts,	affections	and	actions	were	reflective	of	something	other	than	the	operation	of	self-interest,	found	themselves	provoked	repeatedly	by	Bernard	Mandeville.	Mandeville’s	disquieting	promotion	of	egoism	was	intended	as	a	particular	provocation	to	supporters	of	Shaftesbury’s	view	of	universal	benevolence	as	a	constitutive	force	in	human	nature.	According	to	Mandeville,	however,	we	were	both	deceived	and	self-deceiving	where	we	trusted	in	our	experience	of	natural	affections	towards	others.207	Mandeville’s	theories	were	unsettling	because	they	further	undermined	our	experience	of	moral	agency.	Hobbes	had,	at	least,	allowed	us	sufficient	self-understanding	to	knowingly	herd	together	for	material	benefit,	and	Pufendorfian	sociability,	although	ultimately	a	matter	of	self-love,	was	held	to	be	a	‘real’	enough	experience	that	we	were	able	to	deduce	our	duties	from	one	another	by	reflecting	upon	it.			The	response	of	Francis	Hutcheson	to	Mandeville,	to	Hobbes,	and	also	to	the	reformed	theological	understanding	of	our	compromised	moral	abilities,	rested	upon	a	turn	to	introspective	psychology	in	the	effort	to	anchor	the	reality	of	virtue.208	I	suggest	that	Hutcheson’s	assumption	was	that	we	could,	by	turning	inward	and	reasoning	analogously	(rather	than	by	the	special	action	of	grace),	know	that	benevolence	was	God’s	moral	perfection.	In	addition,	and	this	is	most	important,	our	natural	moral	goodness	could	not,	within	the	framework	of	communicable	attributes,	be	utterly	different	in	kind	to	God’s	–	so	that	self-love	could	not	be	the	foundation	of	our	moral	abilities	and	be	something	quite	other	in	God.				Accounts	of	the	operation	of	species-wide,	uniform,	natural	principles	deemed	foundational	for	mind	and	nature	come	to	the	fore	in	this	bid	to	explain	and	to	validate	moral	experience.209			Natural	principles	of	mind	and	nature	were	held	to	set	the	conditions	for	the	possibility	of	virtue,	as	they	structured	an	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	moral	thought	and	behaviour.																																																									207	Colman,	“Bernard	Mandeville,”	125-139.	208	See	Gill,	British	Moralists,	for	his	thesis	on	the	importance	of	views	on	human	nature	in	the	late	seventeenth	and	eighteenth	century.		209	Hans	Aarsleff,	From	Locke	to	Saussure,	158-163.		
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Deductions	from	the	‘nature	of	man’	to	the	specification	of	our	duties	had	a	long	history	in	the	natural	law	tradition	of	the	early	modern	period.	Clarke,	as	we	saw,	had	agreed	with	Pufendorf	and	Cumberland	that,	in	principle,	we	may	deduce	our	duties	to	others	from	our	social	affections.	After	Clarke,	though,	the	debate	moved	away	from	the	derivation	of	duties	to	focus	more	directly	on	attempts	to	identify	and	describe	the	hierarchy	of	natural	principles	at	work	in	the	production	of	action.		As	Hutcheson	explained	in	1730,	though	many	recent	writers	have	taken	the	position	that	sociability	is	the	source	of	nearly	all	our	duties,	they	do	not	seem	to	have	sufficiently	
addressed	the	general	question	of	what	those	things	are	which	are	to	be	
called	natural	to	man.210[My	emphasis.]			Whilst	Clarke	offered	no	detailed	moral	epistemology	beyond	an	underdeveloped	appeal	to	intuitive	insight	into	self-evident	principles,	Hutcheson	followed	Clarke’s	tactic	of	exploring	what	seems	immediate	and	certain	to	us	in	moral	judgment.	Experience	of	moral	judgment	was	legitimised	as	a	field	of	inquiry	because,	alongside	the	assumption	of	uniformity,	a	principle	of	awareness	had	become	central	to	the	philosophy	of	ideas.	This	asserted	that	the	workings	of	mind,	its	contents	and	‘the	principles	of	actions’	were	transparent	and	available	to	us.211	In	combination	these	two	assumptions	validated	introspection	as	a	method	for	the	investigation	of	moral	thought	and	behaviour.	As	we	shall	see	in	the	next	chapter,	the	legitimacy	of	an	appeal	to	declarative	(conscious,	or	explicitly	held)	and	non-declarative	(non-conscious	or	implicitly	held)	principles	is	a	complex	part	of	Hutcheson’s	moral	sense	or	judgment	and	one	with	which	he	struggles.	I	raise	this	now	because	Hutcheson	relied	on	the	appeal	to	introspectively	available	features	of	our	motivation	and	affections	in	order	to	make	his	most	fundamental	claims	about	what	virtue	consists	in	and	how	we	may	be	brought	to	behave	virtuously.212			Hutcheson’s	work	up	until	the	1730s	was	preoccupied	by	the	need	to	defeat	orthodox	Calvinist	claims	about	the	ruination	of	our	natural	abilities	and	egoist																																																									210	Hutcheson,	inaugural	lecture,	194-195.		211	This	claim	is	discussed	in	much	greater	detail	in	the	next	chapter.		212	See	also	Gill,	British	Moralists,	on	Hutcheson’s	appeal	to	benevolence	as	an	‘observable	phenomena’	to	counter	the	‘egoists’	circuitous	psychological	stories’,	146-147.	
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accounts	of	virtue	that	have	us	moved	solely	by	self-love.	Explanations	surrounding	the	various	natural	principles	at	work	in	the	explanation	of	sociability	were	the	focus	of	Hutcheson’s	arguments	in	his	war	on	egoism.	Hutcheson’s	responses	to	Hobbes,	Mandeville	and	Pufendorf	are	significant	because	Hutcheson	rebuffed	their	explanations	of	the	‘protean’	working	of	self-love	on	the	grounds	that	the	moral	actor	is	not	aware	of	selfish	motivations	when	she	acts.	Hutcheson	wanted	us	to	be	able	to	trust	the	experience	of	wanting	to	do	something	good	for	someone	else	because	this	feeling	is	of	epistemic	relevance	to	us	in	practical	morality.	If	we	reinterpret	it	as	supervening	on	a	more	fundamental	motivation	of	self–love	then	we	will,	or	at	least	might,	override	our	natural	judgment	that	these	benevolent	affections	really	are	the	moral	good	and,	in	so	doing,	destroy	our	natural	moral	abilities.			Whether	a	principle	must	be	consciously	available	to	us	in	order	for	it	to	play	an	active	role	in	our	motivation	or	cognition	is	an	important	question,	given	Hutcheson’s	use	of	introspection	to	justify	his	assertions	about	our	motivation	and	our	moral	responses.	It	also	underpinned	his	claims	about	the	practical	import	of	moral	philosophy.	Hutcheson,	like	his	contemporaries,	saw	one	of	the	great	tasks	of	moral	philosophers	to	be	to	show	how	acting	virtuously	is	to	our	own	best	advantage	‒	but	this	was	not	the	end	of	his	claims	about	the	practical	duties	of	moral	philosophers.213	Hutcheson	thought	that	in	order	to	develop	our	natural	moral	potential	it	was	necessary,	in	a	practical	sense,	to	trust	in	the	reality	of	our	experience	of	our	moral	responses	and	motivation.	The	development	and	continued	operation	of	these	natural	abilities,	however,	was	at	risk	from	current	moral	teaching	itself.	This	complaint	went	far	wider	than	his	claim	that	a	priori	demonstration	was	likely	to	lead	to	scepticism.	Hutcheson’s	concern	with	correcting	our	views	of	human	nature	was	primarily	practical.	This	is	a	position	he	kept	to	throughout	his	works,	even	where	subsidiary	motivational	factors	such	as	future	state	considerations	or	laws	are	entertained.	Like	Clarke,	with	his	insistence	on	the	need	for	regular	and	careful	instruction	in	relevant	revealed	truths,	Hutcheson																																																									213	On	the	practical	purpose	of	moral	philosophy	for	Hutcheson,	see	Kate	Abramson,	“Sympathy	and	the	Project	of	Hume’s	Second	Inquiry,”	Archiv	fur	Geschicte	der	Philosophie	83	(2001):	45-80.		
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recognised	the	need	for	a	naturally	existing	disposition	to	virtue	to	be	cultivated.	Being	left	to	our	own	moral	devices	was	not	an	option	for	Hutcheson,	despite	the	natural	origin	of	our	potential	moral	abilities.	His	later	published	works	are	far	more	concerned	with	the	cultivation	and	practice	of	virtue	by	a	variety	of	means,	and	the	way	he	understands	naturalness	changes.214	At	the	beginning	of	his	career	though,	Hutcheson’s	concern	was	with	the	damage	that	holding	incorrect	views	about	our	own	nature	is	likely	to	do	to	our	moral	ability.			Here	I	would	like	to	discuss	some	of	the	material	that	Hutcheson	presented	in	his	earliest	publications,	a	series	of	letters	also	published	in	1725,	the	year	of	the	first	edition	of	the	Inquiry,	as	his	concern	about	the	practical	implications	of	the	beliefs	that	we	hold	about	our	motivation	and	divine	intention	are	illustrated	well	here	and	they	reflect	important	aspects	of	the	argument	presented	in	the	
Inquiry	and	the	Essay/Illustrations.			The	first	is	a	letter	published	in	The	London	Journal	that	served	as	a	preamble	to	the	1725	first	edition	of	his	Inquiry.	Set	out	in	it	is	Hutcheson's	belief	in	the	practical	power	of	holding	the	right	beliefs	and	the	corrupting	power	of	mistaken	beliefs	about	the	nature	of	our	natural	moral	abilities	and	the	nature	of	God.	Hutcheson	asked	whether	the	impotence	of	recent	improvements	in	our	wisdom	to	effect	behavioural	change	were	the	result	of	natural	corruption,	or	had	we	in	fact	been	led	astray	by	these	‘leading	principles	of	science’?		Are	all	the	efforts	of	humane	wisdom,	in	an	age	which	we	think	wonderfully	improved,	so	entirely	ineffectual	in	that	affair,	which	is	of	the	greatest	importance	to	the	happiness	of	mankind?	Shall	we	lay	it	on	a	natural	corruption	in	us,	growing	stronger,	the	more	opposition	it	meets	with?	Or	may	we	not	rather	suspect,	there	must	be	some	mistakes	in	the	leading	principles	of	science;	some	wrong	steps	taken	in	our	instruction	which	make	it	so	ineffectual	for	the	end	it	professes	to	pursue?215		Hutcheson	then	revealed	his	own	pragmatic	theory	of	moral	knowledge.	It	is	pragmatic	in	the	sense	that	the	test	of	its	truthfulness	is	to	be	found	in	its	practical	effect	upon	us.																																																										214	See	Thomas	Arnhert	“Francis	Hutcheson	and	the	Heathen	Moralists,”	The	Journal	of	Scottish	
Philosophy	8,	no.1	(2010):	51–62.				215	Hutcheson,	Two	Texts,	97.	
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All	virtue	is	allowed	to	consist	in	affections	of	love	towards	the	Deity,	and	our	fellow	creatures,	and	in	actions	suitable	to	those	affections.	Hence	we	may	conclude,	1st,	“That	whatever	scheme	of	principles	shall	be	most	effectual	to	excite	these	affections,	the	same	must	be	the	truest	foundation	of	all	virtue:	And	2dly,	Whatever	rules	of	conduct	shall	lead	us	into	a	course	of	action	acceptable	to	the	Deity,	and	the	most	beneficial	to	mankind,	they	must	be	the	true	precepts	of	morality”.216			 	The	truth	of	any	moral	system	is	to	be	assessed	by	the	degree	to	which	it	excites	loving	affections	towards	God	and	other	people,	since	they	are	what	virtue	consists	in.	If	the	scheme	works	to	excite	these	affections	then	it	must	be	true,	Hutcheson	insisted.	Whatever	'scheme	of	principles'	it	is	that	best	inspires	affections	towards	God	and	one	another,	this	‘must	be	the	truest	foundation	of	all	virtue’.	The	test	of	the	truth	of	any	system	of	moral	knowledge	is	the	degree	to	which	its	principles,	inculcated	in	our	minds,	raise	these	particular	affections	in	us.				In	this	early	text,	Hutcheson	looked	to	the	cultivation	of	positive	beliefs	about	our	nature	and	the	nature	of	the	Deity	as	the	foundation	of	our	practical	moral	abilities.		To	bolster	his	argument,	Hutcheson	then	pointed	to	Bayle’s	observation	about	the	failure	of	men	to	do	what	they	know	to	be	right:	This	is	the	reason	of	what	a	very	ingenious	writer	justly	observes,	viz.	that	mens	[sic]	practices	are	very	little	influenced	by	their	principles.	The	principles	he	means,	are	those	which	move	men	to	virtue	from	considerations	of	interest.217		Hutcheson	pointed	out	a	variety	of	moral	failings	in	unnamed	individual	thinkers,	whose	lamentable	conduct	is	the	result	of	their	failing	to	be	moved	to	virtue	by	the	‘nice	distinctions’	supplied	by	their	own	principles	of	self-love.	His	observation	here	was	that	holding	faulty	views	of	what	constitutes	a	moral	principle	can	result	in	an	inability	to	raise	kind	affections	towards	God,	and	other	people.	Hutcheson	then	asked	us	to	‘observe	how	our	moralists	inculcate	these	great	foundations	of	all	virtue,	the	love	of	God	and	of	our	neighbour’	in	their	followers.	Their	scheme	failed,	Hutcheson	argued,	because	appealing	to	the	
																																																								216	Ibid.,	97.	217	Ibid.,	98.		
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principle	of	self-interest,	in	the	form	of	threats	or	promises,	cannot	make	us	approve	a	vice	or	hate	virtue	because		Some	qualities	of	mind	necessarily	raise	love	in	every	considering	spectator,	and	their	contraries	hatred;	and	when	these	qualities	don’t	appear	we	in	vain	attempt	to	purchase	either	love	or	hatred.218		Our	natural	kind	affections	are	the	true	practical	principles	behind	morality,	and	we	feel	love	towards	those	who	display	them.	Our	loving	esteem	or	complacence,	which	is	raised	only	by	the	perception	of	benevolence	in	others,	is	not	under	our	voluntary	control.219		Any	effect	on	the	will	of	potential	reward	or	punishment	is	impotent	in	the	raising	of	those	kind	affections.			As	Harris	has	pointed	out,	Hutcheson	allowed	that	the	thoughts	of	reward	and	punishment	in	a	future	state	could	act	as	subsidiary	motivational	aids.220	But	for	Hutcheson,	the	practical	sufficiency	of	our	primary,	natural,	other-directed	affections	is	threatened	when	we	ignore	the	promptings	of	our	own	kind	affections,	because	moralists	have	taught	us	they	are	false	or	misguided.	Hutcheson	lamented	that	‘Many	of	our	moralists,	after	Mr	Hobbs’	misrepresent	human	nature	as	corrupted	and	entirely	self-interested	and	fail	to	draw	our	attention	to	or	kinder	instincts,	natural	sociable	affections	and	a	love	of	virtue	in	others	and	of	being	honoured	for	our	own	virtue.	They	compound	this	error	when	they	attempt	to	get	us	to	do	good	for	others	by	threatening	the	pains	of	divine	sanction.		Hutcheson	also	took	aim	at	Pufendorf	for	suggesting	that	the	utility	of	a	belief	in	God	establishes	its	truth.221	He	moved	on	to	criticise	those	who,	though	'ashamed'	of	this	type	of	argument,	go	on	to	give	us	‘rational	arguments	for	the	existence	and	power	of	the	Deity’	and	misrepresent	the	divine	nature	as	‘fond	of	glory,	jealous	of	honour,	sudden	in	resentment	of	affronts,	and	resolute	in	
																																																								218	Ibid,,	98.	219	See	Luigi	Turco,	“Sympathy	and	the	Moral	Sense,”	British	Journal	for	the	History	of	Philosophy	7,	no.	1	(1999):	79-101,	on	complacence	in	Hutcheson.		220	Harris,	“Religion,”	210.	221	Hutcheson,	Two	Texts,	98	and	see	Mautner,	in	the	same,	on	the	unfairness	of	this	remark,	92-93.			
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punishing	every	transgression	of	his	laws’.222	Hutcheson	believed	that	emphasising	the	'boundless	goodness'	of	God	was	a	far	more	effective	way	to	lead	a	mind	to	the	love	of	God,	which	in	turn	will	lead	us	to	have	confidence	that	our	own	benevolence	issues	from	his	nature.	As	for	our	duties	to	ourselves,	Hutcheson	noted	that	we	are	given	many	ways	to	check	our	passions.	He	argued	though,	that	it	does	not	help	us	to	govern	our	passions,	if	we	are	led	to	believe	that	having	them	is	a	sign	of	a	corrupted	nature.	The	proper	way	for	us	to	restrain	vice	is	to	let	us	see	that	we	are	'good	natured,	yet	weak	and	fallible'	and	to	rectify	other	false	beliefs	that	lead	us	to	anger,	jealousy,	fear,	sorrow,	cowardliness,	and	ambition.	Unless	just	representations	be	given	of	the	objects	of	our	passions,	all	external	arguments	will	be	but	rowing	against	the	stream;	an	endless	labour,	while	the	passions	themselves	do	not	take	a	more	reasonable	turn,	upon	juster	apprehensions	of	the	affairs	about	which	they	are	employed.223		A	proper	understanding	of	our	own	nature,	verified	and	proven	by	introspection	into	our	own	experience	was	Hutcheson	thought,	the	best	way	for	the	majority	of	us	not	gifted	with	Newtonian	powers	of	ratiocination	to	counter	the	scepticism	promoted	by	Hobbes	and	Mandeville.	The	reality	of	a	virtue	understood	to	be	natural	to	us	was	underwritten	by	the	notion	of	God’s	communicable	attributes.			In	other	letters	of	1725,	published	in	the	Dublin	Journal,	Hutcheson	addressed	the	campaign	to	have	self-love	recognised	as	the	sole	principle	upon	which	we	are	capable	of	acting	or	responding	to	anything	at	all.	In	several	of	these	letters,	Hutcheson	responded	to	Hobbes’	account	of	laughter,	in	which	Hobbes	argued	that	laughter	arose	uniquely	from	a	sense	of	superiority	within	us,	which	was	tickled	into	action	by	the	presentation	of	the	reduced	abilities	or	status	of	others.		Hobbes’s	self-enhancing	superiority	principle	was	supposed	to	be	responsible	for	us	finding	anything	at	all	funny.	I	will	not	go	into	the	details	of	Hutcheson’s	response	to	Hobbes,	but	one	of	his	objections	was	that	we	are	just	not	aware	of	this	superiority	when	we	laugh	at	something.	How	then,	Hutcheson	asked,	can	it	provoke	a	response	from	us?		Hutcheson	noted	that	Hobbes,	Pufendorf	and	those																																																									222	Hutcheson,	Two	Texts,	99.	223	Ibid.,104	-105.		
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of	an	Epicurean	bent	such	as	Lucretius,	suggested	that	our	true	motives	remain	hidden	from	us.		We	go	to	our	closets	often	to	spin	out	some	fine	conjectures	about	the	principles	of	our	actions	which	no	mortal	is	conscious	of	in	himself	during	the	action;	thus	the	same	authors	above	mentioned	tell	us,	that	the	desire	which	we	have	to	see	tragical	representations	is,	because	of	the	secret	pleasure	we	find	in	thinking	ourselves	secure	from	such	evils.	224		This	is	the	awareness	principle	spelled	out.	Hutcheson	thought	that	we	should	be	able	to	trust	our	natural	affections	towards	others.	These	immediate	affections	were	the	basis	of	our	actions	and	they	did	not	require	post	hoc	reinterpretation	by	the	light	of	other	principles	that	we	were	not	conscious	of	experiencing.225	Hutcheson,	delightfully	pre	Freudian,	asked	how	a	motivation	or	a	feeling	that	we	were	unaware	of	could	move	us?	What	we	experienced	was	immediate	and	primary	in	terms	of	explaining	behaviour,	or	at	least	it	could	not	be	contradicted	by	opposing	non-conscious	principles.		Hutcheson	makes	the	same	argument	in	both	the	Inquiry	and	the	Essay/Illustrations	about	the	appeal	to	contorted	and	non-conscious	aspects	of	self-love	to	account	both	for	the	standard	by	which	we	approve	actions	and	the	basis	for	their	motivation,	against	those	who	would	‘rather	twist	self-love	into	a	thousand	shapes,	than	allow	any	other	principle	of	approbation	than	interest.’	226	In	the	Illustrations	he	complains	that		men	are	conscious	of	no	such	intentions	or	acute	reflections	in	these	actions.	Ingenious	speculative	men,	in	their	straining	to	support	an	hypothesis,	may	contrive	a	thousand	subtle	selfish	motives,	which	a	kind	and	generous	heart	never	dreamed	of.227			It	should	be	mentioned	though,	that	Hutcheson	resorted	to	exactly	the	same	type	of	argument	when	he	explained	our	approval	of	other	qualities	such	as	courage,	where	there	is	no	immediate	beneficiary.	In	such	cases	‘it	is	upon	some	secret	apprehension	of	a	good	intention	in	the	use	of	it’.228			
																																																								224	Hutcheson,	Opera	Minor,	110.		225	Ibid.,	100.		226	Hutcheson,	Inquiry,	93.		227	Hutcheson,	Illustrations,	135.	228	Hutcheson,	Inquiry,	102.		
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This	then	was	the	basis	of	Hutcheson’s	use	of	introspection	into	our	moral	experience.	Five	years	after	the	appearance	of	his	first	publications,	Hutcheson	was	appointed	to	the	chair	of	moral	philosophy	at	Glasgow.	In	his	inaugural	
lecture	he	was	ready	to	foreground	the	particular	emphasis	on	the	naturalness	of	our	moral	abilities,	both	cognitive	and	behavioural,	within	the	context	of	a	full	blown	providential	teleology.229			I	will	outline	Hutcheson’s	teleology	in	the	next	section,	because	it	gives	us	an	understanding	of	one	form	of	the	sort	of	providential	guarantee	that	Hutcheson	put	forward	to	secure	the	reality	of	our	moral	abilities.	I	suggest,	in	the	last	section	of	this	chapter,	that	Hutcheson	goes	a	little	further	than	a	providentially	instituted	naturalism	in	his	realism,	and	I	offer	an	interpretation	of	his	argument	in	the	Metaphysics	to	support	this	claim.	In	between	these	sections	I	also	discuss	Hutcheson’s	changed	views	on	the	nature	of	our	moral	obligation.	I	suggest	that	practical	effect	of	moral	obligation,	in	the	(re)	formulation	it	received	in	the	
Essay/Illustrations,	is	to	lead	us	to	an	appreciation	of	the	existence	of	God	and	his	communicable	attributes.					Hutcheson’s	naturalism	and	his	teleology			Hutcheson’s	inaugural	lecture	was	intended	to	comprise	‘a	rather	more	careful	consideration	of	human	nature’.230	This	time	Locke	was	named	(and	to	a	certain	extent	shamed):	I	do	not	know	how	it	happened,	but	since	the	famous	Locke	and	other	writers	demonstrated	to	the	satisfaction	of	many,	among	them	men	both	illustrious	and	honourable,	that	there	are	no	ideas	of	things	in	the	human	mind	from	the	very	beginning,	no	conception	of	things,	no	judgements,	whether	theoretical	or	practical	(which	alone	they	are	determined	to	call	innate),	these	men	have	virtually	abandoned	investigation	into	natural	ideas,	apprehensions,	judgements,	and	the	natural	sense	of	anything	whatever.231				In	the	lecture,	Hutcheson	says	that	he	will	restrict	himself,	on	the	topic	of	human	nature,	to	discussing	‘those	parts	of	the	human	mind	which	make	us	sociable’.232																																																									229	See	also	Harris,	“Religion,”	on	the	role	for	providence	in	Hutcheson	across	all	texts,	205-222.		230	Hutcheson,	inaugural	lecture,	193.	231	Ibid.,	212.	232	Ibid.,	194.	
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Hutcheson	acknowledged	that	many	have	taken	the	view	that	sociability	is	the	source	of	‘nearly	all	our	duties’,	but	he	argued	that	there	had	not	been	a	proper	discussion	of	what	it	is	which	is	natural	to	us,	what	our	‘sociality	consists	in’	and	which	part	makes	us	seek	out	and	be	fit	for	social	life,	with	or	without	the	presence	of	civil	government.233			Does	a	desire	for	social	life,	and	for	good	to	accrue	to	the	‘mass	of	mankind’,	originate	in	our	equally	natural	‘want,	weakness	and	indigence’?	Hutcheson	said	that	Pufendorf	adopted	this	Epicurean	position	in	order	to	argue	that	God	implanted	this	desire	because	we	need	to	pull	together	in	order	to	survive,	and	that	he	also	created	us	weak	in	order	than	we	might	discover	our	moral	selves.	Sociability	makes	us	happy	and	provides	us	with	benefits,	and	we	are	led	into	company	by	a	desire	for	happiness,	not	aware	that	our	best	interests	are	served	by	doing	so.	Rather	than	invoke	an	appeal	to	introspection	here,	since	Pufendorf	agreed	that	we	experience	social	affections,	Hutcheson	had	to	move	the	argument	on	to	consider	the	order	of	our	natural	principles.	God	intends	both	our	benevolence	and	our	‘indigence	and	weakness’,	but	does	the	self-preserving	motive	underpin	the	desire	to	act	for	others?	Hutcheson’s	answer	was	to	see	Pufendorf	(and	Cumberland’s)	gloss	on	‘natural’	as	amounting	to	an	understanding	of	social	life	as	‘natural	in	a	secondary	sense	and	certainly	as	necessary’.234		This	is	fine	as	far	as	it	goes,	says	Hutcheson,	better	than	fine	in	fact	(‘correct’,	‘perceptive’	and	‘profound’),	but	Hutcheson	wanted	to	insist	that	human	nature	is	sociable	’for	its	own	sake’,		‘in	itself,	immediately	and	primarily	kind,	unselfish	and	sociable	without	regard	to	its	advantage	or	pleasure’.235	We	also	did	not	need	first	to	exchange	services	with	someone	in	order	to	raise	their	tender	feelings	towards	us.236	For,	such	is	the	structure	of	the	human	mind,	that	when	certain	images	of	things	come	before	it,	certain	affections	arise	under	the	sole	guidance	of	nature,	without	any	art	or	deliberation,	indeed	without	any	command	of	the	will	.	.	.	when	images	of	other	men	and	their	fortune	come	to	our	
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attention,	they	excite	public	and	unselfish	feeling,	even	though	there	is	no	prospect	of	private	advantage.237			Moreover,	whatever	the	faults	or	flaws	that	God	has	allowed	to	our	natures,	there	is	a	priority	to	them.	We	are	inclined	to	seek	the	good	of	all	others	who	are	‘harmless’,	however	remote	they	are	to	us.	Malevolence	can	only	result	from	‘a	conflict	of	interests,	rivalry,	jealousy,	or	by	some	thoughts	of	previous	injury	or	cruelty.’	This,	Hutcheson	believes,			seems	to	demonstrate	that	benevolence	is	directly	and	in	itself	natural,	but	malevolence	is	only	secondarily	so,	and	often	results	from	ignorance	and	accident.238		In	addition	to	malevolence	resulting	from	misunderstanding,	Hutcheson	allowed	that	there	are	principles	or	‘weaknesses’	within	our	nature	that	tend	to	vice,	the	‘lower	faculties’	for	example,	which	are	there	are	there	by	divine	institution.		The	moral	sense	has	been	implanted	to	identify	vice	as	being	unnatural	to	our	nature.	This	‘ruling	principle’	allowed	us	to	distinguish	those	parts	of	our	nature	that	God	had	implanted,	but	intended	us	to	view	as	non-natural	and	to	govern	as	such.	Through		that	moral	sense	which	we	may	also	call	natural	conscience,	we	see	clearly	that	vices	are	not	natural	to	our	nature;	we	see	the	faculties	which	ought	to	moderate	and	govern	the	lower	desires.	Therefore	though	the	strength	and	power	of	this	sense	or	conscience	may	be	so	diminished	that	it	is	often	unable	to	govern	the	lower	desires,	yet	we	see	clearly	that	by	its	own	nature	it	is	naturally	fit	to	rule.	Clearly	it	is	the	ruling	principle	[hegemonikon],	to	which	all	things	were	made	subject,	and	rightly	so,	in	the	integral	state	of	our	nature.	239		In	looking	at	the	natural	parts	of	our	‘moral	character’	Hutcheson’s	teleology	was	to	the	fore.	He	argued	that	we	might	distinguish	the	natural	from	the	artificial	in	anything	constructed	-	eyes,	teeth,	buildings,	ships,	human	nature	-	by	looking	at	the	purpose	for	which	it	was	designed.	What	is	by	deliberate	design	and	what	is	by	accident	or	external	force	may	be	understood	by	its	intended	function,	just	as	eyes	are	for	seeing	and	buildings	are	for	sheltering	in.	Focusing	on	the	faults	is	unhelpful.	First,	we	can’t	discover	the	intended	purpose	of	a	structure	by	looking	at	the	problems	with	it,	and	second,	those	elements	of	our	nature	that	seem																																																									237	Ibid.,	205.		238	Ibid.,	210.		239	Ibid.,	199.		
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unhelpful	to	us	might	be	there	by	design	and	are	in	some	way	helpful	or	necessary	for	the	designer	to	achieve	his	vision.	We	just	aren’t	in	a	position	to	appreciate	his	overall	scheme.	For	example:	The	weakness	of	our	nature	seem	to	have	been	willed	by	the	good	and	great	God	in	the	excellent	wisdom	of	his	counsel;	yet	all	our	innate	desires	strive	against	that	weakness	and	declare	that	such	weakness	is	not	the	end	of	duties,	much	less	the	goal	which	nature	has	set	for	our	actions.240			Hutcheson’s	panegyric	to	the	natural	rests	on	his	presumption	that	we	are	able	to	identify	the	goal	or	end	envisaged	for	us	by	God,	via	an	implanted	desire	of	which	we	are	introspectively	aware.	For	a	desire	implanted	by	nature	is	perhaps	the	only	conceivable	faculty	of	an	active	nature	that	would	allow	us	to	distinguish	between	natural	states	or	actions	and	their	contraries;	particularly	if	united	with	that	desire	is	a	sense,	equally	innate,	which	makes	the	actions	or	results	agreeable	and	pleasant.241			This	is	why,	Hutcheson	argues,	we	are	‘right	to	call	that	state	which	is	most	highly	cultivated	the	natural	state	of	the	human	race’.	It	was	also,	he	insists,	our	original	pre-lapsarian	state,	since	even	reformed	theologians	did	not	deny	that	‘the	original	fabric	of	our	nature	was,	by	the	divine	art	and	plan,	designed	for	every	virtue’.242	Nor	indeed	can	the	true	fabric	of	our	nature	as	God	disposed	it	be	restored	until	conscience,	seated	on	this	its	proper	throne,	crushes	the	bodily	desires	beneath	its	feet.243		The	moral	sense,	for	Hutcheson	by	1730,	is	doing	far	more	for	us	than	just	providing	us	with	the	original	idea	of	virtue	–	it	is	now	the	ruling	principle,	whose	dictates	tell	us	how	we	ought	to	be	governing	ourselves,	which	of	course	is	how	God	intends	that	we	ought	to	govern	ourselves,	which	is	our	final	end.			Hutcheson	and	the	religious	purpose	of	(moral)	obligation	I	will	now	look	at	Hutcheson’s	thoughts	on	the	relationship	of	the	moral	sense	to	moral	obligation	as	it	stood	at	the	end	of	the	1720s,	just	prior	to	his	inaugural																																																									240	Ibid.,	197.		241	Ibid.,197.	242	Ibid.,	200.		243	Ibid.,	199.		
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lecture.	In	the	Essay	and	Illustrations	Hutcheson	had,	under	the	force	of	some	pressure	from	Gilbert	Burnet,	expanded	the	role	of	reason	in	correcting	or	checking	the	deliverances	of	the	moral	sense.	He	had	also	advertised	a	greater	role	for	reason	in	our	move	from	an	instinctive	affection	towards	those	we	love	and	admire	because	of	our	proximity	to	them	(genetic	or	otherwise),	to	our	being	able	to	display	the	sort	of	universal	benevolence	required	by	the	New	Testament	(and	required	by	Burnet	and	Balguy).244			Furthermore,	by	this	point	Hutcheson	had	also	clarified	his	views	on	the	absence	of	a	role	for	the	moral	sense	in	moral	motivation.	Darwall	neatly	summarises	three	reasons	why	the	moral	sense,	for	Hutcheson,	was	not	practically	able	to	motivate	the	very	behaviour	it	identified	as	of	moral	worth.245		First,	Hutcheson	held	that	a	sense	or	perception	or	judgment	cannot	excite	us	to	action,	only	desire	or	passion	can	move	us	directly	to	action.	Secondly,	our	desires	(and	passions)	are	all	directed	towards	securing	natural	goods,	either	for	us	or	for	others	‒	they	do	not	aim	directly	at	obtaining	moral	good.	Lastly,	since	we	can	only	raise	desires	for	natural	goods,	the	moral	sense	cannot	motivate	us	to	a	
moral	action.	Moral	action	is	counted	moral	if,	and	only	if,	it	is	motivated	by	a	desire	to	secure	natural	goods	for	others	(benevolence).	Acting	from	a	desire	to	experience	the	natural	good	of	self-approval	delivered	by	our	moral	sense	would	not	be	a	motivation	that	we	could	approve	using	this	moral	sense.		
	As	Darwall	has	carefully	documented,	Hutcheson’s	formulation	of	moral	obligation	in	the	Essay/Illustrations	(and	in	some	of	the	revisions	to	the	Inquiry),	reflected	his	reformulation	of	the	relationship	between	the	moral	sense	and	moral	action.	Hutcheson,	like	Clarke,	did	not	understand	moral	obligation	as	a	rational	motive	where	rational	motive	is	understood	as	a	self-interested	reason	to	act.	Instead,	in	the	formulation	offered	in	the	Illustrations	the	normative	force	is	applied	to	an	approval	of	the	performance	of	an	action	(or	disapproval	of	its	not	having	been	performed).246																																																										244	See	Gill,	British	Moralists,	156-167,	for	an	account	of	the	correspondence	between	Burnet	and	Hutcheson.		245	Darwall,	Internal	Ought,	321.		246	Darwall,	Internal	Ought,	233.		
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When	we	say	one	is	obliged	to	an	action,	we	either	mean,	1.	That	the	action	is	necessary	to	obtain	happiness	to	the	agent,	or	to	avoid	misery:	or,	2.	That	every	spectator,	or	he	himself	upon	reflection,	must	approve	his	action,	and	disapprove	his	omitting	it,	if	he	considers	fully	all	its	circumstances.	The	former	meaning	of	the	word	obligation	presupposes	selfish	affections,	and	the	senses	of	private	happiness:	The	latter	meaning	includes	the	moral	sense.247		Hutcheson	argued	that	we	are	morally	obliged	to	an	action	where	everyone	who	has	considered	it	approves	its	performance	(or	where	we	ourselves	approve	it	after	reflection).	It	is	clear	that	the	obligatory	nature	of	an	action	may,	in	part,	be	properly	determined	by	the	reasoned	opinion	of	others,	an	opinion	of	which	we	may	or	may	not	be	aware,	but	which	would	nevertheless	make	it	obligatory.			Hutcheson’s	notion	of	a	moral	obligation	seems	to	comprise	the	judgement	of	the	action	(and	not	only	the	intention)	in	a	thorough	manner	‘fully	in	all	its	circumstances’	and	this	‘latter	meaning’	only	‘includes’	the	moral	sense.	Hutcheson	now	suggested	that	any	action,	which	is	obligatory,	or	approved,	is	made	so	by	more	than	just	the	experience	of	the	non-volitional	pleasurable	idea	of	approval	in	us.	It	must	derive	from	a	reasoned	assessment	of	the	action	in	context.	To	this	end	in	the	Illustrations	Hutcheson	gives	us	more	of	his	moral	calculus	as	an	aid	to	the	fulfilment	of	this	task.248	This	is	not	because	Hutcheson	thought	that	through	reasoning	itself	we	may	comprehend	eternal	relations,	in	the	way	that	Clarke	argued	we	might,	but	so	that	we	might	properly	consider	the	motives	of	others	and	ourselves,	and	assess	the	amount	of	public	good	achieved	or	potentially	achievable	by	the	action.	It	also	might	include	our	understanding	of	the	wider	context	of	that	action	in	‘all	its	circumstances’.	Hutcheson	wanted	our	natural,	instinctive,	pre-religious	actions	to	be	morally	praiseworthy,	as	the	action	of	our	moral	sense	indicates	to	us	that	it	is.	But	Hutcheson	also	wanted	their	obligatory	quality	to	consist	in	a	reasoned	appreciation	of	the	fuller	context,	as	far	as	we	were	aware	of	it.	The	fuller	context,	the	one	appreciated	by	all	properly	thinking	people,	of	course	included	God.	Hutcheson’s	reformulation	of	moral	obligation	in	the	Illustrations	is,	I	believe,	an	indication	of	his	wish	to																																																									247	Hutcheson,	Illustrations,	146.		248	Ibid.,	189.			
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integrate	a	morality	understood	naturally	by	us	to	be	something	in	the	quality	of	persons,	within	the	wider	system	of	natural	law.			If	the	moral	sense,	at	this	point	at	any	rate,	is	not	directly	able	to	raise	a	moral	motivational	impulse	in	us,	does	it	have	any	directly	practical	effect?	It	does,	and	I	argue	that	Hutcheson	intended	that	its	practical	effect	is	to	lead	us	to	an	appreciation	of	the	existence	of	God	and	his	communicable	attributes.	A	sense	may	raise	a	desire	for	a	natural	good.	I	suggest	that	the	pleasure	of	approval	arises	upon	the	perception	of	benevolence,	and	the	pleasures	of	moral	approval	delivered	by	the	moral	sense	incline	us	to	the	search	for	more	benevolence,	or	more	about	benevolence,	in	order	to	experience	the	pleasure	of	approval.	It	raises	a	selfish	desire	to	experience	the	pleasure	of	discovering	benevolence	(and	of	course,	it	means	that	benevolence	itself	is	naturally	desired).			There	is	no	problem,	that	I	can	see,	with	a	pleasurable	idea	of	moral	approval,	being	itself	experienced	as	a	natural	good	and	thereby	raising	a	particular	self-interested	desire	to	experience	more	of	this	pleasure,	by	increasing	the	amount	of	time	we	spend	considering	the	intentions	behind	actions	and	the	character	of	moral	agents,	as	long	as	we	do	not	mix	this	up	with	our	moral	obligation.		(So	long	as	we	do	not	mistake	the	natural	good	offered	by	the	pleasure	of	moral	contemplation	as	a	moral	motivation	to	be	virtuous.)			It	might	be	objected	that	the	pain	of	moral	censure	would	act	as	an	equal	motivational	counterbalance	to	this	search	for	moral	truth,	that	disapproval	might	stop	us	inquiring.	Hutcheson,	from	the	first	edition	of	the	Inquiry	is	explicit	that	unlike	purely	benevolent	intention,	pure	disinterested	malice	does	not	really	exist.		As	to	malice,	human	nature	seems	scarce	capable	of	malicious	disinterested	hatred,	or	a	sedate	delight	in	the	misery	of	others,	when	we	imagine	them	no	way	pernicious	to	us,	or	opposite	to	our	interest.249		We	never	just	desire	that	others	suffer	or	are	disadvantaged.	Their	suffering	may	be	an	outcome	of	our	own	rapacious	self-love,	but	when	we	act	viciously	it	is																																																									249	Hutcheson,	Inquiry,	105.	
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because	we	intend	to	gain	something,	or	do	not	wish	to	lose	something,	and	not	simply	because	we	wish	to	cause	someone	else	misery.	To	this	natural	imbalance	in	distribution	of	benevolent	and	malicious	affections,	in	favour	of	benevolence,	Hutcheson	adds	that	the	moral	sense,		if	we	form	true	opinions	of	the	tendencies	of	actions,	and	of	the	affections	whence	they	spring,	.	.	.	is	the	fountain	of	the	most	intense	pleasure.250			Since	Hutcheson	believes	that	we	are	all	capable	of	natural	benevolence,	that	pure	malice	rarely,	if	ever,	is	seen,	and	that	the	perception	of	benevolence	provides	us	with	the	highest	pleasure,	we	can	see	him	tip	the	scale	towards	moral	evaluation	providing	us	with	more	pleasure	than	pain	overall	and	thus	inducing	us	to	search	for	it.			Hutcheson	insisted,	with	respect	to	our	sense	of	beauty,	that	the	search	for	the	pleasure,	or	beauty	(guided	by	the	principle	of	‘uniformity	amidst	variety’)	would	eventually	reveal	to	us	the	way	in	which	the	natural	world	has	been	designed.	This	would	lead	us	to	infer	the	existence,	ability,	power	and	the	essential	benevolence	of	the	Deity	in	annexing	pleasure	to	uniformity	amidst	variety.			Now	from	the	whole	we	may	conclude,	“That	supposing	the	Deity	so	kind	as	to	connect	sensible	pleasures	with	certain	actions	or	contemplations	beside	the	rational	advantage	perceivable,	there	is	a	great	moral	necessity	
from	his	goodness	that	the	internal	sense	of	men	should	be	constituted	as	it	
is	at	present	so	as	to	make	uniformity	amidst	variety	the	occasion	of	pleasure”.251	[My	emphasis.]		In	the	same	way,	our	moral	sense	has	been	implanted	within	us	to	reveal	to	us	both	our	own	natural	benevolence,	and	God’s	own	loving	nature.	For	now,	the	moral	sense	operates	in	order	that	we	attend	to	what	we	(naturally)	find	pleasing	in	an	action,	and	use	our	reason	to	fully	assess	not	only	the	circumstances	of	particular	moral	judgments	and	the	likely	outcomes,	but	the	operation	of	principles	of	our	own	nature	too.	Via	the	pleasure	derived	from	the	operation	of	the	moral	sense	we	are	naturally	obliged,	or	motivated	to	think	about	the	intention	of	agents	and	to	seek	out	their	moral	excellence.	We	are																																																									250	Hutcheson,	Essay,	106.	251	Hutcheson,	Inquiry,	80.	
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motivated	to	reason	sufficiently	about	the	intention	of	agents	and	to	identify	what	it	is	that	we	approve	in.	In	this	way,	we	may	come	to	understand	the	priority	that	God	(in	whose	existence	our	sense	of	beauty	has	also	led	us	to	believe)	has	assigned	to	our	various	natural	faculties,	as	we	consider	how	to	behave.	This	is	one	of	the	ways	in	which	the	moral	sense	was	understood	by	Hutcheson	in	1730	to	function	as	a	‘hegemonikon’	or	ruling	principle.	God	had	implanted	this	sense,	along	with	our	sense	of	beauty,	in	the	form	that	they	take,	because	‘there	is	a	great	moral	necessity	from	his	goodness	that	the	internal	sense	of	men	should	be	constituted	as	it	is	at	present’.252	I	now	turn	to	examine	the	nature	of	that	moral	necessity.				Hutcheson’s	realism	As	discussed	at	the	start	of	the	chapter,	Hutcheson,	like	Clarke,	saw	God’s	goodness	as	necessary,	and	as	necessary	in	the	same	way	(even	if	Hutcheson,	perhaps,	did	not	see	their	agreement	here.)	Moreover,	Hutcheson	and	Clarke	both	agreed	that	we	did	not	have	knowledge	of	essences	of	substances,	but	that	this	insufficiency	did	not	mean	that	we	could	not	know	the	true	attributes	and	properties	of	anything,	including	the	Supreme	Being.	Neither,	Clarke	argued,	could	we	claim	to	doubt	his	existence	because	we	did	not	know	his	essence.253			Clarke	claimed,	moreover,	that	there	could	be	nothing	essential	to	the	nature	of	God	that	could	be	contradictory	to	our	‘clear	ideas’.	Though	we	have	no	ideas	of	the	substance	of	God	(or	anything	else),	yet	we	are	as	infallibly	certain	that	there	cannot	possibly	be	either	in	the	one	or	the	other	any	contradictory	modes	or	properties,	as	if	we	had	the	clearest	and	most	distinct	ideas	of	them.254		Here	is	Hutcheson	agreeing	with	Clarke	on	essences	(whether	Hutcheson	appreciated	this	agreement,	or	not)	Hence	there	may	be	full	knowledge	of	spirits	and	bodies	alike;	the	inner	nature	of	both	are	unknown	[but]	the	properties	(affectiones)	are	known.255																																																										252	Ibid.,	80.	253	Clarke’s	argument	is	found	at	29-31,	Being	and	Attributes.		254	Ibid.,	30.	255	Hutcheson,	Metaphysics,	117.	
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	This	was	how	Hutcheson	saw	the	operation	of	our	external	and	internal	senses	proceeding	in	the	Metaphysics	with	respect	to	our	understanding	of	God’s	(communicable)	virtues:		What	we	derive	from	our	external	senses	is	supplemented	by	arguments	from	which	we	rightly	infer	that	there	is	a	God,	and	that	he	is	endowed	with	every	virtue;	no	external	sense,	however,	can	grasp	the	virtues	of	God	themselves.	All	mental	virtues	therefore	are	understood	by	an	internal	
sense	or	by	internal	consciousness	of	the	self	and	its	properties.	This	is	the	
source	from	which	at	least	the	elements	of	all	the	notions	which	represent	
the	divine	virtues	are	engendered	in	the	mind.256	[My	emphasis.]		A	little	later,	when	Hutcheson	moved	from	a	discussion	of	God’s	incommunicable	attributes	to	his	communicable	attributes,	Hutcheson	explained	that	we	will	now	proceed	to	expound	upon	the	virtues,	which	we	know	from	
that	inner	awareness	of	our	own	virtues	that	we	mentioned	above.257	[My	emphasis]		I	suggest	that	Hutcheson’s	adoption	of	the	division	between	communicable	and	incommunicable	virtues	makes	perfect	sense	in	the	context	of	his	account	of	how	we	come	to	have	an	idea	of	virtue	in	the	first	place.	The	internal	sense	here	is	that	of	consciousness	of	our	self	and	its	(moral)	properties.258	As	I	go	on	to	explain	in	the	next	chapter,	Hutcheson’s	use	of	the	term	inner	sense	changes	over	time,	but	that	internal	sense,	or	consciousness,	is	also	the	source	of	our	ideas	of	moral	good.			Hutcheson’s	commitment	to	introspection	is	an	argument	about	how	we	might	best	go	about	defeating	scepticism	because	it	is	an	argument	about	the	ways	in	which	we	are	capable	of	grasping	or	understanding	God’s	goodness.	It	was	also	an	important	part	of	Hutcheson’s	(and	Clarke’s)	argument	about	why	our	moral	good	could	not	derive	ultimately	from	self-interest.	For	if	this	were	the	case	then	surely	God’s	moral	perfection	itself	would	have	lain	in	self-interest?	A	communicable	attribute	is	one	that	is	found	in	a	perfect	form	in	God,	and	an																																																									256	Ibid.,162.		257	Ibid.,	167.	258	Hutcheson’s	use	of	the	term	‘internal	sense’	does	shift	in	several	ways.	He	used	it	at	first	to	describe	our	sense	of	beauty,	and	by	analogy	our	moral	sense	and	later	to	refer	to	our	internal	sense	of	consciousness.	This	is	discussed	in	the	next	chapter.			
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analogous	form	in	us.	We	know	about	such	attributes	because	we	have	ideas	of	our	own	distinctively	moral	motivation.	A	communicable	attribute	could	not,	therefore,	be	benevolence	in	God	and	self-interest	in	us.			The	notion	that	God’s	goodness	(however	it	was	understood)	grounded	the	operation	of	our	own	moral	abilities	is	the	substance	of	the	sort	of	naturalist	providentialism	that	Haakonssen	and	Gill	agree	upon.	The	bigger	question	though,	and	the	question	with	which	Clarke’s	supporters,	and	Clarke	himself	were	most	preoccupied,	was	not	the	question	of	the	goodness	of	God’s	motive	in	creating	the	world	according	to	eternal	law.	Their	primary	concern	was	the	nature	of	the	power	ascribed	to	God,	by	the	champions	of	voluntarism,	to	create	the	world	as	he	did.	The	essence	of	the	voluntarist	position	was	that	God	had	been	able	to	denominate	moral	good	and	evil	at	will,	potentially	at	least,	in	contradiction	to	their	specification	in	eternal	law.	Extreme	voluntarism	was	muted	in	some	authors	via	an	appeal	to	the	distinction	between	God’s	absolute	power	and	his	ordained	power.259			The	salient	point	for	the	discussion	of	Hutcheson	is	that	God	could	have	chosen	to	create	the	world	other	than	he	did	(his	absolute	power)	but	once	he	had	chosen	to	create	as	he	did	(his	ordained	power),	there	were	natural	laws	in	place	which	reflected	the	content	of	eternal	law.	Hutcheson	himself	adverted	to	this	in	the	Inquiry.			If	it	be	here	enquired,	“Could	not	the	Deity	have	given	us	a	different	or	contrary	determination	of	mind,	viz.	to	approve	actions	upon	another	foundation	of	benevolence?”	It	is	certain,	there	is	nothing	in	this	surpassing	the	natural	power	of	the	Deity.260	[My	emphasis.]		God’s	natural	power,	that	is	I	suggest,	not	his	moral	power,	could	have	had	us	approving	something	other	than	benevolence,	just	as	he	could	have	had	us	appreciate	the	beauty	of	something	other	than	regularity.	The	reassuring	caveat	that	Hutcheson	supplied	here	was	that	if	God	really	aims	at	our	happiness	then	he	could	not	‘rationally	act	otherwise’.	Hutcheson	went	on:																																																											259	On	this	distinction	see	Oakley,	“Locke,	Natural	Law	and	God,”	624-651.	260	Hutcheson,	Inquiry,	197.		
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For	if	the	Deity	be	really	benevolent,	or	delights	in	the	happiness	of	others,	he	could	not	rationally	act	otherwise,	or	give	us	a	moral	sense	upon	another	foundation,	without	counteracting	his	own	benevolent	intentions.261	[My	emphasis.]		Hutcheson	went	on	to	explain	why	benevolence	must	be	in	our	own	interests,	but	the	point	here	is	that	God	is	free	to	act	and	retained	the	natural	power	to	act	as	he	chose,	but	that	in	choosing	to	make	us	happy	he	could	not	act	inconsistently	with	his	own	aims	and,	therefore,	his	own	rationality.	As	we	will	see	in	Chapter	5,	Clarke,	Burnet	and	Balguy	all	insisted	that	God’s	goodness	lay	in	the	rectitude	of	his	will	(his	always,	freely,	conforming	his	will	to	his	understanding	of	eternal	law).	I	suggest	that	what	Hutcheson	argued,	was	that	God’s	benevolence	led	him	to	exactly	the	same	rectitude.			Hutcheson	elaborated	on	the	notion	of	God’s	freedom	in	the	Metaphysics	and	he	went	further	in	this	text.	All	ascribe	liberty	to	God,	but	different	kinds	of	it.	However,	hardly	anyone	would	say	that	he	could	will	anything	contrary	to	his	own	innate	virtues	or	fail	to	win	anything	consistent	with	them.	God	is	not	therefore	thought	to	be	indifferent	to	all	those	things	that	depend	on	him,	or	favourable	to	both	sides;	for	there	is	a	certain	necessary	will.262		God	then	‘cannot	will	anything	contrary	to	his	own	virtues’.	A	little	later	Hutcheson	stated	that	‘goodness	is	the	cause	of	the	divine	operations’.263			Haakonssen	has	associated	Hutcheson’s	providentialism	with	a	strain	of	realism	in	protestant	natural	law	that	is	premised	on	the	sort	of	compromise	advanced	by	Pufendorf.	That	is	(very	briefly),	Pufendorf	had	insisted	that	God	had	created	a	world	and	imposed	moral	values	upon	it,	but	that	the	values	selected	(because	God	was	good)	were	not	arbitrary	and	his	moral	rules	provided	us	with	proper	guidance.	The	objection	to	this	was	to	ask	whether	we	ought	to	obey	because	God	had	commanded	us	or	because	there	is	something	else	in	play	other	than	the	need	to	comply	with	divine	command	through	self-interest?264	The	Cambridge																																																									261	Ibid.,	197.	262	Hutcheson,	Metaphysics,	173-4.		263	Ibid.,	180.		264	See	Haakonssen,“Natural	Law	and	Moral	Realism,”	63-72.	
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Platonists	and	Clarke	and	his	followers	also	wanted	to	know	whether	God’s	absolute	power	extended	to	his	being	able	to	change	or	alter	moral	value	at	will.	They	agreed	that	he	had	not	done	so,	when	exercising	his	ordained	power,	but	did	this	possibility	lie	within	his	absolute	power?			One	of	the	objections	that	Hutcheson	sought	to	answer	directly	in	the	
Illustrations	was	the	question	of	why	God	had	chosen	to	create	as	he	did	(‘to	make	one	constitution	rather	than	another’.)	He	had	already	stated	in	the	Inquiry	that	our	internal	senses	were	implanted	in	the	form	that	they	were,	by	God,	through	‘moral	necessity’.	The	argument	of	Clarke,	Burnet	and	Balguy	was	that	God	acted	according	to	his	own	understanding	of	eternal,	immutable	relations,	but	that	God	himself	did	not	have	the	power	to	alter	eternal	law.	Furthermore,	the	immutable	and	necessary	truthfulness	of	that	law,	was	the	reason	that	God	had	created	as	he	did.			One	of	Hutcheson’s	most	prominent	arguments	in	the	Illustrations	was	that	we	cannot	be	moved	or	excited	to	an	action	by	reason	alone,	but	that	we	require	an	affective	impulse.	Hutcheson	claimed,	against	Gilbert	Burnet,	that	unless	God	had	the	sort	of	benevolent	affections	that	we	were	created	with,	then	he	would	not	have	been	motivated	to	create	in	the	first	place	–	hence	his	essential	benevolence	is	his	‘moral	necessity’.	‘Tis	plain	if	the	Deity	had	nothing	essential	in	his	nature	corresponding	to	our	sweetest	and	most	kind	affections,	we	can	scarce	suppose	he	could	have	any	reason	exciting	him	to	any	thing	he	has	done.265		[My	emphasis.]		For	Hutcheson,	our	views	about	how	God	might	operate	are	necessarily	taken	from	a	reflection	upon	the	workings	of	various	principles	of	our	own	nature	(and	then	perfected).	We	do	not	have	any	other	natural	means	of	thinking	about	divine	attributes	(‘we	can	scarce	suppose’).	Hutcheson’s	argument	was	that	if	God	did	not	feel	benevolently	towards	us	then	he	would	not	have	had	a	reason	to	do	‘any	thing	he	has	done’.	God’s	own	exiting	reason	was	benevolence.			In	Chapter	5,	we	will	look	at	Burnet	and	Balguy’s	objection	to	this	kind	of	necessity	–	a	necessity	from	God’s	good	nature,	and	their	requirement	that	God’s	affection																																																									265	Hutcheson,	Illustrations,	151.		
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towards	us	be	assessed	by	his	reason	and	found	reasonable	before	he	would	act	upon	it.				The	only	real	evidence	that	Hutcheson	thought	that	God	could	have	acted	in	
creation	to	make	us	approve	something	other	than	benevolence	(malice,	for	example)	is	if	God	had	used	his	natural	power	without	reference	to	his	goodness	
or	his	understanding.	‘It	is	certain,	there	is	nothing	in	this	surpassing	the	natural	
power	of	the	Deity’.266	[My	emphasis.]	My	reading	of	this	passage	and	those	other	passages	at	which	he	says	that	it	is	possible	that	there	might	be	beings	(non	humans)	who	do	not	possess	a	moral	sense,	or	that	humans	might	have	been	created	with	a	sense	of	malice,	is	this	–	that	God	might	possess	the	natural	power	to	create	without	reference	to	his	own	knowledge	of	a	moral	order,	but	first,	he	is	curtailed	in	his	natural	power	by	his	moral	attributes,	and	second,	that	whilst	he	may	have	been	able	to	ignore	this	knowledge,	it	would	mean	that	he	did	not	act	
rationally	if	his	will	was	to	create	with	our	happiness	as	an	end.	Here	is	the	quote	again:	 For	if	the	Deity	be	really	benevolent,	or	delights	in	the	happiness	of	others,	he	could	not	rationally	act	otherwise,	or	give	us	a	moral	sense	upon	another	foundation,	without	counteracting	his	own	benevolent	intentions.267	[My	emphasis.]		In	effect,	in	the	act	of	creation,	God’s	wish	to	communicate	his	goodness	to	us	(to	make	us	happy	because	it	makes	him	happy	‘in	his	own	perfection’)	is	causally	prior	to	his	understanding	of	what	moral	good	is,	but	it	did	not	give	him	the	power	to	overturn	his	understanding	of	what	moral	good	is.			Moreover,	virtue,	as	Hutcheson	had	remarked	in	the	Metaphysics,	was	‘praiseworthy	in	itself	and	the	supreme	excellence	and	perfection	of	an	intelligent	nature’	[My	emphasis].268	In	this	text	he	referred	to	the	distinction	found	in	the	reformed	scholastics	between	knowledge	of	simple	intelligence	and	knowledge	
																																																								266	Hutcheson,	Inquiry,	197.		267	Ibid.	268	Hutcheson,	Metaphysics,	174.		
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of	vision.269	Hutcheson	said	that	the	scholastics	applied	this	twofold	knowledge	to	God.	By	the	former	God	is	thought	to	view	all	abstract	truths	as	well	as	his	own	nature	and	necessary	virtues;	these	are	all	those	things	which	they	do	not	wish	even	the	will	of	God	to	be	the	cause	of,	since	among	the	eternal	ideas	themselves	in	the	mind	of	God	are	the	necessary	relations	and	immutable	connections	which	are	expressed	in	these	eternal	and	abstract	truths.	No	
one	could	conceive	that	these	truths	could	be	otherwise,	or	that	the	nature	
of	things	could	be	changed	that	such	proportions	could	become	false.270	[My	emphasis.]		Interpreting	this	paragraph	is	a	challenge	as	Hutcheson	gives	ownership	of	the	wish	(that	these	eternal	truths	do	not	result	from	the	will	of	God)	to	the	scholastics	–	‘they	do	not	wish	even	the	will	of	God’.	Conceivably	Hutcheson’s	own	view	may	have	been	that	such	absolute	truths,	both	abstract	and	those	of	‘his	own	nature	and	necessary	virtues’	were	made,	independently	of	reason,	by	an	act	of	divine	will.	This	is	less	likely,	I	believe,	given	the	last	statement	emphasised	in	the	quotation	above.	Hutcheson	said	here	‘no	one	could	conceive’	the	situation	where	truths	could	be	otherwise	and	the	nature	of	things	be	created	in	such	a	way	as	to	make	them	false.	Hutcheson,	like	Locke	and	Clarke,	also	claimed	that	acting	in	accordance	with	understanding	was	no	abridgment	to	liberty.271			Hutcheson	was	no	more	a	voluntarist	with	respect	to	the	foundation	of	moral	goodness	than	Clarke	was,	but	Hutcheson	believed	that	everything	morally	good	originated	in	kind	affection	and	that	God’s	understanding	of	this	began	with	an	idea	from	an	inward	sense.272	Hutcheson	in	fact	argued	that	God	himself	was	
																																																								269	See	Moore,	in	Hutcheson	Metaphysics,	footnote	3,	p170	270	Hutcheson,	Metaphysics	170.	On	the	knowledge	of	vision	refers	to	divine	foreknowledge	of	the	absolute	truths	of	the	existence	of	things	and	his	intentions	with	respect	to	them,	see	Moore,	footnote	3,	170.	271	Hutcheson,	Metaphysics,	97-99.		272	Cuneo,	on	the	evidence	presented	in	two	passages	in	the	Inquiry,	at	197-198,	says	Hutcheson’s	remarks	on	God’s	essential	benevolence	entail	that	‘Hutcheson	is	no	subjectivist’	and	that	‘these	passages	clearly	imply	that,	in	Hutcheson’s	view	there	are	necessary	moral	facts’,	in	“Reason	and	the	Passions,”	234.	I	quite	agree.	Cuneo	does	not	discuss	Hutcheson’s	wider	arguments	about	the	communicability	of	God’s	benevolence,	or	the	arguments	found	in	the	Metaphysics,	and	elsewhere.	I	attempt	to	show	the	nature	of	the	necessity	in	Hutcheson’s	theistic	metaphysics,	which	goes	beyond	the	fact	of	God’s	goodness	governing	his	creative	activity.		
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probably	possessed	of	a	moral	sense,	or	something	like	it	by	which	he	came	to	approve	benevolence.	Recall	that	Hutcheson	insisted	that	virtue		is	praiseworthy	in	itself	and	the	supreme	excellence	and	perfection	of	an	intelligent	nature,	the	very	sense	of	which	brings	joy	to	such	a	nature,	[God’s	nature]	but	also	because	no	temptation	to	a	contrary	course	could	occur	to	a	superior	nature	which	needs	nothing	for	its	own	sake.273	[My	emphasis.]		He	also	asked	the	following	question:		Why	may	not	the	Deity	have	something	of	a	superior	kind,	analogous	to	our	moral	sense,	essential	to	him?274		Balguy,	as	we	will	see	in	Chapter	5,	objected	to	God’s	understanding	of	virtue	being	premised	upon	a	sense,	but	this	is	not	what	Hutcheson	was	aiming	at.	Hutcheson	said	that	virtue	is	praiseworthy	in	itself	and	that	the	sense	of	it	brought	him	joy.	He	did	not	say	that	God	received	his	ideas	of	moral	good	via	his	sense,	only	that	they	brought	him	joy.	God	wished	to	communicate	his	goodness	to	us	because	it	made	him	happy	(as	Hutcheson	and	Clarke	himself	had	argued).	In	our	minds,	Hutcheson,	as	we	have	seen,	annexed	pleasure	to	our	moral	ideas	in	order	that	we	might	value	virtue.	But	God,	having	perfect	intelligence,	and	an	unfettered	will,	does	not	need	to	be	motivated	in	this	way.	He	does	not	need	the	hedonic	clue	as	to	what	it	is	either	praiseworthy	in	itself,	or	ultimately	good	for	us,	and	his	will	is	perfectly	compliant	with	his	understanding.	Virtue	makes	God	happy	because	it	is	praiseworthy	in	itself.	Hutcheson	only	supposed	God’s	moral	sense	to	be	analogous	to	ours,	not	identical	to	it.			Such	is	the	nature	of	God’s	divine	ideas	that	they	fall,	for	Hutcheson,	into	the	communicable	category	of	his	‘virtues	connected	with	the	understanding’.	God	does	not	have	sensations,	Hutcheson	said,	or	images	or	any	inadequate	ideas.275		However,	when	we	look	more	closely	at	the	nature	of	ideas	from	moral	sense	in	our	own	minds,	as	Hutcheson	understood	them,	we	might	see	why	they	might	
																																																								273	Hutcheson,	Metaphysics,	174.		274	Hutcheson,	Illustrations,	153.		275	Hutcheson,	Metaphysics,	169.	
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not	reflect	sensations,	as	Locke	understood	them,	but	something	altogether	more	elevated.	In	fact,	for	Hutcheson,	they	amount	to	‘a	third	kind	of	perception.’			In	this	chapter,	I	have	discussed	why	Hutcheson’s	sentimentalism,	resting	as	it	did	on	the	ideas	of	God’s	communicable	virtue,	was	unlikely	to	have	been	understood	by	Hutcheson	as	a	species	of	voluntarism,	and	went	beyond	an	appeal	to	a	providentially	implanted	naturalism.	I	have	discussed	the	similarities	between	Clarke	and	Hutcheson	to	this	effect.	I	have	also	taken	care	to	emphasise	the	ways	in	which	Hutcheson,	from	his	very	earliest	letters,	to	his	inaugural	
lecture	of	1730,	saw	our	natural	moral	abilities	as	leading	us	to	an	understanding	of	God,	the	nature	of	his	moral	attributes	(and	ours)	and	finally	our	place	within	the	system	and	our	final	ends.	I	have	also	outlined	the	way	in	which	Hutcheson’s	introspective	method	rested	upon	the	assumption	of	transparency	of	our	thoughts	and	motives	to	us.	The	significance	of	this	assumption	will	be	discussed	in	greater	detail	in	the	next	chapter,	as	I	turn	to	the	matter	of	the	nature	of	the	operation	of	Hutcheson’s	sense	of	beauty	and	his	moral	sense.								
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Chapter	4		Hutcheson	and	the	‘third	kind	of	perception’				The	aim	of	this	chapter	is	to	consider	Hutcheson’s	moral	epistemology	in	some	detail.	I	examine	various	ways	in	which	Hutcheson,	conceivably,	understood	the	acts	of	sense	perception	and	judgment	to	operate	to	produce	our	experience	of	moral	evaluation.	I	then	consider	the	ontology	of	Hutcheson’s	ideas	from	moral	sense,	and	finish	with	a	discussion	of	Hutcheson’s	realism.			There	have	been	discontented	murmurings	in	the	secondary	literature	recently	over	the	prominence	given	to	commentary	on	Hutcheson’s	moral	sense	theory,	with	appeals	to	examine	its	importance	within	the	whole	scheme	of	his	work.276	Harris,	although	clear	that	the	concern	with	moral	epistemology	is	not	(just)	a	retrospectively	fashioned	preoccupation,	argues	that	it	was	not	Hutcheson’s	main	concern,	or	indeed	his	main	contribution	to	his	field.	Hutcheson’s	main	aim,	for	Harris,	was	to	persuade	his	readers	of	the	naturalness	of	social	life	and	the	naturalness	of	the	virtue	that	enables	social	life.277	I	believe	though,	that	Hutcheson’s	epistemology	was	central	to	this	campaign.	Naturalness	for	Hutcheson,	as	we	saw	in	the	discussion	of	the	moral	sense	in	his	inaugural	lecture,	is	something	that	needs	to	be	achieved	through	a	reflexive	appreciation	of	the	order	and	priority	of	our	various	natural	principles.			To	downplay	Hutcheson’s	moral	epistemology	is	also,	I	think,	to	discount	the	doggedness	of	his	attempt	to	show	how	moral	thought	might	be	implemented	within	a	natural	human	mind.		From	the	beginning,	Hutcheson’s	attentiveness	to	contemporary	epistemology	offered	something	new	to	his	readership.	This	was																																																									276	Harris,	“Religion,”	206.	See	also	Ahnert,	Heathen	Moralists,	53.		277	Harris,	“Religion,”	206.	This	may	well	be	true,	but,	when	Harris	says	that	‘in	two	of	Hutcheson’s	most	clearly	programmatic	statements	of	his	philosophical	ambitions’,	the	‘Reflections’	letter	(Two	Texts	in	this	thesis)	and	his	inaugural	lecture,	cited	in	the	previous	chapter,	that	‘the	moral	sense	is	not	so	much	as	mentioned’,	he	is	mistaken.	The	‘Reflections’	letter,	it	is	true,	does	not	mention	the	moral	sense,	although	Hutcheson	did	refer	briefly	to	‘qualities	of	mind’	that	equate	to	the	moral	sense.	In	his	inaugural	lecture	though,	as	we	have	just	seen,	Hutcheson’s	concern	was	to	describe	in	some	detail,	the	way	in	which	the	action	of	the	moral	sense	allows	us	to	cultivate	our	natural	virtue.		
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not	his	appeal	to	a	moral	sense	per	se.	It	was	the	level	of	detail	with	which	Hutcheson’s	moral	sense	was	specified	as	a	natural	principle	of	mind	which	was	novel	for	an	early	eighteenth-century	audience.	Cudworth’s	treatise	on	innatist	epistemology	was	not	published	until	1731	and,	in	any	case,	did	not	concern	itself	primarily	with	moral	epistemology.	Henry	More’s	‘boniform	faculty’	was	more	a	statement	of	the	contents	of	a	notional	moral	sense	than	an	attempt	to	embed	that	faculty	in	a	natural	mind.	Similarly,	Shaftesbury‘s	striking	analogy	of	morality	with	harmony	and	aesthetics	and	his	searching	theory	of	character	development	was	not	concerned	with	the	details	of	a	cognitive	psychology	of	moral	judgment	per	se.278	Over	the	course	of	his	lifetime,	and	often	under	pressure	from	critical	commentary,	it	was	Hutcheson	who	sought	to	provide	a	natural	implementation	of	moral	knowledge	within	a	contemporary	theory	of	mind.		
	Hutcheson	had	to	tread	a	careful	line	between	insisting	on	the	original	providentially	implanted	(‘natural’)	character	of	his	moral	sense,	while	still	attempting	to	avoid	a	direct	appeal	to	innate	ideational	or	propositional	content.279	His	approach	to	the	notion	of	a	moral	sense	needs	to	be	read	as	a	very	deliberate	balance	of	the	epistemological	possibilities	offered	by	the	term	‘sense’.	Hutcheson	was	committed	to	the	Aristotelian/Lockean	idea	of	sense	as	the	original	‘inlet’	of	all	our	ideas.	This	was	the	starting	point	of	his	attempt	to	explain	the	flow	of	information	about	virtue	through	a	human	mind.	He	was	though,	equally	keen	to	premise	our	moral	cognition	on	a	sense	of	virtue	that	provides	a	kind	of	inborn	guidance	that	cannot	be	explained	further,	at	least	until	we	have	been	led	to	an	appreciation	of	the	existence	of	God.			One	debate	about	the	nature	of	Hutcheson’s	moral	perceptions,	which	began	immediately	after	the	publication	of	the	first	edition	of	the	Inquiry,	concerned	(and	still	concerns)	the	question	of	what	Hutcheson’s	ideas	from	moral	sense	delivered	to	us.	There	have	been	various	approaches	to	answering	this	question.																																																									278	Anthony	Ashley	Cooper,	Characteristics	of	Men,	Manners,	Opinions,	Times,	ed.	Lawrence	Kline			(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1999).		279	This	is	a	line	that	Hutcheson	did	not	tread	successfully	for	his	critics	such	as	Gay	who	accused	him	of	reverting	to	the	use	of	innate	ideas.	See	Gay,	Dissertation,	xiv.	
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In	the	more	recent	secondary	literature,	there	was	an	attempt	by	Norton	to	defend	Hutcheson	as	holding	a	realist,	cognitivist	position	because	Hutcheson’s	moral	perceptions	were	said	to	be	‘concomitant	ideas’	of	objective	moral	qualities	of	intentions	or	actions,	where	other	‘concomitant’	ideas,	such	as	extension,	figure,	motion	and	rest,	but	especially	those	of	duration	and	number,	provided	us	with	ideas	of	primary	qualities	of	objects.280	Winkler,	following	Richard	Price,	countered	that	these	ideas	were	better	read	as	ideas	of	secondary	qualities,	such	as	our	ideas	of	colour.	As	such	they	did	not	directly	represent	(to	us)	any	quality	inherent	in	objects	themselves	(i.e.	in	actors,	their	intentions	or	actions).	Rather	they	reflected	a	providentially	instituted	relationship	between	various	qualities	in	those	objects	and	the	human	mind.	This	relationship,	however,	offered	no	guarantee	that	the	perception	of	such	secondary	qualities	represented	anything	external	to	our	own	minds.281				This	debate	was	part	of	an	attempt	to	speak	to	the	question	of	Hutcheson’s	moral	realism.	There	are,	however,	other	questions	that	arise	from	considering	Hutcheson’s	epistemology	in	relation	to	this	matter,	which	issue	from	the	framework	of	the	epistemological	logics	of	the	seventeenth	and	eighteenth	century.	In	the	Inquiry	and	the	Essay/Illustrations	Hutcheson	made	frequent	implicit	reference	to	the	judging	capacity	of	the	moral	sense	in	his	use	of	the	terms	approbation	and	condemnation,	the	approver,	approved	and	so	on.	The	rhetorical	tension	between	Hutcheson’s	characterisation	of	our	moral	responses	as	a	sense	–	that	is	a	delivery	system	for	the	basic	idea	of	something	‒	and	the	ability	of	those	same	ideas	to	offer	a	moral	judgment,	was	present	from	the	first.	Hutcheson’s	great	task	was	to	explain	not	only	how	we	receive	moral	ideas,	but	also	how	the	experience	of	moral	evaluation	might	constitute	a	moral	judgment.	Hutcheson’s	later	published	works,	his	System	and	Short	Introduction,	were	manifestly	preoccupied	with	this	question,	but	if	there	is	a	suggestion	that	this	tension	does	not	arise	before	Hutcheson	made	an	overt	attempt	to	integrate	his	ideas	from	moral	sense	within	the	framework	of	natural	law,	then	I	do	not	believe	this	to	have	been	the	case.	I	maintain	that	Hutcheson	was	thinking	about																																																									280	See	Norton,	“Hutcheson’s	Moral	Realism,”	for	example	281	See	Winkler,	“Alleged	Realism”	and	“Color,”	for	example.			
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various	possibilities	in	the	relation	between	sense	and	judgment	throughout	his	time	in	Dublin	in	the	1720s,	and	that	this	can	be	seen	in	his	four	treatises	and,	especially,	in	his	Metaphysics	and	Logic.		The	question	is	whether	or	not	a	sense	can	deliver	a	judgment	(leaving	to	one	side,	for	the	moment,	the	matter	of	the	nature	of	the	quality	in	the	object	that	is	being	sensed,	perceived	or	judged).	This	question	is	pertinent	to	Hutcheson	because,	as	we	saw	in	chapter	1,	there	were	several	ways	in	which	the	firmness	of	the	boundary	between	sense	and	judgment	had	been	tested	in	the	epistemological	logics	of	ideas.		It	will	be	important	to	bear	in	mind	here	that	knowledge	in	the	early	modern	era	was	characterised	as	either	rational	intuition	into	the	truth	of	self-evident	principles,	or	the	indubitable	perception	of	the	relationship	between	two	ideas.	Knowledge	was	different	in	kind	to	belief.282	Judgment	in	knowledge	(intuitive	knowledge),	as	opposed	to	probabilistic	judgment	involved	in	belief	formation	was,	as	we	saw	in	the	introductory	chapter,	markedly	perceptual	in	character	for	Locke.283		In	addition,	Locke	named	the	ideas	produced	by	the	power	of	an	external	or	internal	sense	as	both	perceptions	and	ideas	from	sense.	Hutcheson	too,	used	both	sense	and	perception	to	describe	the	ideas	from	his	moral	sense.	Hutcheson’s	contemporaries,	his	rationalist	critics	Gilbert	Burnet	and	Balguy,	objected	to	Hutcheson’s	premising	virtue	upon	the	traditional	non-epistemic	function	of	a	sense,	preferring	to	see	the	act	of	judgment	in	knowledge,	however	perceptual	or	intuitive	in	character,	as	the	proper	basis	for	moral	knowledge.		In	this	chapter	I	will	explore	three	ways	in	which	Hutcheson	may	have	understood	his	ideas	from	moral	sense	to	deliver	a	judgment	as	to	the	moral	value	of	an	action.	Support	for	all	three	is	found	in	Hutcheson’s	Metaphysics	and	
Logic,	read	alongside	the	four	treatises.	First,	I	argue,	that	the	direction	of	Hutcheson’s	thought	may	have	reflected	the	weakened	boundary	between	sense	or	perception	and	judgment	discussed	in	chapter	1.		As	we	saw	in	that	chapter,																																																									282	See	Maria	Rosa	Antognazza,	“The	Benefit	to	Philosophy	of	the	Study	of	its	History,”	British	
Journal	for	the	History	of	Philosophy	23,	no.1	(2015):	168.		283	Belief,	for	Locke,	was	a	matter	of	probable	judgment	and	the	weighing	of	evidence.	See	Locke,	
ECHU,	4:15	and	16,	652-668.		
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by	the	late	seventeenth	century	there	were	a	number	of	ways	in	which	having	an	idea	of	sensation	(a	perception	from	either	an	internal	or	an	external	sense)	might	have	been	said	either	to	involve	a	judgment,	or	to	function	as	a	judgment,	and	I	will	refer	to	back	some	of	these	later	in	this	chapter.			Second,	I	argue	that	Hutcheson’s	response	to	his	rationalist	critics,	who	decried	the	sensory,	and	by	their	definition	the	non-epistemic	nature	of	the	ideas	from	moral	sense,	can	be	seen	in	the	Essay/Illustrations	(and	in	later	revisions	to	both).284		Here,	Hutcheson	both	re-examined	the	role	of	reason	in	the	stages	prior	and	subsequent	to	the	emergence	of	an	idea	of	moral	sense,	and	he	continued	to	appeal	to	the	epistemic	function	of	a	sense,	which	is	also	a	judgment.	I	will	argue	that	Hutcheson	shifted	the	judging	function	onto	our	preparatory	conscious	reasoning,	but	then	yoked	the	operation	of	the	moral	sense	to	the	results	of	that	judgment.	This	entailed	that	our	reasoning	either	
caused	us	to	have	a	moral	perception,	or	that	our	moral	perceptions	emerged	from	this	preparatory	reasoning.	In	this	case,	the	boundary	between	sense	and	judgment	remained	intact.	I	will	argue	the	epistemic	burden	falls	onto	preparatory	reasoning,	but	that	it	does	so	in	such	a	way	as	to	invalidate	Hutcheson’s	analogy	between	the	moral	sense	and	the	sense	of	beauty,	and	comes	close	to	invalidating	his	claim	that	we	do	not	need	a	reasoned	criterion	of	moral	goodness	to	judge	by.	Third,	I	consider	the	ontology	of	Hutcheson’s	ideas	of	moral	sense.	I	will	argue	that	these	‘internal	ideas’,	got	by	the	operation	of	a	‘reflexive’	sense,	were	held	by	Hutcheson	to	deliver	to	us	‘intellectual	ideas’	of	the	‘true	properties	of	man’.	I	will	explain	the	way	in	which	I	think	Hutcheson	claimed	that	these	were	ideas	of	‘true’	properties.	The	chapter	closes	with	a	discussion	of	the	implications	of	the	material	presented	in	this	chapter	for	Hutcheson’s	‘alleged	realism’.			In	the	next	section	I	provide	an	introduction	to	Hutcheson’s	moral	epistemology.																																																										284	Gill,	British	Moralists,	156-167,	has	an	account	of	the	ways	in	which	Hutcheson	responded	to	his	rationalist	critics’	comments	on	the	Inquiry	in	the	Essay/Illustrations.	See	also	Peach,	introduction,	Illustrations,	3-100.	In	this	chapter,	I	look	at	the	implications	of	Hutcheson’s	position	in	the	Essay/Illustrations	and	revisions	to	the	Inquiry	for	the	requirement	for	conscious	awareness	in	the	formation	of	judgments	–	this	does	not	relate	to	Burnet’s	comments,	but	does	it	form	part	of	the	argument	that	Gay	has	with	Hutcheson,	see	Chapter	6.		
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	Hutcheson’s	sense	of	beauty	and	his	moral	sense	The	foundation	of	Hutcheson’s	approach	was	laid	out	in	the	Inquiry.	In	it,	Hutcheson	proposed	twin	powers	of	disinterested	perception	made	available	through	an	inner	sense,	one	for	the	appreciation	of	beauty,	the	other	for	virtue.	Hutcheson	began	with	an	inquiry	into	aesthetics	to	establish	that	we	have	a	natural,	'internal'	sense	of	beauty.	This	sense	is	realised	in	an	innate	‘power'	to	receive	an	idea	of	beauty,	however,		an	internal	sense	no	more	presupposes	an	innate	idea,	or	principle	of	knowledge	than	the	external.285		
 There	are	two	types	of	beauty	that	we	respond	to.286	The	first	is	‘original	or	absolute	beauty’	that	responds	to	shapes,	natural	objects,	or	scenes,	and	theorems.		The	second	is	‘comparative	or	relative	beauty’	that	responds	to	the	visual	arts	-	paintings,	sculpture	and	so	on	that	depict	natural	objects	and	which	are	found	beautiful	to	the	extent	that	they	imitate	what	we	find	beautiful	in	nature.	Hutcheson	opened	with	his	account	of	absolute	beauty,	which	is	followed	by	a	chapter	on	the	beauty	of	theorems.	He	spent	fourteen	pages	explaining	our	absolute	sense	of	beauty	and	four	on	the	sense	of	relative	beauty.				We	experience	the	reception	of	this	idea	of	absolute	beauty	as	a	characteristic	and	specific	pleasure,	as	we	encounter	'objects	of	contemplation',	from	natural	bodies	to	theorems,	which	this	sense	perceives	as	instancing	some	ratio	or	relation	of	uniformity	to	variety,		what	we	call	beautiful	in	objects,	to	speak	in	the	mathematical	style,	seems	to	be	in	a	compound	ratio	of	uniformity	and	variety.287	
 Our	sense	of	beauty	arises	immediately	and	necessarily	on	perception	of	this	quality.	It	is	a	non-volitional	act,	which	Hutcheson	equated	with	the	power	to	receive	ideas	from	external	senses.	It	is	not	established	by	convention.	We	can																																																									285	Hutcheson,	Inquiry,	67.		286	Peter	Kivy,	The	Seventh	Sense:	Francis	Hutcheson	and	Eighteenth	Century	British	Aesthetics	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	2003),	is	the	best	account	of	Hutcheson’s	sense	of	beauty.	See	also	Peter	J.	E.	Kail.	“Function	and	Normativity	in	Hutcheson’s	Aesthetic	Epistemology,”	British	Journal	
of	Aesthetics	40	(2000):	441-451.	287	Hutcheson,	Inquiry,	29.	
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neither	'will'	ourselves	to	find	an	object	beautiful,	nor	to	experience	the	pleasures	of	beauty.	Such	exquisite	perceptions,	moreover,	are	not	caused	by	our	knowledge	of	the	formal	aspects	of	objects.			This	superior	power	of	perception	is	justly	called	a	sense,	because	of	its	affinity	to	the	other	senses	in	this,	that	the	pleasure	does	not	arise	from	any	knowledge	of	principles,	proportions,	causes,	or	of	the	usefulness	of	the	object;	but	strikes	us	at	first	with	the	idea	of	beauty:	nor	does	the	most	accurate	knowledge	increase	this	pleasure	of	beauty.288	
 Our	ideas	of	beauty	do	not	result	from	our	knowledge	of,	or	conscious	reflection	upon,	the	principle	of	uniformity	amidst	variety.	In	this	way,	we	find	ourselves	aesthetically	dumbfounded.		But	in	all	these	instances	of	beauty	let	it	be	observed,	that	the	pleasure	is	communicated	to	those	who	never	reflected	on	this	general	foundation;	and	that	all	here	is	alleged	is	this,	“that	the	pleasant	sensation	arises	only	from	objects,	in	which	there	is	uniformity	amidst	variety:”	We	may	have	the	sensation	without	knowing	what	is	the	occasion	of	it;	as	a	man’s	taste	may	suggest	ideas	of	sweets,	acids,	bitters,	tho’	he	be	ignorant	of	the	forms	of	the	small	bodies,	or	their	motions	which	excite	these	perceptions	in	him.289		
 Our	experience	of	beauty	arises	as	we	receive	ideas	from	external	sensation	of	the	complex	ideas	of	bodies,	or	of	shapes	or	of	equations.	Like	laughter,	in	Hutcheson’s	account,	our	sense	of	beauty	is	functional.290	Hutcheson	devoted	most	of	his	first	Inquiry	(other	than	the	sections	which	explain	the	nature	of	an	internal	sense)	to	explaining	the	function	of	this	sense	of	absolute	beauty.	It	had	been	gifted	to	us	in	order	that	we	might	be	motivated	to	discover	the	few	'simple	general	causes'	at	work	in	the	universe.	Were	a	cruel	and	deceitful	creator	to	have	implanted	a	contrary	love	of	the	irregular	object	or	particular	truth,	such	a		'contrary	sense'	would	have	lead	us	away	from	understanding	the	ways	in	which	the	universe	works.291	Providential	purpose	in	granting	us	a	sense	of	beauty	that	responded	to	uniformity	in	geometrical	shapes,	natural	features	of	the	physical																																																									288	Ibid.,	25.	289	Ibid.,	35.	290	Hutcheson’s	approach	to	laughter	is	teleological,	as	he	looks	to	the	moral	good	it	might	do	us.	He	addresses	the	question	of	the	several	functions	of	ridicule	and	laughter,	for	example	when	it	arises	good	naturedly	to	arrest	our	enthusiastic	passions	of	things	and,	citing	Malebranche,	to	laugh	us	out	of	‘smaller	vices’.	Hutcheson,	“Remarks	upon	Laughter	and	Remarks	upon	the	Fable	of	the	Bees,”	Opera	Minor,	97-170.	291	Hutcheson,	Inquiry,	80.	
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world	and	mathematical	theorems,	was	to	excite	us	to	an	effective	search	for	knowledge.	Discovering	all	the	uniformity	amidst	all	the	variety	in	the	world	is	a	source	of	pleasure	to	us,	and	it	leads	us	to	the	discovery	of	general	truths.	We	may	be	aesthetically	dumbfounded,	as	we	do	not	necessarily	appreciate	that	this	principle	is	the	source	of	our	pleasure.	But,	even	if	we	do	appreciate	this	fact,	this	knowledge	does	not	itself	cause	our	idea	of	beauty.292	It	is	the	pleasure	we	derive	from	an	encounter	with	uniformity	amidst	variety,	Hutcheson	argued,	which	motivates	us	to	seek	out	that	which	is	uniform	and	generally	true.		
 Hutcheson's	clear	intention	was	that	our	sense	of	beauty	and	our	sense	of	moral	beauty	were	to	be	seen	as	operating	in	an	analogical,	if	not	identical,	manner.	On	the	questions	of	innatism	and	disinterest,	for	example,	Hutcheson	noted	the	following:	We	are	not	to	imagine,	that	this	moral	sense,	more	than	the	other	senses,	supposes	any	innate	ideas,	knowledge	or	practical	proposition:	we	mean	by	it	only	a	determination	of	our	minds	to	receive	amiable	or	disagreeable	ideas	of	actions,	when	they	occur	to	our	observation,	antecedent	to	any	opinion	of	advantage	or	loss	to	redound	to	ourselves	from	them;	even	as	we	are	pleased	with	a	regular	form,	or	an	harmonious	composition,	without	having	any	knowledge	of	mathematics.293 
 Our	sense	of	virtue	is	experienced	in	us	as	an	immediate,	non-volitional,	pleasurable,	approval	of	certain	kinds	of	intentions.	We	feel	approval	or	have	an	idea	of	moral	approbation	only	when	we	perceive	a	benevolent	intention.	Where	intentions	are	mixed,	for	example	if	we	want	to	experience	the	pleasure	of	moral	approval	and	act	from	kind	affections	towards	others,	we	respond	to	the	relative	proportions	of	the	intentions	behind	actions.		We	approve	of	an	actor	whenever	her	intention	to	increase	the	natural	good	others	receive,	exceeds	the	benefit	she	intends	to	accrue	for	herself.294 Just	as	our	sense	of	beauty	requires	that	we	use	reason	to	acquire	the	ideas	of	the	visual	scene,	object	or	theorem	before	us,	we	also	use	reason	to	understand	the	action	and	the	intention	behind	it.	From	this																																																									292	See	Peter	Kivy,	“The	Perception	of	Beauty	in	Hutcheson’s	First	Inquiry:	A	Response	to	James	Shelley,”	British	Journal	of	Aesthetics	47,	no.	4	(2007):	416-431.		See	James	Shelley,	“Aesthetics	and	the	World	at	Large,”	British	Journal	of	Aesthetics	47,	no.	2	(2007):	169-183,	for	a	contrary	view	of	the	epistemic	nature	of	our	ideas	of	beauty.		293	Hutcheson,	Inquiry,	100.	294	See	Douglas	R.	Paletta,	“Francis	Hutcheson:	Why	Be	Moral?”	Journal	of	Scottish	Philosophy	9	(2011):	149–159,	on	mixed	motivation.		
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reasoned	analysis	of	the	intention	of	the	actor,	which	could	sometimes	be	surmised	from	its	results,	the	ideas	of	the	moral	sense	take	rise.	But	in	these,	and	in	all	other	instances	of	the	like,	the	approbation	is	founded	on	benevolence,	because	of	some	real,	or	apparent	to	the	public	good.	For	we	are	not	to	imagine	that	this	sense	should	give	us	without	
observation,	ideas	of	complex	actions,	or	their	natural	tendency	to	good	or	
evil:	it	only	determines	us	to	approve	benevolence	whenever	it	appears	in	
any	action	and	to	hate	the	contrary.	So	our	sense	of	beauty,	does	not	without	reflection,	instruction,	or	observation,	give	us	ideas	of	the	regular	solids,	temples,	cirques	and	theatres;	but	determines	us	to	approve	and	delight	in	uniformity	amidst	variety,	wherever	we	observe	it.295		[My	emphasis.]		All	our	moral	ideas	are	acquired	first	through	this	moral	sense,	and	not	in	the	first	place	by	reasoning	about	what	the	moral	good	might	be.	As	moral	spectators,	we	simply	have	the	experience	of	approval	or	disapproval.	Hutcheson,	in	the	1729	and	1738	revisions	to	the	Inquiry,	made	it	clear	that	this	experience	was	the	result	of	both	an	idea	of	something	and	a	feeling	of	pleasure	or	displeasure.		The	admired	quality	is	conceived	as	the	perfection	of	the	agent,	and	as	such	a	one	is	distinct	from	the	pleasure	either	in	the	agent	or	the	approver,	tho’	‘tis	a	sure	source	of	pleasure	to	the	agent.	The	perception	of	
the	approver	tho’	attended	with	pleasure,	plainly	represents	something	
quite	distinct	from	this	pleasure;	even	as	the	perception.	This	may	prevent	many	cavils	upon	this	subject.296	[My	emphasis.]		In	the	Metaphysics,	I	suggest,	this	representation	of	the	‘admired’	quality	is	revealed	to	be	an	‘adequate	idea’	of	the	‘true	properties’	of	man.	This	will	be	discussed	later	on	in	the	chapter.	In	the	next	section,	I	will	examine	some	of	the	ways	in	which	Hutcheson	might	have	understood	his	ideas	from	moral	sense,	or	moral	perceptions,	to	function	as	judgments.			The	boundary	between	sense	and	judgment		So,	to	begin	with,	how	might	Hutcheson	have	conceived	of	sensory	judgment?		Peter	Kail	proposes	that	Hutcheson,	in	his	four	treatises,	used	an	understanding	of	the	functional	role	of	sensory	ideas	of	natural	pleasure	and	pains	found	in																																																									295	Hutcheson,	Inquiry,	139.		296	Hutcheson,	Inquiry,	see	Leidhold,	textual	notes,	222.		
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Descartes	and	developed	more	fully	in	Malebranche.	According	to	this	reading,	sensory	ideas	that	give	us	pleasant	and	unpleasant	experiences,	determine	us	in	a	brute	fashion	to	pursue	or	avoid	the	object	that	provoked	them.	The	function	of	a	sensory	idea	is	to	predispose	the	agent	to	pursue	natural	goods	that	were	beneficial	to	her	health.	By	providential	design,	pleasures	and	pains	had	been	associated,	respectively,	with	that	which	tended	towards	our	survival	and	that	which	was	likely	to	jeopardise	it.	For	example,	pleasant	tastes	inform	us	of	what	is	in	fact	good	for	our	body,	and	unpleasant	tastes	tell	us	what	should	be	avoided.	As	the	tastes	are	pleasant	or	unpleasant	to	us	they	elicit	a	‘disposition	to	appropriate	behaviour’.	This	motivational	charge,	however,	and	its	associated	behavioural	impulse,	as	Kail	points	out,	should	not	be	understood	as	being	represented	by	any	belief	entertained	by	practical	reason.	Reacting	to	a	painful	stimulus	should	not,	Kail	argues,	be	explained	by	our	beliefs	about	what	is	painful,	and	a	standing	desire	to	avoid	pain.297	Kail	cites	a	reference	in	Hutcheson’s	Essay	to	this	account	of	the	role	of	bodily	sensations.		Now	our	reason,	or	knowledge	of	the	relations	of	external	things	to	our	bodies,	is	so	inconsiderable,	that	it	is	generally	some	pleasant	sensation	which	teaches	us	what	tends	to	their	preservation;	and	some	painful	sensation	which	shows	what	is	pernicious.298			He	goes	on	to	argue	that	Hutcheson’s	sense	of	beauty	and	moral	sense	were	supposed	to	function	in	this	way	–	as	a	hedonic	signal	to	us	of	the	presence	of	good	or	evil	in	our	own	intentions	(or	in	the	intentions	of	others)	which	motivates	our	actions	without	our	understanding	what	has	caused	this	–	we	just	sense	the	good	and	pursue	it.	We	don’t	carry	out	a	formal	judgment	here,	rather	the	judging	function	is	just	built	into	the	experience	of	pleasure	or	pain.			Kail’s	account	is	attractive,	the	semiotic	function	of	sensory	ideas,	including	pleasures	and	pains	was	well	attested	to	in	the	early	modern	era,	especially	with	respect	to	our	lower	faculties.	Kail’s	view	might	hold	for	the	notion	of	a	moral	sense	as	Hutcheson	presented	it	in	the	first	edition	of	his	Inquiry.	It	will	not	hold	entirely,	or	at	least	it	falls	down	in	certain	places,	if	we	look	at	the	development																																																									297		Peter	J.	E.	Kail,	“Hutcheson's	Moral	Sense:	Skepticism,	Realism	and	Secondary	Qualities,”	
History	of	Philosophy	Quarterly	18	(2001):	62.			298	Hutcheson,	Essay,	45.	
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of	Hutcheson’s	thought	as	it	is	presented	in	the	Essay/Illustrations	and	the	revisions	Hutcheson	made	to	the	Inquiry.	Hutcheson’s	account	of	moral	motivation	was	developed	in	the	Essay/Illustrations	from	which	Kail’s	quotation	is	taken.	In	it	(as	discussed	in	the	preceding	chapter)	Hutcheson	argued	that	the	moral	sense	could	not	motivate	us	directly	to	moral	action	(in	the	four	
treatises).299	This	had	to	be	motivated	directly	by	a	desire	to	achieve	good	for	others	and	not	by	the	prospect	of	garnering	pleasurable	self-approbation.	What	would	move	us	to	an	action	was,	in	any	case,	either	a	desire	or	a	passion,	and	not	an	idea	from	sensation	or	reason	in	any	form.	Desires	and	aversions,	even	moral	ones,	were	raised	by	the	perception	of	natural	pleasure	and	pains	–	in	the	case	of	moral	motivation,	a	desire	to	accrue	natural	good	for	others.	Passions,	which	did	involve	ideas	of	pleasure	and	pain,	were	a	‘brutal	impulse	of	the	will’	and	as	such,	might	preoccupy	us	to	the	extent	that	we	are	unable	to	form	a	true	opinion	of	the	natural	good	and	evil,	or	pleasure	and	pain.	Passions	did	not	have	to	aim	at	a	
known	good.	If	Hutcheson	had	held	a	similar	view	of	the	function	of	bodily	sensations	to	that	of	Malebranche	and	Descartes	then	our	resulting	behavioural	dispositions	would	have	been	passionate	in	nature.	But	our	desires	were	not	passions	or	appetites,	as	Hutcheson	made	clear	in	the	Essay.300	Desires	were	formed	on	the	strength	of	a	belief	about	the	extent	to	which	a	good	is	present	in	an	object.	Pure	or	calm	desires,	for	universal	benevolence	or	for	our	own	greatest	happiness,	lacked	any	passionate	element	and	were	formed	for	whatever	was	rationally	apprehended	as	good.301		Kail,	in	his	analogous	treatment	of	Hutcheson’s	sense	of	beauty,	wants	to	preserve	the	non-epistemic	nature	of	Hutcheson’s	ideas	of	beauty,	so	his	theory	cannot	move	us	closer	to	an	understanding	of	Hutcheson’s	moral	sense	as	issuing	in	a	judgment.		By	the	time	of	his	inaugural	lecture	in	1730,	Hutcheson	used	the	terms	moral	sense,	natural	judgments,	conscience,	and	ruling	principle	interchangeably.	In	this	lecture,	and	in	his	account	in	the	Metaphysics	of	a	reflexive	sense	of	‘the	fitting	and	the	good’	that	passed	judgment	‘as	from	the	bench’,	Hutcheson	aimed																																																									299	Darwall,	Internal	Ought,	takes	much	trouble	to	demonstrate	this,	223-237	(although	not	in	relation	to	Kail’s	thesis).		300	Hutcheson,	Essay,	67.	301	See	Darwall,	Internal	Ought,	225.		
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explicitly	at	a	combination	of	the	reporting	functions	of	sensory	ideas	with	the	epistemic	nature	of	a	judgment.		Hutcheson	blamed	Locke,	as	we	saw,	for	the	reluctance	to	investigate	‘natural	ideas,	apprehensions,	judgements,	and	the	natural	sense	of	anything	whatever’.302		Whereas	‘the	ancients’,	Hutcheson	noted,			without	exception	said	that	all	ideas,	apprehensions,	and	judgments	which	we	form	about	things	under	the	guidance	of	nature	at	whatever	stage	this	may	occur,	or	which	are	received	by	any	of	the	faculties	of	our	nature	more	or	less	necessarily	and	universally,	are	innate.303				Hutcheson,	by	1730,	had	decided	definitively	to	elevate	his	native	moral	sense	from	the	means	by	which	our	moral	ideas	are	generated,	to	the	position	of	Butlerian	conscience	or	Stoic	‘hegemonikon’.	This	entailed	that	our	moral	ideas	no	longer	simply	provided	us	with	an	‘instinctive	appreciation’	of	certain	moral	qualities	in	intentions,	but	now	appeared	to	be	capable	of	regulating	our	choice,	or	potential	choice,	of	passions	or	desires	upon	which	to	act.	Whatever	Hutcheson’s	natural	judgments	were,	they	clearly	did	not	function	simply	as	a	brute	provocation	to	action.	Hutcheson	had	to	balance	his	commitment	to	the	sensory	origins	of	our	moral	ideas	with	the	judicial	pre-eminence	he	wished	to	assign	to	it	as	the	proper	governor	of	the	soul.			Hutcheson,	however,	could	never	abandon	the	elements	of	his	account	of	moral	sense	that	had	given	him	the	resources	to	pronounce	our	moral	reactions	universally	‘natural’,	by	appeal	to	their	immediacy	and	non-voluntariness	and	their	necessity.	He	needed	to	retain	these	features	in	order	to	argue	against	the	idea	the	will	is	able	to	determine	judgment.	‘Almost	everyone	agrees	that	we	do	not	judge	a	thing	is	this	way	or	that	way	because	we	so	wanted	to	judge’,	he	insisted	in	his	Metaphysics.304	Natural	judgments	needed	to	be	necessary,	in	the	sense	of	their	being	involuntary,	and	not	made	according	to	our	own	will,	and,	as	such,	could	not	be	altered	directly	by	reasoning.			Daniel	Carey	argues	that	Hutcheson	needed	to	keep	moral	judgment	coincidental	with	the	‘moment	of	perception’	in	order	to	insulate	it	from	Mandevillian	social																																																									302	Hutcheson,	inaugural	lecture,	212.	303	Ibid.,	212.		304	Hutcheson,	Metaphysics,	124.		
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corruption	and	to	claim	temporal	priority	(its	‘instantness’)	over	Clarke’s	moral	reason.305	The	point	about	Mandeville	is	well	taken.	The	point	about	temporal	priority	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	chapter.	The	main	reason,	I	suggest,	that	Hutcheson	could	not	abandon	the	sensory	character	of	the	moral	sense	was	because	he	continued	to	deny	innate	ideas	and	propositions	a	role	in	moral	thought	in	the	four	treatises.	Despite	his	references	to	natural	ideas	and	judgments	in	the	inaugural	lecture	(and	complaints	that	Lockeans	‘alone’	described	them	as	innate),	Hutcheson,	in	all	his	revisions	to	the	Inquiry	and	the	
Essay/Illustrations	(or	in	the	System	and	Short	Introduction),	never	actually	revoked	his	denial	that	his	moral	sense	operated	according	to	innate	ideas,	principles	or	knowledge.		This	meant	that	Hutcheson,	throughout	the	1720s	and	beyond,	had	to	have	had	an	understanding	(or	at	least	hoped	to	have	an	understanding)	of	how	a	judgment	might	be	natural	to	us,	and	yet	still	not	fall	foul	of	the	charge	of	nativism.				I	also	don’t	think	that	Hutcheson	needed	a	particular	target	here	in	order	to	blur	the	distinction	between	sense	perception	and	judgment,	or	to	make	them	coincident,	although	I	agree	completely	with	Carey	that	he	sought	to	retain	characteristics	of	both.306		I	suggest	that	Hutcheson’s	account	of	a	sense	that	judged	derived	from	the	context	of	the	breakdown	of	traditional	mental	act	theory	which	Descartes,	Locke,	the	Port-Royalists,	Aldrich	and	many	others	retained.	The	marriage	of	a	mental	act	structure	with	the	logic	of	ideas,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	1,	was	put	under	particular	strain	in	accounts	of	perception.			As	we	saw,	Locke’s	perceptual	theory	of	intuitive	and	deductive	knowledge	had	already	put	the	traditional	demarcation	of	perception	or	apperception,	and	judgment	at	risk.	Locke’s	appeal	to	the	self-evident	propositions	that	were	formed	whenever	we	made	a	basic	sensory	distinction	(that	white	is	not	black,	for	example)	further	breached	the	banks.	The	role	of	unnoticed	inference	in	basic																																																									305	Carey,	Locke,	Shaftesbury	and	Hutcheson,	166.	See	also	Daniel	Carey,	“Francis	Hutcheson’s	Philosophy	and	the	Scottish	Enlightenment:	Reception,	Reputation,	and	Legacy,”	in	Scottish	
Philosophy	in	the	Eighteenth	Century,	Volume	1:	Morals,	Politics,	Art,	Religion	ed.	Aaron	Garrett	and	James	A.	Harris	(Oxford,	Oxford	University	Press,	2015),	36-76.		306	This	is	discussed	further	at	the	end	of	the	present	chapter.		
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visual	perception	meant	that,	at	least	in	the	case	of	three-dimensional	visual	perception,	judgment,	in	certain	epistemological	logics,	was	on	its	way	to	becoming	a	Reidian	sense.	Berkeley’s’	objections	to	Cartesian	accounts	of	judgment	in	depth	perception	and	his	psychology	of	natural	signs	in	which	experience	works	on	naturally	given	cues	were	also	mentioned,	although	Berkeley	insisted	that	the	traditional	boundary	between	sense	and	judgment	be	retained.307	Introspective	psychology,	whether	of	mental	operations	or	associative	connections,	though,	is	no	respecter	of	inferential	relations,	and	the	way	of	ideas	could	not	sustain	a	strict	demarcation	between	sense,	perception	and	judgment	by	appeal	to	the	introspection	of	mental	events.		Winkler	argues	that	there	were	two	strains	of	thought	with	respect	to	judgment	in	the	eighteenth	century.	The	first	was	a	move	to	'downgrade'	judgment	to	sensation,	promulgated	by	Condillac	and	Hume,	working	from	a	perceptual	approach	to	knowledge	and	using	association	or	suggestion	to	account	for	belief.	The	second,	conversely,	was	the	approach	taken	by	Reid	and	Kant	to	'upgrade'	sensation.	This	entailed	either	the	incorporation	of	judgment	as	part	of	every	act	of	sensation	(Reid)	or	the	acknowledgement	that	the	combinatorial	function	of	judgment	occurred	prior	to,	or	alongside	the	having	of	a	sensation	(Kant).308		According	to	the	first	understanding	an	act	of	judgment	proceeds	like	an	act	of	perception.	According	to	the	second	it	issues	a	verdict	on	a	judgment	candidate	brought	before	it.	Winkler	argues	that	Hutcheson’s	conception	of	judgment	(not	moral	judgment),	as	presented	in	his	Logic,	was	clearly	‘verdicative’.	It	was,	Winkler	maintains,	based	on	Henry	Aldrich’s	logic	and	as	such,	was	both	a	mark	of	his	distance	from	Locke’s	perceptual	account	of	judgment	in	knowledge,	and	of	his	(Hutcheson’s)	commitment	to	a	traditional	approach	to	the	demarcation	of	mental	acts.309		It	is	true	that	in	the	statement	in	Hutcheson’s	Logic	judgment	appears	as	the	second	act	in	the	traditional	hierarchy	of	mental	acts,	which	begins	with	apprehension.																																																									307	See	Kenneth	Winkler,	“Ideas,	Perception	and	Judgment,”	in	The	Cambridge	History	of	
Eighteenth-Century	Philosophy,	ed.	Knud	Haakonssen	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006),	262.			308	Winkler,	“Ideas	and	perceptions,”	262-264.		309	Ibid.,	265-266.	
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Judgment	is	an	act	of	the	mind	by	which	it	forms	an	opinion	about	two	ideas.310		I	do	not	agree	with	Winkler’s	suggestion	that	Hutcheson’s	notion	of	judgment	is	verdicative	because	he	sought	to	maintain	the	boundary	between	the	first	and	second	mental	acts.	I	believe	that	Hutcheson	was	well	aware	of	the	various	ways	in	which	the	boundary	between	the	two	might	be	less	than	distinct,	and	that	he	understood	judgment	to	have	been	incorporated	into	sensation,	at	least	with	respect	to	some	judgments,	moral	or	otherwise.	Reid’s	later	petition	to	natural	language	in	order	to	claim	that	sense	always	involved	judgment	simply	followed	suit.	Carey	does	not	refer	to	early	modern	accounts	of	perception	but	he	mentions	briefly	that	Hutcheson	had	‘effectively	adopted	[Reid’s]	line	without	expressly	declaring	it’.311	I	think	it	is	just	as	likely	that	Reid	adopted	Hutcheson’s	line,	without	expressly	declaring	it.		Hutcheson's	statement	on	the	capacity	of	the	deliverances	of	the	moral	sense	(the	sense	of	'the	fitting	and	the	good')	to	deliver	a	verdict	was	also	found	in	his	
Metaphysics.		Of	all	these	reflexive	senses	the	most	notable	is	the	sense	of	the	fitting	and	the	good,	which	passes	judgment	as	from	the	bench	on	all	the	things	men	do,	on	all	our	pleasures	of	body	or	mind,	on	our	opinions,	sentiments,	actions,	prayers,	intentions,	and	feelings,	determining	in	each	case	what	is	fine,	fitting	and	good,	and	what	is	the	measure	in	each.312			‘Reflexive	sense’	as	a	term	for	the	moral	sense	did	not	appear	in	the	four	
treatises,	although	the	moral	sense	was	considered	an	internal	sense	on	the	model	of	Locke’s	internal	sense	of	reflection.313	(The	change	in	terminology	will	be	discussed	later	on	in	this	chapter.)	This	reflexive	sense	passed	judgement,	here,	'as	from	the	bench'	and	it	clearly	assumed	an	understanding	of	the	sense	that	involved	more	than	a	reporting	function.	Hutcheson’s	thoughts	may	be	made	clearer	here	by	looking	at	his	formulation	of	the	general	act	of	judgment	in	the	Metaphysics	in	the	section	‘On	the	Human	Mind’.	
																																																								310	Hutcheson,	Logic,	11.		311	Carey,	“Hutcheson	and	the	Scottish	Enlightenment,”	57.		312	Hutcheson,	Metaphysics,	119	313	Hutcheson,	Illustrations,	16.		
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Judgment,	which	is	called	the	second	operation	of	the	understanding,	can	
hardly	be	totally	distinct	from	perception.	For	an	absolute	judgment	may	be	said	to	be	the	complex	perception	of	a	thing	existing	at	a	certain	time,	which	is	prompted	either	directly	by	means	of	the	senses	or	by	the	intervention	of	reason,	when	one	discerns	the	connection	of	the	thing	which	is	the	subject	of	the	judgment	with	the	things	which	sense	shows	to	exist.	Abstract	judgments	are	perceptions	of	relations	which	exist	between	things	observed;	or,	if	anyone	thinks	that	judgments	are	distinct	actions	of	the	mind,	which	nevertheless	originate	in	these	perceptions,	the	act	of	judgment	is	represented	by	a	simple	idea	which	cannot	be	defined.314	[My	emphasis.]		Here	we	see	that	Hutcheson	understood	that	judgment	was	much	closer	to	perception.	The	two	acts	were	blurred	in	the	perception	of	complex	ideas	(‘absolute’	judgments)	and	the	perceptions	of	relations	(‘abstract’	judgments).	The	alternative,	as	Hutcheson	presented	it	here,	was	that	judgments	were	distinct	mental	acts	that	‘nevertheless	originate’	in	perceptions.	Hutcheson	was	well	aware	of	the	formal	difference	between	ideas	linked	together	provisionally	to	be	presented	to	judgment	for	a	verdict,	as	we	saw	in	his	Logic.	Indeed,	in	the	
Illustrations	he	refers	directly	to	the	‘thema	complexum’,	which	is	a	proposition	candidate	presented	to	the	judgment	for	adjudication.315	He	doesn’t	seem	to	have	been	referring	to	this	process	for	these	two	classes	of	judgment,	even	if	judgment	was	considered	as	a	separate	act	of	mind.	These	judgments,	Hutcheson	said,	‘originate[d]	in	these	perceptions’.	Might	an	absolute	judgment	have	been	a	moral	judgment	for	Hutcheson?	Did	Hutcheson	understand	that	reason	would	judge	the	presence	of	benevolent	intention	(‘the	subject	of	the	judgment’)	and	show	its	connection	to	our	(probably	simple)	ideas	of	moral	worth	(‘the	things	which	sense	shows	to	exist’)?316		Quite	possibly	Hutcheson	did	not	intend	either	of	these	particular	instances	of	judgments,	which	were	also	perceptions,	to	apply	to	moral	thought,	but	the	statements	which	appear	in	the	Logic	and	the	Metaphysics	show	that	he	was	
																																																								314		Hutcheson,	Metaphysics,	124.	315	Hutcheson,	Illustrations,	161.	316	Hutcheson	waited	until	the	third	and	fourth	editions	of	the	Inquiry	(1729,	1738)	to	state	that	his	ideas	from	moral	sense	were	‘probably	simple	ideas,	which	cannot	be	farther	explained’.	See	Leidhold,	textual	notes,	Inquiry,	217.	
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more	than	alert	to	the	blurring	of	the	distinction	between	perception	and	judgment	as	mental	acts.				A	little	earlier	in	the	Metaphysics	in	the	section	‘On	Being’	Hutcheson	had	looked	at	the	difference	between	internal	and	external	necessity.	Internal	necessity	or	absolute	necessity	finds	its	necessity	in	the	‘very	nature	of	a	thing’	and	‘does	not	depend	on	any	will	at	all’.	Both	were	distinct	from	external,	or	subsequent	necessity	that	necessarily	follows	upon	something	else	that	has	been	posited.	Hutcheson	explained	that	a	perception	is	said	to	be	necessary	if	it	presents	itself	to	us,	whether	we	will	or	no;	a	voluntary	[perception],	on	the	other	hand,	is	one	which	we	can	change,	obstruct	or	stop.	Judgement	is	necessary;	this	is	either	because	the	nature	of	the	object	is	such	that	it	cannot	be	changed	for	any	reason	so	as	to	render	the	judgement	untrue,	or	because	the	connection	or	conflict	between	the	terms	in	the	stated	position	is	such	as	to	ensure	that	the	proposition	will	always	be	true.317		Hutcheson	treated	perceptions	and	judgments	separately	in	this	passage,	but	did	Hutcheson’s	comments	on	necessary	judgment	provide	a	model	for	the	kind	of	judgments	that	are	necessarily	determined	by	the	nature	of	things	or	the	‘nature	of	the	object’?		Are	they	his	‘natural’	judgments	that	are	‘formed	under	the	guidance	of	nature’	referred	to	in	his	inaugural	lecture?318	So	that,	having	been	created	as	we	have,	we	must	approve	benevolence	where	we	perceive	it	because	the	judgment	that	benevolence	is	good	or	approvable	is	necessary	for	us?	Again	the	evidence	is	clearly	lacking,	but	perhaps	the	tendency	of	Hutcheson’s	thought	might	be	glimpsed.		Both	a	necessary	judgment	and	an	absolute	perception	(if	they	apply	at	all	to	Hutcheson’s	moral	epistemology)	force	the	mind	to	judge/perceive	that	benevolence	is	good.			What	I	want	to	argue	is	that	Hutcheson	is	working	within	a	framework	where	the	status	of	the	perception	of	ideas	of	sense	and	judgments	relating	to	them	as	distinct	mental	acts	has	broken	down.	Thoughts	can	shuttle	between	acts	of	
																																																								317	Hutcheson,	Metaphysics,	89.	318	Hutcheson,	inaugural	lecture,	212.	
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perception	and	acts	of	judgment	in	the	operational	details	of	the	different	types	of	perception	and	judgment	that	give	rise	to	these	thoughts.				Hutcheson	also	recognised	Locke’s	claim	that	having	a	sensible	idea	could	issue	in	a	propositional	judgment.	As	we	saw	in	the	introductory	chapter,	Locke’s	self-evident	propositions	were	formed	when	we	attend	to	ideas	of	sense.		Hutcheson	too	pointed	out	that	universal	assent	does	not	imply	that	an	axiom	is	innate,	in	the	sense	of	its	having	been	known	from	birth,	since	the	perception	of	an	idea	from	sensation	can	form	an	immediate	self-evident	proposition,	and	yet	these	ideas	are	not	counted	innate	(by	Locke,	one	imagines).	For	all	will	assent	to	any	proposition,	including	a	singular	proposition	which	concerns	any	sensible	idea	presented	to	it,	when	there	is	an	obvious	connection	or	opposition	between	subject	and	predicate;	yet	these	authors	say	that	singular	and	sensible	ideas	are	not	innate.319			Furthermore,	again	as	discussed	in	Chapter	1,	unnoticed	inferences	or	judgments	had	long	been	understood	to	be	necessary	for	three-dimensional	perception	given	the	two	dimensional	nature	of	the	retinal	image.	Do	we	make	an	unnoticed	inference	when	we	sense	our	moral	approval?	When	we	make	an	unnoticed	sensory	judgment,	we	are	not	aware	of	it	being	a	judgment,	for	example,	our	visual	experience	just	is	three-dimensional.	In	the	same	way	might	Hutcheson	have	understood	that	we	just	do	experience	moral	approval	or	disapproval	once	we	have	reasoned	about	the	direction	of	intention	of	the	motivation	of	an	actor?	Hutcheson’s	insisted	throughout	the	Inquiry	and	the	Essay/Illustrations	that	our	experience	of	moral	approval	or	condemnation	arose	as	the	result	of	a	‘fix’d	law	of	nature’.	As	such,	Hutcheson	could	maintain,	our	moral	perceptions	were	isolated	from	the	influence	of	will	–	we	couldn’t	choose	what	we	approved	or	condemned.	The	first	two	editions	of	the	Inquiry,	especially,	emphasised	the	affective	aspects	of	our	reactions	to	vice	and	virtue.	I	suggest,	cautiously,	that	it	is	possible	that	Hutcheson	saw	the	experience	of	moral	spectatorship	in	a	similar	way.			
																																																								319	Hutcheson,	Metaphysics,	75.		
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The	accounts	of	judgment	in	visual	perception	offered	by	Descartes	and	Locke	argued	that	these	were	non-conscious,	habitual,	judgments.	Locke’s	account	of	this	process	is	especially	pertinent	to	the	present	inquiry.	Locke,	in	the	ECHU,	accounted	for	the	occurrence	of	non-conscious	or	unnoticed	inference	in	the	following	way,	and	extended	its	operation	to	hearing	and	reading.	This	is	in	many	cases	by	a	settled	habit,	in	things	whereof	we	have	frequent	experience,	is	performed	so	constantly,	and	so	quick,	that	we	take	that	for	the	perception	of	sensation	which	is	an	idea	formed	by	our	judgment;	so	that	one,	viz,	that	of	sensation,	serves	only	to	excite	the	other,	and	is	scarce	taken	notice	of	itself;	as	a	man	who	reads	or	hears	with	attention	and	understanding,	takes	little	notice	of	the	characters,	or	sounds,	but	of	the	ideas,	that	are	excited	in	him	by	them.320	[My	emphasis.]		And	shortly	thereafter:		And	therefore	‘tis	not	so	strange,	that	our	mind	should	often	change	the	idea	of	its	sensation,	into	that	of	its	judgment,	and	make	one	serve	only	to	
excite	the	other,	without	our	taking	notice	of	it.321	[My	emphasis.]			Hutcheson’s	position	is	that	our	ideas	from	moral	sense	(and	beauty)	arise	from	the	work	of	the	mind	upon	ideas	from	external	sensation	(they	are	reflexive	in	this	sense).	For	Locke,	we	initially	perform	a	judgment	upon	an	idea	from	sensation	(in	order	to	judge	that	a	disc	is	a	sphere,	or	a	sound	is	a	word),	but	this	soon	becomes	habitual	so	that	the	presentation	of	those	ideas	from	sense	’excite’	the	judgment	(sphere	or	word)	and	we	do	not	notice	that	we	judge,	we	just	‘sense’	or	experience	a	sphere	or	a	word.			On	this	reading	of	Hutcheson’s	account,	we	may,	presumably,	first	think	about	an	actor’s	motivation	and	become	aware	that	we	feel	pleasure	in	response	to	some	of	these	thoughts.	At	some	point,	presumably,	we	judge	that	this	pleasant	feeling	is	our	idea	of	moral	approval	(as	we	saw,	Hutcheson	made	it	clear	that	our	moral	ideas	contain	a	representational	element,	which	is	distinct	from	the	pleasure).	In	this	way,	after	repeated	judgments,	the	judgment	that	this	pleasant	feeling	is	the	experience	or	sign	of	our	moral	approval	becomes	habitual	and	unnoticed	-	thus	we	simply	‘sense’	our	moral	approval.																																																										320	Locke,	ECHU,	2:9:9,	146	321	Ibid.,	2:2:10,	147	
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	In	this	section	I	have	examined	a	number	of	ways	in	which	Hutcheson	acknowledged	that	the	distinction	between	the	acts	of	sense	and	judgment	was	not	absolute,	so	that	the	act	of	perception	might	also	involve	some	aspects	of	an	act	of	judgment.	In	the	next	section	I	turn	to	the	role	of	reason	in	Hutcheson’s	account.	Here,	I	believe,	Hutcheson	left	the	boundary	between	sense	and	judgment	intact	(officially)	but	has	moral	perceptions	emerging,	or	arising,	from	a	judgment.	This	strategy,	I	suggest,	was	conceived	in	order	to	deal	with	any	charge	of	innatism,	but	it	contradicted	Hutcheson’s	own	commitment	to	the	awareness	principle.			Reason,	awareness	and	principles		For	Locke,	whatever	the	principles	or	rules	by	which	our	minds	are	able	to	sense	or	judge	anything,	and	regardless	of	whether	we	are	able	to	discover	them	by	science,	our	explicit	knowledge	of	these	principles	will	not,	in	the	first	instance,	cause	us	to	be	able	to	sense	or	judge.322	Locke,	in	the	ECHU,	objected	to	the	use	of	implicit	principles,	by	which	we	non-consciously	judge,	as	part	of	his	rebuttal	of	the	dispositional	nativism.	Locke	was	opposed	to	the	idea	that	we	might	use	an	implicitly	held	speculative	general	principle	that	we	were	not	aware	of	(e.g.	‘a	thing	cannot	be	and	not	be’)	in	order	to	judge	a	particular	proposition	(e.g.	‘that	green	is	not	red’).	Locke	argued	his	case	here	on	the	grounds	that	we	had,	as	Descartes	had	agreed,	full	awareness	of	all	that	passed	in	our	minds.323	‘No	proposition	can	be	said	to	be	in	the	mind,	which	it	never	yet	knew,	which	it	was	never	conscious	of’,	said	Locke.324	Locke	also,	of	course,	denied	the	operation	of	implicitly	held	practical	principles	in	moral	reasoning.	Locke	insisted	that	we	judged	an	actor	or	action	with	conscious	reference	to	one	of	three	known	laws	(divine,	civil	or	opinion).			
																																																								322	De	Rosa	provides	an	excellent	account	of	Locke’s	rebuttal	of	dispositional	nativism	here.		It	is	she	who	coins	the	requirement	for	conscious	awareness	the	‘awareness	principle’	in	“Locke,	question-begging,”	82-110.	323	Locke,	ECHU,	1:2:22,	60.	See	de	Rosa,	ibid.,	86.	324	See	Locke,	ECHU,	1:2:5,	50,	for	this	excerpt	and	the	wider	statement	of	Locke’s	position.		
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In	1697	and	1699	an	anonymous	set	of	critical	‘remarks’	upon	the	ECHU	was	published.	They	were	written	by	Thomas	Burnet,	a	disciple	of	Cudworth	at	Cambridge	and	friend	to	Henry	More.325	Burnet	opposed	the	account	of	moral	epistemology	offered	by	Locke.		He	viewed	the	'long	and	obscure	deductions'	required	for	a	deductive	understanding	of	natural	law	as	being	beyond	most	of	the	(largely	illiterate)	population.	Burnet	was	keen	to	restore	the	kind	of	natural,	non-inferential	guidance	in	moral	matters	that	innatism	had	guaranteed.	To	this	end,	Burnet	argued	for	the	existence	of	something	termed	a	moral	sense,	which	he	identified	with	a	natural	conscience.	This	amounted	to	a	power	or	ability	to	sense	the	distinction	between	moral	good	and	evil.	Burnet	refused	to	equate	his	natural	conscience	with	innate	ideas	or	propositions.	He	preferred	to	describe	it	as	operating	according	to	natural	principles.326		Locke	responded	once	to	Burnet	publically,	but	we	also	have	his	marginal	commentary	on	Burnet's	third	set	of	remarks.	To	begin	with,	Locke	would	not	have	the	change	in	terminology.	What	this	author	has	to	say	about	natural	principles	I	know	not.	That	which	I	deny	is	that	practical	principles	or	rules	are	innate.327		Locke	would	not	allow	Burnet's	equation	of	a	faculty,	or	power,	or	ability	with	a	
principle	understood	as	mental	content.328	Conscience	is	the	making	of	a	judgment.	It	is	a	mental	act,	an	operation,	just	like	external	or	internal	sensation,	it	is	not	a	declarative,	that	is,	explicitly	held,	principle.	Conscience	is	not	the	law	of	nature	but	judging	by	that	which	is	taken	to	be	the	law.329		Locke	would	also	not	allow	equivalence	between	those	instinctive	acts	of	self-preservation	and	procreation	to	be	counted	as	duties	prior	to	our	conscious	realisation	that	they	are	a	duty.	We	can	perform	these	duties,	that	is	we	can	
																																																								325	George	Watson,	introduction	to	Remarks	on	John	Locke	by	Thomas	Burnet	with	Locke’s	Replies,	ed.	George	Watson	(Doncaster:	Brynmill	Press,	1989),	9.	Henceforth	Remarks.	Carey,	Locke	
Shaftesbury	Hutcheson,	offers	a	brief	treatment	of	the	exchange	between	Thomas	Burnet	and	Locke	in	relation	to	Hutcheson,	166-167.			326	Burnet	“First	remarks,”	Remarks,	24.		327	Locke’s	marginal	comment,	Remarks,	70.			328	Ibid.,	64-65.	329	Ibid.,	68	
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perform	the	actions,	but	conscience	cannot	judge	them	(as	the	fulfilment	of	a	duty)	without	understanding	that	they	are	part	of	natural	law.		Yes,	we	may	do	it	without	the	formality	of	a	law,	but	conscience	cannot	acquit	or	condemn	us	for	what	we	do	without	a	law	telling	us	it	is	our	duty	to	do	or	forbear.330			Locke’s	problem	with	Thomas	Burnet’s	moral	sense	is,	of	course,	that	it	equates	conscience	with	innate	(i.e.	implicitly	held)	propositions	that	judge	for	us,	since	we	are	not	aware	of	the	principle	by	which	we	are	judging.			Hutcheson	argued	that	that	we	do	not	use	the	conscious	appreciation	of	a	reasoned	moral	principle	to	judge	moral	action	by.	We	have	also	seen	Hutcheson’s	denial	that	his	sense	of	beauty	and	moral	sense	are	innate	propositions.	He	did	admit	that	they	were	‘secret	‘	senses	and	that	their	operation	was	‘occult’	in	exactly	the	same	way	that	our	understanding	of	the	way	in	which	voluntary	action	is	initiated	is	unclear	to	us	(although	he	later	removed	this	remark).331	So	how	then,	are	the	principles	that	‘uniformity	amidst	variety	is	beautiful’	and	‘benevolence	is	approvable	and	its	contrary	condemnable’	to	be	understood	as	being	held	within	Hutcheson’s	model	of	mind?	Apparently,	they	were	held	neither	externally	to	be	discovered	by	reason	(and	then	used	to	judge	by)	nor	were	they	held	internally,	as	innate	principles	or	propositions.	They	were	neither	declarative	nor	non-declarative.		So,	what	was	the	nature	of	the	principles	by	which	Hutcheson’s	ideas	of	beauty	and	morality	were	produced?			Hutcheson	would	probably	have	liked	his	readers	to	stop	at	the	thought	that	moral	ideas	arose	just	as	our	ideas	of	external	sense,	or	Lockean	simple	ideas	of	reflection,	did.		For	Locke,	our	ideas	arose	as	the	result	of	an	encounter	with	solids,	or	colours,	or	us	willing	or	doubting	something.	Locke	did	not	claim	that	science	would	be	forever	unable	to	account	for	the	principles	underlying	our	perception	(although	the	essence	of	substance	was	permanently	unknowable).		But	in	any	case,	this	scientific	knowledge	would	not	cause	a	perception	or	judgment.	The	problem	is	that	Hutcheson	did	specify	the	principles	by	which	our																																																									330	Ibid.,	71.		331	Noted	by	Carey,	“Hutcheson	and	the	Scottish	Enlightenment,	“49.	Hutcheson	dropped	this	after	the	first	edition	of	the	Inquiry.		
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minds	judge	or	react	to	beauty	in	an	object	or	theorem,	and	morality	in	an	action.	The	question	is	whether	or	not	our	implicit	knowledge	of	these	principles	causes	our	moral	ideas	(in	which	case	it	apparently	violates	Hutcheson’s	own	commitment	to	the	awareness	principle).					Our	sense	of	beauty	and	moral	sense,	for	Hutcheson,	were	powers,	or	abilities	or	faculties	that	allowed	us	to	experience	beauty	or	moral	approval	or	condemnation,	as	there	were	other	powers	that	produce	ideas.	Locke	had	argued	that	the	power	by	which	we	perceived	something	to	be	solid	or	red,	or	gained	awareness	of	our	own	mental	operations,	produced	our	ideas.	This	was	fine,	at	least	at	first	pass.	The	problem	was,	that	having	specified	the	propositional	content	of	the	principles	by	which	we	generate	ideas	of	virtue	and	simultaneously	judge	virtue	and	beauty,	Hutcheson	needed	to	account	for	the	operation	of	these	principles	with	reference	to	our	minds.	If	we	did	judge	by	them,	how	were	they	implemented?	Hutcheson’s	principles	looked	very	much	like	innate	implicit	propositions	which	specified	the	criteria	of	virtue	and	beauty,	and	operated	outside	of	conscious	awareness.			Hutcheson	was	officially	signed	up	to	the	full	disclosure	model	of	mind	that	Descartes	and	Locke	had	insisted	upon.		It	was	stated	thus	in	the	Metaphysics: The	other	power	of	perception	is	a	certain	internal	sense,	or	consciousness,	by	means	of	which	everything	that	takes	place	in	the	mind	is	known.	Each	man	knows	his	own	sensations,	judgments,	reflections,	volitions,	desires	and	intention;	they	cannot	be	concealed	from	the	mind	in	which	they	are.332		This	was	a	statement	that	would	have	underlined	Hutcheson’s	insistence	that	we	must	be	aware	of	our	motivational	tendencies,	and	could	not	therefore	posit	the	non-conscious	workings	of	self-love	as	motivations.			We	could	at	this	stage	replay	Thomas	Burnet	and	Locke’s	exchange	in	Locke’s	marginal	notes,	(it	would	do	as	well	as	any	iteration	of	the	arguments)	with	Hutcheson	stepping	in	for	Burnet.																																																										332	Hutcheson,	Metaphysics,	117.	
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H:	The	moral	sense	is	an	innate	power,	like	the	power	of	external	sensation.		L:	Fine,	it’s	an	ability	then.	To	sense	the	moral	good?	How?		H:	Well,	it’s	an	ability	that	works	according	to	a	principle.		L:	Ok,	which	principle?		H:	The	principle	that	is	the	criterion	of	virtue	or	the	criterion	of	beauty.		L:	OK,	so	it’s	an	innate	proposition	then?		H:	No	it’s	not	an	innate	proposition	-	it	has	nothing	to	do	with	innate	ideas	knowledge	or	practical	principles.	It	is	an	innate	power,	like	your	internal	sense.		L:	Well,	it	is	illegitimate	to	call	a	principle	a	power	-	is	‘uniformity	amidst	variety	is	beautiful’,	or	‘benevolence	is	the	thing	that	is	good	in	motivation’	a	power?	No.	If	this	is	the	principle	that	determines	what	beauty	or	the	moral	good	are,	then	we	must	have	thought	about	this,	or	at	least	be	aware	of	it,	if	we	are	going	to	use	it	to	judge	by.	H:	No,	we	don’t	need	to	use	reason.	It’s	the	principle	by	which	we	are	non-consciously	judging.	L:	What?	I	thought	we’d	both	agreed	that	we	need	to	have	access	to	the	ideas,	or	principles,	in	our	minds,	or	we	can’t	use	them	to	know	anything.		H:	Well,	we	are	conscious	of	the	ideas,	just	not	the	principle	that	produces	them.	L:	That	would	be	the	innate	propositional	principle	then?	H:	No,	it’s	an	innate	power	to	produce	‘natural	ideas	.	.	.		natural	apprehensions,	judgements,	and	the	natural	sense	of	anything	whatever’.	It’s	a	natural	principle.	L:	I	never	mentioned	anything	about	natural	principles,	what	are	they?	H:	They	are	the	principles	by	which	we	know	whether	an	action	is	moral	or	not.	But	we	don’t	need	to	know	about	them	to	approve	or	disapprove	of	an	action.		L:	No	-	a	moral	action	means	a	law	requires	the	action.	We	have	to	know	what	law	it	is	we	judge	or	are	judged	by.	Its	God’s	law	ideally,	obviously.		H:	What’s	the	law	of	nature	then?	L:	A	law,	which	we	know	to	be	a	law,	so	that	when	it	comes	to	moral	actions	we	can	be	judged	by	it!!		H:	Well,	how	do	we	know	what	the	law	is,	or	that	it	is	a	law?	L:	We	read	our	bibles,	or	some	of	us	reason	it	out.	H:	I	don’t	need	to.	I	have	a	moral	sense		L:	Francis,	we’ve	been	through	this	.	.	.		
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And	so	on		
	Did	Hutcheson	have	any	way	out	of	this	that	might	satisfy	Locke,	or	even	have	satisfied	Gay,	who	charged	him	with	innatism?	That	is,	can	Hutcheson	make	a	convincing	case	that	his	moral	sense/natural	judgments/ruling	principle	both	does	not	operate	according	to	innately	held	propositional	principles,	the	content	of	which	we	are	unaware	of,	yet	still	judge	by,	yet	still	offers	an	account	of	moral	thought,	which	is	experienced	as	a	sense	and	delivers	moral	ideas,	but	also	involves	or	reflects	a	judgment?			I	suggest	that	Hutcheson	turned	to	the	preparatory	role	of	reasoning	to	maintain	his	commitment	to	moral	principles	that	are	not	innate	propositions	but	are	‘natural’	to	us.	In	fact,	I	think	Hutcheson	offered,	or	might	be	seen	as	having	offered,	two	partial	solutions	of	sorts.	The	first	involved	distinguishing	between	the	operations	of	the	sense	of	beauty	and	the	moral	sense,	according	to	whether	they	proceeded	with	reference	to	declarative	or	non-declarative	principles.	The	second	involved	Hutcheson’s	moral	algebra.		First	then:	Hutcheson	wanted	us	initially	to	see	our	moral	sense	as	analogous	to	our	sense	of	beauty.	When	we	make	a	moral	judgment	we	are	supposed	to	be,	or	at	least	some	of	us	are	supposed	to	be,	morally	dumbfounded.	This	was	supposed	because,	on	the	analogy	of	external	senses	and	our	internal	sense	of	beauty	and	harmony,	we	do	not	need	to	know	what	causes	our	sensory	or	aesthetic	responses	in	order	to	have	them.	Hutcheson	believed	that	moral	principle	by	which	we	judge	is	very	probably	benevolence,	but	that	this	was	something	that	would	need	to	be	confirmed	by	continued	investigation.	As	moral	spectators,	we	simply	have	a	feeling	of	approval	or	disapproval,	which	Hutcheson	later	made	clear	was	an	idea	of	something	other	than	our	own	pleasure	or	displeasure,	together	with	a	feeling	of	pleasure	or	displeasure.	However,	Hutcheson	in	the	
Illustrations	went	on	to	clarify	the	role	of	reason	in	the	process	of	moral	thought.	We	use	reason,	he	explained,	to	judge	the	outcome	of	the	action	for	someone	
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other	than	the	actor	and	the	relative	mix	of	benevolence	and	self-interest	that	motivates	the	actor	and	to	correct	our	opinions	of	these	two	judgments.		Just	so	in	our	ideas	of	actions.	These	three	things	are	to	be	distinguished,	1.	The	idea	of	the	external	motion,	known	first	by	sense,	and	its	tendency	to	the	happiness	or	misery	of	some	sensitive	nature,	often	inferr’d	by	argument	or	reason.	2.	Apprehension	or	opinion	of	the	affections	in	the	agent,	concluded	by	our	reason	.	.	.	3.	Our	reason	does	often	correct	the	report	of	our	senses,	about	the	natural	tendency	of	the	external	action,	and	corrects	rash	conclusions	about	the	affections	of	the	agent.333		
 As	Haakonssen	notes,	a	reasoned	belief	is	formed	concerning	the	direction	of	the	intention	of	the	agent.334	This	is	cognitive	work	proper	(reasoning),	which	we	do	when	we	think	about	actions.	We	have	to	consider	intentions	in	order	to	have	an	idea	of	moral	sense.	To	answer	Locke,	the	rule	by	which	we	judge	an	action	is	‘whom	does	the	agent	intend	to	benefit?’		We	do	this	consciously.	So,	in	this	way,	Hutcheson	claimed,	when	we	think	about	actions,	prior	to	the	operation	of	the	moral	sense,	we	have	already	answered	the	question,	actually	both	the	questions,	according	to	the	criterion	of	virtue	–	Who	was	intended	to	benefit?	I	suggest	that	Hutcheson	thought	that	this	was	just	how	we	analysed	actions,	but	that	we	did	so	consciously	using	reason.	Hutcheson	thought	that	just	was	a	natural	fact	about	how	we,	as	humans,	thought	about	actions.		Under	Hutcheson’s	scheme	though,	this	was	not	the	case	with	our	sense	of	beauty.	Here	we	were	busy	with	cognitive	work	analysing	natural	objects,	or	scenes	in	terms	of	the	visual	array	they	present,	or	we	were	busy	thinking	about	theorems,	but	we	were	not	consciously	analysing	these	in	terms	of	their	uniformity/variety.	Our	sense	of	beauty	may	have	led	us	to	prefer	regularity	or	universal	truths,	and	if	we	are	to	become	guided	by	this	we	may	have	learnt	that	universal	truths	were	worth	pursuing,	but	we	did	not	need	to	be	consciously	thinking	about	uniformity	amidst	variety	in	order	to	raise	an	idea	of	beauty.	We	needed	to	use	reason	to	know	about	regularity,	to	realise	whether	a	shape	was	regular	or	misshapen	and	perhaps	to	know	that	a	principle	that	explained	many	observations	was	different	from	one	that	explained	one	observation,	but	we	did	
																																																								333	Hutcheson,	Illustrations,	177	334	Haakonssen,	Natural	Law,	73.		
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not	need	to	search	consciously	for	regularity	or	uniformity.	That	we	preferred	it,	and	that	it	was	action-guiding	in	intellectual	work	was	probably	true,	Hutcheson	believed,	but	we	did	not	need	to	realise	this	in	order	for	it	to	be	so.	Peter	Kivy	has	argued	that	Hutcheson’s	ideas	of	beauty	are	non-epistemic	on	the	grounds	that	we	do	not	have	knowledge	of	this	principle	when	we	sense	beauty,	or	that	even	if	we	do	know	this,	then	the	idea	of	beauty	is	not	produced	as,	or	because,	we	know	it.	That	is,	Kivy	claims,	knowing	it	does	not	cause	our	idea	of	beauty.	To	be	sure	the	perception	of	the	idea	of	uniformity	causes	our	idea	of	beauty,	but	our	
conscious	realisation	that	this	is	the	principle	by	which	we	judge	does	not.335	We	do	not	need	to	be	searching	for	beauty	in	order	to	perceive	it.			I	suggest	though,	that	with	the	preparatory	role	of	reason	in	moral	judgment,	we	
do	know	that	we	are	examining	agent	intention,	we	are	thinking	about	the	thing	that	causes	our	moral	ideas	to	emerge,	and	we	do	need	to	be	thinking	about	it	in	order	for	an	idea	of	moral	sense	to	arise.	We	don’t	need	to	know	that	an	actor’s	motivation	will	have	a	moral	quality,	but	we	do	need	to	be	thinking	about	that	motivation	and	whom	the	actor	intends	to	benefit	by	her	action	(herself,	others,	or	both).	In	this	way,	our	reasoning	about	actions	may	be	said	to	cause	our	ideas	from	moral	sense,	where	our	reasoning	about	a	visual	array,	or	theorems	may	not	be	said	to	cause	our	sense	of	beauty.			I	suggest	that	Hutcheson’s	moral	sense	approves	the	qualities	we	knowingly	reason	about	in	intentions.	That	we	recognise	that	we	have	moral	abilities	at	all,	though,	is	the	result	of	our	moral	sense.	Without	it	we	might	still	judge	actions	according	to	the	rule	of	whom	the	agent	intends	to	benefit,	but	without	a	moral	sense	we	would	not	realise	which	of	these	intentions	was	a	moral	good,	or	even	that	there	was	such	a	thing	as	moral	good.	We	would	be	moral	idiots	because	our	ideas	of	actions	would	not	contain	anything	that	linked	them	to	virtue	because	we	would	not	have	any	ideas	of	virtue	or	a	sense	that	morality	existed.	The	moral	sense	operates	to	signal	to	us	that	benevolence	is	what	is	morally	good.		This	is	not	a	judgment	that	arises	in	particular	cases,	it	is	a	blanket	response	to	the																																																									335	Kivy,	“Response	to	Shelley,”	182.	Kivy	emphasizes	that	his	argument	holds	good	only	for	Hutcheson’s	thought	in	the	first	edition	of	the	Inquiry.		
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reasoned	detection	of	benevolence.	We	are	saved	from	the	effort	of	discovering	which	intentions	are	morally	good	or	evil,	but	we	are	not	saved	from	the	effort	of	reasoning	the	benevolent	or	selfish	intention	in	each	case	that	comes	before	us.	In	this	sense,	we	judge	properly	the	presence	of	benevolence	and	we	sense/judge	that	it	is	a	moral	good.	The	judgment	that	the	moral	sense	offers	is	simply	‘moral’	or	‘not	moral’.	There	are	difficulties	here.	Most	problematic	is	the	fact	that	we	can’t	really	ever	know	the	intentions	or	motives	of	another	person	and	must	look	to	outcomes.	As	Hutcheson	admitted,	it	is	‘	the	external	marks	by	which	men	must	judge’,	because	we	‘do	not	see	into	each	others	hearts.’336				To	a	certain	extent,	however,	I	think	that	adverting	to	the	role	of	preparatory	reasoning	allows	Hutcheson	to	escape	the	charge	that	the	moral	sense	is	driven	by	innate	propositional	content.	This	is	because	we	are	unaware	that	we	judge	by	the	principle	that	benevolence	is	a	moral	good.	Hutcheson	has	shifted	the	heavy	lifting	epistemic	work	back	onto	conscious	reasoning.	It	just	happens	that	we	already,	naturally,	that	is	innately	but	consciously	assess	actions	by	thinking	about	who	benefits	from	them	and	what	the	intention	of	the	actor	is.	The	recognition	that	benevolent	intention	is	good	in	actions	and	is	a	necessary	or	‘natural’	judgment,	or	perception,	is	achieved	by	a	sense,	by	a	‘fix’d	law	of	nature’.	In	this	way	thinking	about	the	presence	of	benevolence	in	an	actor’s	intention	does	raise	the	idea	of	moral	approval	–	it	does	cause	this	idea.	Thinking	or	reasoning	about	an	actor’s	intention	in	combination	with	the	moral	sense	therefore	is	Hutcheson’s	whole	moral	epistemology	in	the	Illustrations.			One	implication	of	thinking	about	Hutcheson’s	ideas	of	moral	sense	in	this	way	is	that,	contrary	to	what	Haakonssen	and	Gill	suggest,	these	ideas	are	an	infallible	judgment	that	benevolence	is	the	moral	good	(a	‘necessary	judgment’,	an	‘absolute	perception’).		Both	Haakonssen	and	Gill	suggest	that	Hutcheson’s	theory	is	a	cognitive	one	because	our	moral	sense	has	a	truth-value	and	may	be	wrong.337	That	is,	they	argue,	we	may	be	mistaken	in	our	moral	judgments	and	use	reason	to	correct	them.	I	suggest,	on	my	reading,	that	the	only	thing	that	we																																																									336	Hutcheson,	Inquiry,	130.	337	Although	they	have	different	opinions	as	to	what	the	implications	of	this	are.	See	Haakonssen,	“Natural	Law	and	Moral	Realism,”	73-75.	See	Gill,	British	Moralists,	299.		
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may	be	mistaken	about	is	the	reasoned	appreciation	of	the	motivation	of	the	actor	and	the	amount	of	public	good	that	was	either	intended,	or	was	actually	produced,	by	the	actor.	Ideas	from	moral	sense	arise	from	this	reasoning	to	indicate	moral	worth	only	upon	the	reasoned	appreciation	of	benevolence.	Our	ideas	from	moral	sense	cannot	be	wrong,	unless	our	underlying	reasoning	has	gone	astray	in	some	way.		We	may	have	long-held	faulty	views	or	beliefs	about	what	is,	in	fact,	benevolent	or	contributes	to	the	public	good	acquired	through	poor	education,	or	‘fantastik’	associations,	or	just	faulty	reasoning.	So	it	might	be	that	our	moral	sense	responds	to	a	faulty	judgment	of	what	is	benevolent,	but	the	moral	sense	always	and	only	responds	to	what	we	consider	to	be	benevolence,	or	self-interest.338	The	truth-value	is	attached	to	our	reasoning	about	an	actor’s	intention.	Our	reasoning	about	the	presence	of	benevolence	can	be	faulty,	and	it	is	open	to	correction	by	subsequent	reasoning	but	we	cannot	directly	stop	the	appearance	of	an	idea	of	moral	worth	upon	the	perception	of	benevolence.	Neither	can	we	correct	our	perception	that	what	we	believe	to	be	benevolence	is	morally	worthy.	These	ideas	signal	to	us	that	benevolence	is	moral	good.	This	is	not	open	to	modification	by	reason.	We	may	have	mistakenly	reasoned,	or	assumed,	or	believed,	that	which	is	actually	a	selfish	motivation	is	a	benevolent	motivation,	and	we	may	correct	this,	but	this	is	reason	correcting	reason.	It	is	not	reason	directly	correcting	an	idea	from	moral	sense.			The	other	way,	I	suggest	(much	more	tentatively),	in	which	Hutcheson	may	have	conceptualised	the	natural	operation	of	the	sense	of	beauty	and	the	moral	sense	was	to	see	them	as	computationally	driven.	Hutcheson	maintained	that	the	ideas	of	duration	and	number	‘do	or	may,	accompany	all	perceptions	of	the	mind’.339	This	was	not	controversial	within	the	epistemology	of	ideas;	it	just	meant	that	we	received	ideas	of	how	strong	or	lasting	our	sensory	ideas	were	-	how	sweet,	or	beautiful,	or	painful.		In	the	Inquiry	Hutcheson	provided	several	equations	that	comprised	his	‘universal	canon	to	compute	the	morality	of	any	actions’,	or	‘how																																																									338	Michael	B.	Gill,	1995.	"Nature	and	Association	in	the	Moral	Theory	of	Francis	Hutcheson,"	
History	of	Philosophy	Quarterly	12	(1995):	281-301,	and	“Fantastick	Associations	and	Addictive	General	Rules:	a	Fundamental	Difference	Between	Hutcheson	and	Hume,”	Hume	Studies	22	(1996):	23-48.	339	Hutcheson,	Metaphysics,	115.		
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we	compute	the	morality	in	our	sense	of	them’.340	Hutcheson	described	the	compound	ratios	by	which	we	assessed	the	‘moral	importance	of	any	agent,	or	the	quantity	of	public	good	produced	by	him’,	and	its	converse	to	assess	moral	evil.	He	derived,	or	proved,	several	aspects	of	his	theories	by	them	–	for	example,	the	need	to	take	into	account	the	ability	of	the	agent	to	achieve	the	outcome	in	relation	to	their	intention	to	do	good.	The	equations	were	removed	from	the	4th	edition	of	the	Inquiry	but	were	restated	in	words	covering	the	same	themes.			In	the	Illustrations,	however,	Hutcheson	used	formulae	again	to	explain,	‘how	we	compute	the	goodness	of	temper’	and	the	‘quantity	of	love	toward	any	person’	(the	degree	of	desire	we	have	for	their	happiness),	which	was	raised	by	our	consideration	of	any	sensitive	being	(who	has	not	harmed	us).	We	were	naturally	inclined	not	to	distribute	our	benevolence	generally,	but	rather	were	predisposed	(through	the	weakness	of	our	understanding	and	lack	of	power	to	obtain	goods	for	all)	to	favour	particular	individuals	with	the	most	‘quantity	of	love’.	These	individuals	were	those	who	we	perceived	as	having	the	most	‘goodness	of	temper’.		This	is	in	a	‘compound	proportion	of	the	apprehended	causes	of	love	in	him,	and	of	the	goodness	of	temper	in	the	observer’.341	Hutcheson	also	used	these	formulae	to	deduce	that	not	loving	God	is	perceived	to	be	far	more	condemnable	than	not	loving	our	fellow	creatures.342		Brooks	and	Aalto	characterise	Hutcheson’s	approach	here	as	his	attempting	to	present	his	theories	‘in	mathematical	terms’.343	Indeed	this	is	an	instance	of	Hutcheson	stepping	outside	of	his	usual	reliance	on	introspection	in	his	method.	Hutcheson	is	understood	here	to	have	stated	the	axiomatic	principles	of	his	theory	as	equations,	and	derived	conclusions	from	them	that	agreed	with	other	aspects	of	his	theory	(about	how	we	assess	the	degree	of	benevolence	in	intentions	in	relation	to	the	outcome	of	an	observable	action,	for	example).344		In	this	way	Hutcheson	could	be	seen	to	offer	a	‘mathematical	statement’	of	his																																																									340	Hutcheson,	Inquiry,	128.		341	Hutcheson,	Illustrations,	189.		342	Ibid.,187.		343	G.	P.	Brooks	and	S.	K.	Aalto,	“The	Rise	and	Fall	of	Moral	Algebra:	Francis	Hutcheson	and	the	Mathematization	of	Psychology,”	Journal	of	the	History	of	Behavioural	Science	17	(1981):	354.	344	Brooks	and	Aalto,	“Moral	Algebra,”	348-9.	
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work.	The	equations	also	stood	as	advice	on	how	one	ought	to	think	or	reason	about	actor	intention	in	relation	to	outcome	and	various	other	relevant	factors.	It	needs	to	be	emphasised	heavily	here,	contra	Brooks	and	Aalto,	that	the	operation	of	the	moral	sense	is	not	being	described	here.	Hutcheson	was	formulating	his	ideas	on	the	operation	of	reason	in	assessing	intention	and	outcome.			I	think,	however,	that	possibly	Hutcheson	alluded	to	something	a	little	different	in	the	Illustrations.	It	is	not	just	that	various	aspects	of	our	moral	thought	and	behaviour	can	be	described	using	equations,	or	even	that	we	ought	to	make	use	of	his	formulae	to	help	us	reason	about	moral	matters.	I	think	Hutcheson	also	implied	here	that	our	thought	is	mathematised	to	some	degree.	We	know	from	the	Metaphysics	that	Hutcheson	argued	that	the	ideas	of	number	and	duration	accompanied	every	‘perception	of	the	mind’,	whether	they	derive	from	internal	or	external	sensation.	As	such	all	our	thought	was	numerated.	In	the	remarks	in	the	Illustrations	especially,	Hutcheson	seems	to	me	to	have	been	describing	not	just	how	we	ought	to	think	about	judging	‘goodness	of	temper’	and	‘quality	of	love’,	if	we	wanted	to	judge	correctly,	but	rather	how	love	was	raised	towards	another	person	by	a	non-conscious	calculation	of	the	‘compound	proportion	of	the	apprehended	causes	of	love	in	him,	and	of	the	goodness	of	temper	in	the	observer’.345			Again,	this	moves	the	rational	element	of	judgment	in	the	case	of	morals	away	from	the	ideas	of	moral	sense,	which	again	here	seem	to	be	some	sort	of	emergent	function	upon	our	prior	reasoning.	Is	this	Hutcheson	suggesting	a	computationally	driven	model	of	mind	from	which	moral	properties	emerge	in	the	form	of	our	ideas	of	moral	sense?	Is	this	how	he	might	have	thought	that	a	power,	as	opposed	to	a	principle	or	innate	proposition	might	operate?	Again,	this	is	a	tentative	suggestion,	but	whatever	the	status	of	our	preparatory	reasoning,	whether	it	is	an	examination	of	agent	motivation	by	a	declarative	principle	or	one	driven	by	an	implicit	calculation,	the	result	is	that	an	idea	from	moral	sense	emerges,	arises,	or	is	produced	by	this	reasoning.																																																											345	Hutcheson,	Illustrations,	187.		
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In	this	section	I	offered	an	account	of	the	role	of	reason	proper	in	Hutcheson’s	epistemology.	I	have	suggested	two	ways	in	which	our	ideas	from	moral	sense	might	arise	from	that	process.	I	think	the	account	of	preparatory	reason	producing	an	idea	of	moral	sense,	in	the	way	that	I	have	outlined,	was	probably	Hutcheson’s	settled	view	at	the	end	of	1720s	as	he	responded	to	the	criticisms	of	Burnet	and	Balguy	and	attempted	to	shield	his	moral	sense	from	the	charge	of	innatism.			Hutcheson,	I	suggest,	was	concerned	primarily	to	account	for	our	experience	of	moral	evaluation.	The	conclusion	that	can	be	drawn	from	this	section	and	the	previous	one,	which	looked	at	the	permeability	of	the	boundary	between	sense	and	judgment,	is	that	his	moral	epistemology	was	built	upon	the	shifting	notions	of	the	operations	of	sense	and	judgment	that	were	characteristic	of	epistemological	logics	in	general.	The	way	of	ideas	placed	great	emphasis	upon	the	first	act	of	perception,	or	the	reception	of	simple	ideas.	These	ideas,	in	addition,	within	nativist	theories	of	ideas	such	as	those	of	Descartes	or	Leibniz,	were	allowed	to	emerge	from	principles	or	general	propositions,	that	we	were	not	necessarily	aware	of.	Hutcheson	did	not	need	us	to	know	that	benevolence	was	the	moral	good	in	order	to	have	an	idea	from	moral	sense.	However,	he	needed	us	to	reason,	naturally,	about	whom	the	agent	intended	to	benefit	by	her	actions,	in	order	for	the	emerging	moral	ideas	to	be	of	epistemic	value	to	us.		As	such,	he	might	shield	his	moral	sense	from	accusations	of	nativism.			In	the	next	section	I	will	examine	the	ontology	of	Hutcheson’s	moral	ideas.		In	the	very	last	section,	I	will	look	at	the	implications	of	this	material	for	an	assessment	of	Hutcheson’s	realism,	within	the	terms	of	eighteenth-century	epistemology.			The	ontology	of	ideas	from	moral	sense	I	will	argue	that	what	secured	the	reality	of	our	moral	perceptions,	for	Hutcheson,	is,	ultimately,	their	ontology.	I	am	not	going	to	address	the	question	of	whether	these	ideas	are	concomitant	ideas,	as	Norton	has	suggested,	and	
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Moore	continues	to	suggest.346	I	think	that	Hutcheson’s	use	of	this	term	is	difficult	to	interpret.	In	this	section,	I	will	examine	the	nature	of	the	ideas	from	moral	sense.			Locke	was	officially	agnostic	on	the	question	of	thinking	matter,	as	he	denied	us	an	ability	to	know	the	real	essences	of	any	substances.	Hutcheson	was	in	agreement	that	we	do	not	have	real	knowledge	of	essences	of	substances	both	material	and	spiritual	‘the	inner	nature	or	essences	of	things	are	hidden	from	us.’	(Metaphysics)	and	‘all	our	ideas	of	substances	are	inadequate’	(Logic).	But	Hutcheson	claimed	‘there	may	be	full	knowledge	of	spirits	and	bodies	alike;	the	inner	nature	of	both	are	unknown,	[but]	the	properties	(affectiones)	are	known’.347 	Hutcheson,	in	the	Logic,	distinguished	three	types	of	ideas:	ideas	of	sensation,	ideas	of	imagination	and	ideas	of	pure	intellect.		Emily	Michael	has	shown	that	‘intellectual	ideas’	were	a	distinctive	feature	of	several	Scottish	logics	that	appeared	in	the	lectures	given	by	John	Loudon,	whom	Michael	believes	to	have	been	Hutcheson’s	tutor	in	logic	at	Glasgow.	At	any	rate,	the	appearance	of	intellectual	ideas	in	these	logics	was	intended	to	address	the	question	of	the	immortality	and	immateriality	of	mind.	Intellectual	ideas	were	held	to	have	been	‘pure’	and	non-corporeal	in	that	they	did	not	arise	from	material	parts	of	mind.	They	were	not	imagistic	in	nature	or	provoked	directly	by	a	material	external	source	but	instead	arose	from	the	mind	itself.	Moore,	like	Michael,	notes	likely	continental	influences	on	pure	intellections	as	a	type	of	ideas	found	in	the	Scottish	logics.	Arnauld	and	Malebranche	both	denied	that	the	source	of	all	our	ideas	was	sensation	and	imagination	working	upon	these	ideas,	and	appealed	to	pure	intellect	as	an	operation	distinct	from	imagination	(Arnauld)	or	that	the	source	of	all	ideas	was	pure	intellect	(Malebranche).	In	the	St.	Andrews	logic,	which	Michael	believes	Loudon	to	have	based	his	lectures	upon,	intellectual	ideas	are	said	to	allow	us	to	‘conceive	God,	angels,	the	human	mind,	virtue,	truth	
																																																								346	Moore,	Logic,	footnote	4,	12-13.	347	Hutcheson,	Metaphysics,	117.		
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and	so	forth’.348	By	their	action	Loudon	understood	us	to	be	able	to	have	knowledge	of	both	universals	and	spiritual	entities,	including	ideas	of	affirmation	and	negation,	truth	and	virtue.349		In	his	Logic,	Hutcheson	explained	that	ideas	are	divided	into	‘sensations,	imaginations	and	pure	intellections’.		Sensations	can	be	external	or	internal.	Pure	intellections	are	ideas	from	internal	sense,	which	are	not	‘grasped	by	any	of	the	bodily	senses’.	By	them	we		discern	things	which	are	different	from	body	as	well	as	their	modes,	but	we	also	attain	more	accurate	ideas	of	number	and	of	shapes	which	have	several	parts	than	those	which	the	sense	provide.350				Hutcheson	then	elaborated	on	the	relationship	between	pure	intellections	and	the	internal	sense	of	consciousness.	Pure	intellections	are	produced	by	our	internal	sense,	which	is	also	our	power	of	reflection.				
There	is	also	an	internal	sense	which	above	all	furnishes	pure	intellections;	
this	is	called	consciousness	(conscientia)	or	the	power	of	reflection.	This	sense	affects	all	the	actions,	passions,	and	modes	of	the	mind:	namely,	judgment,	discourse,	certainty,	doubt,	joy,	sorrow,	desires,	aversions,	love	and	hatred,	virtues,	vices.	The	more	precise	and	abstract	ideas	of	primary	qualities	are	also	attributed	to	pure	intellections.	But	in	truth	all	ideas	
arise	from	reflection	or	from	[an]	external	sense.351	[My	emphasis.]		Just	to	be	clear,	in	the	Logic	there	are	three	possible	categories	of	ideas	(sensations	-	external	or	internal,	imaginations,	and	pure	intellections),	but	they	are	not	mutually	exclusive.	They	can’t	be	because	our	ideas	of	internal	sense	are	
also	our	pure	intellections	and	they	produce	our	ideas	of	virtues	and	vices	(and	abstract	ideas	of	primary	qualities).			The	issue	of	the	relationship	between	our	power	of	reflection,	our	ideas	of	reflection	and	our	conscious	awareness	is	one	that	has	long	troubled	Locke	
																																																								348	Michael,	“Glasgow	Logic,”	89-90.		349	See	also	Moore,	introduction,	Logic,	xi.		350	Hutcheson,	Logic,	12.	351	Ibid.,	12	
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scholars.352	Thiel	has	argued	that	Locke	does	not	equate	the	power	of	reflection	with	conscious	awareness,	but	that	many	of	Locke’s	contemporaries	did	not	recognise	this.	Locke	certainly	referred	to	the	operation	of	an	internal	sense,	where	‘the	mind	turns	inward	upon	itself’.	Hutcheson	himself	adverted	to	this.353	I	am	not	going	to	discuss	Locke’s	position	here,	but	I	want	to	look	at	how	Hutcheson	positioned	himself	in	relation	to	Locke,	on	the	question	of	our	ideas	of	beauty	and	moral	sense	and	internal	senses	and	reflection.			In	the	preface	to	the	Essay,	Hutcheson	set	out	his	complaint	about	the	narrow	use	of	the	term	sense	to	refer	to	external	senses.	Hutcheson	complained	that	we	had	‘multitudes’	of	perceptions	that	‘had	no	relation	to	external	sensations’,	if	by	it	[external	sensation]	we	mean	perceptions,	occasioned	by	motion	or	impressions	made	on	our	bodies,	such	as	the	ideas	of	number,	duration,	proportion,	virtue,	vice,	pleasures	of	honour,	of	congratulations;	the	pain	of	remorse,	shame,	sympathy,	and	many	others.354			Hutcheson	wished	that	those	who	were		at	pains	to	prove	a	beloved	maxim,	that	“all	ideas	arise	from	sensation	and	reflection,”	had	so	explained	themselves,	that	none	should	take	their	meaning	to	be,	that	all	our	ideas	are	either	external	sensations	or	reflex	acts	upon	external	sensations;	or	if	by	reflection	they	mean	an	inward	
power	of	perception,	as	I	fancy	they	do,	they	had	as	carefully	examined	into	
the	several	kinds	of	internal	perceptions,	as	they	have	done	into	external	
sensation;	that	we	see	whether	the	former	be	not	a	natural	and	necessary	as	the	latter.	355		Hutcheson	very	obviously	had	Locke	in	his	sights	here.	Hutcheson’s	position	here	is	that	an	‘inward	power	of	perception’	produces	several	types	of	‘internal	perceptions’.	This	‘inward	power	of	perception’	works	by	performing	‘reflex	acts	upon	external	perceptions’.		A	little	later	on,	in	a	footnote,	Hutcheson	explained	that	our	moral	perceptions	of	approbation	and	dislike,	like	our	ideas	of	regularity	and	uniformity	in	figures,	for	example,	were	produced	when	affections,	tempers,	sentiments	and	actions	were	‘reflected	upon	in	ourselves’.																																																									352	Udo	Thiel,	“Hume’s	Notions	of	Consciousness	and	Reflection	in	Context,”	British	Journal	for	the	
History	of	Philosophy	2	(1994):	75-115.	See	also	Kevin	Scharp,	“Locke’s	Theory	of	Reflection,”	
British	Journal	for	the	History	of	Philosophy	16,	no.	1	(2008):	25-63.	353	Hutcheson,	Metaphysics,	115,	see	also	footnote	9,	115.		354	Hutcheson,	Essay,	5.	355	Ibid.		
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Our	sense	of	beauty,	Hutcheson	maintained,	derived	from	‘perceptions	of	the	
internal	sense’,	our	moral	perceptions	arose	‘in	a	like	manner’.356			In	the	Metaphysics	Hutcheson	seemed	to	separate	our	‘internal	sense,	or	consciousness’	from	our	reflexive	or	subsequent	sensations,	as	he	has	them	in	consecutive	subsections.357	But	he	also	(in	this	section)	continued	to	refer	to	our	ideas	of	number	and	duration	(‘our	more	abstract	ideas	of	primary	qualities’)	as	being	perceived	by	‘the	internal	sense	or	by	reflection	as	it	is	called’	as	he	had	done	in	the	Logic.358		Hutcheson’s	terminology	is	confusing,	but	I	believe	that	Hutcheson’s	view	was	that	reflection	(as	an	act)	is	a	reflex	operation	upon	ideas	got	from	external	sensation,	and	that	we	are	made	aware	of	this	operation	by	our	internal	sense,	which	is	the	source	of	our	ideas	of	‘reflex	or	subsequent	sensations’.		This	internal	sense,	or	‘consciousness,	or	power	of	reflection’,	gives	us	our	ideas	of	whatever	our	reflex	acts	of	reflection	have	done	to	ideas	from	external	sense.	As	such,	our	ideas	from	our	(internal	and	reflexive)	moral	sense	(of	vice	and	virtue)	are	in	the	category	of	pure	intellections.	Pure	intellections	are	produced	by	an	internal	sense,	working	upon	information	from	external	sense.	This	reading	brings	together	Hutcheson’s	various	uses	of	internal	sense,	reflection,	consciousness,	an	inward	power	of	perception,	reflex	acts	and	reflexive	or	subsequent	sensations.			If	we	turn	to	the	Metaphysics	we	can	see	where	Hutcheson	was	keen	to	take	this	division	between	pure	intellections	(from	internal	reflection)	and	ideas	of	external	sense	and	imagination.			Hutcheson’s	chapter	in	the	Metaphysics	entitled		‘Whether	a	Spirit	Is	a	Different	
Thing	from	Body’	makes	it	clear	that	he	intends	his	ideas	of	an	inner	sense,	or	ideas	of	pure	intellection,	to	be	ideas	of	spirit.	Hutcheson	began	by	agreeing	again	with	Locke	on	the	question	of	essences	within	this	context,																																																									356	Hutcheson,	Essay,	16.		357	Hutcheson,	Metaphysics,	117.		358	Ibid.,	115.		
 151 
it	will	be	well	to	remember	that	the	eye	of	the	mind	is	dull,	and	cannot	penetrate	to	the	inner	natures	of	things,	and	therefore	we	are	merely	inferring	likely	conjectures	about	them	from	properties	known	by	sense	or	experience.359			Hutcheson	continued	though,			 it	is	not	by	arguments	or	reasoning	based	on	the	perceived	nature	of	things	that	we	are	brought	to	adopt	some	of	the	most	vital	doctrines	in	philosophy,	but	rather	by	a	certain	internal	sense,	by	experience,	and	by	a	kind	of	impulse	of	nature	or	instinct.360			Hutcheson	agreed	with	Locke,	that	reasoning	based	upon	the	deliverances	of	our	external	senses	cannot	provide	us	with	knowledge	of	real	essences,	but	he	maintained	instead	that	our	ideas	from	internal	sense	can,	for	example,	give	us	probable	belief	that	spirit	is	different	from	matter.	Hutcheson	went	on	to	explain	that	we	all,	‘under	the	guidance	of	nature’	are	conscious	that	our	mind	is	distinct	from	our	body,	and	this	consciousness,		seems	to	perceive	that	this	body	and	its	parts,	however	they	may	be	connected	with	itself,	are	nevertheless	subject	to	itself,	to	be	ruled	by	its	command,	and	are	useful	to	itself;	and	perceives	itself	therefore	to	be	distinct	from	that	body.361	[Italics	in	original]			In	the	next	section	headed	“A	threefold	distinction	between	perceived	properties”,	we	can	see	more	starkly	what	else	Hutcheson’s	ideas	from	‘pure	intellection’	are	capable	of	providing	us	with	(‘a	certain	internal	sense,	experience,	and	a	kind	of	impulse	of	nature	of	instinct.).362	Here	Hutcheson	explains	that	this	argument	‘comes	from	Plato	or	Socrates’.	Hutcheson	goes	on	to	describe	the	three	types	of	properties	and	their	perceptions.	It	is	worth	quoting	at	length:	Some	[perceptions]	under	the	guidance	of	nature	herself	refer	wholly	to	external	things,	which	belong	to	us	only	in	the	sense	that	they	are	perceived	and	whose	changes	do	not	affect	us.	There	is	a	second	kind	of	perception,	namely	those	which	touch	us	more	nearly,	pervading	us	with	a	sense	of	pleasure	or	pain,	and	which	by	a	warning	of	nature,	are	always	attributed	to	the	parts	of	the	corporeal	system	we	call	our	body	.	.	.	These	two	kinds	of	ideas	are	involved	in	some	way	with	corporeal	properties	i.e.,	motion	extension,	and	space	and	contribute	nothing	to	the	true	dignity	and	excellence	of	man	or	his	depravity	or	baseness,	and	one	would																																																									359	Hutcheson,	Metaphysics,	139.	360	Ibid.	361	Ibid.,	140.		362	Ibid.,	141.		
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not	put	a	lower	or	higher	value	on	himself	or	another	[person]	on	the	basis	of	these	ideas.		Finally,	there	is	a	third	kind	of	perception,	foreign	to	every	corporeal	property,	which	represents	the	very	properties	of	man	or	of	the	human	mind,	and	involves	no	ideas	of	space,	extension,	or	motion,	but	
depicts	the	true	properties	of	each	self,	from	which	are	fashioned	all	its	dignity,	goodness	and	excellence	on	the	one	hand,	and	all	its	evil	depravity	and	baseness	on	the	other.	Such	are	the	notions	of	understanding,	cognition,	knowledge,	reasoning,	love,	benevolence,	faithfulness	and	virtue	and	of	their	contrarieties;	none	of	them	having	anything	in	common	with	any	kind	of	corporeal	property.	363	[My	emphasis.]			Here	Hutcheson	provides	us	with	an	answer	to	the	question	of	what	the	ontology	of	our	moral	or	intellectual	ideas	is.	They	are	quite	distinct	from	anything	that	is	known	to	us	by	its	effect	upon	our	body,	including	primary	qualities	such	as	space,	extension	and	motion.			This	is	a	non-corporeal	reality	(spirit)	that	includes	several	denominators	of	cognitive	and	moral	activity	(‘understanding,	cognition,	knowledge,	reasoning,	love,	benevolence,	faithfulness	and	virtue’)	and	their	‘contrarieties’,	the	perceptions	of	which	provide	us	with	ideas	of	the	‘very	properties	of	man	or	the	human	mind’.	It	is	a	reality	that	encompasses	all	of	our	thinking	that	is	not	concerned	or	to	do	with,	corporeality.	Most	primary	and	secondary	qualities	refer	to	physical	properties	and	these	perceptions	are	differentiated	entirely	by	Hutcheson	from	our	reason	and	moral	qualities.	In	the	Logic	Hutcheson	included	only	the	more	abstract	ideas	of	primary	qualities	in	his	ideas	of	pure	intellection.			We	have	seen	that	Hutcheson	categorised	our	ideas	of	vice	and	virtue	and	our	‘more	precise	and	abstract	ideas	of	primary	qualities’	together	as	intellectual	ideas,	or	ideas	of	pure	intellection.		So,	our	ideas	from	moral	sense	are	not	like	ideas	of	primary	qualities	in	the	same	way	that	ideas	of	extension,	figure,	motion	and	rest	are.	These	(the	ideas	of	extension,	figure,	motion	and	rest)	are	ideas	of	primary	qualities	perceived	by	external	senses	only	and	are	not	ideas	of	pure	intellect.		Ideas	from	moral	sense	and	ideas	of	number	and	duration,	which	are																																																									363	Ibid.		NB	There	is	no	indication	that	this	was	a	revision	added	in	the	1744	edition	in	Moore’s	notes.	
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concomitant	and	apply	to	ideas	of	primary	qualities,	are	both	ideas	of	pure	intellection.	Our	ideas	of	virtue	and	vice	are	ideas	of	pure	intellect	as	well,	but	they	are	not	‘abstract	ideas	of	primary	qualities’.		Hutcheson	identified	both	our	ideas	of	vice	and	virtue	and	ideas	of	number	and	duration	(our	'more	abstract	ideas	of	primary	qualities')	as	being	ideas	of	pure	intellect,	which	come	from	inner	sense,	which	is	consciousness.			So,	are	our	ideas	of	vice	and	virtue	ideas	of	anything	that	exists	outside	our	own	minds?	Hutcheson's	ideas	of	pure	intellect	are	also	his	ideas	from	a	‘third	kind	of	perception’.	They	‘represent	the	very	properties	of	man	or	of	the	human	mind’.	They	‘depict	the	true	properties	of	each	self,	from	which	are	fashioned	all	its	dignity,	goodness	and	excellence.’	[My	emphasis.]	Hutcheson	has	made	his	case	that	we	are	not	able	to	reason	our	way	to	an	understanding	of	the	value	of	these	properties	without	the	assistance	of	a	sense,	or	third	kind	of	perception.	The	same	argument	applies	to	our	privileging	of	rationality.			The	ideas	from	Hutcheson’s	‘third	kind’	of	perception	tell	us	about	our	own	minds	and	report	its	true	properties.	These	may	be	triggered	by	other	minds,	presumably	in	temporal	sequence	after	we	have	gained	some	knowledge	of	our	own	minds	(presumably	early	on	in	development).	We	know	all	men	have	the	properties	of	'understanding,	cognition,	knowledge,	reasoning,	love,	benevolence’	and	so	on.		Man	is	perceived	to	be	capable	of	being	an	understanding,	cogitative	animal	and	a	loving,	virtuous,	faithful	animal	'and	their	contrarieties'	using	this	third	kind	of	perception.	These	ideas	give	us	an	understanding	of	the	properties	of	our	own	non-corporeal	natures.	These	are	created	natures	of	course,	and	it	is	arranged	by	a	'fix'd	law'	that	we	have	ideas	of	this.	We	have	ideas	of	all	our	non-corporeal	properties.	Since	Hutcheson	says	of	corporeal	properties	‘no	one	would	not	put	a	lower	or	higher	value	on	himself	or	another	[person]	on	the	basis	of	these	ideas’,	we	may	take	it	that	we	rank	order	our	value	as	people	on	the	basis	of	these	ideas.	They	are	judgments	of	'our	value'	and	the	value	of	others.	This	is	how	the	moral	sense	can	order	or	prioritise	affections	and	intentions;	we	make	a	value	judgment	by	appeal	to	these	kinds	of	ideas.		
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	We	value	virtue	(benevolence)	in	exactly	the	same	way	that	we	may	understand	epistemic	virtue.	We	sense	that	it	is	better	that	we	reason,	calmly	reflect,	cogitate,	seek	knowledge.	Both	understanding	and	benevolence	are	divine	communicable	attributes	that	we	partake	of	because	God	is	loving	and	seeks	our	happiness	and	saw	that	the	best	way	to	achieve	this	for	us	is	to	create	us	with	analogous	versions	of	these	abilities	and	then	have	us	value	them.			
		Hutcheson’s	realism	Michael	Gill	sees	the	debate	about	realism	within	eighteenth-century	British	moral	philosophy	as	being	characterised	by	two	sorts	of	approach.	There	were	those	who	alleged	that	there	was	a	real	difference	between	the	motives	in	the	people	they	judged	virtuous	and	those	they	judged	vicious	(anti-egoist	realists)	and	there	were	those	who	held	that	moral	properties	‘exist	independently	of	the	human	mind	and	that	our	moral	judgments	represent	those	properties	accurately'	(mind-independent	realists).	364		Gill	agrees	that	Hutcheson	is	an	anti-egoist	realist,	but	believes	that	Hutcheson	promoted	a	brand	of	subjectivism	under	which	it	is	only	a	contingent	fact	that	our	moral	judgments	coincide,	and	where	it	is	possible	that	what	is	moral	for	one	person	is	not	moral	for	another.	Gill’s	full	statement	is	as	follows:	I	hold	that	Hutcheson	believes	that	moral	properties	depend	on	human	affections	and	that	these	moral	judgments	do	not	represent	anything	in	the	external	world.	So	according	to	Hutcheson	if	no	one	had	a	moral	sense,	moral	properties	would	not	exist;	and	if	everyone	had	a	moral	sense	that	approved	of,	say,	malice,	then	malice	would	be	as	moral	as	benevolence	is	now.365		From	the	argument	presented	in	this	and	the	previous	chapter,	I	think	that	Hutcheson’s	theistic	metaphysics	deny	that	‘if	no	one	had	a	moral	sense,	moral	properties	would	not	exist;	and	also	that	if	everyone	had	a	moral	sense	that	approved	of,	say,	malice,	then	malice	would	be	as	moral	as	benevolence	is	now’.		
																																																								364	Gill,	British	Moralists,	296.		365	Ibid.,	296.		
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Hutcheson’s	theistic	metaphysics	indicated	that	whatever	our	ideas	of	virtues	are,	they	reflect,	however	poorly,	the	same	ideas	of	virtue	that	exist	as	divine	ideas	(of	his	own	virtues).	The	only	way	in	which	we,	as	a	species,	could	actually	approve	of	malice,	as	opposed	to	our	mistakenly	believing	that	an	act	of	malice,	
was	an	act	of	benevolence,	is	if	God	understood	malice	to	be	virtuous.	I	am	not	suggesting	that	Hutcheson	claimed	that,	as	individuals	we	could	not	be	mistaken	in	our	judgments	about	the	presence	of	benevolence.	I	am	suggesting	that	Hutcheson	maintained	that	our	perception	or	judgment	of	benevolence	itself	as	
being	a	moral	good	is	always	a	true	reflection	of	what	the	moral	good	is,	because	benevolence	is	God’s	goodness,	and,	as	we	saw	in	the	previous	chapter,	benevolence	is	praiseworthy	in	itself	(however	mistaken	we	may	be	about	the	actual	presence	or	absence	of	benevolence).			As	explained,	Hutcheson	argued	that	God	is	moved	by	the	necessity	of	his	own	nature	to	seek	our	happiness	and	to	create	in	accordance	with	what	will,	eventually	turn	out	to	bring	us	happiness.	On	Hutcheson’s	understanding,	God	retained	the	natural	power	to	do	as	he	pleased,	but	not	the	moral	liberty.	As	I	argued	in	the	previous	chapter,	there	is	no	way	in	which	if,	for	example,	God	knows	that	his	own	virtue	exists	and	that	it	consists	in	his	benevolence,	that	he	could	create	us	with	a	malice-approving	sense	and	still	be	acting	rationally.	He	could	have	created	us	without	a	moral	sense,	I	suppose,	if	he	did	not	wish	to	communicate	his	moral	attributes	to	us.			Hutcheson	argued	that	we	are	only	aware	of	moral	value	because	of	our	third	power	of	perception.	It	is	quite	true,	and	of	course,	it	is	Hutcheson’s	main	claim	that	we	can	only	know	any	of	this	a	posteriori,	working	back	from	effect	to	cause.	But	this	does	not	entail	that	what	we	value	is	not	mind-independent.	Gill	presents	substantial	textual	evidence	of	Hutcheson’s	arguments	for	our	sense	of	beauty	reaching	no	further	than	our	own	minds.	Our	responses	being	sensations	that	existed	within	our	own	minds,	where	there	is	‘perhaps	no	resemblance	to	the	objects	which	we	find	beautiful’	[my	emphasis],	where	a	mind	without	a	sense	of	beauty	could	not	call	objects	beautiful,	where	beauty	always	has	a	relation	to	the	‘sense	of	some	mind’	and	so	on.	Gill	argues	that	we	should	see	
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Hutcheson	as	having	claimed	the	same	kind	of	‘origin’,	for	our	moral	sense.	However,	our	ideas	of	beauty	are	not	mentioned	in	the	list	of	ideas	produced	by	the	third	power	of	perception,	which	may	mean	that	Hutcheson	just	did	not	see	them	as	having	the	same	ontology	as	our	ideas	from	moral	sense.			I	think	though,	that	we	need	to	look	at	the	proposed	function	of	our	sense	of	absolute	beauty.	As	I	discussed	previously	its	intended	function	(Hutcheson	believed)	was	to	incline	us	to	search	for	general	and	universal	truths,	rather	than	particular	truths.	Now,	it	may	very	well	be	true	that	neither	God,	nor	any	other	beings,	require	our	particular	sense	of	beauty,	or	love	for	the	uniform	to	search	for	general	truths.	It	may	also	be	true,	as	Gill	indicates,	that	animals	may	have	a	different	sense	of	what	is	beautiful.	This	though	would	be	because	God	did	not	find	it	necessary	to	incline	beasts	or	angels	to	search	for	general	truths	(because	animals	required	knowledge	of	particular	truths	and	angels	had	intuitive	insight	into	those	truths).	What	is	mind-independent	is	the	value	of	general	truths,	because,	as	Hutcheson	argued,	general	truths	describe	the	operation	of	the	universe.			The	same,	I	think,	is	true	for	Hutcheson’s	moral	sense.	The	mind-independent	value	it	connects	us	with	is	God’s	goodness.	As	I	argued	before,	our	reasoning	about	the	intentions	of	actors	and	the	outcomes	of	their	actions	is	fallible	and	may	vary	between	persons,	so	that	we	may	have	actually	approved	something	which	was	not	in	fact	a	morally	good	action,	and	which	might	be	corrected	by	further	reasoning.	This	is	not	the	operation	of	our	moral	sense	though	–	our	moral	sense	just	responds	to	what	we	detect	as	benevolence	or	self-interest	(or	calculate	to	be	the	greater	part	of	a	relative	mix	of	the	two).	What	is	independent	to	our	minds	is	God’s	goodness.	It	is	true	that	it	was	not	naturally	necessary	for	God	to	communicate	this	to	us	–	he	could	have	left	it	as	an	incommunicable	attribute.	He	chose	not	to	though.	Having	chosen	freely	to	communicate	his	goodness	to	us,	Hutcheson	maintained,	God	was	limited	in	his	choices	as	to	how	he	communicated	this	to	us,	by	the	goodness	of	his	own	nature	and	by	his	own	understanding	of	what	that	goodness	consists	in.	That	is,	having	given	us	a	moral	sense,	his	concern	for	our	happiness	dictated	that	it	should	respond	to	the	
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analogous	form	of	his	goodness,	he	had	implanted	in	us.	This,	is	suggest,	is	the	nature	of	the	moral	realism	that	was	offered	by	Hutcheson’s	moral	theory.			In	the	next	chapter,	I	move	on	to	discuss	the	objections	of	Clarke’s	supporters,	Gilbert	Burnet	and	John	Balguy,	to	Hutcheson’s	moral	sense	and	indeed	Hutcheson’s	theistic	metaphysics	in	order	to	continue	to	explore	the	ways	in	which	the	principles	responsible	for	the	experience	of	moral	thought	were	contested.									 	
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Chapter	5		Gilbert	Burnet	and	John	Balguy:	‘Rational	and	sensible	agents’		In	this	chapter,	I	will	examine	the	response	of	Clarke’s	defenders,	Burnet	and	Balguy	to	the	appearance	of	Hutcheson’s	moral	sense	theory	and	to	Hutcheson’s	views	on	God’s	communicable	attributes	(and	their	relationship	to	our	own	moral	abilities).	I	will	also	return	to	the	theme	of	Chapter	2,	which	discussed	Clarke’s	views	on	the	relationship	of	moral	knowledge	to	motivation	and	moral	action.		Here,	I	consider	the	degree	to	which	Burnet	and	Balguy	can	be	said	to	have	taken	the	view,	attributed	to	Clarke,	with	respect	to	the	motivation	of	moral	actions.	I	ask	whether	they	(as	I	argued,	Clarke	did	not,)	defended	the	idea	that	a	rational	perception	of	the	fitness	of	an	action	and	our	obligation	to	perform	it	was	sufficient	to	motivate	a	moral	action?			The	three	main	themes	of	the	thesis	are	all	addressed	here:	I	begin	with	the	approach	taken	by	Burnet	and	Balguy	to	moral	epistemology	and	their	accounts	of	sense,	judgment	and	reason	(the	influence	of	Locke	is	noted	and	discussed).	I	then	move	on	to	the	question	of	motivation	and	I	finish	with	an	account	of	their	views	on	the	moral	attributes	of	God.	In	each	section	I	will	discuss	Burnet	first,	and	then	Balguy.			The	experience	of	reason			Burnet	and	Balguy	had	taken	to	print	in	order	to	explain	and	promote	Clarke’s	views,	where	Clarke’s	account	of	the	fitness	or	unfitness	of	actions	seemed	unclear.	Part	of	this	defence	involved	an	engagement	with	Hutcheson	over	the	experience	of	moral	judgment	and	how	to	interpret	that	experience.	One	of	their	difficulties	was	that	Clarke	had	not	much	concerned	himself	with	the	details	of	moral	epistemology,	beyond	his	contention	that	intuition	of	self-evident	truths	served	as	the	foundation	of	our	moral	knowledge.	Burnet	and	Balguy	advanced	their	arguments	with	reference	to	their	understanding	of	the	general	perceptual	account	of	reason	provided	by	Locke.		
 159 
Locke	had	denied	the	existence	of	self-evident	principles	in	moral	reasoning.	When	presented	with	any	candidate	moral	rule,	Locke	had	argued	we	might	always	ask	why	this	should	be	a	rule?366	Burnet	and	Balguy,	as	we	shall	see,	rejected	this	claim,	but	they	used	Locke’s	account	of	reason	as	the	general	framework	for	their	epistemology.	This	offered	Burnet	and	Balguy	certain	advantages	as	they	attempted	to	counter	Hutcheson’s	account	of	a	moral,	internal	sense.		In	an	effort	to	accommodate	Hutcheson’s	appeal	to	the	phenomenological	aspects,	or	experience	of	moral	judgment,	Burnet	and	Balguy	stretched	a	perceptual	account	of	reason	to	make	reason	itself	an	‘internal	sense’,	which	was	also	our	moral	sense.			It	is	here	that,	once	again,	that	we	can	see	the	influence	of	a	psychological	or	epistemological	approach	to	logic	upon	accounts	of	moral	reason.	Method	demanded	that	we	introspect	and	observe	the	experience	of	thought	(the	flow	of	ideas	through	the	mind	and	the	operations	that	we	performed	upon	them)	in	order	to	explain	how	we	arrived	at	truth	(or	probable	belief).367	As	discussed	in	Chapter	1,	and	the	second	of	the	chapters	on	Hutcheson	(Chapter	4),	the	terms	used	to	describe	or	account	for	the	experience	of	thought	were	liable	to	lack	the	sort	of	precise	referents	that	indicated	a	clear	demarcation	between	sense,	judgment	and	reason.	This	was	especially	true	where	that	experience	was	of	our	immediate,	intuitive,	responses.	Hutcheson,	Burnet	and	Balguy	all	attempted	to	explain	what	they	took	to	be	the	brute	fact	of	our	immediate	and	affective	moral	judgments	–	as	such,	they	were	all	intuitionists.368		They	battled,	amongst	other	things,	over	what	might	be	termed	the	‘experiential	priority’	of	reason	over	sense.	By	this	I	mean	that	both	Burnet	and	Balguy	claimed	that	reasoning,	however	perceptual	in	nature,	provided	us	with	certain	experiences	that	were	of	epistemological	value	to	us.		They	both	argued	that	these	were	experiences	that	could	not	be	had	by	an	act	of	sensation.	Hutcheson,	conversely,	claimed	only	a	
																																																								366	Locke,	ECHU,	1:3:4,	68.		367	For	the	identification	of	cognitive	psychology	with	descriptive	epistemology,	see	Goldman,	“Epistemology	and	Psychology,”	29-68.		368	See	W.	D.	Hudson,	Ethical	Intuitionism	(New	York:	St	Martin's	Press,	1967).		
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sense	was	capable	of	delivering	the	right	sort	of	experience	to	make	a	moral	judgment.369		Given	space	constraints,	I	am	not	going	to	address	how	far,	or	how	successful,	Burnet	or	Balguy	were	in	defending	Clarke’s	theory.	I	am	also	going	to	leave	Burnet	and	Balguy’s	own	readings	of	Hutcheson	largely	unchallenged.	There	are	already	accounts	of	the	exchange	between	Burnet	and	Hutcheson	and	the	impact	of	that	discussion	on	the	development	of	Hutcheson’s	thought	in	the	
Essay/Illustrations.370	My	concern	here	is	to	examine	the	ways	in	which	Burnet	and	Balguy	used	aspects	of	Locke’s	approach	to	reason	to	counter	Hutcheson’s	arguments	(as	they	saw	them),	in	order	to	explain	how	reason	could	be	termed	our	moral	sense	with	any	degree	of	coherence.	I	say	‘as	they	saw	them’	because	Burnet	wrote	in	response	to	the	publication	of	the	first	edition	of	Hutcheson’s	
Inquiry,	published	in	1725,	while	Balguy	wrote	initially	in	1728	and	1729	to	refute	the	arguments	presented	in	Hutcheson’s	Inquiry	and	the	first	edition	of	his	
Essay/Illustrations.	I	don’t	believe	that	either	could	have	had	access	to	Hutcheson’s	notes	on	Metaphysics	or	Logic,	or	the	text	of	his	inaugural	lecture.	It	was	in	these	texts,	as	we	saw	over	the	course	of	the	two	previous	chapters,	that	Hutcheson	developed	and	extended	his	theistic	metaphysics,	and	revealed	the	ontology	of	his	ideas	of	moral	sense.	The	aim	of	those	chapters	was	to	examine	the	direction	of	Hutcheson’s	thought	in	the	period	up	to	1730.	I	do	not	doubt	though,	that	had	Burnet	and	Balguy	had	sight	of	these	other	texts,	they	would	still	have	found	elements	to	quarrel	with.			The	crux	of	Burnet	and	Balguy’s	objection	to	Hutcheson’s	moral	sense	was	their	understanding	of	the	limitations	of	a	sensory	idea	on	the	Lockean	model	of	an	idea	from	external	sense	delivering	information	about	Lockean	secondary																																																									369	Gill	has	examined	the	phenomenology	of	Hutcheson’s	account	of	the	beauty	of	virtue	in	contrast	with	the	analogy	drawn	by	some	rationalists	to	the	experience	of	mathematics.	My	aim	is	not	quite	the	same	here.	I	examine	the	ways	in	which	Locke’s	account	of	reason	and	logics	of	ideas	in	general	appealed	to	the	experiences	of	immediacy	and	certainty	to	indicate	the	presence	of	knowledge	or	truth	to	us,	along	with	other	experiential	features	of	the	act	of	reasoning	which	Burnet	and	Balguy	deemed	to	be	significant.	There	is	some	overlap	with	Gill’s	approach	though.	See	Gill,	“Math	or	Beauty”.		370	Gill,	British	Moralists,	156-167,	has	an	account	of	the	ways	in	which	Hutcheson	responded	to	his	rationalist	critics’	comments	on	the	Inquiry	in	the	Essay/Illustrations.	See	also	Peach,	introduction,	3-100,	for	discussion.		
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qualities	such	as	colour	or	taste.	Locke	had	been	very	clear	about	the	nature	of	ideas	of	secondary	qualities;	there	was	no	necessary	connection	between	our	ideas	of	secondary	qualities	and	the	primary	qualities	from	which	they	derived.	The	information	they	reported	to	us	was	the	result	of	an	‘arbitrary	determination’	by	God.371	Burnet	and	Balguy	both	saw	ideas	from	Hutcheson’s	putative	moral	sense,	by	extension,	as	exhibiting	the	same	sort	of	contingency.		They	were	unhappy	with	his	moral	sense	because	it	did	not	appear	to	deliver	ideas	of	moral	good	that	were	eternal	or	immutable.372	Such	ideas,	they	thought,	could	only	report	information	about	our	own	reactions,	and	could	not	deliver	a	moral	judgment.	More	importantly,	these	ideas	did	not	appear	to	reflect,	in	any	direct	way,	the	ideas	of	moral	good	found	in	the	divine	mind.			They	were,	however,	happy	enough	to	use	Locke’s	suggestion	that	his	ideas	of	reflection	derived	from	an	inner	sense,	to	equate	the	power	of	reflection,	which	they	read	as	reason	(the	perception	of	the	agreement	or	disagreement	between	ideas)	with	an	inner	sense,	in	order	to	produce	a	rival	to	Hutcheson’s	moral,	and	inner,	sense.			Gilbert	Burnet	and	the	moral	sense		Burnet	did	not	question	the	existence	of	a	moral	sense,	or	the	divine	source	of	its	institution	within	us.373		He	took	the	view	that	the	conclusions	of	Hutcheson’s	
Inquiry,	although	generally	correct	and	‘capable	of	demonstrative	truth’,	left	virtue	‘unsupported’	and	in	need	of	a	‘firm	foundation’.	Fortunately,	Burnet	continued,	this	foundation	had	already	been	supplied	by	the	principles	advanced	by	Cumberland,	Clarke	and	Wollaston.	These	principles,	he	argued,	could	be	reduced	to	a	single	proposition,	‘that	virtue	or	moral	goodness,	is	founded	on	truth’.374			
																																																								371	Locke,	ECHU,	4:3:28,	558-559.	372	Beiser,	Sovereignty,	stresses	how	threatening	all	English	rationalists	found	any	challenge	to	the	eternal	and	immutable	nature	of	moral	ideas,	269.		373	Burnet,	Correspondence,	203.		374	Burnet,	Correspondence,	199-200.		
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Burnet	argued	that	a	sense	could	only	deliver	an	idea	of	good	in	the	secondary	sense	of	it	being	‘good’	relative	to	us.	He	identified	Hutcheson’s	ideas	from	moral	sense	with	the	perception	of	pleasure.	Pleasure,	Burnet	maintained,	was	known	to	be	deceitful	about	the	true	nature	of	any	good.	The	ideas	of	moral	good	and	moral	evil	in	the	divine	mind	however,	must	be	‘immutably	fixed’	and	refer	to	a	good	or	evil	in	the	‘primary’,	or	‘absolute’	sense.		They	do	not	refer	to	what	God	approves	of,	or	dislikes	(if	they	did	they	would	be		‘useless	and	supernumerary	words’).	So,	when	we	say	that	God	is	good,	this	cannot	be	because	we	believe	that	he	simply	approves	something,	if	we	have	no	idea	why	it	is	that	he	approves	it.	God’s	bare	approval,	or	disapproval,	of	an	action	cannot	indicate	his	moral	perfection	to	us,	unless	we	know	that	the	basis	upon	which	this	approval	and	disapproval	is	founded	is	fixed,	or	eternal,	and	has	an	‘immutable	foundation	in	the	nature	of	things’.	Burnet	went	on:			It	follows,	that	things	are	not	morally	good	because	God	approves	them.	But	he	is	immutably	good	himself,	in	the	moral	sense	of	the	word,	because	he	always	and,	unchangeably,	approves	what	is	in	itself	good,	and	disproves	what	is	in	itself	evil,	and	always	acts	conformably.375		Our	moral	ideas	derive	from	God’s	moral	ideas.	God’s	ideas	derive	from	the	eternal	law	that	specifies	moral	truth.		Our	ideas	ought	not	then,	Burnet	thought,	to	derive	from	a	different,	special	sense.	In	this	way,	Burnet	may	be	seen	to	insist	on	an	analogous	form	of	God’s	communicative	attribute	of	understanding.376		In	Burnet’s	first	letter	we	find	him	rebutting	the	basis	for	the	experience	of	moral	judgment	with	a	petition	to	Locke’s	account	of	reason.	Burnet,	like	Balguy	and	Gay,	offered	no	resistance	to	Hutcheson’s	description	of	the	experience	of	moral	judgment	as	being	rapid,	involuntary	and	pleasant	or	unpleasant	depending	on	the	finding.		Locke,	as	we	saw	in	the	introductory	chapter,	had	argued	that	almost	all	of	our	simple	ideas	were	accompanied	by	ideas	of	pleasure	or	pain.377	Burnet	believed	that	this	explained	their	apparent	coincidence	of	idea	and	pleasure	–	the	experience	of	reasoning,	of	discovering	what	is	reasonable,	itself	gives	us	pleasure.																																																										375	Ibid.,	202.		376	Just	as	Hutcheson	had	suggested	God	may	have	had	something	analogous	to	our	moral	sense.	Hutcheson,	Illustrations,	153.	377	Locke,	ECHU,	2:7:1-6,	128-131.	
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The	constitution	of	all	rational	agents	that	we	know	of	is	such	indeed	that	pleasure	is	inseparably	annexed	to	the	pursuit	of	what	is	reasonable.	And	pleasure	ought	never	to	be	considered	something	independent	on	reason,	no	more	than	reason	ought	to	be	reckoned	unproductive	of	pleasure.	But	
still,	the	ideas	of	reason	are	quite	different	from	those	of	pleasure	and	must	
always	in	reasoning	be	considered	distinctly;	reason	as	the	ground	of	
inward	pleasure	and	that	pleasure	as	the	encouragement	to	follow	
reason.378	[My	emphasis.]	 	Burnet	made	full	use	of	Locke’s	characterisation	of	intuitive	knowledge	as	the	immediate	perception	of	agreement	or	disagreement	between	ideas.	Burnet	called	reason	an	internal	sense	and,	in	relation	to	actions,	he	argued,	this	is	our	moral	sense.		But	reason,	as	the	‘sense’	of	the	relationship	between	ideas,	Burnet	argued,	was	quite	distinct	from	any	‘joy’	that	those	ideas	may	give	us.	
Reason	and	pleasure	may	both	of	them	be	properly	enough	styled	internal	
sense	and,	with	relation	to	moral	actions,	moral	sense.	But	still	they	must	be	conceived	as	different	senses;	reason	as	the	sense	of	the	agreement	or	disagreement	of	our	simple	ideas	or	of	the	combination	of	them	resulting	from	their	comparison;	pleasure	as	the	sense	of	the	joy	which	any	ideas	afford	us.379	[My	emphasis.]			Burnet	went	on	to	explain	that	the	pleasant	or	painful	experience	that	accompanies	the	results	of	an	encounter	with	truth	or	falsehood	(although	it	may	also	be	properly	styled	a	moral	sense)	is	not	the	rule	by	which	we	assess	truth	or	falsehood.		Pleasure	gives	us	an	indication	of	truth	having	been	discovered	by	us	(we	believe)	about	a	moral	action.	Yet	the	experience	of	pleasure,	even	moral	pleasure,	cannot	function	either	as	an	implicit	rule,	or	a	declarative	principle	to	judge	by.	The	other	internal	or	moral	sense	of	pleasure	or	pain,	whereby	we	conceive	joy	in	discerning	truth,	or	pain	in	feeling	ourselves	embarrassed	with	falsehood	–	or,	in	moral	actions,	by	reflecting	upon	ourselves,	or	observing	in	others,	moral	good	or	moral	evil	–	is	not	itself	the	rule	by	which	we	judge,	or	can	judge	of	truth	or	falsehood,	of	moral	good	or	evil;	but	only	the	consequence	of	finding	we	judge	right,	and	according	to	reason.	And	this	latter	sense	indeed	constitutes	our	idea	of	beauty;	by	which	word,	I	think,	we	mean	no	more	than	what	pleases	us.380		
																																																								378	Burnet,	Correspondence,	204.		379	Ibid.,	204-205.	380	Ibid.,	205.	
 164 
Burnet	here	accounted	for	the	'other	internal	or	moral	sense	of	pleasure	and	pain'	we	feel	in	the	intellectual	activity	of	judgment	and	truth-seeking	in	the	way	that	Descartes	had,	as	an	emotion	intérieur	arising	from	rational	activity	in	the	mind.381		Burnet	seems	to	have	equated	this	to	a	joy	in	discovering	truth	or	moral	good	(founded	upon	truth),	and	a	pain	upon	discovering	falsehood	or	moral	evil	(founded	upon	falsehood).		As	Burnet	well	knew,	a	pleasure	in	discovering	general	truths	(uniformity	amidst	variety)	was	exactly	the	function	Hutcheson	had	envisaged	for	our	internal	sense	of	(absolute)	beauty.	Burnet	claimed	that	we	find	beauty,	or	more	properly	pleasure,	in	what	we	have	first	judged	by	reason,	to	be	right.	We	may	have	had	the	experience	of	the	pleasure	of	rational	perception	at	the	same	time	as	we	discerned	truth,	he	allowed.	We	may	not	experience	this	as	a	clear	temporal	priority,	but	there	is	logical	priority	as	the	rational	perception	of	truth	or	falsehood	produces	the	feeling	of	pleasure	or	displeasure.		I	do	not	say,	there	is	always	a	distance	of	time	between	the	two	sentiments,	viz.	of	the	truth	or	right,	and	beauty.	But	I	speak	only	of	the	order	in	which	we	should	consider	them,	and	their	dependence	they	have	on	one	another.382		Burnet	equated	reason	with	an	internal	sense	here.	Locke	had	described	our	ideas	from	reflection	as	deriving	from	an	inner	sense,	and	identified	knowledge	as	the	perception	of	the	agreement	or	disagreement	of	the	connections	between	ideas,	known	through	reason.	Hence,	I	suggest,	Burnet’s	identification	of	reason	as	the	moral	(inner)	sense	in	order	to	undermine	Hutcheson’s	own	petition	to	internal	senses.	Thiel,	as	we	saw	in	the	introductory	chapter,	has	argued	that	Locke’s	ideas	of	reflection	did	not	refer	to	the	activity,	or	power	of	reflection	itself	(i.e.	reason),	nor	were	they	the	source	of	our	conscious	awareness	of	our	own	minds,	but	he	suggests	that	there	is	no	reason	to	suppose	that	this	view	was	widely	held	in	the	late	seventeenth	or	early	eighteenth	century.383	Burnet	seems	to	have	used	the	sensory	(conscious)	awareness	of	the	perception	of	the	agreement	or	disagreement	of	ideas	as	part	of	a	justification	for	his	claim	that																																																									381	See	Susan	James,	Passion	and	Action:	The	Emotions	in	Seventeenth-Century	Philosophy	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1997),	198.	382	Burnet,	Correspondence,	205.		383	See	Udo	Thiel,	“Hume’s	Notions	of	Consciousness,”	102-105,	for	a	discussion	of	Locke’s	position.		
 165 
reason	is	an	internal	sense.	Reason	was	a	moral	sense	for	Burnet,	presumably	because	it	was	a	‘sense’	of	the	agreement	or	disagreement	of	ideas	about	moral	actions.	Burnet	made	no	distinction	here	between	the	perceptual	awareness	of	our	having	perceived	a	connection	between	simple	ideas,	and	having	a	simple	idea	from	an	inner	sense	informing	us	of	the	mental	operation	of	reasoning	-	but	then	Locke	himself	was	not	clear	about	this.			Moreover,	Locke	had	not	distinguished	between	the	intuitive	knowledge	of	our	own	ideas	(our	awareness,	or	knowledge,	of	our	own	ideas	and	their	content)	and	the	intuitive	knowledge	that	we	have	of	self-evident	propositions.	Thiel	has	provided	an	account	of	the	correspondence	of	John	Wynne	with	Locke	in	1695,	which	spoke	to	this	very	matter.384	Wynne	wanted	to	know,	from	Locke,	whether	our	conscious	awareness	of	our	own	minds	ought	to	be	considered	as	a	different	sort	of	knowledge	to	the	intuition	of	self-evident	truths	(or	the	certain,	i.e.	self-evident	agreement	of	certain	ideas)?	Locke’s	reply	to	Wynne	does	not	survive,	but	Thiel	suggests	that	another	of	Wynne’s	letters	to	Locke	gives	us	an	indication	of	what	Locke	thought	here.	Locke	appears	to	have	replied	that	they	ought	both	to	be	considered	‘under	the	general	name	of	intuition’	because,	although	different,	they	were	experienced	with	the	same	immediacy	and	an	‘equal	degree	of	certainty’.385			Burnet	also	gave	exactly	this	experiential	priority	to	reason.	He	argued	that	the	experience	of	discovering	truth	delivered	the	experience	of	certainty	that	we	needed	in	order	for	us	to	feel	secure.	In	the	introductory	chapter	I	discussed	the	ways	in	which	epistemological	logics,	or	logics	of	ideas,	were	founded	upon	the	psychology	or	phenomenology	of	reasoning,	and	the	way	in	which	the	experience	of	certainty	became	paramount	as	proof	within	them.		Locke	wrote	to	Stillingfleet,	for	example,	that	‘with	me,	to	know	and	to	be	certain,	is	the	same	thing.’386	In	the	ECHU	he	affirmed	the	following:	
																																																								384	Thiel,	The	Early	Modern	Subject,	118-119.		385	Ibid,	quotations	from	Locke’s	letter	are	cited	at	118.		386		Locke	to	Stillingfleet,	The	Works	of	John	Locke.	Vol.	iv.	(London:	Thomas	Tegg	and	others,	1823),	145.			
 166 
Once	we	know	we	are	certain	it	is	so;	and	we	may	be	secure,	that	there	are	no	latent	proofs	undiscovered,	which	may	overturn	our	knowledge,	or	bring	it	in	doubt.387		Locke	did	not,	as	explained	in	the	introductory	chapter,	make	self-evidence	a	proof	in	practical	reason.	Certainty	(of	self-evidence),	however,	was	the	crux	of	Burnet’s	argument	to	Hutcheson	over	what	the	experience	of	moral	reason	provides	us	with.	Burnet	maintained	that	we	could	not	use	pleasure	or	the	sense	of	moral	beauty	as	‘ultimate	principles’	because	we	could	not	gain	the	experience	of	satisfaction	or	certainty	to	move	to	any	demonstrative	conclusions	from	them.	We	must	judge	the	experience	of	moral	beauty	by	referring	to	reason	‘or	our	
internal	sense	of	truth	and	falsehood,	moral	good	and	evil,	right	and	wrong.’388	[My	emphasis.]	When	we	go	back	to	reason	in	our	investigation,	i.e.	when	we	resolve	propositions	into	self-evident	or	evident	truths,	then	we	find	no	further	doubt	in	our	minds	but	meet	with	a	principle	which	we	cannot	but	acquiesce	in.	In	one	case	we	still	leave	our	principle	to	be	proved.	In	the	other	we	reach	a	principle	which	is	self-evident	or	certainly	demonstrable.	.	.	.	when	we	rest	our	foot	upon	such	truths	as	are	evident	or	demonstrate,	we	leave	nothing	unproved	but	arrive	at	as	much	
certainty	as	we	are	capable	of	and	can	go	no	further.389	[My	emphasis.]		Burnet	argued	that	the	perception	of	a	self-evident	truth	left	no	experiential	room	for	doubt.390	In	addition,	he	claimed,	this	experience	of	certainty	was	accompanied	by	an	experience	of	intellectual	joy.	So,	for	example,	Burnet	argued	that	since	we	all	‘immediately	and	with	one	glance	of	thought’	perceive	it	‘reasonable	and	fit’	that	advantage	for	everyone	is	better	than	private	advantage	or	advantage	for	some,	so	we	feel	certain,	and	see	subsequently	beauty	in	any	action	that	aims	at	this.391	We	might	feel	as	if	we	have	experienced	the	judgment	of	benevolent	action	as	beautiful,	but	we	must	have	felt	certain	that	benevolence	was	a	moral	good	in	the	first	place.	In	the	example	cited,	Burnet	claimed	that	we	just	need	to	ask	ourselves	‘why	do	we	find	benevolence	beautiful?’	Then	we	will	immediately	see	that	it	is	self-evidently	true	that	‘happiness	for	all	is	best’	and																																																									387	Locke,	ECHU,	4:15:3.,	655.	388	Burnet,	Correspondence,	207.		389	Ibid.,	223.		390	Ibid.,	223.		391	Ibid.,	204.	
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feel	certain	of	this.	Then	we	have	grounds	for	our	judgment	of	benevolence	in	others,	and	more	importantly	we	will	know	the	truth	of,	and	feel	certain	of,	the	reasons	for	acting	benevolently.392		Burnet	also	addressed	Hutcheson’s	charge	that	deductive	reason	itself	was	too	slow	and	doubtful	to	account	for	the	immediacy	of	our	moral	response.	Burnet	countered	that	we	may	‘see	the	truth’	before	we	have	reasoned	all	the	steps.	Sometimes,	we	perceive	truth	or	right,	by	a	kind	of	natural	penetration	and	sagacity	of	the	mind,	before	we	have	stayed	to	weigh	distinctly	every	one	of	the	steps	which	lead	to	it.	And	then	taking	the	conclusion	for	granted,	we	esteem	it	beautiful	or	pleasant.393			This	was	especially	true	in	moral	science,	he	claimed,	which	was	far	less	abstruse	than	other	sciences.		Few,	indeed	are	capable	of	such	quick	perceptions	in	those	kind	of	sciences,	where	the	conclusion	are	forced	to	pass	through	many	steps.	But	almost	all	mankind	are	capable	of	them	in	moral	science,	where	the	conclusion	and	premise	lie	within	a	narrower	compass.394				Burnet	did	make	a	clear	distinction	between	deductive	reasoning	and	the	rational	perception	of	self-evident	truths.	Burnet,	though,	thought	that	there	were	plenty	of	examples	of	self-evident	truths	that	just	could	not	be	questioned	further.	For	example,	the	truth	that	‘it	is	better	that	the	species	should	be	happy	than	that	it	should	not’	(also,	‘it	is	best	that	all	should	be	happy’),	is	both	self-evident	and	‘such	an	unmoveable	truth	that	it	will	bear	all	the	weight	we	can	lay	upon	it’.395	Furthermore,	this	truth	in	combination	with	the	deductive	truth	that	the	moral	sense	tends	to	make	us	happier	in	the	long	run	‘will	afford	us	a	solid	bottom	on	which	the	whole	structure	of	morality	may	safely	rest’.396			Burnet,	minding	Locke’s	opposition	to	the	self-evidence	of	practical	truths,	maintained	that	all	truth	is	‘strictly	speaking’	speculative.	Truths	are	‘seen	and	perceived	by	the	mind’.		When	they	relate	to	action	in	rational	agents	they	are																																																									392	Ibid.,	236	–	237.		393	Ibid.,	206	.		394	Ibid.,	206.		395	Ibid.,	238.	396	Ibid.,	238.	
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called	practical	truths,	but	they	are	really	just	the	rational	conclusions	drawn	from	speculative	truths,	which	are	not	in	themselves	rules	for	action	(‘it	is	best	that	all	should	be	happy’).	Burnet	argued	that	a	nominally	practical	truth	was	to	discover,	from	the	reason	of	things,	our	obligation	to	act,	or	in	other	words,	in	what	manner	persons	are	obliged	to	act	towards	such	objects,	or	what	means	they	are	obliged	to	employ	in	order	to	obtain	them.397		So,	using	our	previous	example,	Burnet	proposed	that	we	perceive	immediately	that	‘it	is	best	that	that	all	should	be	happy’.	Our	‘object’	is	therefore	happiness	for	everyone,	and	from	this	we	may	conclude	that	benevolence	is	the	‘properest	and	fittest	means	to	procure	the	happiness	of	the	species.’	Therefore,	we	are	under	an	obligation	to	act	benevolently.			I	will	examine	Burnet’s	views	on	obligation	in	a	little	more	detail	when	I	move	on	to	look	at	his	position	on	motivation.	At	this	point,	I	turn	to	Balguy’s	response	to	Hutcheson’s	moral	sense.	Balguy,	like	Burnet,	addressed	the	issue	of	the	coincidence	of	ideas	of	pleasure	with	the	results	of	reason	which	told	us	whether	an	action	is	fit	or	not,	to	be	performed.	He	also	termed	the	perception	of	the	agreements	or	disagreements	between	ideas	an	internal	sense,	but	here	he	offered	an	objection	to	the	terminological	equivalence	of	sense	and	perception.	Balguy	too,	dealt	with	Locke’s	refusal	to	allow	self-evidence	a	place	in	practical	reason.			Balguy	and	the	moral	sense398		Balguy	turned	his	attention	to	Hutcheson’s	moral	sense	in	the	first	and	second	parts	of	his	Foundation	of	Moral	Goodness,	Second	Part,	(1729,	1733).399	Balguy																																																									397	Ibid.,	218.		398	For	biographical	details	and	an	overview	of	his	thought,	see	Hugh	David	Jones,	John	Balguy:	An	
English	Moralist	of	the	Eighteenth	Century	(Leipzig:	Verlag	Von	Quelle	and	Meyer,	1907).	Balguy	is	not	much	discussed	in	the	secondary	literature,	but	see	Irwin,	“Balguy:	A	defense	of	Rationalism”	and	“Balguy	and	Clarke:	Morality	and	Natural	Theology,”	Development,	Vol.	II,	439-463	and	465-472.	See	also	Carey,	“Hutcheson	and	the	Scottish	Enlightenment,”	43-44,	and	David	Fate	Norton	and	Manfred	Kuehn,	“The	Foundation	of	Morality,”	in	Knud	Haakonssen,	ed.	The	Cambridge	
History	of	Eighteenth-Century	Philosophy	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006),	958-262.			399	John	Balguy,	The	Foundation	of	Moral	Goodness:	Or	a	Further	Inquiry	into	the	Original	of	Our	
Idea	of	Virtue.	By	a	Clergyman,	1728,	revised	1731,	1733.	Henceforth	First	Part;	The	Second	Part	
of	The	Foundation	of	Moral	Goodness;	Illustrating	and	Enforcing	the	Principles	and	Reasonings	
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championed	Clarke’s	position	that	eternal	law	was	the	foundation	of	moral	goodness	and,	as	such,	was	the	‘original’	of	our	ideas	of	virtue.	For	Balguy,	eternal	law	must	be	the	origin	of	our	moral	ideas	because	it	was	the	origin	of	God’s	moral	ideas.		It	would	be	inappropriate	for	the	source	and	nature	of	God’s	ideas	(a	rational	perception	of	eternal	law)	and	our	ideas	(an	implanted	moral	sense)	to	be	different.	Eternal	law	dictated	what	was	right	–	both	to	God	and	to	us.		In	the	First	part,	Balguy’s	concern	was	to	show	that	a	perception	of	the	rightness	of	an	action	is	not	delivered	by	a	moral	sense.	Balguy	held	that	we	could	only	approve	an	action	that	what	we	had	first	reasoned	was	‘fit’	to	be	performed.	This	was	true	both	logically	and	temporally.	In	addition	there	were	two	ways	in	which	virtue	could	be	considered,	‘either	under	the	notion	of	pulchrum,	or	honestum’.	Pleasure,	or	beauty,	Balguy	thought,	is	not	seen,	or	‘visive’,	but	felt,	and	on	these	experiential	grounds,			sensibility	seems	to	be	as	distinct	from	understanding,	as	the	understanding	is	from	the	will.	We	should	not	therefore	confound	them	in	our	conceptions.400		Balguy,	in	1728,	confessed	to	being	unsure	about	whether	we	needed	a	special	sense,	or	‘some	distinct	power’,	to	perceive	the	beauty	of	actions,	since	as	individuals	we	differed	greatly	in	our	affective	responses	to	moral	actions.401	Balguy	agreed	that	we	possess	more	‘superior’	senses	that	responded	to	music	and	paintings	and	buildings,	however,	these	only	relished	such	objects	or	raised	pleasure	in	our	minds.	They	could	not	communicate	the	truth	of	the	relations	of	those	things	(like	harmony,	form	or	structure).	At	any	rate,	our	ideas	of	virtue	considered	as	‘honestum’,	were,	Balguy	insisted,	ideas	of	the	intrinsic	rectitude	of	actions.	Any	sensed	approbation,	in	the	form	of	pleasurable	feeling,	followed	on	from	the	perception	of	that	rectitude.402																																																																																																																																																																	
Contained	in	the	Former.	Being	an	Answer	to	Certain	Remarks	Communicated	by	a	Gentleman	to	
the	Author,	1729,	1733.	Henceforth	Second	Part.	400	Balguy,	First	Part,	24.		401	Ibid,	23-24.	Balguy	began	as	a	supporter	of	our	sense	of	the	beautiful	in	aesthetics,	but	later	took	up	the	rationalist	position.	See	Kivy,	Seventh	Sense,	127-133	and	138-140.			402	Balguy,	First	Part,	23.		
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In	the	Second	Part,	Balguy	offered	further	argument	for	our	faculty	of	reason	being	the	only	faculty	we	needed	to	use	in	order	to	access	moral	truths.	Balguy	did	not	disbar	the	identification	of	reason	with	a	moral	and,	again,	an	internal	sense.		If	anyone	has	a	mind	to	call	that	faculty	by	which	we	perceive	moral	
agreements	and	disagreements	an	internal	sense,	I	am	very	unwilling	to	dispute	about	words.403	[My	emphasis.]		As	long,	that	was,	as	we	also	allowed	that	the	intelligence	we	used	to	reach	physical	or	mathematical	truths	was	also	an	internal	sense.	Balguy	thought	that	external	senses	were	‘very	distinct	from	our	understanding’,	as	they	only	supplied	material	to	it		(like	‘an	architect’	and	his	‘labourers’).		Balguy	then	claimed	that	difference	between	the	power	of	perception	responsible	for	any	truth,	including	moral	truths	(which	is	called	‘intelligence’)	and	that	of	the	power	of	perception	responsible	for	sensory	information	(which	is	called	‘sense’),	was	to	be	found	in	their	objects.	Intelligence	perceives	‘real	agreements’,	whereas	a	sense	perceives	the	effect	external	objects	have	on	our	own	particular	minds.		A	sensory	perception,	moreover,	actually	modifies	our	minds	in	some	way.	An	intellectual	perception,	however,	does	no	such	thing.		An	intellectual	perception,		only	shows	what	its	objects	are	in	themselves;	where	they	agree	or	disagree,	or	differ	from	each	other.	Both	sense	and	intelligence	consist	in	a	
power	of	perception,	and	both	powers	are	passive.	But	I	know	of	no	other	resemblance	between	them.404	[My	emphasis.]		Balguy	objected	to	the	blurring	of	the	boundaries	between	sense	and	intelligence,	because	for	Balguy,	this	distinction	was	founded	upon	the	objects	that	they	perceive.	If	a	power	of	perceiving	real	agreements	ought	to	be	called	a	sense	or	sentiment;	what	partition,	what	boundaries	will	remain	between	sense	and	intelligence?405		
																																																								403	Balguy,	Second	Part,	48.		404	Ibid.,	52.		405	Ibid.		
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Balguy	is	acute	here	though,	on	the	implications	of	‘a	power	of	perceiving	real	agreements’	being	called	a	sense.	If	the	term	‘sense’	was	pressed	into	service,	then	‘what	boundaries	will	remain	between	sense	and	intelligence?’	he	asked.	It	is	this	question	that	speaks	to	the	semantic	instability	of	the	terms	sense,	judgment	and	reason.	Balguy	insisted	here,	I	think,	that	if	Hutcheson’s	moral	sense	was	supposed	to	provide	us	with	epistemological	access	to	real	knowledge,	then	this	was	an	activity	of	the	intellect,	no	matter	that	we	experienced	both	sense	and	intelligence	as	involuntary	and	non	effortful	mental	operations.					For	Balguy,	truth	was	either	of	words,	ideas,	or	things.	Verbal	truth	is	the	truth	of	propositions	relating	to	either	the	truth	of	ideas	(ideal	truth)	or	the	truth	of	things.	The	truth	of	things	pertains	to	the	relative	natures	of	things	and	their	agreement	or	disagreement.	Moral	truth	is	the	truth	of	things,	and	it	dictates	the	ways	in	which	different	things	should	be	treated.	Balguy	argued,	for	example,	that	to	treat	men,	brutes	and	stones	in	a	similar	manner	is	disagreeable	to	the	nature	of	things.	It	is	disagreeable	in	the	same	way	as	an	attempt	to	make	an	angle	from	two	parallel	lines	would	be	disagreeable	to	the	truths	of	things	such	as	angles	and	parallel	lines.406	Our	moral	ideas,	unlike	our	mathematical	ideas,	however,	are	only	representations	of	relative	natures,	and	so	cannot	be	as	certain	of	our	perception	of	them	as	we	may	be	of	our	ideas	of	numbers,	which	have	no	external	referents.	In	most	cases,	though,	we	may	rely	on	these	perceptions.	The	objects	of	these	perceptions	are	‘often	self-evident	truths,	and	almost	always	resolvable	into	such’.407	They	‘seldom	fail	to	appear	to	us	in	a	clear	light’.	Balguy	here	followed	Clarke	and	Hutcheson,	and	Locke,	in	maintaining	that	we	do	not	have	access	to	the	essences	of	‘things’,	we	have	access	to	their	modes	of	existence	only.408	Our	ideas	here	are	only	copies	of	divine	ideas.409		In	the	Second	Part	Balguy	complained	that	Locke	had	insisted	on	the	absence	of	any	self-evident	practical	propositions,	but	that	he	had	still	proposed	that	a	certain	demonstration	of	morality	was	possible.	Balguy	wanted	to	know	from																																																									406	Balguy,	First	Part,	36.		407	Ibid.,	38.		408	Ibid.,	31.	409	Ibid.,	37.		
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what	foundation	that	demonstration	would	proceed?		Given	that	Locke	had	suggested	that	morality	might	be	demonstrated	with	as	much	certainty	as	mathematics,	what	would	be	the	foundational	premise,	if	not	a	self-evident	proposition?410		Balguy	here	appealed	to	the	obviousness	(he	thought)	of	the	truths	about	the	relations	(not	the	essences)	of	agents	to	actions	and	objects.	The	relations	of	other	modes	may	certainly	be	perceived	as	well	as	those	of	number	and	extension.411			Once	again	our	own	certainty	proved	to	be	the	criterion	for	truth	(although	we	could	be	mistaken	and	correct	our	views).	Hutcheson	argued	that	our	moral	ideas	contained	a	distinctive	pleasure	of	moral	approval	(or	its	contrary),	which	provided	a	sort	of	evaluative	certainty	of	its	own.	Balguy,	on	the	other	hand,	also	placed	great	emphasis	on	the	special	quality	of	what	reasoning	as	an	act	means	to	us	–	its	‘honour’	or	‘dignity’,	or	the	‘fitness’	of	reason	to	influence	us,	together	with	the	special	quality	of	the	objects	of	rational	moral	thought.	The	apparent	‘self-eligibility’,	‘intrinsic	excellence	or	‘self-amiableness’	of	such	actions,	he	argued,	resulted	in	their	necessarily	being	approved	as	right	and	freely	chosen.412		Burnet	and	Balguy’s	reliance	upon	our	access	to	the	self-evidence	and	the	‘self-eligibility’	of	moral	principles	carried	them	to	argue	that	the	criterion	of	truth	now	became	our	certainty	of	the	truth.	Burnet	and	Balguy	supposed	these	experiential	features	(of	moral	reasoning)	to	be	part	of	the	reason	why	we	choose	to	act	in	accordance	with	them.	We	are	just	carried	by	the	quality	of	the	experience	of	our	own	reasoning	process	to	act	in	accordance	with	its	diktats.	In	this	sense,	their	battle	with	Hutcheson	is	about	the	meaning	we	give	to	our	introspective	experience	of	moral	approbation,	and	parts	of	their	argument	exploited	or	reflected	the	terminological	confusion	of	Locke’s	account	of	reason,	reflection,	intuitive	knowledge,	conscious	awareness	and	sense.			
																																																								410	Balguy,	Second	Part,	43.		411	Balguy,	First	Part,	44.		412	Balguy,	Second	Part,	74,	for	example.		
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The	question	for	the	next	part	of	the	chapter	is	whether	or	not	Burnet	or	Balguy	argued	that	a	rational	perception	of	the	fitness	of	an	action,	and	(therefore)	our	rational	obligation	to	perform	it,	was	sufficient	to	motivate	an	action.			Burnet,	Balguy	and	the	question	of	motivation	Burnet	and	Balguy,	I	argue,	like	Clarke,	were	both	rationalists	about	moral	knowledge	and	moral	obligation,	but	were	not	about	motivation,	or	at	least	were	not	straightforwardly	so.		I	argue	that	for	Balguy,	as	much	as	for	Clarke,	our	lack	of	perfection	entailed	the	need	for	us	to	recognise	the	truth	of	the	promise	of	the	afterlife	and	the	distribution	of	divine	justice	in	order	for	us	to	lead	a	moral	life.	Balguy,	in	fact,	called	acting	to	secure	divine	reward	our	‘religious	obligation’.	In	order	to	make	virtue	a	practical	reality,	Balguy	claimed	that	we	needed	to	recognise	and	fulfil	both	our	religious	and	our	moral	obligations.	Irwin	treats	Balguy’s	(and	Clarke’s)	religious	commitments	as	an	almost	separate	part	of	their	theory.413	Irwin	sees	both	Clarke	and	Balguy’s	appeal	to	the	consequences	to	self	of	compliance	or	non-compliance	with	divine	command	as	simply	a	practical	support	for	virtue.	But	Irwin	here,	I	believe,	misses	completely	the	moral	value	that	Balguy	allows	acts	of	self-interest	to	have.			Irwin	makes	the	same	observation	about	Balguy	that	we	saw	Schneewind	make	about	Clarke.	This	is	that	the	will	may	‘rebel’	against	the	necessary	conclusion	of	reason,	which	Clarke,	for	Schneewind,	explained	by	pointing	to	the	weakness	of	will.	Irwin,	talking	about	Balguy,	says,		like	Clarke,	he	[Balguy]	allows	this	possibility	[that	the	will	may	not	comply	with	rational	assent],	but	he	has	some	difficulty	explaining	it.	
Though	he	agrees	that	the	will	sometimes	rebels	against	rational	assent,	he	
still	assumes	that	rational	assent	is	normally	sufficient	for	action,	without	
any	further	approval	by	the	will.414	[My	emphasis.]		I	argue	that	neither	Clarke	nor	Balguy	thought	rational	assent	to	the	fitness	of	an	action	was	‘normally	sufficient’	to	move	an	agent	to	a	moral	action.	It	ought	to	have	been,	they	agreed,	but	as	a	species	we	had	failed	that	particular	test.	God																																																									413	Ibid.,	They	appear	in	a	separate	section	in	a	later	chapter	entitled	“Balguy	and	Clarke:	Morality	and	Natural	Religion,”	465-475.		414	Ibid.,	445.		
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has	seen	fit,	they	also	agreed,	to	create	us	with	a	variety	of	apparent	weaknesses	(God’s	reason	for	this	is	ultimately	the	result	of	his	wisdom	and	his	wish	for	our	happiness).	God’s	perfection	lies	in	the	perfect	conformity	of	his	will	to	his	understanding.	Since	we	lack	this	perfection,	our	ability	to	fulfil	a	rationally	perceived	moral	obligation	is	incomplete.	The	appeal	to	divine	reward	and	punishment	notwithstanding,	Clarke,	Balguy	and	Burnet	also	all	referred	to	the	hedonic	elements	of	conscience	to	motivate	behavioural	compliance	with	rational	assent.	In	which	case,	as	I	argued	in	Chapter	2,	they	then	argued	that	the	motivation	was	hedonic,	and	did	not	derive	directly	from	the	perception	of	the	fitness	of	an	action.			Burnet	and	motivation	Burnet,	in	his	correspondence	with	Hutcheson,	did	not	assign	a	prominent	role	to	the	pleasures	and	pains	of	eternity	in	his	moral	theory.	The	question	(for	me)	is	why	not?	If	I	am	correct	to	emphasise	the	vital	part	that	belief	in	the	promises	of	the	afterlife	plays	in	Clarke’s	theory,	and,	since	Burnet	wrote	to	defend	Clarke’s	approach	as	much	as	Balguy	did,	why	is	this	argument	largely	missing	in	Burnet’s	letters	to	Hutcheson?			An	answer	may	be	found,	I	believe,	in	the	preface	that	Burnet	wrote	to	the	publication	of	his	letters	with	Hutcheson.		Here,	Burnet	reported	that	the	foundation	that	Hutcheson’s	‘beautiful	structure’	so	badly	lacked	had	already	been	provided	by	Cumberland	and	Clarke	‘in	the	beginning	of	his	second	Boyle	lectures’,	and	Wollaston.415	The	beginning	of	the	second	Boyle	lectures	(the	first	proposition)	was	precisely	the	place	in	which	Clarke	outlined	the	way	in	which	our	moral	knowledge	and	obligation	was	founded	in	reason.	The	rest	of	that	lecture,	however,	was	devoted	to	an	explanation	of	why	the	natural	knowledge	of	the	perception	of	the	fitness	of	an	action	was	insufficient	to	actually	move	us	to	virtue	and	how	Revelation	made	up	for	this	deficit.			
																																																								415	Burnet,	Correspondence,	199.		
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Burnet,	in	his	correspondence	with	Hutcheson,	made	it	clear	that	his	question	was	not	‘what	in	experience	is	seen	to	lead	men	to	act	but	what	ought	to’.416	[My	emphasis.]	What	ought	to	motivate	us	was	the	subject	of	Clarke’s	first	proposition.	Burnet,	as	we	shall	see,	fully	allowed	that	God	had	gifted	us	all	sorts	of	useful	natural	passions,	affections	and	even	a	moral	sense	itself	to	help	motivate	us	to	act	(‘the	proper	means	to	animate	and	support	as	reason	dictates’).		Nevertheless,	Burnet,	like	Clarke	in	the	first	proposition,	argued	that	affections	were	not	what	made	an	action	moral,	and	they	were	not	what	ought	to	move	us	to	virtue.417		At	one	point	in	his	reply	to	Burnet,	Hutcheson	chastised	Burnet	for	bringing	in	the	‘end	of	the	Deity	as	a	reason	[for	us]	of	pursuing	public	good’.418	This	was	because	Hutcheson	was	seeking	to	account	for	how	virtue	might	emerge	in	us,	irrespective	of	our	knowledge	of	God,	or	the	metaphysical	grounding	of	moral	good.	Burnet,	I	think,	responded	to	the	terms	of	Hutcheson’s	argument.	He	agreed	that	an	account	of	our	natural	moral	understanding	should	be	given.	For	Burnet,	and	for	Clarke	and	Balguy,	natural	reason	could	indeed	tell	us	what	
ought	to	motivate	us.			I’ll	begin	by	looking	at	Burnet’s	thoughts	on	obligation.	For	Burnet	only	discursive	reasoning,	and	not	the	immediate	perception	of	a	self-evident	truth,	laid		 the	proper	and	indeed,	strictly	speaking,	the	only	obligation	upon	us	to	act	in	a	certain	manner,	since	we	are	always	self-condemned	whenever	we	contradict	its	conclusions	and	directions.419				Burnet	thought	that	we	could	not	be	obliged	by	a	disposition	to	act	from	natural	affection,	or	a	sense	of	beauty	in	an	action	because	these	are	only	affections	and	
																																																								416	Burnet,	Correspondence,	232.		417	Ibid.,	207.	418	Hutcheson	to	Burnet,	Correspondence,	228.		419	Burnet,	Correspondence,	223,	244.		As	we	saw	in	chapter	4,	there	was	a	similar	emphasis	on	discursive	reason	in	the	re-formulation	that	Hutcheson	gave	to	moral	obligation	in	the	
Illustrations	–	that	it	included	the	moral	sense	in	the	context	of	a	fully	reasoned	appreciation	of	the	context	and	consequences	of	an	action.	
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relish	and	carry	no	obligatory	force	with	them,	until	we	have	judged	them	‘fit’	by	deduction	from	a	rational	principle.		In	short,	all	sort	of	obligation	to	anything	requires	reason	to	give	it	force,	without	which	it	is	a	mere	phantasm	of	the	imagination.420		[My	emphasis.]			Burnet	claimed	that	we	cannot	even	‘form	an	obligation	without	introducing	reason	at	its	foundation’.	We	can	only	be	obliged	to	an	end	that	is	rational,	meaning	an	end	we	have	reasoned	as	correctly	reflecting	the	nature	of	things	and	the	relations	between	them.	What	does	obligation	mean?		Obligation	is	a	word	of	a	Latin	original	signifying	the	action	of	binding	which,	therefore	in	a	moral	sense	.	.	.	must	import	the	binding	of	an	intelligent	agent	by	some	law,	which	can	be	no	other	than	the	law	of	reason.	For	all	other	ties	are	reducible	to	this	and	this	is	primary	and	reducible	to	no	other	principle.421		Burnet	maintained	that	we	are	self-condemned	when	we	act	against	what	we	know	to	be	true,	as	we	might	judge	ourselves	if	we	acted	against	a	truth	about	anything.	I	can	act	against	desires	and	affection,	however,	Burnet	maintained,	without	having	to	‘bring	myself	in	guilty’.	Moral	goodness,	in	our	case,	as	in	the	case	of	God,	just	was,	for	Burnet,	acting	in	accordance	with	what	we	took	to	be	a	true	proposition,	or	propositions.		Burnet	said	that	when		I	find	certain	true	propositions	resulting	concerning	the	nature	of	things,	then	moral	goodness,	I	say	consists	in	acting	agreeably	to	those	propositions,	moral	badness	acting	disagreeably	to	them.	422			For	Burnet,	what	actually	moves	a	person	to	act	is	not	the	question	–	this	is	generally	not	moral	obligation,	he	freely	admitted,	but	only	reason	can	tell	us	if	a	planned	action	is	the	right/correct	one,	which	then	puts	us	under	a	moral	obligation.	
The	question	is	not	what	is	seen	in	experience	to	lead	men	to	act.	I	confess	
their	passions	and	affections	generally	do	lead	them.	And	it	is	their	happiness	and	the	wisdom	of	their	creator	that	they	have	such	affections	and	passions	as	naturally	tend,	till	they	corrupt	them,	to	produce	in	many	instances	the	same	effects	which	reason	dictates.	But	it	is	still	reason	which	informs	us	beforehand	that	such	actions	would	be	right	as	well	as																																																									420	Burnet,	Correspondence,	224.	421	Ibid.,	235.		422	Ibid.,	232.	
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afterwards	they	were	right.	And	of	this	indeed	there	can	be	no	doubt	to	anyone	who	has	ever	felt	reason	working	in	his	breast.423	[My	emphasis.]		Burnet	did	not	wish	to	deny	the	motive	force	of	beauty	and	pleasure	that	we	perceive	in	virtue,	or	our	natural	affections	for	others,	since	they	were	put	there	by	divine	institution	in	order	that	we	be	motivated	by	them.	I	know	they	are	the	most	successful	solicitors	to	everything	that	is	right	and	reasonable	if	duly	attended	to	and	not	mistaken	or	misused.	And	we	should	be	comfortless	and	forlorn	creatures	if	we	had	no	affections	and	inward	warmth	of	sentiment	to	spur	us	on	to	what	dry	reason	approves	of.	But	I	would	not	have	men	depend	on	their	affections	as	rules	sufficient	to	conduct	them,	though	they	are	the	proper	means	to	animate	them	and	support	them	as	reason	directs.	I	would	have	them	search	still	higher	for	the	foundation	and	grounds	of	these	very	motives.424		Burnet	clearly	expressed	the	view	in	these	letters	that	the	comprehension	of	our	obligation	is	reached	by	right	reason.	We	may	carry	out	an	act	from	kind	affection,	which	results	in	the	beneficiary	gaining	in	natural	good,	and	Burnet	argued	that	this	is	‘generally’	what	leads	us	to	act.	But	he	was	silent	on	what	‘generally’	means.	It	is	just	not	clear	to	what	degree	Burnet	thought	it	was	possible	for	us	to	act	purely	from	a	regard	to	the	moral	value	of	an	action.	In	any	case,	the	role	of	conscience	working	to	motivate	us	to	fulfil	an	obligation	is	not	free	from	hedonic	influence.			Burnet’s	minimal	comments	on	the	force	of	self-condemnation	of	acting	(we	are	‘self-condemned’	where	we	act	against	the	results	of	our	own	reasoning,	hence	we	are	obliged	to	follow	them),	like	Clarke’s,	are	difficult	to	interpret.425	Do	we	act	to	fulfil	our	obligation	to	reason	because	we	believe	the	action	to	be	right,	or	do	we	act	to	secure	the	pleasure	of	self-approval	and	avoid	the	pain	of	guilt	(of	acting	according,	or	not,	to	that	knowledge)?	What	role	do	these	considerations	of	our	own	‘self-good’	play	in	our	consistently,	or	at	least	regularly	behaving	according	to	our	understanding	of	what	it	is	right	or	correct	(or	at	least	regularly	enough	to	secure	our	own	salvation)?	Moreover,	did	it	matter	to	God,	why	we	acted	or	was	the	matter	of	our	actual	motivation	a	matter	of	indifference	to	him,																																																									423	Ibid.,	233.	424	Ibid.,	207.	425	Ibid.,	224.		
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as	long	as	we	also	aimed	for	virtue	as	well?	What	was	God’s	view	on	mixed	motives?	These	concerns	lay	at	the	very	core	of	Balguy’s	approach	to	the	possibility	of	virtue	as	he	took	up	the	question	of	the	moral	value	of	acts	of	self-interest.			Balguy	and	motivation	Balguy	is	important	because	he	attempted	to	address,	more	directly	than	Clarke	perhaps,	the	question	of	how	God	had	acted	to	make	virtue	possible	for	us	given	the	tendency	of	the	sensible	parts	of	our	nature	to	lead	us	away	from	our	rational	understanding	of	what	is	right.			In	the	First	and	Second	Parts	Balguy	argued	that	our	moral	obligation	consists	in	our	freely	choosing	to	act	according	to	our	rational	perception	of	the	‘fitness’	of	an	action.	But	did	he	make	the	‘practical	claim’	that	this	is	sufficient	to	move	us	to	choose	to	act	virtuously?	I	argue	that	Balguy	did	not	make	the	claim	that	knowledge	of	fitness	and	the	obligation	derived	from	this	is	sufficient	to	motivate	moral	action,	for	exactly	the	same	reason	that	I	argued	that	Clarke	did	not	–	because	we	presently	require,	and	have	required	since	the	Fall,	knowledge	of	our	immortality	and	a	future	state	where	divine	justice	is	meted	out,	to	in	order	behave	virtuously.			Balguy’s	first	Letter	to	a	Deist,	published	in	1726	took	on	Shaftesbury’s	claims	over	the	sufficiency	of	the	inherent	moral	beauty	of	an	action	to	move	us	to	virtue.426	Balguy	agreed	that	though	‘her	charms’	were	considerable	and	derived	from	an	intrinsic	worth,	these	weren’t	sufficient	to	make	us	behave	virtuously.	Balguy	thought	that	Shaftesbury’s	insistence	on	the	detrimental	effect	that	acting	for	reasons	of	self-interest	had	on	the	moral	quality	of	our	motivation	was	misplaced.	This,	Balguy	argued,	was	because	considerations	of	reward	and	punishment	clearly	enhanced	our	ability	to	behave	virtuously.	In	the	Second	Part	Balguy	argued	that,	as	we	had	been	created	both	rational	and	sensible,	God	had	placed	us	under	a	‘double	obligation’	as	rational	and	sensible	(sensitive)																																																									426	John	Balguy,	A	Letter	to	a	Deist	Concerning	the	Beauty	and	Excellency	of	Moral	Virtue,	and	the	
Support	and	Improvement	Which	it	Receives	from	the	Christian	Religion,	1726.	Henceforth	First	
Letter.		
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agents.427	These	twin	obligations	were	designed	to	enhance	our	ability	to	practice	what	we	knew	to	be	right.	The	implication	of	this	was	that	we	were	not	less	obliged	in	the	actual	performance	of	a	moral	action	by	a	consideration	of	divine	rewards	and	punishments.	Moreover,	for	Balguy	(although	he	did	not	state	this),	the	implication	was	that	the	‘natural	sanctions’	of	conscience	(guilt	and	condemnation)	could	also	now	be	seen	to	be	perfectly	acceptable	in	the	fulfilment	of	our	obligations	as	sensible	agents.	Balguy,	moreover,	argued	that	certain	duties	to	self,	such	as	self-care	and	personal	development	also	came	under	the	label	of	moral	virtues,	although	they	were	not	social	virtues.428	So,	we	have	both	religious	obligations	that	entail	that	we	need	to	consider	the,	likely,	judgment	of	our	actions	in	a	future	state	and	we	have	duties	to	our	moral	(self)	development	that	entail	that	we	ought	to	act	on	the	hedonic	force	of	conscience.			Both	Clarke	and	Balguy	believed	that	our	natural	reasoning	abilities,	in	practice,	had	been	partially	destroyed	by	the	Fall.	For	the	‘greatest	part	of	mankind’,	our	choice	to	pursue	sensual	pleasure	and	indulge	our	passions	had	overwhelmed	the	ability	of	natural	reason	to	perceive	the	truth	and	to	choose	to	fulfil	our	obligation	to	act	according	to	it.	Both	Clarke	and	Balguy,	it	is	true,	most	frequently	made	the	claim	that	the	insufficiency	of	reason	applies	to	the	majority	of	mankind,	rather	than	the	explicit	assertion	that	no	one	was	ever	moved	to	a	moral	action	by	reason	of	its	having	been	understood	to	be	the	right	thing	to	do.	Clarke,	as	we	saw,	deemed	it	possible	that	a	very	few	excellent	‘ancients’	might	have	managed	this	very	occasionally,	but	that	same	natural	reason	remained	an	inadequate	source	of	motivation	for	even	sages	to	live	a	life	of	consistent	virtue.			Balguy	argued,	like	Clarke,	that	the	Stoic	claims	to	the	sufficiency	of	the	intrinsic	qualities	of	virtue	were	misguided,	given	the	sensible	elements	of	our	natures,	which	had	been	implanted	by	a	God	who	created	us	according	to	what	was	best	for	us,	given	his	total	comprehension	of	eternal	law.	Indeed,	Balguy	saw	himself,	in	the	Second	Part,	as	having	reconciled	the	truths	in	both	Stoic	and	Epicurean	positions,	and	to	have	done	so	in	a	way	that	respected	God’s	intention	in	creating																																																									427	Balguy,	Second	Part,	14-15.		428	Ibid.,	65.		
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us	rational	and	sensible.429	It	was	Balguy’s	particular	mission	to	explain	why,	given	that	we	were	created	with	the	dual	qualities	of	rationality	and	sensibility,	it	was	perfectly	acceptable	to	act	for	self-concerned	reasons	concerned	with	the	quality	of	our	immortal	lives	in	a	future	state.	He	refused	to	disbar	certain	duties	to	self-interest	from	the	moral	sphere.	These	were	not	social	virtues	(friendship,	gratitude,	natural	affection,	generosity,	public	spirit	and	compassion),	but	they	were	not	entirely	outside	of	the	moral	sphere	as	Hutcheson	had,	he	thought,	claimed.	Balguy	found	that	he	could	not	conclude	that	no	actions	can	be	morally	good,	which	are	solely	directed	to	private	interest.430		The	First	Letter	was	penned	anonymously	by	Balguy,	after	reading	the	
Characteristics,	to	complain	about	the	‘low	and	disadvantageous	account	he	has	given	of	those	religious	motives	which	both	reason	and	revelation	set	before	us.’431	Balguy	agreed	with	Shaftesbury	that	morality	could	‘in	no	way’	be	resolved	into	self-interest.	‘Interest	can	never	enter	into	the	nature	and	constitution	of	virtue,	yet	why	may	it	not	be	allowed	to	accompany	and	stand	beside	her?’		Self-interest,	thought	Balguy,	could	only	be	opposed	to	virtue	if	it	destroyed	benevolence.	If	we	destroyed	benevolence,	then	we	destroyed	virtue,	he	allowed.432		Balguy	here	showed	the	same	sort	of	pragmatic	attitude	to	moral	thought	that	Hutcheson	did	in	his	letter	introducing	the	Inquiry.	Hutcheson,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	maintained	that	whichever	beliefs	about	our	own	nature	and	the	nature	of	God	increased	benevolence	were	correct	beliefs.	Balguy	claimed	that	reasons	of	self-interest	could	only	be	opposed	to	what	we	thought	of	as	virtue	if	they	actually	decreased	the	amount	of	benevolence	that	resulted	from	their	being	held.			Balguy	insisted	that	virtue	and	the	rewards	of	virtue	(which	accrued	to	the	actor,	so	amounted	to	a	selfish	motivation	if	we	acted	to	reap	them)	should	not	be	considered	as	antithetical	to	one	another,	primarily	because	they	had	been	joined	together	by	God.	He	then	outlined	all	the	ways	in	which	knowledge	of	a																																																									429	Balguy,	Second	Part,	99-100.	430	Balguy,	First	Part,	5.	431	Balguy,	First	Letter,	5.		432	Ibid.,	10.		
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future	state	with	rewards	and	punishments	develops	and	enhances	our	benevolence,	and	prevents	us	from	sinning.	These	‘new	motives’	do	not	hinder	benevolence,	he	claimed,	since	a	‘strict	attention	to	self-good’	adds	to	our	enjoyment	of	virtue.	In	addition,	this	knowledge	promises	us	‘great	and	endless	happiness’	and	a	peaceful	and	tranquil	mind,	‘in	proportion	to	the	strength	of	our	hopes’.	Experience	and	observation	would	tell	us	that	this	knowledge	increases	our	goodness	of	temper,	‘endears’	us	to	one	another	and	moves	us	to	respond	with	gratitude	to	our	creator,	both	of	which	have	a	positive	practical	effect.	Truly,	to	live	without	these	hopes	‘would	strike	all	virtue	dead’	-	‘dejected	and	disconsolate’,	we	would	do	no	good	for	either	for	others	or	for	ourselves.433		In	short,	to	prescribe	and	preach	up	virtue,	without	a	future	state,	appears	to	be	no	otherwise	than	as	a	sort	of	religious	knight-errantry.	However	men	may	gaze	or	listen	for	a	while,	they	will	never	be	influenced	by	a	doctrine	that	is	carried	so	high,	as	to	be	above	the	principles	of	human	nature.434				The	other	difficulty	with	a	sole	appeal	to	the	intrinsically	appealing	qualities	of	virtue	was		‘how	small	a	proportion	of	mankind’	were	capable	of	discerning	them.		Shaftesbury’s	scheme	required	the	cultivation	of	tastes	unlikely	to	be	stirred	in	the	‘bulk	of	mankind’,	and	even	an	appeal	to	a	universal	moral	sense,	as	proposed	by	Hutcheson,	needed	to	be	‘cherished’	by	the	care,	attention	and	
practice	of	virtue	if	it	is	not	to	be	extinguished.435	Both	schemes	appeared	to	Balguy	to	be	insufficient	to	support	and	maintain	morality	in	most	of	us,	because	we	cannot	arrive	at	a	natural	knowledge	of	the	worth	of	virtue	by	‘abstract	reasonings	and	speculations’.	In	truth		to	expect	indeed	any	way	that	the	greatest	part	of	mankind	should	have	just	ideas	of	virtue	and	understand	its	worth;	is	to	expect	the	greatest	part	of	mankind	should	become	philosophers.436		
	Even	if	this	truth	were	perceived,	how,	Balguy	asked,	could	it	be	expected	to	operate	effectively	on	us?	‘What	slight	hold	would	such	intellectual	beauties	take	on	the	understanding	of	the	vulgar;	and	how	feebly	would	they	operate	upon	
																																																								433	Ibid.,	11-15.		434	Ibid.,	15.		435	Ibid.,	16-17.		436	Ibid.,	13.		
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them?’437	Whatever	it	is	that	motivates	us	to	an	action,	by	the	necessity	of	our	created	natures,	it	needs	to	work	strongly	on	our	‘gross	minds’	by	affecting	our	sense	and	passions.	What	better	method	then,	than	rewards	and	punishments	to	motivate	us	to	do	our	duty?	Direct	compulsion	was	‘inconsistent	with	our	nature’,	therefore	God	provided	us	with	these	more	suitable	motives.	The	necessity	of	these	motives	will	become	clear	when	we	recognise	‘a	great	part	of	mankind	as	deeply	engaged	in	sinful	courses’.	Reformation	could	not	be	left	either	to	our	(‘their’)	‘dark	and	depraved’	natural	reason	or	an	unsupported	moral	sense.	The	intrinsic	goodness	of	virtue	is	not	apparent	to	most	people.	Try	representing	‘to	a	vicious	man	the	beauty	of	virtue	and	you	speak	to	him	in	a	language	he	does	not	understand.’438			Vice	had	ruined	our	natural	understanding,	and	a	‘strong	attachment	to	sin’	is	produced	by	inclination	and	strengthened	by	practice.	The	only	truth	powerful	enough	to	penetrate	the	fog	of	depravity	is	a	truth	that	first	appeals	to	self-interest.	It	is	not	only	to	those	of	us	engaged	in	vice	that	a	future	state	of	rewards	and	punishments	acts	as	an	encouragement	to	virtue.	These	same	motives	that	work	on	sin	also	work	to	console	those	of	us	suffering	in	grief,	pain,	adversity	or	hardship.			Like	Clarke,	Balguy	found	the	Stoic	appeal	to	the	sufficiency	of	the	intrinsic	qualities	of	virtue	deeply	misguided.	These	motives	then,	supply	all	the	defects	of	our	nature	with	effective	motives	to	conduct	ourselves	virtuously.	Such	motives	are	not	a	social	virtue,	but	acting	upon	them	produces	virtue,	and	as	such,	they	are	necessary	for	virtue.		We	plainly	see	that	she	is	not	self-sufficient;	and	how	could	her	defects	be	better	supplied,	than	by	those	rewards	which	revelation	has	offered	men?439			They	are	‘auxiliaries’	to	virtue	to	be	sure,	but	they	are	no	less	necessary	to	the	practise	of	virtue.	In	reality,	if	we	took	away	all	the	actions	that	had	been	conducted	for	the	benefit	of	others	but	in	expectation	of	interest	to	ourselves,	‘the	remainder,	in	all	likelihood’	would	not	be	very	considerable.	Our	duty	and	interest	must	coincide	for	moral	actions	to	be	performed.																																																										437	Ibid.,	17.		438	Ibid.,	18.		439	Ibid.,	23-24.		
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‘Tis	vanity	and	presumption	in	him	to	slight	those	advantages	which	are	necessary	to	his	well-being.	On	the	other	hand	‘tis	mean	and	mercenary	to	pursue	those	advantages	alone.	To	prevent	both	God	has	closely	connected	our	duty	and	interest	and	interwoven	them	together.440	
	Wanting	to	please	God,	for	reasons	of	self-interest,	was	nothing	to	be	ashamed	of,	in	fact	it	rivalled	disinterest	for	the	claim	of	noblest	motive.		A	desire	to	please	the	supreme	being,	and	obtain	his	approbation,	is	so	wise	and	worthy	an	intention,	so	just	a	principle	of	action,	so	agreeable	to	the	dictate	of	right	reason,	and	the	genuine	inclinations	of	human	nature,	that	it	may	seem	to	rival	the	most	disinterested	love	of	virtue,	or	at	least	to	claim	a	place	very	near	it.441		
	What	the	‘exalted	mind’	of	Socrates	understood	was	that	to	separate	virtue	and	interest,	and	pursue	either	alone	was	to	act	not	only	against	our	own	natures	but	also	the	‘rules	of	found	wisdom’.	The	knowledge	that	at	the	crucifixion,	Christ	endured	his	position	‘for	the	joy	that	was	set	before	him’,	was	surely	enough	authority	and	assurance	that	anyone	could	want	that	‘the	mixed	principle	before	mentioned	is	perfectly	right’.442		Six	years	later	in	1732,	after	the	publication	of	his	First	and	Second	parts,	Balguy	added	a	postscript	to	the	unaltered	text	of	the	third	edition	of	his	Letter	to	a	Deist	(henceforth	Postscript).	In	it	he	wanted	to	clarify	that	whatever	he	had	said	about	the	usefulness	and	‘in	some	cases	absolutely	necessary’	rewards	offered	by	religion,	the	truth	remained	that	‘the	more	disinterestedly	the	agent	acts,	the	more	virtuous	he	is’.		Balguy	wished	to	retract	anything	that	he	had	said	which	was	contrary	to	the	notion	that,		the	highest	principle	of	a	moral	agent	is	a	love	of	virtue	for	virtue’s	sake;	as	his	chief	merit	is	to	pursue	and	practice	it	upon	its	own	account.443		This	indeed	is	God’s	perfection.	And	it	would	be	ours	too	except	that,	in	our	present	condition,	it	was	impractical	for	parts	of	our	duty	to	be	motivated	by	disinterested	love	of	virtue	alone.		
																																																								440	Ibid.,	24.		441	Ibid.,	26.		442	Ibid.,	27.	443	Postscript,	1732,	33.		
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Man	is	not	capable	of	so	perfect	and	exalted	a	course	of	virtue	.	.	.	at	least	not	in	his	present	condition.	Considering	the	indigence	and	infirmity	of	his	nature,	some	parts	of	his	duty	are	really	impracticable	on	the	foot	of	disinterest.444				Since,	 a	sensible	agent	can	no	more	be	indifferent	to	happiness	than	a	moral	agent	can	be	indifferent	to	rectitude.	They	must	therefore	be	reconciled	and	rendered	consistent;	which	in	many	cases	cannot	possibly	be,	without	support	and	influence	of	future	rewards.445		Given	that	it	is	in	our	nature	to	seek	happiness,	we	may	give	up	the	prospect	of	immediate	happiness	in	return	for	a	fuller	happiness	in	a	later	state,	but	for	God	to	require	a	person	to	give	up	happiness	altogether	(assuming	no	future	state)	would	be	to	require	him	to		renounce,	or	counter-act	the	principles	of	his	own	nature;	which	unavoidably	engage	him	in	the	quest	of	happiness,	at	the	same	time	that	they	incline	him	to	the	pursuit	of	virtue.446		Balguy	stated	that	virtue	or	moral	rectitude	could,	and	should,	be	considered	in	two	ways.	Either	it	could	be	regarded	in	itself,	as	an	eternal	rule	of	action	for	intelligent	beings,	necessarily	arising	from	the	nature	of	things,	its	own	dignity	and	beauty	must,	in	ordinary	cases,	recommend	it	to	uncorrupted	minds.447		Or	else	it	could	be	thought	of	as	religion,	or	‘the	will	and	command	of	the	supreme	legislator’,	and	as	such	must	be	enforced	by	reward	and	punishment.	Given	the	depravity	of	the	‘bulk	of	the	species’,	the	majority	of	us	need	to	be	governed	by	authority	and	‘managed	by	the	springs	of	hopes	and	fear’.	If		this	be	the	true	state	of	mankind,	as	must	be	acknowledged;	whoever	attempts	to	take	off	men’s	thoughts	and	regards	from	the	sanctions	of	religion	and	fix	them	entirely	on	the	natural	charms	of	virtue	will	in	all	probability	do	much	more	hurt	than	good.448																																																										444	Ibid.,	34.		445	Ibid.,	34.		446	Ibid.,	35.	447	Ibid.,	36.	448	Ibid.,	37.		
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It	should	also	be	emphasised	that	while	in	the	First	and	Second	Parts	Balguy	wrote	primarily	to	explain	the	foundations	of	moral	virtue	‘in	itself’,	he	made	here	the	same	argument	about	our	dual,	but	distinct,	existences	as	‘moral	agents’	and	‘religious	agents’.	In	the	Second	Part,	Balguy	complained	that	Locke	(and	others)	had	confused	the	two	by	founding	both	moral	virtue	and	religion	upon	the	will	of	God.	In	fact,	religion	and	moral	goodness		may	be	looked	upon	as	coincident,	both	in	respect	of	their	ultimate	ground,	and	the	agreement	of	their	precepts,	yet	upon	these	accounts	we	ought	not	to	confound	these	ideas,	which	are	themselves	distinct.449			God,	being	morally	perfect,	is	‘incapable	of	religion’.	In	our	case	although	those	moral	actions	performed	for	their	own	sake	are	‘the	purest	and	most	perfect’	that	we	are	capable	of,	but,	we	nonetheless	need	religion.	We	need	it	in	order	to	fulfil	all	our	duties	to	God,	which	call	for	some	of	the	same	actions,	but	which	derive	from	his	authority	as	our	governor,	who	wants	us	to	be	happy	in	our	immortal	state	‒	it	is	the	actual	performance	of	benevolent	action	that	is	important	to	God.	This	is	presumably	because	by	acting	for	the	good	of	others,	from	whatever	motive,	we	increase	happiness	on	earth	for	everybody,	which	is	his	aim.		The	actual	performance	of	the	action	is	what	Balguy	seems	to	think	is	paramount	in	meeting	the	demands	of	our	religious	agency.		The	perception	of	the	obligation	to	act	in	accordance	with	what	reason	tells	us	is	required;	it	is	what	is	paramount	in	meeting	the	demands	of	our	moral	agency.	In	terms	of	our	ability	to	fulfil	our	roles	as	moral	agents,	we	had	been	given	a	chance	to	use	our	natural	reason,	but	failed.	God	was	pleased	therefore	to	reinforce	virtue	with	religion,	to	give	men	new	light,	and	new	laws,	and	strengthen	these	laws	by	powerful	sanctions.450		Our	duty	to	behave	virtuously	is	in	fact	composed	of	two	separate	duties,	one	to	act	for	virtue’s	sake,	and	one	to	act	according	to	God’s	will.	Balguy	did	not	agree	with	Hutcheson	‘that	no	actions	can	be	morally	good,	which	are	solely	directed	at	private	interest’.451	He	appraised	the	reader	of	the	following	situation:		
																																																								449	Balguy,	Second	Part,	42.		450	Ibid.,	44.		451	Balguy,	First	Part,	5.		
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Whatever	pre-eminence	may	be	due	to	virtue,	on	account	of	its	intrinsic	excellence	and	dignity,	yet	the	authority	and	majesty	of	religion	seem	much	fitter,	and	more	effectual	to	restrain	licentious	men,	and	govern	a	degenerate	world.	Those	purer	beings,	which	are	of	an	order	superior	to	human	nature,	need	not	perhaps	any	other	rule	than	the	internal	one	of	reason	or	virtue;	but	our	frail	and	faulty	species	wants	both	another	law,	and	a	legislator,	to	curb	their	follies	and	vices,	and	keep	them	in	some	measure	within	the	bounds	of	their	duty.	452		Balguy’s	aims	were	three	fold	‒	to	explain	the	need	for	the	Revelation	of	the	Gospels,	to	encourage	his	readership	to	virtue,	and	to	insist	that	the	foundations	of	morality	did	not	rest	upon	the	arbitrary	will	of	God,	but	rather	upon	an	eternal	truth,	which	God	had	chosen	to	be	guided	by.		We,	being	less	than	perfect,	needed	the	obligations	of	religion	as	well	as	the	perception	of	our	moral	obligation	to	make	us	practice	virtue.			Balguy	argued,	in	the	First	and	Second	Parts,	against	Hutcheson,	that	we	could	not	count	an	action	from	instinctual	affection	moral,	at	some	length.	This	was	because	he	thought	that	acting	from	instinct	did	not	fulfil	our	obligations,	moral	(including	our	social	duties	and	duties	to	self)	or	religious	(to	obey	the	will	of	God).	He	also	said,	quite	clearly,	that	we	need	to	use	reason	to	discover	our	duties	and	perceive	our	obligations	and	that	virtue	consists	in	a	‘rational	determination’.453	The	closest	that	Balguy	comes	to	the	undifferentiated	practical	rational	claim	is	here,	when	Balguy	dealt	with	Hutcheson’s	claim	that	reason	could	not	excite	us	to	action.	Balguy	argued	that	a	rational	perception	of	virtue	leads	to	our	approbation	of	it	(because	it	is	a	rational	perception),	What	is	the	reason	exciting	a	man	to	the	choice	of	a	virtuous	action?	I	answer,	his	very	approbation	of	it	is	itself	a	sufficient	reason,	wherever	it	
is	not	over-ruled	by	another	more	powerful.454	[My	emphasis].		The	point	being	that	we	have	other	rational	approbations,	which	include	those	that	argue	for	our	rational	self-interest,	or	happiness.	Balguy	argued	that	we	have	a	non-reducible	rational	affection	for	the	‘rectitude’	of	actions	(their	‘honestum’,	not	their	‘pulchram’).		This	is	not	reducible	to	an	affection	for	self,	or																																																									452	Balguy,	Second	Part,	43.		453	Balguy,	First	Part,	13,	21.		454	Ibid.,	Balguy	had	rubbished	Leibniz’s	notion	of	sufficient	virtue	(which	Leibniz	claimed	was	undermined	by	Clarke’s	moral	necessity).		
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others,	and	we	may	be	excited	by	it.	‘The	end	of	rational	actions	and	rational	agents’,	Balguy	insisted	‘considered	as	such,	is	reason	or	moral	good’.455	But,	we	need	to	keep	in	mind	that	we	are	both	rational	and	sensible	agents	and	have	obligations	to	both	these	agencies.	The	sensitive	part	of	our	nature	demands	that	we	fulfil	our	obligations	to	the	will	of	God,	because	obedience	also	determines	our	happiness.	Indeed,		as	God	has	framed	our	natures	in	such	as	manner	as	makes	it	necessary	to	approve	and	pursue	both	these	ends,	we	may	infallibly	conclude,	that	he	does	not	intend	to	suffer	them	finally	to	interfere.456		I	do	believe	that	Clarke	and	Balguy	are	done	a	disservice	by	readers	whose	interpretative	strategy	leads	them	to	ignore	the	parts	of	Clarke	and	Balguy’s	argument	which	dealt	with	the	role	of	future	reward	and	punishment	This	approach	does	indeed	leave	them	looking	as	if	they	struggled	to	account	for	motivation,	as	Irwin	and	Schneewind	suggest.	They	didn’t	struggle	to	account	for	motivation;	they	just	did	so	in	a	way	that	later	commentators	have	not	always	deemed	valid,	or	interesting.			In	the	final	part	of	this	chapter,	I	will	explore	Burnet	and	Balguy’s	theistic	metaphysics	and	compare	their	arguments	with	those	presented	by	Hutcheson.	This	comparison	is	made	somewhat	difficult	because	I	have	presented	Hutcheson’s	arguments	as	they	were	found	across	texts	that	Burnet	and	Balguy	did	not	have	access	to.	Hutcheson,	however,	did	indicate	the	direction	of	his	thought	on	God’s	moral	attributes	in	the	four	treatises	and	Burnet	was,	of	course,	aware	of	Hutcheson’s	discussion	of	this	matter	in	his	letters	to	Burnet.	Burnet	and	Balguy	responded	to	these	arguments.	These	arguments	are	important	because	they	reveal	the	foundation	of	Burnet	and	Balguy’s	objection	to	Hutcheson’s	moral	theory.	Burnet	and	Balguy	objected	to	Hutcheson	founding	moral	goodness	on	the	benevolent	nature	of	the	Deity.	Burnet	insisted	that	God	aimed	at	our	happiness	because	eternal	law	stated	that	happiness	was	best.	God’s	moral	perfection	lay	in	his	always	conforming	his	will	to	his	understanding	of	what	was	right	(his	rectitude).	This	is	where	our	moral	goodness	lies	too,	but																																																									455	Balguy,	First	Part,	88.		456	Ibid.,	50.		
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our	less	than	perfect	natures	led	God	to	implant	kind	affections	to	help	us	act	for	the	happiness	of	others.	Balguy	made	the	same	arguments.		Burnet	on	God’s	moral	perfection	We	saw	in	the	previous	two	chapters	that	Hutcheson	had	maintained	that	God’s	creative	acts	were	made	in	conformity	to	his	understanding	of	what	would	be	best	for	us,	because	of	his	benevolent	nature.	God	retained	the	absolute	power	to	act	(prior	to	creation)	as	he	willed,	but	he	chose	not	to	act	against	this	understanding	in	his	acts	of	creation.	Burnet	equated	antecedent	fitness	with	the	situation	that	obtained	prior	to,	or	independent	of	God’s	creation.457	Hutcheson,	in	conversation	with	Burnet,	did	not	discuss	God’s	natural	power	(which	I	have	suggested,	for	Hutcheson,	equated	to	his	absolute	power	to	act,	not	the	choices	he	made	in	conformity	with	his	moral	nature).			Hutcheson,	in	reply	to	Burnet,	had	argued	that	God’s	moral	perfection	lay	in	‘something	like’	our	kind	affections	(as	far	as	we	are	able	to	comprehend	his	moral	nature).	Burnet	countered	that	the	value	of	universal	happiness	was	
understood	by	the	divine	intelligence.	This	understanding	in	fact	legitimised	God’s	benevolent	desires.		It	is	best	that	all	should	be	happy.	This	is	the	truth	a	conformity	to	which	makes	the	desire	of	public	good	reasonable	in	the	Deity,	and	I	add	in	all	rational	creatures	who	would	imitate	the	wisdom	and	goodness	of	the	Deity.458		Hutcheson	only	referred	to	the	communicable	perfections	of	God	in	his	
Metaphysics,	but	Burnet	saw	the	implications	of	Hutcheson’s	reference	to	God’s	kind	affections	as	exciting	him	to	action.	Burnet	saw	that	Hutcheson	referred	here	to	God’s	pleasure	in	his	kind	affections	as	exciting	God	to	action,	because	this	would	ground	God’s	communicative	decision	to	implant	analogous	affections	and	a	moral	sense	in	us.	But	God’s	happiness,	for	Burnet,	was	not	a	moral	reason	for	God	to	act.	God	is	esteemed	to	be	essentially	good	by	us	because	his	actions	conform	to	his	understanding.	
																																																								457	Burnet,	Correspondence,	220.		458	Ibid.,	233.		
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I	own,	indeed,	that	we	cannot	but	conceive	something	in	the	Deity	in	some	measure	analogous	to	our	kindest	affections	as	that	he	takes	infinite	pleasure	in	communicating	his	good	to	his	creatures.	But	this	consideration	leads	us	only	to	conclude	him	infinitely	happy	and	not	good	in	a	moral	sense.	We	esteem	him	essentially	good	because	he	knows	all	truth	and	always	acts	according	to	it.459		Moreover,	Burnet	argued	that	God’s	happiness	was	so	complete	as	a	result	of	his	perfect	ability	to	conform	his	will	to	his	understanding	that	he	did	not	require	the	assistance	of	affections	to	‘augment	his	disposition	to	do	right’.	God	stands	in	need	of	no	such	assistance	from	affections	to	redouble	his	happiness	and,	thereby	to	augment	his	disposition	to	do	right,	as	he	has	made	us	to	want	and	has	therefore	afforded	us.	And	as	he	does	not	stand	in	need	of	such	assistance,	so	neither	could	he	possibly	receive	it,	being	of	a	perfectly	independent	nature	whom	therefore	nothing	from	without	can	influence	or	act	upon.460			Burnet	and	Hutcheson,	I	suggest,	both	thought	that	God	had	decided	to	create	in	accordance	with	his	understanding,	but	they	thought	that	this	decision	was	not	motivated	by	his	benevolence.	For	Hutcheson,	God	saw	that	his	own	moral	perfection	was	his	benevolence.	God	had	chosen	to	communicate	this	to	us,	both	because	it	was	true	that	benevolence	was	a	moral	perfection	in	itself,	and	because	he	was	made	happy	by	it,	and	wished	to	share	that	happiness	with	us.	We	have	already	seen	Hutcheson’s	remarks	concerning	the	necessity	of	God’s	nature	not	reflecting	any	abridgement	of	his	freedom.	Burnet	also	thought	‘the	necessity	of	[God’s]	own	nature’	prompted	his	conforming	his	power	to	his	understanding.	It	was	not	God’s	love	for	us,	however,	or	his	kind	affections,	that	Burnet	claimed	constituted	the	necessary	part	of	his	moral	nature.	God	was	perfectly	happy	in	his	perfect	knowledge	and	his	unlimited	power	to	act	in	accordance	with	this	knowledge.			Burnet	appears	to	have	thought,	contrary	to	Hutcheson,	that	God’s	affection	or	love	for	us	was	not	communicated	by	him	to	us	as	a	moral	perfection,	but	rather	our	own	kind	affections	were	implanted	to	help	us	with	our	less	than	perfect	ability	to	conform	our	wills	to	our	understanding.	For	Burnet,	God’s	love	for	us	did	not	need	to	cause	his	creative	action,	because	that	was	not	what	constituted	his	moral	perfection	–	this	was	the																																																									459	Ibid.,	239.		460	Ibid.,	247.		
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rectitude	of	his	will.		We,	however,	required	the	assistance	of	kind	affections	as	a	motivational	aid,	but	they	did	not	constitute	our	moral	goodness	either.			I	believe	that	Burnet	may	have	followed	Clarke	here	and	that	the	comprehension	of	their	position,	and	Hutcheson’s,	is	enlarged	by	a	consideration	of	the	nature	of	God’s	moral	perfection.	I	suggest	that	Burnet’s	objection	is	that	Hutcheson	founds	divine	moral	perfection	in	an	affective	aspect	of	his	nature,	rather	than	it	being	in	his	nature	to	always	conform	his	will	to	his	understanding.	Burnet	however,	is	more	concerned	with	what	it	is	that	is	necessary	in	the	divine	nature	that	leads	God	to	always	obey	his	understanding,	not	whether	there	was	something	necessary	in	the	divine	nature	that	achieved	this	in	the	first	place.			Balguy	and	God’s	moral	perfection	Balguy	in	the	First	Part	offered	a	range	of	objections	to	Hutcheson’s	claims	that	virtue	consisted	in	benevolent	affections	(in	ourselves	and	in	God),	and	that	we	were	in	possession	of	a	moral	sense	which	enabled	us	to	receive	ideas	of	moral	goodness.			Balguy’s	objections	to	moral	goodness	consisting	in	instinct	or	affection	were,	as	might	be	supposed,	grounded	in	an	objection	to	actions	of	natural	necessity	being	counted	as	moral.	Necessity	for	God,	Balguy	thought,	could	mean	one	of	two	things,	either	he	was	necessarily	determined	by	the	reason	of	things,	or	by	a	necessary	disposition	of	his	nature	(his	benevolence,	for	example).	If	God	was	determined	by	the	latter	this	was	not	a	moral	perfection.		The	‘blind	instinct’	of	brutes	could	not	be	a	factor	at	work	in	a	perfect	being.	God	must	have	decided	to	act	benevolently	for	the	reason	that	it	was	the	best	thing	to	do,	not	through	an	impulse	of	love	towards	us,	or	an	unavoidable	inclination,	in	order	for	us	to	
consider	him	perfect.461	Balguy	then	gave	a	range	of	examples	that	demonstrated	how	we	place	a	lower	moral	value	on	behaviour	issuing	from	love	rather	than	duty.	Instincts	and	affections	were	legitimate	auxiliaries	to	reason,	instinct	being	a	kind	of	‘infant	virtue’,	which	would	lead	us	to	a	place	where	reason	could	assume	command.	He	also,	frequently	and	with	a	variety	of	rhetorical	flourishes,																																																									461	Balguy,	First	Part,	4-10.		
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put	forward	the	objection	that	it	was	‘ignoble’	for	virtue	to	be	founded	on	sense	and	instinct.462				Balguy	took	up	Hutcheson’s	comment	that	there	was	‘nothing	surpassing	the	natural	power	of	the	Deity’	directly.	Balguy	argued	that		it	was	no	more	in	the	power	of	the	Deity	to	make	rational	beings	approve	of	ingratitude,	perfidiousness	etc.,	than	it	is	in	his	power	to	make	them	conclude	that	a	part	of	any	thing	is	equal	to	the	whole.463		I	have	argued,	in	a	previous	chapter,	that	this	was	not	Hutcheson’s	point	here.	I	argued	that	Hutcheson	opposed	natural	to	moral	power	and	that	the	exercise	of	God’s	natural	power,	without	his	moral	power,	would	have	entailed	that	he	also	abandoned	his	understanding	of	eternal	law	in	creation.	Quite	why	God’s	natural	power	would	never	be	exercised	in	this	way	was,	of	course,	due	to	his	moral	perfection.	Balguy,	however,	would	not	have	been	aware	of	the	full	drift	of	Hutcheson’s	argument	here.			In	another	tract	Balguy	expressed	his	views	in	more	detail.	In	his	Divine	Rectitude	of	1733,	Balguy	insisted	that	the	‘narrowness	of	our	minds’	entailed	that	we	could	never	really	know	the	full	extent	of	God’s	perfections.	Balguy,	however,	thought	that	whatever	these	perfections	might	be,	they	could	be	subsumed	under	the	idea	of	his	moral	rectitude.	This	amounted	to	God’s	‘determining	himself	by	moral	fitness,	or	acting	perpetually	according	to	the	truth,	nature	and	reason	of	things’.464	Balguy	objected	here,	again,	to	the	notion	that	God’s	moral	perfection	lies	in	the	‘supposition	of	such	a	natural	propension’	as	his	benevolence.	This	was	‘injurious	to	his	honour’	and	lessened	his	moral	excellence.	It	was	‘intrinsically	right	and	fit	to	communicate	happiness’,	and	the	production	of	happiness,	or	natural	good	must	be	preferable	to	its	non-production,	but	this	was	not	God’s	final	end.465		God’s	own	end	was	his	‘glory,	which	consists	in	his	own	approbation	of	his	works	and	actions.’466	This	was	not																																																									462	Ibid.,11-18.		463	Ibid.,	25.		464	John	Balguy,	Divine	Rectitude:	or,	a	Brief	Inquiry	concerning	the	Moral	Perfections	of	the	Deity,	
particularly	in	respect	of	Creation	and	Providence,	1733,	4.	Henceforth	Divine	Rectitude.	465	Balguy,	Divine	Rectitude,	10-11.	466	Ibid.,	12.		
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because	he	had	created	a	world	that	was	conducive	to	our	happiness,	which	was	only	a	subservient	end,	but	because	the	‘real	and	intrinsic	worth’	of	his	creation	was	‘amiable	in	the	sight	of	the	creator	himself’.467						This	chapter	has	explored	the	ways	in	which	Locke’s	perceptual	account	of	reason	gave	rise	to	Burnet	and	Balguy’s	claims	that	reason	was	our	inner,	and	moral	sense,	and	how	the	focus	on	our	experience	of	immediate,	affective	moral	reactions	led	to	their	claims	about	the	experiential	priority	of	reason	over	sense	perception	in	the	intuition	of	self-evident	moral	principles.	It	was	Balguy	who	objected	to	the	resulting	indistinctness	of	the	boundary	between	sense	and	reason,	or	intellect.	In	addition,	I	argued	that	Balguy	followed	Clarke	in	his	approach	to	motivation,	which	was	not,	in	fact,	something	either	of	them	could	be	said	to	struggle	with,	once	their	whole	approach	is	considered.	Lastly,	I	considered	their	objections	to	Hutcheson’s	account	of	benevolence	as	God’s	moral	perfection.			In	the	next	chapter	I	move	on	to	Gay,	who	protested	about	the	reliance	of	moral	theory	on	the	awareness	of	our	introspective	experience	in	moral	thought	and	motive,	this	picks	up	on	this	theme	discussed	in	some	detail	in	Chapter	4	on	Hutcheson.	Gay’s	chief	aim,	I	suggest	was	to	explain	how	the	rational	and	sensible	parts	of	our	nature	might	be	brought	together	in	a	unified	account	of	agency	that	saw	human	nature,	obligation	and	motive	bound	together	to	explain	the	possibility	of	virtue.	In	addition,	Gay	presented	a	theory	of	divine	motivation	that	moved	away	from	the	idea	of	God’s	communicable	virtues.			 		 	
																																																								467	Ibid.,	13.		
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Chapter	6		 John	Gay:	‘Resting	Places’		In	1731	Edmund	Law	appended	the	anonymous	Preliminary	Dissertation	
Concerning	the	Fundamental	Principle	of	Virtue	or	Morality	to	his	translation	of	William	King’s	work,	An	Essay	on	the	Origin	of	Evil.	468This	work	was	written,	as	it	turned	out,	by	Law’s	Cambridge	associate,	John	Gay.	Gay	was	heralded	by	Albee,	as	‘one	of	the	most	original,	even	if	not	one	of	the	profoundest,	thinkers	in	the	whole	development	of	English	ethics’.	In	the	Dissertation,	Albee	found	the	first	statement	of	the	‘utilitarian	principle	in	its	wholly	undifferentiated	form’.469			Gay’s	originality,	with	respect	to	the	precise	nature	of	his	theological	utilitarianism,	is	not	of	direct	concern	here.	My	concern	is	to	look	at	the	ways	in	which	Gay	responded	to	the	work	of	Clarke	and	his	defenders	and	to	Hutcheson,	with	respect	to	the	three	themes	that	the	thesis	is	concerned	with:	the	relationship	of	rationalism	to	obligation	and	motivation,	the	relative	roles	of	sense	and	judgment	in	moral	knowledge	(and	the	demand	that	motive,	ideas,	principles,	propositions	and	judgments	be	available	to	conscious	awareness),	and	the	theistic	metaphysics	used	to	support	arguments	about	realism	(with	particular	emphasis	on	God’s	communicative	attributes).	In	addition,	although	this	is	not	major	theme	in	itself,	as	has	been	the	case	in	the	preceding	chapters,	Locke’s	influence	will	be	made	apparent.	Locke	was	a	far	less	problematic	figure	for	Gay,	who,	like	Edmund	Law,	took	himself	to	be	following	Locke	in	his	approach	to	moral	matters.			Gay	has	been	selected	for	inclusion	in	the	thesis	because	he	took	himself	to	be	offering	a	synthesising	solution	to	the	threefold	discord	between	Clarke	and	his	supporters,	Hutcheson,	and	those	such	as	John	Clarke	of	Hull,	Archibald	Campbell	and	Law’s	group	at	Cambridge,	who	proposed	self-interest	as	the	sole																																																									468	William	King,	An	Essay	on	the	Origin	of	Evil,	trans.	Edmund	Law	(London:	Thurlbourn,	1731).	Henceforth	Origin.		469	Ernest	Albee,	“Review:	British	Moralists;	Being	Selections	from	Writers	Principally	of	the	Eighteenth	Century	by	L.	A.	Selby-Bigge,”	Philosophical	Review	8,	no.	1	(1898):	82-86.	See	also	his	
A	History	of	English	Utilitarianism,	1901.		
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principle	of	motivation	in	moral	action.470	Gay	proposed	a	model	of	rational	action	that	consisted	of	a	four-part	theory	of	obligation,	and	he	identified	each	obligation	with	a	particular	‘inducement’,	which	promised	to	affect	our	happiness	as	individuals.	He	explained	both	our	experience	of	‘public	affections’	as	the	motivation	for	other-directed	actions,	and	our	experience	of	approbation	of	beneficent	actions,	or	benevolent	characters	as	supervening	on	more	a	fundamental	principle	of	private	happiness.	Gay	rejected	the	accounts	of	moral	obligation	provided	by	Clarke,	Burnet	and	Balguy,	and	Hutcheson.	He	also	overruled	Hutcheson’s	appeal	to	evidence	from	introspection,	as	to	our	motivation	and	moral	approval	or	disapproval,	on	the	grounds	that	we	need	to	go	beyond	our	immediate	awareness	in	order	to	uncover	the	‘fundamental	principle	of	virtue	or	true	morality’.	Gay’s	explanation	of	motivation	and	approbation	relied	on	the	operation	of	the	principle	of	the	association	of	ideas,	the	specification	of	which	Gay	attributed	to	Locke.				To	see	why	Gay	believed	his	account	capable	of	synthesising	the	approaches	of	Clarke,	Burnet	and	Balguy	and	Hutcheson,	attention	must	be	paid	to	Gay’s	understanding	of	what	it	was	that	God	had	communicated	to	us	via	his	act	of	creation.	To	understand	Gay’s	position,	it	will	be	necessary	to	discuss	the	work	of	Edmund	Law	and	William	King.471		This	will	be	the	focus	of	the	next	section	of	the	chapter.	The	subsequent	section	will	deal	with	Gay’s	account	of	motivation.	The	final	section	will	look	at	Gay’s	objection	to	introspection	as	a	method	in	moral	philosophy,	and	the	nature	of	the	associative	process	that	he	held	
																																																								470	Gay	is	also	included	because,	as	Garrett,	has	recently	been	at	pains	to	point	out,	Gay’s	work	has,	to	date,	been	underexplored	in	the	secondary	literature.	Although	I	do	not	discuss	it	directly	here,	I	have	had	sight	of	a	PDF	of	Garret’s	recent	very	helpful	(to	me)	and	insightful	talk	on	Gay	-	“A	Lockean	Revolution	in	Morals.”	Paper	presented	at	the	John	Locke	Conference,	Department	of	Philosophy,	University	of	Pittsburgh,	April	11th,	2015.		Gay	is	also	discussed	briefly	in	Christian	Maurer,	“Self-Interest	and	Sociability,”	in	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	British	Philosophy	in	the	
Eighteenth	Century,	ed.	James	A.	Harris,	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013),	304-105,	and	Carey,	“Hutcheson	and	the	Scottish	Enlightenment,”	49-50,	and	Irwin	Development,	Vol	II,	825-827.	Gay	has	received	some	attention	in	the	literature	on	David	Hartley,	as	he	is	the	figure	named	by	David	Hartley	as	the	inspiration	for	Hartley’s	own	associative	theory	of	mind.	See	Richard	C.	Allen,	David	Hartley	on	Human	Nature	(New	York;	State	University	of	New	York	Press,	1999),	chapter	7,	265-296.			471	Gay	mentioned	Hutcheson	by	name,	and	he	discussed	the	approach	of	those	who	appealed	to	fitness	and	unfitness,	and	distinguished	their	approach	from	that	of	Wollaston.	He	did	not	refer	to	Clarke,	Burnet	or	Balguy	by	name.		
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responsible	for	our	apparent	experience	of	benevolent	instincts	and	a	moral	sense.				King,	Law	and	Gay	and	divine	communication			Edmund	Law	first	published	his	translation	of	William	King’s	De	Origine	Mali,	together	with	his	own	set	of	footnotes	in	1731.	King’s	foremost	concern	was	theodicy.		Law’s	footnotes	were	designed	to	shepherd	the	reader	towards	Law’s	own	views	on	a	range	of	topics,	which	included	epistemology,	and	the	nature	of	our	abstract	ideas.472	Law,	who	took	himself	to	be	following	Locke,	denied	the	abstract	notions	of	space	and	time	any	real	existence	outside	of	our	own	ideas.473		Law’s	target	here	was	Clarke	and	his	defence	of	Newton.	Law	was	part	of	a	wider	group	at	Cambridge	who	all	objected,	for	somewhat	different	reasons,	to	Clarke’s	attempt	to	demonstrate	what	they	saw	as	‘Newton’s	God’,	and	Clarke’s	use	of	the	a	priori	as	a	means	of	demonstrating	the	first	cause	and	his	incommunicable	attributes.474			When	it	came	to	the	‘general	powers	and	properties	of	human	nature’,	Law	had	also	looked	to	Locke.475	In	Law’s	opinion,	the	views	of	Locke	and	Clarke	here	were	incommensurate,	not	least	because	of	Clarke’s	founding		all	our	moral	knowledge,	on	certain	innate	instincts,	or	absolute	fitnesses	(however	inconsistent	these	two	terms	may	appear),	the	former	[Locke’s	approach]	being	wholly	calculated	to	remove	them.476		Presumably,	although	he	does	not	explain	this	further,	Law	found	Clarke’s	self-evident	moral	principles	operationally	equivalent	to	an	appeal	to	innate																																																									472	Law’s	concerns	were	not	simply	broader	than	King’s-	on	occasion	they	held	opposing	views,	for	example	Law	removed	the	section	where	King	defended	the	existence	of	innate	ideas.	See	John	Stephens,	“Edmund	Law,”	166.			473	Ayers	has	argued	for	a	realist	reading	of	Locke’s	ideas	of	space	and	time,	as	Young	points	out,	Young,	Religion	and	Enlightenment,	88.	Moore	has	argued	that	Hutcheson,	in	his	Metaphysics,	used	his	own	realist	reading	of	Locke	to	counter	Law’s	thesis	with	an	argument	for	the	real	existence	of	space	and	time.	See	Moore,	introduction,	LMNSM,	xxiv.	474	Clarke’s	particular	demonstration	of	the	divine	attributes	of	immensity	and	eternity	were	closely	associated	with	Newton’s	understanding	of	the	universe	as	containing	the	real	entities	of	absolute	space	and	time	(Clarke	deemed	space	and	time	‘coeval’	with	the	existence	of	God).	See	Young,	Religion	and	Enlightenment,	83-119,	and	on	the	separation	between	the	reception	of	Locke	and	Newton	in	early	eighteenth-century	Cambridge,	with	respect	to	Clarke’s	work.			475	Edmund	Law,	“Preface,”	in	An	Essay	on	the	Origins	of	Evil,	by	William	King,	5th	Edition,	Revised	(London:	Faulder,	1781),	xvi.	Law	named	(only)	Locke	as	‘one	of	my	chief	guides’.			476	Ibid,	xix	
 196 
instincts.	Locke,	as	Law	knew,	had	denied	the	existence	of	both	innate	and	self-evident	propositions	as	practical	principles	where	they	were	supposed	to	guide	us	unknowingly,	or	unquestioningly,	towards	moral	good.477			Law	argued,	again	on	the	basis	of	his	reading	of	Locke,	that	the	nature	of	our	abstract	ideas	of	space	and	time	was	such	that	they	did	not	allow	us	to	assert	the	real	existence	of	God’s	incommunicable	properties	of	immensity	or	eternity,	as	(Law	believed)	Clarke	had	suggested	they	did.	When	it	came	to	the	relationship	between	God’s	communicable	attributes	and	his	creative	activity,	both	King,	and	Law	argued	against	the	view	taken	by	Balguy	that	was	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter.	To	recap:	-	Balguy	insisted	that	God	had	created	the	world	for	his	own	final	end,	which	was	in	fact,	his	own	glory.	The	creation	was	not	(just)	the	result	of	divine	benevolence,	as	Hutcheson	had	argued.	Balguy	maintained	that	God’s	glory	could	only	be	satisfied	by	the	creation	of	something	intrinsically	good,	and	not	just	something	that	would	make	us	happy.	Making	himself,	or	indeed	us,	happy,	Balguy	declared,	was	only	one	of	God’s	subservient	ends	in	creation.	King	and	Law	shared	the	assumption	made	by	Clarke	and	Hutcheson	(discussed	in	chapter	3),	and	Burnet	and	Balguy,	that	since	God	was	perfect	and	his	creative	powers	unlimited,	he	neither	needed,	nor	wanted	for	anything.	King	argued	however,	that	this	meant	that	God	did	not	create	for	his	own	advantage,	which	included	his	own	glory.478	King	admitted	that	Scripture	tells	us	that	‘the	world	was	made	for	the	glory	of	God’,	but	argued	that	this	was	falsely	considered	as	analogous	to	man’s	own	desire	for	glory	to	God.	479	The	correct	interpretation,	King	claimed,	is	that	although	God’s	communicable	attributes,	his	power,	goodness	and	wisdom,	‘shine	forth	as	clearly	in	his	works	as	if	he	had	no	other	intent	in	making	them	beside	the	ostentation	of	these	attributes’,	God’s	real	aim,																																																									477	Locke	denied	that	innate	speculative	principles	could	operate	to	produce	a	particular	truth	without	our	being	aware	of	their	content.	In	addition	he	claimed	that	there	were,	in	fact,	no	self-evident	moral	principles	because	we	could	always	ask	why	they	should	be	followed	as	rules.	The	comparison	that	Law	drew	between	Clarke’s	self-evident	principles	and	innate	principles	is	awkward	(as	he	acknowledged	here)	because	Clarke,	like	Burnet,	did	not	differentiate	between	speculative	and	practical	principles	in	the	way	that	Locke	did.	For	Clarke	and	Burnet,	an	
obligation	to	perform	an	action	arose	from	the	perception	that	an	action	was	fit	to	be	performed	because	it	accorded	with	the	eternal	relations	between	the	different	natures	of	things.		478	King,	Origin,	52	-54.	479	See	Stephens,	“Edmund	Law,”	for	a	summation	of	King’s	views,	167.	(Stephens	does	not	discuss,	Clarke,	Balguy	or	Hutcheson.)		
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or	end,	in	creation	was	to	communicate	his	power	and	goodness	in	order	to	make	us	happy.	480	He	had	done	this	by	creating	‘a	world	with	the	greatest	goodness’.	What	King	meant	by	‘good’	here,	he	explained,	was	a	natural	good	for	us,	that	could,	if	used	properly,	make	us	happy.		By	good,	I	here	understand,	that	which	is	convenient	and	commodious,	that	which	is	correspondent	to	the	appetite	of	every	creature.481		Law	also	took	the	view	that	God	had	communicated	his	power	and	goodness	to	us,	by	the	exercise	of	his	will,	in	making	a	world	in	which	we	were	capable	of	being	happy.482	God	had	created	the	conditions	under	which	we	may	freely	choose	to	make	ourselves	happy,	in	either	this	world	or	the	next,	by	obeying	his	will.483	Neither	Hutcheson	nor	Clarke,	nor	Burnet	or	Balguy,	would	have	disagreed	with	this.	But	they	argued	that	God	had	communicated	his	goodness	(his	benevolence	or	his	rectitude)	to	us,	by	creating	us	with	an	analogous	form	of	goodness	as	a	potential	of	our	own	nature.		This	is	not	what	Law,	or	his	associate	John	Gay,	claimed.			Hutcheson	had	insisted	that	God	communicates	his	own	moral	perfection,	which	we	understand	to	be	benevolence	or	irreducible	kind	affections,	by	creating	us	capable	of	similar	kind	affections	and	of	recognising	them	as	moral	good	(and	after	observation	and	reflection,	by	extension	and	enlargement,	capable	of	understanding	that	benevolence	is	God’s	moral	perfection).	God’s	goodness,	for	Hutcheson,	is	not	reducible	to	God’s	desire	to	communicate	that	goodness	in	order	that	either	he,	or	his	creatures,	is	made	happy,	although	this	is	a	result	of	it.	It	is	important	to	emphasise	again	that	for	Hutcheson,	participating	or	sharing	directly	in	divine	love	itself,	through	the	activity	of	the	Holy	Spirit,	is	not	the	method	whereby	the	communication	of	God’s	goodness	is	achieved	(as	it	had	been	in	reformed	accounts	of	the	operation	of	the	Trinity).	Our	benevolence,	for	
																																																								480	King,	Origin,	54	481	Ibid.,	55.	482	Law,		“The	Translator’s	Preface,”	in	An	Essay	on	the	Origin	of	Evil,	by	William	King	(London:	Thurlbourn,	1731)	ix.		483	Law	develops	his	argument	on	freedom	here	across	the	editions.	See	Stephens,	“Edmund	Law,”	168.		
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Hutcheson,	is	only	analogous	to	God’s.	484	Clarke	and	Balguy	argued	that	God’s	moral	perfection	lies	in	the	unalterable	rectitude	of	his	will,	and	that	this	too	constitutes	the	basis	for	our	moral	ability.	Again,	for	Clarke	and	Balguy,	the	nature	of	God’s	moral	perfection	is	communicated	to	us	–	we	ought	to	be	able	to	understand	that	our	knowledge	of	an	action	as	‘fit’	means	that	it	ought	always	to	be	performed,	and	we	ought,	therefore,	to	always	perform	it.	Clarke	and	Balguy	believed	that	that	perfection,	or	some	appropriately	analogous	degree	of	it,	had	been	potentially	achievable	by	us,	at	least	prior	to	the	Fall.	However,	as	I	argued,	they	maintained	that	it	had	been	proven	to	God	that	we	had	chosen	to	ruin	our	understanding	and/or	the	ability	to	conform	our	will	to	that	understanding.	We	therefore	needed	revelation	to	comprehend	a	range	of	other	truths	(the	existence	of	a	future	state,	for	example),	which	would	help	motivate	us	to	behave	in	a	way	that	would	ultimately	be	acceptable	to	God	(irrespective	of	the	true	nature	of	moral	goodness).				Gay	followed	Law	(and	King)	on	the	question	of	God’s	motivation	and	his	aims	in	creation.	King,	Law	and	Gay	supposed	that	God’s	goodness	is	known	(outside	of	revelation)	through	observation	of	natural	good	in	the	world,	and	the	potential	for	happiness	that	it	offers	us.	Law	offered	the	following	observation:	When	I	enquire	how	I	got	into	this	world,	and	came	to	be	what	I	am,	I’m	told	that	an	absolutely	perfect	being	produced	me	out	of	nothing,	and	placed	me	here	on	purpose	to	communicate	some	part	of	his	happiness	to	me,	and	to	make	me,	in	some	measure,	like	himself.485		Gay	and	Law	both	argued	that	God’s	happiness,	and	his	goodness	led	him	to	communicate	that	happiness	to	us.	They	did	not	make	an	argument	from	the	nature	of	the	divine	will	(i.e.	in	terms	of	its	rectitude	[Clarke],	or	its	necessary	determination	by	his	loving	nature	[Hutcheson])	that	supposed	that	the	nature	of	his	moral	perfection	was	found,	in	some	small	analogous	way,	in	human	nature.	Gay	argued,	it	seems	to	me,	that	what	is	communicated	to	us	in	creation,	is	what	God	wills	us	to	do	(i.e.	the	content	of	divine	command),	and	of	course,	the																																																									484	See	Danaher,	A	World	For	All?	181	on	the	difference	between	Hutcheson’s	use	of	the	distinction	between	communicable	and	incommunicable	virtues,	and	the	more	traditional	understanding	of	this	division	that	occurred	in	the	context	of	metaphysical	arguments	to	do	with	the	Trinity.			485	Law,	“The	Translator’s	Preface,”	in	Origin,	iv	
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fact	that	it	is	the	command	of	an	all-powerful	being.		Gay	said,	very	clearly,	that	for	us	as	sensible	and	rational	agents,	who	were	created	to	respond	to	pleasure	and	pain,	that		‘happiness	is	the	general	end	of	all	actions’.486	He	did	not	say	that	happiness	is	the	general	end	of	all	God’s	actions,	quite	possibly	because	he	thought	that	God’s	general	ends	in	their	entirety	had	not	been	disclosed	to	us,	but	he	believed	that	God’s	aims	in	creation	were	directed	towards	our	happiness.487				Gay	took	the	notion	of	God’s	communicable	attributes	away	from	a	consideration	of	virtue	as	a	facet	of	our	nature	that	echoed	the	moral	perfection	of	the	divine	nature	(benevolence,	or	the	ability	to	conform	will	to	understanding	of	what	was	right,	or	fit,	regardless	of	whether	our	own	interests	were	harmed	by	acting	this	way),	towards	the	idea	of	us	as	beneficiaries	of	God’s	own	happiness,	who	were	created	needing	each	other	in	order	to	increase	the	‘sum	of	pleasures’	available	to	us,	in	order	that	we	might	be	happy,	and	that	God	might	see	his	happiness	reflected	back	to	himself.			Clarke	and	his	defenders,	Hutcheson,	Law	and	Gay,	all	agreed	that	God	wanted	us	to	be	happy,	and	that	being	virtuous	would	make	us	happy,	if	not	in	this	life	then	the	next.	There	was	also	an	agreement	that	God’s	communication	of	his	goodness	to	us,	in	whatever	form	or	forms	it	took,	made	him	happy	(although	this	was	not	a	necessary	part	of	his	motivation).	Their	differences	lay	in	their	understanding	of	what	God’s	moral	perfection	consisted	of,	and	his	method	of	communication.	For	Hutcheson	this	communication	is	achieved	by	implanting	analogous	benevolent	instincts.	For	Clarke,	Burnet	and	Balguy,	it	is	achieved	by	granting	us	sufficient	natural,	moral	knowledge	and	a	free	will	that	ought	to	be	used	to	produce	behaviour	consistent	with	that	knowledge	(and	was	originally	capable	of	being	used	to	that	end).	Burnet	and	Balguy	agreed	that	we	had	been	granted	natural	affections	for	others,	which	were	not	reducible	to	self-interest,	but	these	natural	affections	had	been	gifted	to	us	as	a	motivational	aid,	rather	than	being	constitutive	of	moral	goodness	itself	(which	was	rectitude).		For	Gay,	this																																																									486	Gay,	Dissertation,	xxv.	487	Ibid.,	xix.	
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communication	is	achieved	by	creating	us	with	a	will	that	responds	to	the	reasoned	appreciation	of	that	which	we	believe	will	lead	to	our	own	private	happiness.			Gay	did	not	directly	discuss	the	difference	in	position	between	himself,	Clarke,	Burnet	and	Balguy,	and	Hutcheson	on	the	question	of	God’s	communicable	attributes.	Gay	believed,	apparently,	that	the	competing	moral	schemes	proposed	by	Hutcheson	and	Clarke	and	his	defenders	were	not	rival	accounts	at	all.	He	appears	to	have	understood,	not	without	justification,	that	their	schemes	all	relied,	in	some	real	way,	upon	our	fundamental	need	to	make	ourselves	happy	in	this	or	a	future	world,	and	that	God	had	willed	our	happiness	(whatever	his	motive	for	doing	so),	and	that	by	being	virtuous	we	would	make	both	God	and	ourselves	happy.			Gay	claimed	that	the	differences	between	himself	and	other	moralists	arose	because	the	general	idea	of	virtue	had	not	been	agreed	upon,	and	because	they	had	used	the	wrong	rule,	or	criterion,	to	judge	whether	or	not	an	action	agreed	with	this	general	idea	of	virtue.	Gay’s	explanation,	as	we	shall	see,	relied	upon	a	general,	complex,	idea	of	virtue	that	included	the	notions	of	obligation	and	approbation,	and	upon	a	range	of	proximal	and	distal	criteria	used	to	decide	whether	an	action	is	virtuous	or	not.	Gay’s	refusal	to	accept	Hutcheson’s	claim	that	we	need	to	be	introspectively	aware	of	any	true	principle	of	motivation	in	order	for	it	to	act	as	a	practical	principle	also	played	a	large	part	in	his	account	of	moral	motivation	and	approbation.	The	following	section	will	examine	Gay’s	attempt	to	synthesise	various	moral	systems	with	his	own	approach.		Particular	attention	will	be	paid	to	Gay’s	treatment	of	the	question	of	our	motivation	for	virtue.			Gay,	moral	ideas,	motivation	and	obligation		Edmund	Law,	Daniel	Waterland,	Thomas	Rutherforth	and	Thomas	Johnson	all	opposed	the	curtailment	of	divine	power	that	they	thought	Clarke's	commitment	
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to	the	necessary	and	immutable	dictates	of	eternal	law	required.488	Gay	was	a	representative,	along	with	others	who	followed	Law	at	Cambridge,	of	a	group	who	sought	to	advance	the	‘interested	scheme’.	Its	supporters	asserted	that	the	pursuit	of	happiness,	or	the	avoidance	of	pain,	provided	us	with	the	only	possible	motivation	for	acting,	and	that	benevolence	was	a	duty	we	performed	in	order	to	advance	our	own	happiness	(whether	we	were	aware	of	this	motivation,	or	not).	They	worked	from,	or	at	least	shared,	Locke’s	basic	model	of	motivation	in	human	behaviour.	Locke	had	allowed	only	two	innate	practical	principles	in	his	account	of	action.		Nature,	I	confess,	has	put	into	man	a	desire	of	happiness,	and	an	aversion	to	misery:	these	indeed	are	innate	practical	principles,	which	(as	practical	principles	ought)	do	continue	constantly	to	operate	and	influence	all	our	actions	without	ceasing.489		Locke,	in	fact,	also	allowed	a	small	collection	of	behavioural	dispositions	or	specific	character	traits,	which	are	formed	in	utero,	but	neither	these,	nor	any	innate	principles,	of	any	kind,	were	held	to	incline	us	towards	either	moral	goodness	or	moral	evil.490		The	particular	task	that	Gay	set	himself	in	the	Dissertation	was	to	explain	how	the	schemes	put	forward	by	Clarke	and	his	defenders	and	Hutcheson,	and	others	including	Wollaston,	and	unnamed	others,	could	in	fact	be	subsumed	under	his	own	approach.491	Gay	began	his	Dissertation	with	something	that	sounds	very	much	like	a	reference	to	‘two-parts	of	ethics’	that	we	saw	proposed	by	Bacon,	Henry	More,	and	Locke	in	the	introductory	chapter.	I	suggested	that	this	distinction	-	between	our	knowledge	of	how	we	ought	to	live	to	please	God	and	secure	our	eventual	happiness	(usually	adequate)	and	the	appropriate	motive	or	means	required	to	bring	this	behaviour	about	(usually	inadequate)	-	reflected	the	overriding	concern	of	philosophers	of	the	period	which	was	to	show	how	we	could	achieve	virtue.	The	two	parts,	in	Locke’s	particular	formulation,	were	the																																																									488	See	Stephens,	“Edmund	Law,”	163-173.		489	Locke,	ECHU,	1:3:3,	67.		490	Although	we	were	also	naturally	inclined	to	form	habits	of	thought	and	action	which,	if	not	carefully	regulated,	would	lead	us	to	vice.	This	is	the	lesson	and	theory	behind	Locke’s	approach	to	moral	education.	See	John	Locke,	Some	Thoughts	Concerning	Education,	ed.	John	W.	and	Jean	S.	Yolton	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1989).		491	See	Dissertation	xi.	Wollaston	is	named	and	discussed	at	xx.	
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‘rule’	(which	was	generally	agreed	upon)	and	the	‘true	motives	to	practice’	(which	were	generally	not).	Gay	began	thus:	Though	all	writers	of	morality	have	in	the	main	agreed	what	particular	actions	are	virtuous	and	what	otherwise,	yet	they	have,	or	at	least	seem	to	have	differed	very	much,	both	concerning	the	criterion	of	virtue,	viz	what	it	is	which	denominated	any	actions	virtuous,	or	so	to	speak	more	properly,	what	it	is	by	which	we	must	try	any	actions	to	know	whether	it	be	virtuous	or	no,	and	also	concerning	the	principle	or	motive	by	which	men	are	induced	to	pursue	virtue.492			Gay	believed	that	the	agreement	between	various	authors	over	which	actions	were	virtuous,	in	the	context	of	apparent	differences	in	their	statements	about	what	virtue	itself	was,	could	be	accounted	for	by	their	use	of	a	‘different	criterion	(though	they	did	not	know	or	attend	to	it)’	from	the	principle	they	professed	to	use	in	order	to	identify	a	particular	action	as	virtuous.493		More	charitably,	Gay	thought,	this	situation	might	have	arisen	from	semantic	confusion.	This	confusion	was	the	inevitable	result	of	the	nature	of	our	moral	ideas,	which	Gay	identified	as	Locke’s		mixed	modes,	or	compound	ideas	arbitrarily	put	together,	having	at	first	no	archetypes	or	original	existing,	and	afterwards	no	other	than	which	exists	in	other	men’s	minds.	Now	since	men,	unless	they	have	these	their	compound	ideas,	which	are	signified	by	the	same	name,	made	up	precisely	of	the	same	simple	ones,	must	necessarily	talk	a	different	language,	and	since	this	difference	is	so	difficult,	and	in	some	cases	impossible	to	be	avoided,	it	follows	that	greater	allowance	and	indulgence	ought	to	be	given	to	these	writers	than	any	others.494		As	I	suggested	in	chapter	1,	it	was	partly	Locke’s	claims	about	the	constructed,	compounded	nature	of	our	moral	ideas	and	the	semantic	instability	of	moral	terms	that	was	the	necessary	result	of	their	make-up,	which	led	Hutcheson	to	look	to	the	model	of	sense	perception	as	a	source	of	our	common,	non-composite,	primitive	moral	ideas.	Gay	however,	embraced	the	necessary	diversity	of	opinion	that	Locke’s	mixed	moral	modes	were	able	to	account	for.	He	thought	that	the	constructed	nature	of	these	ideas	entailed	that	opposing	moral	schemes	would,	in	fact,	be	resolvable	into	his	version	of	the	interested	scheme,	once	agreement	could	be	reached	over	the	‘confused	notion	of	virtue	in	general.’																																																										492	Gay,	Dissertation,	xi.	493	Ibid.,		xi.		494	Ibid.,	xii.		
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	However,	Gay	noted,	even	the	full	specification	of	the	simple	ideas	which	went	towards	the	final	compound	of	a	mixed	mode	could	not	tell	us	how	to	decide	whether	a	particular	action	was	in	fact	an	instance	of	a	particular	virtue.	(If	temperance	was	a	virtue,	for	example,	how	would	we	know	whether	a	particular	action	was	temperate	or	intemperate?).	Gay’s	point	was	that	the	compound	idea	of	virtue	could	not	contain	its	own	measure,	or	rule,	or	criterion.	This,	as	we	saw	in	chapter	4,	was	Locke’s	counter	argument	to	Thomas	Burnet’s	moral	sense.	Locke	insisted	that	in	moral	cases	we	need	a	rule	to	judge	by,	we	could	not	simply	have	an	idea	of	moral	good	which	both	(somehow)	includes	a	statement	of	the	moral	good	and	a	judgement	that	an	action	is	an	instance	of	that	moral	good,	unless	that	idea	is	considered	(illegitimately)	as	innate,	or	it	is	produced	(again	illegitimately)	by	the	operation	of	an	innate	proposition,	or	principle	that	we	are	unaware	of.			Hutcheson’s	moral	ideas	may	have	been	the	target	here	for	Gay	(although	Gay	doesn’t	state	this	directly).	Just	as	a	Lockean	simple	idea	of	sweet	could	only	report	sweet	and	not	bitter,	or	a	simple	idea	of	willing	could	only	tell	us	that	we	willed	(and	not	doubted),	so,	(and	given	that	Hutcheson	himself	had	drawn	the	parallel	with	Lockean	simple	ideas	of	reflection),	an	idea	of	moral	approbation	could	only	identify	moral	approbation.	As	discussed	in	chapter	4	however,	somehow	the	principle	that	‘benevolence	is	morally	approvable’	is	also	contained	within	that	idea,	or	produces	that	idea.		Gay	insisted	that	we	needed	an	external	criterion	or	rule	which	did	not	contain	the	idea	of	virtue	itself,	in	order	to	judge	whether	an	action	was	virtuous	or	not.		Gay	defined	the	general	idea	of	virtue	as	composed	of	elements	that	‘everyone,	or	most,	put	into	their	idea	of	virtue’	–	that	is,	that	it	implied	‘some	relation	to	others’,	and	an	obligation	to	choose	the	action,	and	that	the	actions	were	deserving	of	approbation.	Virtue	is	the	conformity	to	a	rule	of	life,	directing	the	actions	of	all	rational	creatures	with	respect	to	each	other’s	happiness,	to	which	conformity	
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everyone	in	all	cases	is	obliged	and	every	one	that	does	so	conform,	is	or	ought	to	be	approved	of,	esteemed	and	loved	for	so	doing.495		The	criterion	of	virtue	was	whatever	rule	of	life	obliged	us	to	obey	it.	It	is	important	to	note	that	for	Gay,	the	criteria	by	which	we	judge	whether	a	particular	behaviour	is	virtuous	also	contains	a	motivational	element	–	it	is	a	rule	of	life	and	derived	ultimately	from	an	authority.	The	immediate	criterion	of	virtue	was	the	will	of	God.	More	specifically	it	was	that	part	of	God’s	will	concerned	with	our	actions	relating	to	others.496			Since	the	‘happiness	of	mankind	is	the	criterion	of	the	will	of	God’,	Gay	continued,	so	it	should	be	ours.	He	argued	that	it	is	evident	from	observation	of	the	good	in	the	world,	and	from	the	happiness	we	take	from	it,	that	God	has	willed	our	happiness.	That	our	happiness	depends	upon	one	another’s	behaviour	is	also	observable.	Therefore,	Gay	maintained,	we	understand	that	it	is	clearly	God’s	will	that	we	act	to	secure	happiness	for	each	other,	as	far	as	we	are	able.			Now	it	is	evident	from	the	nature	of	God,	viz	his	being	infinitely	happy	in	himself	from	all	eternity,	and	from	his	goodness	manifested	in	his	works,	that	he	could	have	no	other	design	in	creating	mankind	than	their	happiness,	and	therefore	he	wills	their	happiness,	therefore	the	means	of	their	happiness,	therefore	my	behaviour	as	far	as	it	may	be	a	means	of	the	happiness	of	mankind	should	be	such.497			Gay	then	argued	that	the	criterion	for	the	happiness	of	others	was	discoverable	by	reason	considering	the	‘relations	of	things	(which	relations,	with	respect	to	our	present	inquiry,	some	have	called	their	fitness	or	unfitness)’.498	What	Gay	meant	by	this,	he	explained,	was	that	some	things	were	‘apt	to	produce	pleasure,	others	pain,	some	are	convenient	and	others	inconvenient’.	When	we	judge	things	as	
they	really	are	(i.e.	correctly),	then	this	reflects	the	operation	of	‘Right	Reason’	(which	means	reason	getting	it	right,	presumably).499	This,	very	obviously,	was	not	what	Clarke	or	Burnet	or	Balguy	would	have	accepted	as	‘Right	Reason’.	Their	account	had	reason	discovering	the	eternal	relations	between	the	eternal																																																									495	Ibid.,	xvii	496	Ibid.,	xvii	–	xviii.	497	Ibid.,	xix.	498	Ibid.,	xix.	499	Ibid.,	xx.		
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natures	of	things	that	were	governed	by	eternal	laws,	and	not	simply	discovering	those	things	that	tended	to	produce	pleasure	or	pain	in	us,	or	were	convenient	or	inconvenient	to	us.	Moreover,	although	Gay	did	claim	that	we	were	virtuous	when	we	conformed	our	will	to	an	understanding	of	what	was	morally	correct	(which	was	to	act	for	one	another’s	happiness),	unlike	Clarke,	Burnet	and	Balguy,	Gay	claimed	that	the	fulfilment	of	a	moral	obligation	to	act	in	the	interests	of	others	was	motivated,	or	induced	in	the	first	place,	by	a	concern	to	raise	esteem	or	approbation,	but	it	was	also	more	fundamentally	a	matter	of	self-interest,	because	‘God	only	can	in	all	cases	make	a	man	happy	or	miserable’.500			Gay	considered	that	we	have	various	obligations,	which	are	all	‘rules	of	life’,	that	could	be	differentiated	by	the	manner	in	which	those	obligations	were	induced	in	us.		 Obligation	is	the	necessity	of	doing	or	omitting	any	action	in	order	to	be	happy,	i.e.	where	there	is	such	a	relation	between	an	agent	and	any	action	that	the	agent	cannot	be	happy	without	doing	or	omitting	that	action,	the	agent	is	said	to	be	obliged.	So	obligation	is	evidently	founded	upon	the	prospect	of	happiness.501			Gay	claimed	that,	by	perceiving	the	natural	consequences	of	things	according	to	the	fixed	law	of	nature,	we	understand	our	natural	obligations.	We	perceive	the	consequences	of	our	actions,	in	terms	of	societal	response	(‘that	arising	from	merit	or	demerit,	as	producing	the	esteem	and	favour	of	our	fellow	creatures,	or	the	contrary‘)	-	these	are	our	obligations	‘usually	titled	virtuous’.502	Our	civil	obligations	derive	from	perceiving	the	authority	of	the	magistrate,	and	lastly	our	religious	obligations	arise	from	the	perceiving	the	authority	of	God.	The	first	three	of	these	however,	are	properly,	subsumed	under	the	fourth,	since	‘a	full	and	complete	obligation	which	will	extend	to	all	cases,	can	only	be	that	arising	from	the	authority	of	God’.503	Thus	Gay	argued	that	the	immediate	criterion	of	virtue	was	the	will	of	God	-	not	the	whole	will	of	God,	but	that	portion	of	it	that	issued	rules	directing	our	behaviour	with	respect	to	other	people.	The	criterion	of	the	will	of	God	was	the	happiness	of	mankind.	The	criterion	for	the	happiness																																																									500	Ibid.,	xix.	501	Ibid.,	xviii.	502	Ibid.,	xviii.	503	Ibid.,	xix.		
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of	mankind,	for	us,	was	reason,	or	experience	informing	us	of	what	was	likely	to	produce	pleasure	or	pain	for	others	or	ourselves.				Balguy,	as	we	saw	in	the	previous	chapter,	had	also	argued	that	we	were	under	more	than	one	obligation.		Balguy	had	supposed	that	there	were	two	sources	of	obligation	–	moral	and	religious.	Balguy	though,	kept	the	two	obligations	separate	in	terms	of	the	authority	from	which	they	were	derived.	He	insisted	that	our	obligations	to	our	present	and	future	happiness	were	religious	duties	to	be	fulfilled	in	order	to	comply	with	the	will	of	God.	Our	moral	obligations,	however,	were	derived	entirely	from	our	rational	appreciation	of	the	fitness	or	correctness	of	an	action,	irrespective	of	the	benefit	of	that	action	to	ourselves,	or	indeed	to	others	(insofar	as	we	knew).	The	actual	motivation	for	the	performance	of	a	moral	action,	for	Balguy,	would	properly	have	been	both	the	will	of	God	and	eternal	law,	but	there	were	two	separate	obliging	authorities.	Gay	thought	that	Hutcheson,	Clarke,	Burnet,	Balguy	or	indeed	anyone	who	did	not	bring	the	will	of	God	directly	into	their	account	of	obligation,	including	moral	obligation,	had	failed	to	explain	how	we	could	be	obliged,	or	would	act	in	a	way	that	would	harm	our	own	interests.504	Gay	agreed	that	specific	moral	actions	could	very	well	produce	an	immediate	diminution	of	our	own	private	happiness	(including	loss	of	life)	and	that	moral	actions	were	undertaken	with	the	understanding	that	this	would	be	the	result.	Those	such	as	Clarke,	Burnet	and	Balguy,	who	drop	the	happiness	of	mankind,	and	talk	of	relations,	the	fitness	and	unfitness	of	things,	are	still	more	remote	from	the	true	criterion	of	virtue.	For	fitness	without	any	relation	to	some	end	is	scarce	intelligible.505				Clarke	and	Balguy,	as	discussed	here	and	in	chapters	2	and	5,	considered	our	self-concerned	motivation	(as	opposed	to	our	moral	obligation)	for	action	as	rightfully	dependent	upon	the	will	of	God.	Burnet	too,	actually,	had	argued	that	fit	was	a	‘relative	word	expressing	the	relation	of	means	to	an	end’	and	that	the	end	of	a	moral	action	was	also	the	will	of	God.	He	had	done	so	in	his	exchange	of	letters	with	Hutcheson	(and	had	been	ticked	off	by	Hutcheson	for	bringing	the	Deity	into	such	matters.)506	Burnet	explained	that	the	‘perfectly	wise	and	good’																																																									504		Ibid.,	xxi.	505		Ibid.			506	Hutcheson	to	Burnet,	Correspondence,	228		
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God	had	created	us	according	to	eternal	law,	and	that	our	happiness	‘must	be	the	chief	end	for	which	the	wise	and	good	author’	had	brought	his	rational	creatures	into	being	–	in	this	sense	the	end	of	other-directed	actions	was	the	will	of	God.	However,	Burnet	went	on,	the	reason	why	God	sought	to	make	us	happy	was	that	happiness	itself	was	a	reasonable	end	as	specified	by	eternal	law.	It	was,	since	we	had	some	access	to	that	part	of	eternal	law	that	governed	our	own	concerns,	therefore	fit	and	reasonable	to	us	that	we	should	act	to	make	one	another	happy.	God,	being	wise	and	good	had	provided	with	the	‘natural	affections	leading	to	this	end’.	These	are	benevolent	affections	that	are	not	reducible	to	self-interest,	because	they	do	not	need	to	be.	They	just	need	to	be	a	reasonable	means	(for	God)	to	his	reasonable	end	(our	happiness).	To	the	question	‘Why	ought	the	public	good	to	be	sought	after?’	Burnet	answered	‘because	it	is	fit	to	accomplish	the	wise	end	of	the	creator	to	make	all	his	creatures	happy	that	it	should	be	so.’	‘Why	is	that	end	to	be	regarded?’	Burnet	replied	‘because	it	is	a	wise	and	reasonable	end.’	‘Indeed	the	fitness	of	means	to	an	end	lay	no	obligation	but	the	end	is	reasonable.’507	So,	for	Burnet,	the	will	of	God	was	indirectly	the	end	to	which	fitnesses	aim.	Burnet	would	not	have	accepted	Gay’s	account	unless	Gay	had	also	made	it	clear	that	God’s	goodness	lay	in	the	rectitude	of	his	will	(his	always	conforming	his	actions	to	that	which	is	reasonable	according	to	eternal	law).			To	consider	the	arguments	of	Clarke	and	his	defenders	and	Hutcheson	on	Gay’s	terms,	we	can	see	that,	the	criterion	for	the	will	of	God,	for	Clarke,	Burnet	and	Balguy,	was	the	reasonableness	of	his	desire	and	will	for	our	happiness,	and	not	simply	‘the	happiness	of	mankind’.	For	Hutcheson	too,	once	the	arguments	in	the	
Metaphysics	are	read	alongside	the	four	treatises,	we	can	see	that	the	criterion	for	the	will	of	God	would	have	been	that	his	motive	was	benevolent,	which	was	‘praiseworthy	in	itself’,	and	not	just	because	the	(always	successful)	results	of	that	intention	cause	the	happiness	of	mankind.508	It	is	important	to	note	that	it	is	not	entirely	clear	how	Gay	(whose	Dissertation	is	the	only	work	known	to	be	his)	dealt	with	the	question	of	what	gave	God	the	moral	authority,	as	opposed	to	the																																																									507	Burnet,	Correspondence,	221.		508	Hutcheson,	Metaphysics,	175.		
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bare	power,	to	command	us.	I	presume	that	he	would	have	argued	that	God’s	goodness	(known	through	observation	of	the	world)	secured	this,	but	as	I	have	suggested,	this	goodness	is	not	explained	in	this	short	work,	further	than	the	assertion	of	God’s	power,	desire	and	ability	to	make	us	happy.			Gay,	introspection	and	the	association	of	ideas	Just	as	Law	had	deemed	Clarke’s	absolute	fitnesses	to	be	equivalent	to	innate	instincts,	so	Gay	charged	Hutcheson’s	moral	theory	with	either	advancing	‘the	doctrine	of	innate	ideas’,	or	offering	an	account	of	our	moral	abilities	that	were	too	mysterious	to	comprehend	(‘it	relishes	too	much	of	that	of	occult	qualities’).509	Gay	agreed	with	Hutcheson,	just	as	Gilbert	Burnet	and	Balguy	had	done,	that	something	we	might	call	a	moral	sense	existed	(‘a	power	or	a	faculty’).	But	although		it	is	necessary	in	order	to	solve	the	principle	actions	of	human	life	to	suppose	a	moral	sense	(or	what	is	signified	by	that	name)	and	also	public	affections,	but	I	deny	that	this	moral	sense,	or	these	public	affections,	are	
innate	or	implanted	in	us.	They	are	acquired	either	from	our	own	
observation	or	the	imitation	of	others	.510	[My	emphasis.]		Gay	complained	that	Hutcheson’s	explanation	of	both	the	reliably	observed	tendency	of	agents	to	act	against	their	own	best	interests,	and	the	equally	reliably	observed	inability	of	agents	to	say	why	they	approved	as	they	did	in	moral	cases,	stopped	short	of	a	full	explanation.	He	found	Hutcheson’s	appeal	to	an	implanted	moral	sense	and	‘natural’	kind	affections	to	be	mistaken,	because,	he	argued,	Hutcheson	had	failed	to	look	beyond	our	introspectively	available	experience.	Hutcheson	had	assumed	innate	or	implanted	abilities	to	act	in	the	interests	of	others	and	to	approve	such	motivations	and	actions.	In	so	doing,	Gay	claimed,	Hutcheson	had	missed	the	true,	original,	principle	behind	our	election	and	approbation	of	actions.		This	ingenious	author	is	certainly	right	in	his	observations	upon	the	insufficiency	of	the	common	methods	of	accounting	for	both	our	election	and	approbation	of	moral	actions,	and	rightly	infers	the	necessity	of	supposing	a	moral	sense	(i.e.	a	power	or	faculty	whereby	we	may	perceive	any	action	to	be	an	object	of	approbation,	and	the	agent	of	love)																																																									509	Gay,	Dissertation,	xiv.	Carey	also	discusses	Gay’s	charge	of	innatism	to	Hutcheson,	Locke,	
Shaftesbury,	and	Hutcheson,	49-50.		510	Gay,	Dissertation,	xxxiii.		
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and	public	affections,	to	account	for	the	principle	actions	of	human	life.	But	then	by	calling	these	instincts,	I	think	he	stops	too	soon,	imagining	himself	at	the	fountain-head,	when	he	might	have	traced	them	much	higher,	even	to	the	true	principle	of	all	our	actions,	our	own	happiness.511		As	we	have	seen,	Gay	insisted	that	the	real	principle	behind	choice	of	actions	was	in	fact	the	agent’s	private	happiness,	based	on	the	inducements	offered	by	actions	considered	obligatory.512	The	original	principle	behind	our	approbation	of	an	action,	or	actor,	Gay	insisted,	was	reason	pointing	out	the	prospect	of	that	private	happiness.513	The	fundamental	principle	of	private	happiness	in	both	cases	needed	to	be	uncovered,	or	better,	recovered	by	us,	since	it	was	not	apparent	to	us	by	immediate	introspection	into	our	motives,	or	judgements.			The		‘grand	objection’	to	his	scheme,	Gay	acknowledged,	was	that,	when	we	act	in	the	interests	of	others,	or	when	we	approve	the	intentions,	or	actions	of	an	agent,	we	are	not	generally	aware	that	we	select	or	approve	an	action	because	it	will	tend	to	our	private	happiness.	In	fact	we	may	very	well	not	be	able	to	supply	any	reason	for	election	or	approbation	other	than	that	it	seemed	the	‘right’	course	of	action	to	undertake	or	motive	to	approve.	As	Gay	admitted,	the	assumption	here	was	that		if	the	grateful	or	compassionate	mind	never	thought	of	that	reason,	it	is	no	reason	to	him.514			Gay	did	not	find	virtue	‘inconsistent	with	acting	upon	private	happiness’,515	(although	acting	purely	from	self-interest	was	‘prudent	but	not	virtuous’.)516	He	argued	that	when	we	acted	virtuously	we	ought,	or	deserved	to	receive,	the	merit	or	esteem	of	others.	The	expected	procurement	of	this	merit,	or	esteem,	could	be	a	motive	in	itself	for	the	performance	of	an	action	(presumably	where	we	did	not	have	an	idea	of	the	more	immediate	criterion	of	the	action	as	commanded	by	God),	but	this	did	not	mean	that	we	did	not	also	experience	the	sorts	of	affections	towards	others	that	Hutcheson	(and	Clarke,	Burnet	and																																																									511	Ibid.,	xiv.	512	Ibid.,	xxv.	513	Ibid.,	xiv.		514	Ibid.,	xxiv.		515	Ibid.,	xxv.	516	Ibid.,	xvii.	
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Balguy)	claimed	we	experienced.		Gay	understood	that	although	we	experienced	kind	affections	towards	others,	and	experienced	the	motivation	to	make	them	happy,	such	estimable	feelings	actually	originated	in	a	more	fundamental	concern	for	private	happiness.517			Gay	explained	the	occurrence	of	public	affections	in	the	following	way:	Our	happiness	on	earth	depended	upon	the	actions	of	other	people	(the	voluntary	actions	of	rational	agents).	We	therefore	approve	of	others	acting	in	our	interests	because	this	is	likely	to	increase	our	happiness	-	hence	we	approve	other-directed	actions	and	the	benevolent	agents	behind	them.	Then,	Gay	slipped	in,	because	we	also	desire	what	we	approve,	so	we	desire	‘the	happiness	of	any	agent	who	has	done	us	good’,	take	pleasure	in	this,	and	anticipate	the	pleasure	that	the	agent’s	happiness	will	bring	them.518	This	was	not	inconsistent	with	Hutcheson’s	claim	that	our	virtue	raised	kind	affections	and	esteem	or	complacence	in	the	recipients	of	our	beneficence,	but	Hutcheson	had	insisted	that	acting	to	procure	esteem	or	the	expected	return	of	feelings	detracted	from	the	virtue	of	an	action.	When	Gay	said	that	our	obligation	‘usually	titled	virtuous’	arose	from	the	expected	procurement	of	‘esteem	and	favour	from	our	fellow	creatures’,	he	did	not	need	to	insist	that	we	acted	solely	from	this	motive	-	we	could	also	genuinely	desire,	and	experience	the	desire	for,	the	happiness	of	others.	The	basis	of	our	feelings	of	love	and	concern	for	others,	however,	originated	in	their	ability	to	act	in	our	interests.	Indeed	Gay	made	it	clear	that	our	obligation	to	that	agent	extended	no	further	than	her	intention	to	act	in	our	interests.	519	An	argument	from	undisclosed	nature	of	the	selfish	origin	of	our	moral	motivation	is	what	Hutcheson	would	have	found	unacceptable.			As	we	saw	in	chapter	3,	Hutcheson	insisted	that	we	had	to	have	introspective	awareness	of	our	motivation	in	order	for	it	to	motivate	us	directly.	Gay	described	the	objection	thus:	
																																																								517	Hutcheson’s	objections	to	this	argument	were	discussed	in	chapter	3.		518	Gay,	Dissertation,	xxiv.		519Ibid.,	xxiv.		
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That	reason	or	end	of	every	action	is	always	known	to	the	agent,	for	nothing	can	move	a	man	but	what	is	perceived.520		Gay	accused	Hutcheson	of	faulty	reasoning	here.	Gay	maintained	that	arguing	for	the	existence	of	instinctive	public	affections,	(because	that	is	what	introspection	reveals	to	us	as	motive),	or	an	implanted	moral	sense,	(because	we	can’t	say	why	we	approve	of	benevolence	or	public	affections),	is	to	argue	‘ad	ignorantiam’	or	‘a	remotione’.521	Gay	did	not	elaborate	on	his	comment,	but	there	are	various	versions	of	this	fallacy	(the	argument	from	ignorance).522	They	involve	the	complaint	that	an	absence	of	evidence	or	proof	(of	a	more	fundamental	principle	behind	election	and	approbation	that	we	are	not	aware	introspectively	of,	for	example)	is	not	evidence	of	absence	(that	a	fundamental	principle	does	not	exist,	for	example).		A	form	of	the	fallacy,	or	a	related	fallacy,	is	the	argument	from	self-knowing,	or	introspective	awareness.	This	fallacy,	familiar	to	many	psychologists,	is	described	(in	Wikipedia)	as	follows	
1. If	P	were	true	then	I	would	know	it;	in	fact	I	do	not	know	it;	therefore	P	cannot	be	true.	2. If	P	were	false	then	I	would	know	it;	in	fact	I	do	not	know	it;	therefore	P	cannot	be	false.	523		This	is	the	root	of	Gay’s	complaint	to	Hutcheson	–	just	because	we	are	not	aware	that	our	true	motive	is	private	happiness	(or	that	our	approbation	of	virtue	was	originally	the	result	of	‘reason,	pointing	out	private	happiness’524),	it	does	not	mean	that	this	is	not,	in	fact,	our	true	motive	(for	action	or	approbation).				Gay	agreed	with	Hutcheson	that	we	approve	of	motives	and	actions	that	aim	at	the	happiness	of	others.	However,	he	argued	that	this	was	because		in	the	pursuit	of	truth	we	don’t	always	trace	every	proposition	whose	truth	we	are	examining,	to	a	first	principle	or	axiom,	but	acquiesce,	as	soon	as	we	perceive	it	deducible	from	some	known	or	some	presumed	truth.525																																																										520	Ibid.,	xviii.	521	Ibid.,	xiv.		522	Locke	has	his	own,	idiosyncratic	formulation	of	this,	ECHU,	4:17:19,	686.		523	Wikipedia,	“Argument	from	Ignorance,”	accessed	29th	March	2017.	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_ignorance	524	Gay,	Dissertation,	xiv.	525	Ibid.,	xxix	
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	Rather	than	‘run	everything	to	the	fountain-head’,	and	because	of	the	narrowness	of	our	minds,	we	employ	a	heuristic	and		choose	out	certain	truths	and	means	of	happiness,	which	we	look	upon	as	resting	places,	which	we	may	safely	acquiesce	in,	in	the	conduct	both	of	our	understanding	and	practice,	in	relation	to	the	one,	regarding	them	as	axioms,	in	the	other	as	ends'.526			This	practice	leads	us	to	mistake	intermediary	propositions	for	axioms	and	intermediary	ends	as	innate	principles	or	instincts.		It	is	important	to	understand,	though,	that	Gay	did	not	claim	that	his	fundamental	principle	operated	entirely	outside	of	our	conscious	awareness.	Gay’s	claim	was	that	we	had,	at	some	original	point,	been	aware	that	we	approved	the	actions	of	agents	that	were	directed	towards	our	own	happiness.	The	explanation	that	Gay	provided	is	that	in	thinking	about	our	motive	or	moral	judgments,	we	do	not	always	interrogate	them	sufficiently	to	uncover	the	more	fundamental	principle	behind	them.	With	respect	to	motive,	Gay	explained	that	we	habitually	settle	for	identifying	our	‘inferior	ends’	rather	than	seek	out,	or	recall	our	‘ultimate	ends’.527	For	example,	the	inferior	end	of	study	is	knowledge,	but	we	ultimately	seek	knowledge	because	it	tends,	or	we	believe	it	will	tend,	to	our	happiness	in	some	way.	So,	we	must	have	had	some	experience	of	knowledge	furthering	our	private	happiness,	or	we	may	reason	for	ourselves	that	it	is	likely	to	do	so.528	It	is	important	to	stress	that	Gay	did	not	claim	that	we	have	never	understood	that	knowledge	either	brought,	or	was	capable	of	bringing,	us	happiness.	He	does	not	suggest	unconscious	motivation	here,	rather	the	habitual	forgetting	of	an	original	insight,	together	with	the	operation	of	a	process	known	as	the	association	of	ideas.				The	case	is	really	this.	We	first	perceive	or	imagine	some	real	good,	i.e.	fitness	to	promote	our	happiness	in	those	things	we	love	and	approve	of.	Hence	(as	was	above	explained)	we	annex	pleasure	to	those	things.	Hence	those	things	and	pleasure	are	so	tied	together	and	associated	in	our	minds,	that	one	cannot	present	itself	but	the	other	will	also	occur.	And	the																																																									526	Ibid.,	xxx.	527	Ibid.,	xxv.		528	Ibid.,	xxv.		
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association	remains,	even	after	that	which	first	gave	them	the	connection	is	quite	forgot,	or	perhaps	does	not	exist.529			Gay	explained	that,	in	the	case	of	the	miser,	for	example,	her	attachment	to	money	is	formed	first	by	her	perceiving	the	goods	or	happiness	that	money	is	able	to	supply	her.	Pleasure	is	thus	associated	with	money	in	her	mind.	But	over	time	she	forgets	that	money	brought	her	pleasure	and	she	simply	associates	money	itself	with	pleasure.	She	then	seeks	to	amass	money,	without	intending	to	use	it	to	secure	her	the	goods	or	services	that	originally	brought	her	happiness,	because	the	money	itself	now	brings	her	‘the	phantastical	pleasure	of	having	it’.530			In	the	same	way,	by	the	process	of	association	we	come	to	love	or	approve	of	benevolence	itself,	because	the	original	increase	in	our	own	happiness	that	agents	acting	benevolently	produced	is	forgotten,	and	we	now	just	associate	pleasure	with	the	perception	of	benevolence,	either	as	our	own	intention	or	as	an	intention	in	others.	Our	instinctive	public	affections,	and	implanted	sense	of	moral	approbation,	are	really	just	the	experience	of	associated	pleasures	that	were	originally	associated	with	the	reasoned	perception	of	our	own	happiness.	At	the	very	end	of	his	Dissertation,	Gay	claimed	that	the	other	way	in	which	we	may	acquire	such	associated	pleasures	is	by	education,	or	through	the	imitation	or	observation	of	others	because	we	perceive	the	esteem	that	others	accord	us	when	we	imitate	them.531				In	eighteenth	century	British	philosophy	four	different	attitudes	towards	the	principle	of	association	of	ideas	were	taken.	These	were:	to	admit	it	as	a	principle	of	mind	but	to	construe	it	as	a	cause	of	comprehensive	error	in	human	understanding	(Locke),	or	as	a	source	of	deviance	from	innate	good	moral	or	aesthetic	sense	(Hutcheson)	(although	both	Locke	and	Hutcheson	do	allow	its	usefulness	in	language	acquisition	and	memory,	and	Locke	suggests	ways	in	which	it	may	be	put	to	good	use	in	early	years	education);	to	admit	it	as	a																																																									529	Ibid.,	xxx-xxxi.	530	Ibid.,	xxxi.	531	Gay,	Dissertation,	xxxiii.		
 214 
principle	of	mind	and	report	its	activity	as	both	beneficial	and	detrimental	to	the	construction	of	veridical	understanding	(Berkeley,	with	Hobbes	as	a	predecessor);	to	admit	it	as	the	single	unifying	principle	of	mind	(Hume,	Hartley,	Priestley),	or	to	deny	it	as	an	original		principle	of	mind	(Reid).	532	Whatever	Gay’s	later	influence	was,	I	do	not	believe	there	is	sufficient	evidence	in	the	
Dissertation	to	claim	that	Gay	took	association	to	be	the	single	unifying	principle	of	mind.	I	do	believe	however,	that	he	thought	that	God	had	implanted	this	principle	into	our	understanding	in	order	to	encourage	us	to	act	to	increase	public	happiness.			Locke	and	Hutcheson	were	vehemently	opposed	to	the	operation	of	associations	in	reasoning,	and	especially	moral	reasoning.533	Locke	had	argued	that	the	natural	tendency	of	our	ideas	to	become	habitually	or	customarily	associated	with	one	another	prevented	the	proper	supervision	of	judgment	that	the	understanding	ought	to	provide.		The	natural	(true)	correspondence	and	connection	of	our	ideas	would	never	be	discovered,	because	the	strength	of	these	associations	made	by	custom,	once	formed,	were	so	difficult	to	break.	The	immediate	and	binding	way	that	our	ideas	naturally	combine	or	recombine	make	this	process	highly	vulnerable	to	irrational	or	habitual	associations.	Once	formed	associations	are	difficult	to	distinguish	from	judgment	in	knowledge,	or	intuitive	knowledge	proper.	534			This	is	because,	as	discussed	in	the	introductory	chapter,	for	Locke	intuitive	knowledge	is	perceptual	in	character	-	we	simply	see	or	perceive	the	connection	between	ideas.	In	the	judgment	of	probable	belief	(which	is	what	our	understanding	is	most	concerned	with),	the	understanding	ought	to	voluntarily	exercise	governance,	but	the	strength	of	an	associative	connection	can	lead	to	our	most	deeply	held	beliefs	going	unscrutinised	by	judgment.	Locke	made	his	opposition	to	its	pervasive	influence	upon	the	understanding	pellucid.	I	shall	be	pardoned	for	calling	it	by	so	harsh	a	name	as	madness,	when	it	is	considered,	that	opposition	to	reason	deserves	that	name	and	really	is																																																									532	See	Martin	Kallich,	The	Association	of	Ideas	and	Critical	Theory	in	Eighteenth-Century	England	(The	Hague:	Mouton,	1970)	for	an	introduction	to	association	(but	who	does	not	offer	this	summary).		533	See	Gill,	“Association,”	for	Hutcheson’s	position.			534	Locke,	ECHU,	4:33:4-5,	395.		
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madness;	and	there	is	scarce	a	man	so	free	from	it	.	.	.	I	do	not	mean	when	he	is	in	power	of	unruly	passion	but	in	the	steady	calm	course	of	his	life	.	.	.	if	this	be	a	taint	which	so	universally	infects	mankind,	the	greatest	care	should	be	taken	to	lay	it	open	under	its	due	name,	thereby	to	exite	the	greatest	care	in	its	prevention	and	cure.	535	
	
	Gay’s	appeal	to	the	association	of	ideas	where	associations	are	formed	through	education	or	custom	allows	that	the	original	insight	into	our	own	private	happiness	only	devolves	as	far	as	the	perception	that	by	acting	in	a	particular	way	we	will	gain	esteem	from	those	we	admire.	In	his	general	account	of	an	original	act	of	reason	pointing	out	private	happiness,	Gay,	I	suggest,	comes	closer	to	adverting	to	Locke’s	account	of	unnoticed	inference	in	perception,	discussed	in	the	introductory	chapter	and	chapter	4.				Locke	insisted	that	ideas	that	are	associated	are	not	part	of	propositional	thought	–	they	are	merely	associated,	so	that	one	regularly	follows	the	other	into	our	mental	purview.	In	the	case	of	unnoticed	inference	in	three-dimensional	visual	perception,	Locke	wrote	that		this	in	many	cases,	by	a	settled	habit,	in	things	whereof	we	have	frequent	experience,	is	performed	so	constantly,	and	so	quick,	that	we	take	that	for	the	perception	of	our	sensation,	which	is	an	idea	formed	by	our	judgment;	so	that	one,	viz.	that	of	sensation,	serves	only	to	excite	the	other,	and	is	scarce	taken	notice	of	itself.536		S.	K.	Land	objects	to	Locke’s	account	here	because	he	believes	that	Locke	has	identified	the	mental	act	of	judgment	in	a	way	that	leaves	it	virtually	indistinguishable	from	that	of	the	association	of	ideas.537	It	may	be	difficult	to	distinguish	the	two	here,	but	Locke	and	Gay	pointed	to	an	original	act	of	judgment	that	has	become	habitual.	In	the	case	of	Locke,	in	the	domain	of	visual	perception	and	Gay,	in	our	approbation	of	actions,	an	original	veridical	judgment	is	made	which	is	later	forgotten.		In	this	way,	I	suggest,	Gay	thought	that	our	introspective	experience	of	approbation	itself	was	misleading,	but	only	insofar	as	God	had	intended	that	it	should	operate	to	encourage	us	‘in	the	conduct	of	our	understanding	and	practice’	to	act	for	one	another’s	happiness.																																																										535	Locke,	ECHU,	4:	33.4,	394.		536	Locke,	ECHU,	2:9:8,	145.	537		Land,	Philosophy	of	Language	in	Britain,	73.		
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	Gay’s	moral	theory	is	included	in	this	thesis	because	Gay	himself	believed	that	it	functioned	as	a	terminus	for	some	of	the	arguments	presented	by	the	other	authors	considered	here.	Gay’s	attempt	to	synthesise	the	approaches	of	Clarke	and	his	defenders	and	Hutcheson,	with	his	own	voluntarist	position,	relied	upon	their	shared	commitment	to	the	basic	principle	that	God	aimed	at	the	happiness	of	all,	and	that	therefore,	this	ought	to	be	our	aim	too.	There	is	no	talk	of	the	nature	of	God’s	communicable	attributes,	or	the	legitimacy	of	various	necessities	with	which	God	might	have	been	led	to	act	in	creation.	Gay,	I	suggest,	sought	to	reduce	the	terms	of	the	argument	with	respect	to	divine	action	to	something	that	all	could	agree	on	–	that	God,	because	of	his	goodness,	aimed	at	everybody’s	happiness,	and	that,	therefore,	we	ought	to	aim	at	everybody’s	happiness	too.				Gay’s	own	commitment	to	the	ultimate	authority	of	God’s	will	and	its	motive	effect	on	the	fulfilment	of	our	obligations,	would	have	been	rejected	by	Clarke	and	his	defenders	as	the	source	of	our	moral	obligation,	but	not	as	the	legitimate	source	of	our	own	motive	to	obey	what	we	knew	to	be	a	divine	command.	Hutcheson	similarly	would	not	have	disagreed	that	this	could	be	an	inducement	for	us	to	act.	By	stopping	at	the	notion	that	God	willed	our	happiness	because	he	was	good,	and	not	speculating	further	than	this	into	God’s	attributes,	or	his	motives	or	reasons	in	creation,	Gay,	I	suggest,	indicated	that	we,	as	moral	agents,	need	not	go	further	than	this	‘fundamental	principle’	behind	God’s	creative	activity,	in	order	to	see	how	and	why	God	had	made	virtue	possible	for	us.		Moreover,	Gay	sought	to	explain	how	the	different	principle	parts	of	our	nature	(the	sensible	and	the	rational)	might	be	brought	together	in	a	unified	account	of	agency	that	saw	human	nature,	its	motivational	apparatus	and	obligation	bound	together	to	explain	the	possibility	of	virtue.			Gay’s	multifactorial	model	of	moral	thought	and	action	used	elements	of	Clarke	and	Hutcheson’s	epistemology	to	explain	different	aspects	of	our	introspectively	available	moral	experience.	If	Gay’s	Dissertation	was	conceived	as	a	consensus	forming	exercise,	then	it	would	have	failed	here.		Neither	Clarke,	Burnet,	Balguy,	nor	Hutcheson	would	have	been	remotely	satisfied	with	Gay’s	theory.	Clarke	and	
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his	defenders	would	have	rejected	Gay’s	reductive	account	of	reason	as	a	method	of	anticipating	and	calculating	pleasure	and	pain.	Hutcheson	would	never	have	agreed	that	our	public	affections	could	be	reduced	ultimately	to	a	concern	for	self-interest.	Although	Hutcheson	very	clearly	thought	that	acting	for	the	sake	of	the	happiness	of	others	was	ultimately	in	our	best	interests,	the	idea	that	we	approved	of	benevolence	because	it	tended	towards	our	own	best	interests	was	something	that	he	railed	against	from	the	beginning	of	his	career.	But	Gay	was	concerned	with	outcome	–	the	good	produced,	and	Hutcheson	himself	had	admitted	that	we	cannot	be	sure	of	the	motives	of	others,	and	that	it	was	easier	to	work	backwards	from	the	outcome	of	an	action	to	discover	the	motive	of	its	agent.538			I	suggest	that	in	all	these	ways	Gay’s	theological	utilitarianism	was	designed	to	provide	us	with	the	most	straightforward	answer	to	the	question	of	how	God	had	made	it	possible	for	us	to	be	virtuous.	Moral	theory	did	not	need	to	concern	itself	with	theistic	metaphysics,	beyond	the	idea	of	an	all-powerful	creator	who	aimed	at	our	happiness.	Moreover	for	Gay,	although	our	ultimate	obligation	and	motive	for	a	moral	action	was	God’s	authority,	we	did	not	necessarily	need	to	realise	this	in	order	to	act	virtuously,	we	just	need	to	have	reasoned,	at	some	point,	that	it	was	in	our	best	interests	for	others	to	act	benevolently	towards	us,	in	order	for	us	to	approve	benevolence,	esteem	our	benefactor	and	then	to	seek	to	accrue	similar	esteem	for	ourselves	by	acting	benevolently.	This	perhaps	would	not	lead	us	to	heroic	acts	of	self-sacrifice,	but	the	associative	nature	of	our	ideas	would	ensure	the	divinely	intended	consequences	of	a	general	increase	in	human	happiness.						 	
																																																								538	Hutcheson,	Inquiry,	130.	
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Chapter	7		 Conclusion			The	broad	intention	of	this	thesis	was	to	investigate	the	ways	in	which	(some)	early	eighteenth-century	British	moral	philosophers	sought	to	account	for	the	possibility	of	virtue.	In	so	doing	my	intention	was	to	further	undermine	the	convention	that	British	moral	philosophy	of	this	period	is	best	conceived	as	a	struggle	between	rationalist	and	sentimentalist	epistemologies.	Over	the	course	of	the	preceding	chapters	I	aimed	to	establish	that	the	appropriate	interpretive	context	for	the	accounts	of	moral	epistemology	offered	by	Clarke,	Burnet,	Balguy,	Hutcheson	and	Gay	was	their	wider,	practical	concern	to	demonstrate	to	their	readership	the	various	ways	in	which	God	had	made	it	possible	for	us	to	be	virtuous.	I	argued	that	each	of	the	philosophers	situated	their	epistemology	within	the	wider	framework	of	an	attempt	to	prove	the	reality	of	virtue	in	the	sense	of	virtue	being	an	achievable	practical	endeavour.	The	ultimate	reality	of	virtue,	or	of	moral	good,	was	secured,	in	each	case,	by	an	appeal	to	theistic	metaphysics,	where	God’s	goodness	was	either	the	bare	fact	of	his	aiming	at	our	happiness	(Gay),	or	a	necessary	part	of	his	nature	(Hutcheson),	or	the	rectitude	of	his	will	(Clarke,	Burnet	and	Balguy).		I	believe	that	a	detailed	account	of	the	ways	in	which	these	authors	used	the	theory	of	God’s	communicable	attributes	is	missing	from	the	secondary	literature,	as	it	stands.			I	presented	reinterpretations	of	the	work	of	Clarke	and	Hutcheson,	whose	moral	philosophy,	I	suggested,	aimed	to	provide	solutions	to	the	problems	of	a	Christian	moral	life	lived	in	the	round,	rather	than	to	satisfy	the	Whiggish	demands	of	later	histories	of	autonomy	or	accounts	of	moral	cognitivism.	I	argued	that	Clarke,	Burnet	and	Balguy	did	not	propose	a	rationalist	account	of	epistemology	in	order	to	explain	how	we	might	be	brought	to	lives	of	virtue.	Rather,	their	intention	was	to	explain	how	we	ought	to	have	been	able	to	bring	ourselves	to	behave	well	using	natural	reason,	but	that,	in	fact,	we	had	demonstrated	(to	God)	that	we	required	certain	religious	truths	about	the	long-term	consequences	of	our	actions	to	be	revealed	to	us.	I	offered	a	partial	
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corrective	to	the	views	expressed	by	commentators	whose	own	concerns	seem	to	have	led	them	to	deny,	or	to	side-line,	those	parts	of	Clarke	and	Balguy’s	argument	that	clearly	stated	the	practical	necessity	of	our	holding	views	on	the	reality	of	future	reward	and	punishment	in	the	afterlife.		The	readings	of	Schneewind	and	Irwin	which	focus	on	Clarke	and	Balguy’s	epistemology,	do	indeed	leave	Clarke,	Burnet	and	Balguy	looking	as	if	they	struggled	to	account	for	the	motivation	of	moral	actions.	I	have	argued	that	they	did	not	struggle	to	explain	motivation;	they	simply	did	so	in	a	way	that	later	commentators	have	not	always	deemed	valid	or	interesting.			I	also	presented	an	account	of	Hutcheson’s	moral	realism.	This	was	something	of	a	reframing	exercise,	as	it	relied	upon	an	interpretation	of	several	parts	of	the	material	found	in	Hutcheson’s	texts	on	Metaphysics	and	Logic,	which	either	had	not	been	examined	before,	or	had	not	been	integrated	with	the	arguments	found	in	the	four	treatises.	I	argued	that	Hutcheson’s	sentimentalism,	resting	as	it	did	on	the	ideas	of	God’s	communicable	virtue,	was	unlikely	to	have	been	understood	by	Hutcheson	as	a	species	of	voluntarism	and,	in	fact,	that	Hutcheson	went	some	way	beyond	an	appeal	to	a	providentially	implanted	naturalism.	I	discussed	the	way	in	which	the	theory	of	God’s	communicable	attributes	legitimised	Hutcheson’s	use	of	introspection	into	our	own	motives,	and	the	ways	in	which	he	believed	that	our	own	beliefs	about	our	own	nature	and	that	of	God	were	of	practical	importance.			I	also	outlined	the	way	in	which	Hutcheson’s	introspective	method	rested	upon	the	assumption	of	the	transparency	of	our	thoughts	and	motives	to	us.	The	significance	of	this	assumption	(inherited	from	earlier	logics	of	ideas)	for	Hutcheson’s	moral	epistemology	was	discussed	at	some	length.	Another	major	part	of	thesis	was	concerned	with	demonstrating	the	ways	in	which	the	moral	epistemology	presented	by	Hutcheson,	Burnet	and	Balguy	and	Gay	reflected	the	influence	of	earlier	logics	of	ideas,	and	especially	Locke’s	way	of	ideas.	Locke’s	influence	on	Hutcheson’s	epistemology	is	far	from	being	an	underexplored	topic	in	the	secondary	literature.	However,	my	concern	here	was	to	reveal	the	ways	in	which	the	first	act	of	perception	or	reception	of	simple	ideas	became	the	focus	of	
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attention	within	epistemological	logics	in	general,	and	that	the	boundary	between	this	and	the	second	act	of	judgment	was	not	seen	as	being	fixed	within	these	logics.	This	approach	offers	another	context	within	which	to	understand	the	grudging	consensus	that	arose	in	the	earlier	part	of	the	eighteenth	century	concerning	the	existence	of	something	called	a	moral	sense.	There	was	widespread	agreement	that	our	moral	thought	needed	to	be	accounted	for	in	a	way	that	avoided	appealing	to	anything	that	looked	as	if	it	might	be	an	innate	idea,	principle	or	maxim,	and	yet	would	still	describe	a	principle	of	mind	that	operated	in	everyone	to	provide	some	sort	of	potential,	primitive,	commonly	available	guidance	in	moral	judgment-making.	I	spent	some	time	detailing	the	ways	in	which	Hutcheson,	Burnet,	Balguy	and	Gay	borrowed	from,	or	exploited,	particular	aspects	of	Locke’s	general	perceptual	account	of	reason	in	order	to	account	for	our	experience	of	moral	evaluation	as	an	involuntary,	immediate,	affective	experience.	I	explained	how	the	battle	to	explain	the	brute	fact	of	our	immediate	moral	reactions	became	a	battle	over	the	experiential	priority	of	sense	versus	reason.	I	also	explained	the	way	in	which	Gay	sought	to	integrate	these	aspects	of	our	experience	of	moral	thought	into	his	own	associative	account	of	moral	judgment.			I	presented	a	fresh	perspective	on	Hutcheson’s	moral	epistemology	in	the	following	three	ways:	First,	by	looking	at	the	permeability	of	the	boundary	between	sense	and	judgment	upon	which	his	moral	epistemology	was	built.	Second,	by	looking	at	the	ways	in	which	Hutcheson,	subsequent	to	the	first	edition	of	the	Inquiry,	shifted	the	epistemological	burden	onto	the	preparatory	reasoning	that	occurred	prior	to	the	emergence	of	our	ideas	of	moral	sense,	in	order	for	those	emerging	moral	ideas	to	be	of	epistemic	value	to	us,	and	so	that	he	might	shield	his	moral	sense	from	accusations	of	nativism.	Third,	and	perhaps	most	importantly	of	all,	by	inspecting	the	ontology	of	his	ideas	from	moral	sense	as	this	was	presented	in	the	Metaphysics	and	the	Logic.			I	explored	the	work	of	Burnet,	and	Balguy	and	Gay,	in	more	detail	than	is	found	the	existing	secondary	literature,	because	their	work	was	central	to	the	detail	of	the	debate	about	the	original,	foundational	and	fundamental	principles	of	virtue	
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that	occurred	between	1725	(the	publication	date	of	Hutcheson’s	Inquiries)	and	1732	(the	publication	of	Gay’s	Dissertation).	This	material	provides	the	context	for	the	various	explanations	of	a	moral	sense	discussed	in	this	thesis.	Furthermore,	a	closer	reading	of	their	work	reveals	that	the	objections	that	Burnet	and	Balguy	had	about	Hutcheson’s	position	in	the	four	treatises	were	as	much	concerned	with	Hutcheson’s	views	on	the	principles	that	motivated	or	caused	God	to	create	in	the	way	that	he	did,	as	they	were	on	the	necessity	of	our	own	moral	epistemology	being	founded	upon	our	intuitive	insight	into	self-evident	propositions.		Gay’s	work	is	important	for	a	number	of	reasons,	but	here	I	have	outlined	his	attempt	to	synthesise	the	positions	of	rival	moral	schemes.	His	chief	aim,	I	suggest,	was	to	explain	how	the	rational	and	sensible	parts	of	our	nature	might	be	brought	together	in	a	unified	account	of	agency	and	obligation	that	saw	human	nature,	its	motivational	and	cognitive	apparatus,	and	God’s	ultimate	authority,	bound	together	to	explain	the	possibility	of	virtue.			The	thesis	had	three	aims:	1)	to	examine	the	relationship	of	rationalism	to	obligation	and	motivation	in	the	work	of	Clarke,	Burnet	and	Balguy,	and	2)	to	explore	the	relative	roles	of	sense	and	judgment	in	Hutcheson,	Burnet,	Balguy	and	Gay	and	to	(re)	examine	the	nature	of	Hutcheson’s	moral	realism,	and	3)	to	investigate	the	theistic	metaphysical	claims	made	by	all	parties	with	respect	to	the	arguments	about	moral	realism.	I	believe	that	I	have	fulfilled	these	aims	and	that	in	so	doing	I	have	made	an	original	contribution	to	scholarship.								 	
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